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FOREWORD

Mugur Valahu's book, *The Katanga Circus*, is one of the most courageous and exciting accounts of African political intrigues to appear in this decade. Mr. Valahu, a life-long fighter against Communism, understands the mechanics of the Red plots in the Congo. But he is also sufficiently unbiased and detached to rise above political one-sidedness and see the weaknesses and corruption of all factions in the Congo, Red, anti-Red, white and black.

It was in Katanga that the potentialities towards corruption of the rough white pioneer settlers and the partly detribalised blacks reached their peak. For there was so much more in Katanga to stimulate the greed of Europeans and Africans with few principles and an unlimited lust for power. Mr. Valahu, a Roumanian refugee who is now an American citizen, spares no one in his scathing analysis of the stupidity and cupidity of all sides in Katanga. He takes no sides. He is totally objective.

And he knows whereof he speaks. The years he spent as a foreign correspondent in Tshombe-ruled, Independent Katanga, are described here with pitiless and extraordinary realism. Fascinating anecdotes glisten like jewels amidst the terse accounts of incredible financial trickery and the orgies of debauchery of unrestrained black Ministers and their Machiavellian white aides. Mr. Valahu holds you spell-bound with the witchery of his prose as he describes the Gargantuan sins of Katangan officials who "got rich too quick." The drunkenness and vice of Katanga is depicted on a broad canvas that glorifies no group and is a relentless exposé of man's meanness and tragedy.

Mr. Valahu is brave in his criticisms of those who manipulated the men, mines and money of Katanga. He does not hesitate to analyze actions of the United Nations in Katanga with a sceptical clarity. He sees the dangers of UN intervention in the internal affairs of a country, and weighs its benefits. And Mr. Valahu dares to attack the "Sacred Cow" of "The African Personality" with an irreverence that is refreshing, and is all the more human for its very boldness.

Yet Mugur Valahu is not anti-African. He is wise and sympathetic enough to see the African as an individual rather than as a faceless symbol, and to deplore the actions of all the intriguers, black or white, who wish to exploit his helplessness, good-will, or naiveté.

As I have traveled for years in Central Africa myself, and lived through the same horrifying incidents that he did, I can appreciate the authenticity of Mr. Valahu's experiences and the reality of his conclusions. I am delighted by his courage in saying what he honestly feels, and by his acid wit in the face of adversity. I respect his exciting day-by-day accounts of brutality and barbarism during the three UN Wars against Katanga. And I am thrilled by his keen insight into the dark morass of evil in the Congo's past.

Mr. Valahu gives credit to the extraordinary achievements of the Congo's missionaries, those heroic, selfless men who are striving singlehanded to bring some order into the Congo's chaos. And he does not overlook the war in Angola which has been an outgrowth of the Congo conflict. His brief account of Angolan terrorism is written with honesty and a cogent understanding of the violent emotional forces at work.

I venture to predict that Mugur Valahu's *The Katanga Circus* will be the most widely discussed, bitterly attacked and honestly controversial book on Africa published this year.

FELIPA MONTERRO

New York/
January, 1964

PREFACE

The misfortunes met by Belgians and other whites in the Congo, and the sufferings they must certainly endure henceforth, will be undoubtedly imputed to the United States and its foreign policy. I base this on two crucial years spent in Africa, principally in Katanga. I was, myself, "anti-American," or more precisely, opposed to American international policy when, as a Rumanian, I was fighting Soviet troops and, again later, when as a political refugee I harbored nostalgia and sorrows while traversing Western Europe. I regarded the United States, of which I knew nothing, as the principal responsible for my exile and the drama of my parents and my Rumanian compatriots. Today my criticism is more lenient since I finally know the real culprit. It is the whole West . . . with its fears, its egotism, its cowardice and its lack of unity and Christian solidarity. I now see the world more comprehensively after experiencing exile. For several years America has been my new home, of which I am very proud. I am overcoming the bitterness and resentment of a political refugee and trying to forget the tragedy of my fatherland in order to decorticate objectively the policies of Europe and the United States. I believe I understand Americans and can, independent of former European attachments, judge them. I earnestly desire that America be great and admired by all. Therefore, when I criticize America, the country which has given me hospitality and the dignity of a free man, I criticize with love and not hatred or ignorance or deceit.

The Katangan Affair has denuded the errors of United States

policy, the weaknesses of Western Europe, the confusion of the United Nations, and lastly, Moscow's intentions for the Afro-Asian *bloc*. During two years in Katanga I observed all kinds of politics and interests, leftist, rightist and so-called neutralist maneuvers. This book, however, is not a dossier of international intrigue in the cold war. It is merely a retrospective show of blunders made by those directly and indirectly involved in the Congolese marasmus. The story will allow me to censure the painters who created the grotesque picture of the Katangan Affair. I will describe all races and all convictions encountered in Katanga in the hope that errors committed there will be avoided in other parts of the world. It is for the benefit of blacks *and* whites in the Congo; for all humanity.

I have seen distrust in the eyes of my friends solely because of my American passport. For most Katangans, an American is an ignorant, vile merchant, a copper thief. America, in the minds of whites and blacks from Katanga, was the author of all their miseries. The United States has made mistakes in the Congo but other nations have behaved even worse.

* * *

It is difficult to write a book about a country where you left friends who opened their hearts to you. It is, indeed, very difficult to reprimand them now with the truth. Perhaps they will understand me but will I be understood by Americans and Europeans, these free men who often look with mistrust and contempt towards Europeans born behind the Iron Curtain? I come from Eastern Europe regarded with pity by the Free World. I come from that part of Europe which has been forgotten by Christianity because people do not like to hear embarrassing things. I come from that captive world sacrificed by the West for their own freedom and comfort.

And as I said to my friends in Katanga when they were hurling insults and accusations at America: "You Belgians, you Western Europeans, you are now free men thanks to the United States. You have no right to criticize Americans. They seized your freedom from Germans and from Russians. They spared you from

becoming like me, like all Rumanians, Poles, Hungarians, people with a broken heart who lost their country, their wives, their children and their friends. You have absolutely no right to insult America. First, because you do not know her, secondly, because if you live, sleep and eat in freedom now, it is due to America and to her military power. Poles, Rumanians, Hungarians and all Eastern Europeans are entitled to condemn America and the West because they sold us to the Russians as cattle are sold in the market. Why are you Belgians and Frenchmen complaining now, you who still have free countries where you can go if the Congo and Katanga are forbidden to you. You are doing as I did when in Rumania, thinking only of *my* life, *my* country, *my* family, and *my* career. Belgium occupied by Germans did not disturb my sleep. Spain tortured by the Reds did not spoil my dinner. I was distressed only when Rumania became forbidden to me, only when my own life was ruined by Communists. Now, what are you doing? You give no thought to Hungary or Rumania. Prove your Christian spirit and cry for these countries which have been enslaved under the eyes of an impassive, egotistical, and cowardly West. This reproach, which I myself deserved when in free Rumania, should make you reflect and thus prevent you from unjustly criticizing America. You who are now in Katanga see only Katanga. Your anti-Communism is confined to Katanga's borders. Your egotism and that of all Western Europeans, Americans included, is the origin of all our miseries. Your limited interests preclude a judicious, able and constructive policy. Your self-centered mind and well-fed body makes you believe you are right and others are wrong. Think of the aspirations and interests of Belgians, for instance, now in other parts of this troubled Congo, and you will censure less and build more for the benefits of all. You pretend to be anti-Communist. Others are, too. But you have in your mind only Katanga, where you have your work and your pleasant life. Try to think further, of the whole Congo, of the whole world. Only by envisioning all problems all over the world can we who hate the Communist tyranny put an end to suffering, and help those

people deprived of peace, liberty, and prosperity. You are, perhaps, anti-Communist but you are defending solely your interests. You refuse to participate in a general offensive against all oppressors. Your defensive tactic will destroy Katanga as the defensive policy of the whole Free World will ruin our civilization."

* * *

For years I heard Frenchmen, Belgians, British, Greeks, and Italians uttering insults and accusations against Americans. But who are these Americans, so clumsy, so ignorant, so wicked? . . . Have they not come from this old Europe which scorns them now? According to most Europeans, America is anti-colonialist. She is against France, against Belgium, against the United Kingdom. Since the end of the World War II, America worked for Communism, and her policies help Moscow in its goal to dominate the world, say the critics. I am ready to accept this, but what is the rest of the West doing meanwhile? What is this courageous, clever and severe West doing to prevent America from making mistakes? What are they doing, the brothers and the parents of those who are now American citizens?

Considering the facts of history, it is not America who should today be setting the course of international politics. It is rather Europe who is guilty of muddying the diplomatic pool, who is morally responsible for the solution of the problems she has created. But is Europe still capable of such gallant leadership? Unfortunately, no. By its weakness Europe has pushed America onto the world podium and forced her to be the leader. America did not want the task, nor was she adequately prepared. But august Europe, bursting with courage and tactful experience jettisoned youthful America into world leadership. One should never bring children into the game of adults, but Europe has brought her son with strong arms into the forefront of world crises, and now stands at the rear crying, accusing, criticizing the resulting adolescent behavior.

New York

October, 1963

PART ONE

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

December of 1960 at the height of Africa's emergence to independence, news about political events in Africa was sporadic and confused. I must admit that I had a vague idea about European accomplishments in Africa. I had, as most Europeans, some preconceived ideas about white colonists. I had never been touched by racial discrimination. I always regarded the Africans, wherever I saw them, without any hatred or contempt and considered them as equals. I never indulged in discrimination of race, color, or religion. I regarded Africa as a land of richness, of mirages and of tears where exploitation by whites was common, where whites lived like millionaires with an army of servants. Later, after reading many books on the Congo, I had the impression that whites boasted about themselves and exaggerated their accomplishments. I thought it was often propaganda and that natives in Africa lived in misery and even quasi-slavery. It is, indeed, difficult to know the truth about a country simply by reading several or even all books on the subject. I make this confession in order to show my sincerity, my prejudices, the errors I committed against the whites in judging their actions with such superficiality before I knew Africa.

I have since traveled in many African countries and spent two years in Katanga. I was dazzled by the Christian civilizing action in this savage land. I now consider that those who condemn Belgian, French and British "colonialism" in Africa are either badly informed or untruthful. If one considers the social and Christian

accomplishment of Europe in Africa, the eventual mistakes made by the "colonialist nations" should be forgiven, if not forgotten.

For two years I took daily notes on facts and actions of all colors and creeds, on every significant political happening in the Congo and Katanga from 1961 to 1963. I thought, at first, of writing this book by looking in the six notebooks I had accumulated. When I began the book I wrote everything from my memory and consulted my notes only for figures and dates. I thought it better to describe my impressions of the Katangan Affair, making at the same time an analysis and a synthesis.

THE COST OF COLONIALISM

Before the Belgians arrived in the Congo in the late nineteenth century, there was only the forest, the savana, the tropical flora and fauna. In this land lived innumerable tribes, often nomadic, among whom fratricide was customary. They were a backward people, badly fed, and victims of sickness and the vicissitudes of nature. I have met many Africans who long for the former status of "savage". They seem to yearn for the era of their ancestors, forgetting of course the inherent cannibalism, heavy mortality, and cruel law of the jungle.

To understand the sacrifices endured by the first explorers, prospectors, and missionaries, one should list all dangers, miseries, moral and physical suffering. To reach Africa at the turn of the century one had to travel several weeks by boat. Once on the African coast, East or West, he had to organize an expedition, traverse the forest and the bush on foot, cross crocodile-infested rivers on primitive rafts, perspire twenty-four hours every day, while slapping his face and body to kill mosquitoes, flies and all sorts of disgusting insects which can unnerve the most insensible man. This happens to a man even now when entering the tropical forest or crossing the Congo river. Such an expedition was never restful. The European needed lots of porters and mercenaries to protect him against savages, who often were cannibals, and against wild beasts. He had to know the poisonous arrows, the poisonous

serpents, the maddening mosquitoes, the beasts, the rains, the sicknesses and finally, the scarcity of fresh water and food. An expedition composed of several whites and a hundred porters, recruited among natives, encountered so many obstacles and dangers that generally only half would reach the destination. And this destination was never complete. The savana had no end, the territory seemed boundless. Many whites died in Africa of starvation, despair, poisonous bites or arrows, and horrid sicknesses. Such was the fate of Stairs, an English explorer hired by King Leopold II of Belgium to secure, more or less legally, Katanga from M'Siri, the King of Bayeke.

The first explorers who penetrated Katanga's territory were Portuguese, Lacerda in 1798 and Graca in 1845. Some tribes received the European with hospitality, some with curiosity, and occasionally, even a hint of affection. For most Africans the white man was a veritable God since his force, his weapons, his knowledge and even his white skin were all subjects of fear and amazement. Everything indicated to the native that the white man was "a master". Even though fearing the white and his aura of "divinity," the natives were suspicious, cruel, treacherous and dangerous. The white man was always on guard, careful and tense.

SOME PERTINENT HISTORICAL FACTS

Belgian King Leopold II initiated exploration of Central Africa and finally acquired the huge territory of the Congo as his personal property in 1891. It was by a stroke of luck and Stairs' astuteness that Leopold II secured Katanga for himself. At the time, the British were coveting this territory which had already acquired fame of hidden mineral wealth. Several expeditions were attempted by Sir Cecil Rhodes to get M'Siri's thumb-signature on an alliance treaty. M'Siri refused to have any dealing whatsoever with Belgians, intending to insure protection of his shaky throne by letting the British enter his lands. M'Siri mistook British Captain Stairs as Rhodes' messenger and offered a protection treaty unaware that King Leopold II was the beneficiary. Captain Stairs

did not sign the treaty with M'Siri himself but with his son, heir to the Bayeke throne. During the parley one of Stairs' aides, Captain Bodson, fearing an unfortunate gesture made by M'Siri, shot the latter and was in turn killed by the M'Siri's son.

In 1876 King Leopold II formed with the British, Portuguese, and French, an African International Association designed to explore and colonize Africa for social, commercial, and scientific purposes. This association was recognized by twelve countries, including America. Leopold II was accepted as King of the Congo Independent State (in 1884). Leopold's men came in greater number to prospect and exploit Katanga. As King Leopold's fortune seemed imperiled by the cost of expeditions he contracted with the Société Générale de Belgique, a wealthy Belgian concern. Together they created the Compagnie du Katanga with the task of clearing the bush in search of minerals. If King Leopold II spent considerable amounts of money in the Congo, he did it less with Christian and humanitarian spirit than with commercial interest. At that time people were talking about fabulous gold mines hidden in this region and King Leopold rushed expeditions to the region to discover them. Cornet, the geologist sent to prospect Katanga, returned to Belgium with no gold but with the discovery of coppers.

The copper was known to the local tribes who were exploiting it in a rudimentary manner for weapons and a sort of "coin." The latter is termed a "croisette" because of its similarity to a cross.

In 1908, following a tendentious propaganda campaign by British and German groups, eyeing the private domain of the Belgian monarch, King Leopold decided to donate it to his country. Hence, the Belgian Congo.

Leopold II and his men were accused of exploiting the Africans with forced labor bordering on terrorism. It is certain that punishment by lash, "the chicotte," was often used against troublemakers. The natives themselves, before Belgian arrival, used the *chicotte*, a kind of whip, with several lashes made from hippopotamus skin. A score of lashes was apparently sufficient to cause the collapse of the unfortunate recalcitrant.

When the Compagnie du Katanga started prospecting the territory an administration was established. Catholic and Protestant missionaries soon followed. Together they brought the Congo: Christianity, European culture, and western law. The civil servants, mining agents, and missionaries have, in eighty years, completely changed the face of Central Africa. The work accomplished by the Church, the Mining Company, and the Belgian administration is immeasurable. In African towns and districts there are now water and electricity, paved streets and, generally, a modern and civilized life. Factories, shops, railroads, cars, and trucks are common aspects of African life. Compared to the Congo of even 1940 the country is unrecognizable. In twenty years European management and machinery have literally raised from the jungle: towns and industries, roads, airports, churches, schools, hospitals, and shops.

Before 1940 the Belgian civil servant appointed to a station had a truer pioneer life. He lived alone or with his family in a mud hut, without windows, electricity, or water. He had no stove, no bathroom, not even a tub. Nevertheless, he lived and worked for years in such harsh conditions, daily risking his life and health, and those of his family. Frequently a hospital and physician were a hundred miles distant. The life of Belgians in the Congo was not easy but people forget the suffering and sacrifices of these true missionaries serving without soutane. Frequently the missionary was the only white man in an area of villages lost in the bush, simultaneously performing as administrator, judge, physician, and teacher.

TRIBAL CONFIGURATION

Before the Belgians' arrival, the Congo was an undelineated territory, inhabited by 200 tribes spread along rivers and waterholes. The borders were artificially drawn by the African International Association whose members shared Central and South Africa. To King Leopold II the Association granted the Congo, almost 1,000,000 square miles, an area eighty times the size of

Belgium. At present, the Congo has almost 14 million Negroes, averaging nine per square mile.

The Africans' life was extremely simple. They were organized in small units, in tribes. They lived in villages, in the bush, along rivers, and most of the time were nomadic. They had a primitive social organization. The most backward population in the Congo were the Pygmies, also called Boshimans. Other tribes treat the Pygmies like animals, killing and exploiting them whenever possible. A friend related to me that while he was a territorial agent in Cocquilhatville his house boy had, in turn, his own "boy," a Pygmy, a veritable slave. The African would give meat to his Pygmy boy as one feeds a dog, by throwing it on the ground. When my friend admonished his boy for such treatment, he casually explained that a Pygmy was not a human being but a beast.

The people in the Congo suffered a frightening mortality from lack of medical care, diseases of all varieties, and a rudimentary, unhealthy nutrition. The life of an African was constantly in danger. The dangers he encountered during his life influenced his psychology in such a way that while he has the conception of good and evil, his whole life is a struggle with the bad. For him, God is a superior force existing in his mind but his preoccupation is with evil and through witchcraft he tries to prevent its effects. Black magic evolves from the African's greater fear of evil than of God. His life is a constant war against the evil forces of death, madness, disease, and the vicissitudes of nature. It is amazing to see how virulently black magic persists today. The village magician, with his poisons, his ritual, and his imprecations, has full authority over the people since all believe that he alone is capable of fighting evil. The magician is often a crook, taking advantage of the naivete of the black to enrich himself.

During my stay in Katanga I heard of an African official in Elisabethville, a civil servant about 30 years old. After several years' work he succeeded in acquiring what we would consider the very basics of existence: mattresses, suits for himself, several dresses for his wife, a bicycle for one of his children, and a second-

hand American car. He had six children between 6 months and 12 years old. He had a good life in the capital of Katanga until the day he spent a short vacation in his native village with his parents. Arriving among his people, the 6 month child died in a matter of hours, for reasons unknown. Several days later the other children became sick, to the despair of their parents. The village magician, envying the small fortune of the civil servant, had quietly poisoned the baby and then offered to help the remaining sick children to whom he had already given various miraculous drinks. A Belgian doctor arriving in the village could not save the poisoned children. Meanwhile, the magician explained to the civil servant that only by ridding himself of his "white man's" goods could he save his children; these evil goods had generated the sickness! Of course, the magician relieved the naive father of his belongings. The civil servant finally returned to Elisabethville with his wife and one child; five had died, poisoned by the shrewd and implacable magician.

Another strange superstition surrounds the birth of twins. Twins are an evil sign, and one of the children should be killed so that the other might survive. This superstition finds roots in the belief that evil has provoked the birth of twins. Generally, the African woman is so badly nourished and lacking hygienic care, frequently loses her baby, particularly if she has multiple births. The reasoning then is simple: one of the offspring is good, the rest are evil because unnatural, or "different."

For 80 years, the Belgians and other whites in the Congo worked in two directions: exploiting the resources of the country, that is extracting them from the terrain and getting them to a market, and improving the living conditions of the area. They thus transformed the outer and inner life of the Congo.

At first they used forced labor. The African is still accustomed to work only to subsist. Before the arrival of the white, he hunted and fished. His wife did the hard work—taking care of the children, carrying water and wood on her back and head. During all the thousands of years before the white came, the African man exploited his women more than his surroundings. He never

thought of improving her lot, she was his work horse which he wore out with heavy tasks and then contemptuously discarded. If a village was hungry, the warriors went hunting for antelope or buffalo, if it was attacked, they defended it. That was the end of their obligations.

This mentality of strict subsistence precluded the idea of saving, or generally improving life.

The Congo territory was divided into six provinces: Leopoldville, Equator, Oriental, Kivu, Kasai and Katanga. Katanga in the native language means "red soil" which it has and is the source of its copper. It is the size of France, but has a sparse population of only 1,600,000. The total number of whites there has never reached 25,000. More than half a million natives and most of the whites are concentrated in towns.

Elisabethville—180,000 natives and 13,000 whites

Jadotville—75,000 natives and 3,000 whites

Kolwezi—90,000 natives and 2,500 whites

Kipoushi—60,000 natives and 700 whites

There is a score of towns but most whites live in those surrounding the operations of the Union Minière. These are the four big mining towns: Elisabethville, the capital of Katanga; Jadotville, Kolwezi, and Kipoushi. The tendency of the black population is to desert the interior to live in the urban centers, mainly Elisabethville.

One and a half million inhabitants for a territory the size of France illustrates the low density of Katanga province, less than seven inhabitants for each square mile. One may question such low density in a country of such fabulous wealth. In Katanga the climate and soil aridity have prevented the natives from being numerous. The Belgian Colonial Administration prevented massive colonization by whites, requiring of prospective settlers a bond of \$1,000 per person. The Belgian Government defended its policy, believing that a limited number of Europeans had a better chance to live in peace among natives because a greater number could have provoked a conflict with the natives.

Among the whites living in Katanga, 70 per cent are Belgians. The rest are Greeks, Jews, Italians, and Portuguese. The 2,000 Greeks in Katanga are of modest means. They possess, in general, small shops in the vicinity of the African towns (*Cités Indigènes* or *Centres Extra-Coutumiers*) and their trade is mainly with natives. The Jewish colony, approximately 1,500, arrived from Rhodes at the beginning of the century; they have important businesses and are probably the richest colons. Many have Italian or British passports and run factories and big shops. The Italians, on the contrary, seem to be rather modest; they have small shops, garages and other workshops and are considered the hardest workers in the whole European colony.

"The Foreigners" (non-Belgians) openly criticize the Belgians, whom they accuse of having prevented them from running important commercial or industrial businesses. Some of them told me that it was practically impossible for a non-Belgian to join the colonial administration or run an enterprise which interfered with the interests of Union Minière. It is no doubt true that Belgians wanted to defend their interests and often disliked the way "foreigners" acted with Africans. Indeed, many poor and modest Europeans disregarded discrimination and became intimate with the natives. This intimacy, according to Belgians, jeopardized the "paternalist" system. The poorly educated Greek and Italian mixed easily with Africans, lived close to African districts, traded with them and degraded, said Belgians, the prestige of the whites in the eyes of Africans. Obviously, Belgians had no sympathy toward "foreigners" and vice versa. The non-Belgian, on the other hand, encouraged a certain anti-Belgian feeling among Africans.

The native population in Katanga, one and a half million, consists of nearly thirty tribes. The most numerous tribe in Katanga is the Baluba, numbering about 600,000, who live in the North between Kasai province and Tanganyika. Together with neighboring tribes, collectively known as "the Balubaises," they are mainly occupied with agriculture, fishing, and hunting, since little mineral wealth can be found. The exception is in the Manono region where manganese is exploited. The Balubas speak Kiluba but the Balu-

baises, although they understand Kiluba, speak their own related tongues or dialects. Many times they cannot understand one another and then have to resort to Kiluba, as a *lingua franca*.

In south Katanga near the Angolan border and Northern Rhodesia, the Lunda are the dominant tribe. The Lundas, about 200,000, are less numerous than Balubas; they have also succeeded in dominating neighboring tribes, forming a cohesive body of "Ludaíses" who do not hide their rivalry toward the Balubas. Lundas and their allies total nearly 700,000 people, but the 150,000 Tshokwe proved recently to be opposed to them, desiring to be rather independent politically. Tshombe's Lundas possess the mineral wealth of Katanga, partially explaining Tshombe's claim over Katanga itself. This wealth provided the Congolese colonial budget with nearly 40 percent of its income.

Before Belgian arrival there were three rival empires consisting of: the Balubas, the Lundas, and the Bayeke of M'Siri. The Bayekes migrated from Tanganyika and once dominated the Lundas and Balubas, establishing true garrisons all over Katanga. The Bayekes mixed with Balubas and Lundas, and particularly with a tribe called the Basanga, which they succeeded in detribalizing completely, the remaining Basanga preferring to call themselves Bayeke. The M'Siri tribe originally amounted to only about 10,000 warriors. As true warriors they came to Katanga without wives and subsequently married women from other tribes.

In Southern Katanga copper is everywhere. Because of copper, the soil has a reddish tinge and the Katangese "paysage" is rather characteristic, a mixture of light green, the bush, and a reddish color, the soil. The copper has made Katanga's fortune but, following independence, has also made its misfortune. Copper has aroused the covetousness of whites and will similarly arouse the natives.

The Congo's frontiers were arbitrarily drawn by British, Portuguese, and Belgians at the Berlin Conference, with German consent. Borders were drawn without regard to local ethnic groupings, with the result that tribes presently living in the Congo are related to those living beyond the borders; frontier tribes have parents,

brothers and sisters in North Rhodesia and in Angola, in the Congo, Brazzaville, or in Tanganyika. The Lundas from Katanga and the Lundas from North Rhodesia and Angola belong to the same tribe, and speak the same language. Thus the present borders of Katanga do not respect tribal configuration.

In Katanga there are also black "foreigners" from other provinces of the Congo, Northern Rhodesia and Ruanda-Urundi. Those from Ruanda-Urundi were imported by the Union Minière which at one time was short of labourers for its mines. The most important group of non-Katangese Africans has come from Kasai, the Balubas, and has played a part in Katanga's political imbroglio. These Balubas from Kasai are unrelated to the Balubas of Northern Katanga. They speak another language and have different facial characteristics. There were, before the United Nations' actions, nearly 100,000 Kasai Balubas living in the suburbs of the mining towns. Opposed to Tshombe and better educated than Katangan tribes, the Kasai Balubas precipitated creation of the famous refugee camp seeking UN protection. Nearly 20,000 were finally evacuated by the UN in the middle of 1962 after this camp of almost 50,000 people became a furnace of promiscuity, epidemics, and political troubles.

The names of various tribes in Katanga have significance in the native languages. Thus, Lunda means "friend or friendly," Bayekes is synonymous with "hunters or warriors," while Baluba, in the language of the Lundas is the equivalent of "false."

* * *

Ethnologists generally agree in classifying Africans according to their evolution, intelligence, qualifications to work, and vitality. Thus, they have discovered that Africans living on the East and West coasts have evolved (or progressed) more rapidly than those from the tropical areas. Belgians who know the Congo indicate that the same phenomenon occurred in their colony. Western Congolese tribes from the Bas-Congo, Leopoldville and Matadi, are more developed than tribes from Katanga, Kivu, and Oriental Province. This fact is attributed to earlier contact by coastal in-

habitants with outsiders. In Katanga, observers have noticed with regard to intelligence and mental evolution, a distinctive spiritual pattern between the thirty local tribes. The Balubas are considered more evolved, more inclined to work, more adroit than tribesmen from the South. This tribal difference is equally apparent in their personalities. While Lundas are kind, gentle, rather lazy, and relatively peaceful, the Balubas are cruel, very solitary and quite xenophobic. One should note that Balubas rallied to the first Lumumba cause and turned quickly into anti-Europeans.

Before Belgian colonization Katanga was very sparsely populated. This low density may be explained by the fact that mining did not interest the natives, while the soil was arid and the climate too vacillating for African standards. In fact many Europeans in Katanga found the weather during the dry season quite cold. The maximum temperature during the hot season, "la saison des pluies" does not exceed 80° F, but during the cold, dry season the thermometer may dip to 32° F. In my opinion, Katanga's climate is probably the most pleasant in the world. The air is dry except for the five months' rainy season between November and March. Even then, between the short and violent rains people are able to enjoy the bright sun. The rains may last a whole night or afternoon, but very rarely for an entire day, as in many parts of tropical Africa. It seems that Africans avoided Katanga largely because they found its climate disagreeable. Many times I have seen in Elisabethville, after sunset, Africans wrapped in blankets and coats, shivering before a fire, while Europeans walked about in shirt sleeves. It was, therefore, natural to see Africans avoiding a climate such as that of Katanga, particularly when they were not dressed in the European manner but wore only a *pagne* made of ratskin.

Due to the sparse labor population in Katanga, the mining company has had to import workers from more populated areas such as: Kasai, Ruanda-Urundi, or Northern Rhodesia. These imported African workers have amounted, lately, to more than 150,000, the most numerous of which are Kasai tribesmen and the Babemba from Northern Rhodesia. The Kasai men soon monopolized practically all the work in the mines, as well as positions

in small commerce: clerks, typists, and bookkeeper's aides. It was a heavy blow for Katanga's economy when in 1961 the Kasai encouraged by the UN, massively sought refuge at UN quarters, deserting offices, factories, mines, and shops.

An ironic facet of the rapid evolution of Kasai-Balubas (known to Belgians as the "African Jewish community") was given to me by Africans themselves. Balubas from Kasai (prior to Belgian arrival) were slaves of the Lundas, Bayekes and Balubas from the North. As the latter were distrustful of the first Europeans, contact between themselves and white colons was established through the medium of these Kasai slaves and servants. Thus, Belgians wishing to talk with local chiefs have seen from the beginning mainly slaves, and only rarely the slaves' masters. The local chiefs preferred to hide in the bush to await the impression of their slaves. Thus, the Kasai cultivated a relationship with Europeans, were later employed by them and finally benefited by learning French and educating themselves. However, the friendship between whites and Kasai was not an accomplished fact. Curiously, the Balubas from Kasai now lead in their hatred of whites, particularly Belgians.

In Katanga many Europeans were technicians for the authorities. The Kasai people also pretended to be "technicians" and did not hesitate daringly to assert that if they quit Katanga, Tshombe and his regime would crumble for lack of skilled workers and civil servants. Essentially, they were correct since Katanga and its economy, excepting the Union Minière, suffered heavily when the Balubas sought refuge at UN quarters and were later evacuated to Kasai province. The Balubas at present consider themselves injured because they cannot have the same jobs as Europeans, when they are as capable, which is rarely the case. There is no doubt that Belgians preferred the Kasai Balubas to other natives, and consciously helped them by means of education and conversion to Christianity.

In spite of this amalgam of tribes, it is important to note that Tshombe and his Party, the CONAKAT, through force and persuasion, have rallied almost 60 per cent of the Katangese

population. Tshombe succeeded in recruiting the Grand chief Kasongo Niembo from Kamina, who brought with him nearly 200,000 tribesmen. By the end of 1961, Tshombe was in process of uniting all Katangese tribes, including the remaining 400,000 Balubas loyal to Lumumba and to the Central Government, by a rather brutal war utilizing Belgian officers and other white mercenaries. In Africa, force is the only means of suppressing tribalism and effecting any unity among tribes.

The UN was evidently within its jurisdiction when it intervened, but its representatives could have advised Tshombe toward more use of persuasion. Had Tshombe's pacifying war in the North been controlled, and even backed by the UN, all tribes in Katanga would now be living in peace. A different and gentler UN approach to Tshombe and his opponents would then probably have peacefully terminated Katanga's struggle for secession. In fact, the Central Government, in unifying the Congo, has done with UN troops exactly what Tshombe attempted on a smaller scale in Katanga with his army and mercenaries: pacification of Katanga's perennially rivalling tribes.

CHAPTER II

BELGIAN PATERNALISM

| Life in Katanga revolves around copper, that is to say the Union Minière, the maker and patron of the country. At the beginning at least, economic and social life in Katanga was centered on the Union Minière. The most important cities and the Africans' towns are in immediate proximity to the mining facilities.

Before independence there were three patrons, three masters: the Belgian Colonial Administration, the Union Minière, and the Catholic Church. These patrons have exerted on the native population what is called "paternalism," namely, ties similar to those existing between fathers and sons.

Although the three masters may have sometimes treated their African children roughly, there is no doubt that all three have acted in concert to establish a standard of living which is rare in Africa. I state they acted in concert because the patrons agreed to effect African development by short stages. Whether in the Union Minière with its workers, or the church with its congregation, or the administration with its black civil servants, the paternalism followed several interrelated colonial tactics.

The paternalism of the Union Minière du Haut Katanga (or U.M.H.K.) originated before independence and continues in effect under the following form: The workers receive generally better wages than those hired by private enterprises. They have opportunity to purchase, on credit, a small one- or two-room house in the African cité of the company, with monthly payments spread

over a twenty-year period (as often in America). They have the benefits of a retirement pension. In Company stores, essential food, such as manioc flour, oil, sugar, and other products basic to native nutrition are available more cheaply than elsewhere. Before independence, the Union Minière was paying its workers half in cash and half in food. The Union Minière financed the construction of African working cities, in which it has built roads, streets, hospitals, schools, and churches. The company brought in electricity and water, although the water is piped only into the yards of houses.

The Union Minière at present employs 20,000 African workers. This means that it offers a fair living for 100,000 African men, women, and children. In the house there are always some parents, a sister with her husband, or a brother and his family. The worker's relatives are called "nduku," namely brothers; in fact, parasites. Thus, the Union Minière workers are supporting an indeterminable number of Africans and the figure of 100,000 should be used as a minimum. An African is never alone; he belongs to a clan and according to his traditions he is obliged to feed all his "nduku," if economically able to do so. His house has the appearance of a hotel. There is always a multitude of people entering and leaving the house and living on the worker's salary. In such a house, possibly two are working; the rest are parasites. The unemployment problem in Katanga is attenuated by this clan spirit, and the duties owed to one's "nduku." In Katanga, there was never unemployment.

According to statistics, schools financed by the Union Minière have 25,000 students yearly. The instruction received by these children is generally limited to six years of elementary school, but there are also professional schools, a sort of high school and even classes for adults. In cooperation with the Colonial Administration and the missionaries, the Union Minière did not want to form high schools and certainly not universities. Africans who succeeded by luck or perseverance in graduating from a university could be counted on one hand.

The Union Minière employs nearly 2,200 white agents, workers,

engineers, and civil servants. Most have been recruited in Europe, but some are now hired on the spot among retreating settlers. All employees have a higher rank than the highest black "clerks," numbering about 400. The education of a native in Katanga averages four to six years of school. Recently the policy has changed and several hundred black students are enrolled in high schools to pass what the Belgians call the French baccalaureat, "Les Humanites," which means more or less the equivalent of a college graduation in the United States. The University of Elisabethville, created in 1956 by the Belgian Government, did not encourage African students until late 1963. There are at present 160 natives studying law, political economy, philosophy, and even medical science, although none will graduate before 1965. The first physician to come from this University will be a white. After two years of independence, Katanga has no black graduates in law, engineering, or architecture. One of the criticized aspects of the Congo setup has been the European design for limited instruction of the natives, on the ground that it is better to raise the literacy level of the masses before educating an intelligentsia. However, the rudimentary education given to Africans in the Congo and Katanga was inadequate for even mediocre attainments in French. In this respect, Belgian paternalism is criticized. I was shocked, when arriving in Katanga, by the rudimentary French spoken by Africans. I was rarely understood by them and this applied to Africans working in hotels, restaurants, and garages. Even in the Administration and the ministries, those who spoke even fair French were rare. Critics contend that the Belgians should have accelerated Congolese education, so that, when independence would eventually be granted, the natives could have their own lawyers, physicians, engineers, etc. It is undeniable that Belgians erred in their system of limited education, since after 80 years of colonization, they failed to teach Africans simple French. Racial understanding is always facilitated by a common language. But it was probably unfeasible, since half of the Europeans in the Congo are of Flemish extraction and their French is often rudimentary. The Flemish speak their own language as much as

possible. In addition, Belgians of Flemish or Walloon extraction preferred to learn several hundred indigenous words rather than to attempt to teach French to the Africans. This persists even now. Even though missionaries and territorial civil servants had to learn the Africans' language to understand them and gain their confidence the Belgians, after several decades, should have categorically refused to speak with or hire an African who did not know French.

The Africans do not speak good French because the Belgians also failed to alter the native traditions. The African will not permit his wife to work for Europeans as a servant. Generally only African men are servants, cooks and baby sitters. Thus, the women were isolated from whites and did not learn French, which, in turn, they could have passed on to their children. More recently young girls are learning the language, but a woman of thirty speaking French is an exception in Katanga. For example, only two ministers' wives speak fluent French. The educational well-being of Katanga would be much more advanced had the Belgians directed their efforts to educate the African women along with the men.

The paternalism practiced by the Belgian Administration and by missionaries followed the formula used by the Union Minière. Protestant and Catholic missionaries have built churches and schools, and in addition to proselytizing, have taught Africans to read, and to lead a more healthful life. The Christian missions have duplicated the social work of the Union Minière. It seems rather certain that paternalism was inspired, if not imposed, by the Belgian Colonial Administration itself. However, I believe the administration would not have opposed action taken by a Catholic mission or a Union Minière manager to enroll several capable Africans in high schools or universities in the Congo or Europe.

After 1950, the Colonial Administration, on orders coming from the home Government, created the "cartes d'immatriculation pour les évolués," that is to say, registration cards for educated Africans. The card was limited to Africans with at least six years, and generally eight years, of schooling, who, in their work and

conduct have proven themselves able to live in the European manner of life. The "card-carriers" were delighted by this distinction. They were allowed to circulate without restriction, to live in European cities, and even enter hotels and restaurants where they were previously never admitted.

The Catholic Church in Katanga has ordained a limited number of African priests and one African bishop. Nevertheless, the Church, through schools, has educated thousands with at least four years of study. Without higher education, Africans are limited to jobs such as "clerks" and "assistants." By contrast, in French, British, and Portuguese colonies the tendency has been to form an African elite.

Belgian paternalism has been violently criticised by Africans themselves, once they became independent. One may partly excuse the Belgians in this respect since they never planned to give independence this soon to the Congo. The idea of independence came to the Belgians suddenly in 1959, just one year before it was granted. In 1955-56, for instance, absolutely no European would have dared to advocate independence in 1960 for the Congo. It was, therefore, impossible to create an African elite in a country with such rudimentary education and very low development of civilization. Even though some Congolese have graduated from universities they still retain many savage customs and primitive traditions, which are incompatible with the requirements of western civilization. The "evolués" in many African countries, form a hybrid African intelligentsia. Educated in haste, they are frequently more at ease in a native milieu, reasoning according to instinct with its roots in customs, traditions, and primitive mentality. Ironically, they are not always accepted or trusted by their own countrymen, because of their hurried, foreign education. While they aspire to intellectual and social equality with the whites, their new European convictions are extremely fragile. Thus, understanding between intellectuals of both races is even more difficult. One can sense in the mind of many African intellectuals a gap which precludes solutions to problems.

The Belgians intended, through their paternalistic formula of

limited education, to suppress native, primitive traditions and customs, while preparing the masses for "civilization." The Belgians never reached this stage with their "charges." They were sure of having enough time gradually to approach the day when selected Africans would have enough luggage of civilized, Christian traditions to be designed for leadership and high ranking jobs in the Administration.

EFFORTS AND ERRORS

The last World War with its attendant confusion and nationalistic propaganda has caused the colonial powers (France, England, and Belgium) to lose their perspective and their patience. Under a sort of inverted moral guilt they granted independence to colonies which were not politically mature or responsible. The Congolese "evolus" wanted to be leaders too quickly. The result is complete chaos. Independence of the Congo has discouraged many whites, because relations between races are now even more confused and unsteady. I prefer to say confused because a great many Africans do not realize what their Congo would be without the presence of Caucasians. When I arrived in Katanga in early 1961 and felt the heavy atmosphere which reigned, the abusive acts by Africans, the insecurity in which both races lived, I mused that if all whites would leave the Congo within twenty-four hours, the African would immediately realize the impossibility of his political emancipation.

In the Congo, Belgian paternalism has brought Africans to a certain, modest level of education, providing an economic and social standard of living which has amazed many people. To illustrate the extent to which Belgians have struggled to raise living standards in the Congo, and the extent of African progress, I shall cite two examples which are concurrently errors in Belgian policy.

The first example of simultaneous progress and poor judgment is the Social Security Law which assured African workers of family allocations, i.e., a bonus for each child under eighteen years of

age. If one momentarily contemplates the facility with which Africans multiply and the relationship between native parents and their children, this social law is electrifying by its aberration! There is no need, there was no need to pay a man and woman in Africa to have children. They have them anyway . . . a dozen! In addition, it encouraged fraud and dishonesty since the control system was difficult and costly. Africans present the Social Security Office with a dozen children, generally by several women. The African has, even now, several wives. So African parents registered a tribe of children. And each child means "money" given by the white, who thus finances lovemaking and children. When people preach birth control, fearing the prolixity of man with its drag on progress and prosperity, why stimulate the Africans? At any rate, the Belgians' critics cannot say the Social Security Law was intended to exterminate the natives.

Another social reform as senseless, premature and contrary to African customs was the system of "retirement (retreat) pensions" for the aged. The Belgian Government required all employers of Africans to guarantee their employees a monthly pension at the age of sixty. To the African mind, a pension for aged people was another whimsical idea of Europeans. He was unable to understand this, since, according to his customs, the aged are maintained by the clan, the family. Clan solidarity in the Congo requires that all members take care of the old. In fact, one never observes old people in city streets: all are sent back to the villages, and the clan feeds them. In certain tribes, the treatment given to aged men is even more amazing. A man who cannot work must leave the village and go into the forest or the bush to die alone. He will probably leave the village without being asked. He walks several (painful) miles, enters the bush and dies of starvation, sickness or is killed by a beast. An old man in certain tribes dies in solitude to obviate the waste of food or clothing for a useless human being. Obviously, African philosophy regarding old age conflicts with western culture. We whites have some children who deny their parents assistance and affection. But generally the state or charitable institutions assume care of our old and disabled people. In

the Congo, however, clan solidarity and customs are so powerful that Africans want to solve the problems of old age in their own manner. For Africans it is the law of nature. The Belgians could not tolerate such inhuman customs, so they introduced the old age retreat. The Government wanted to remedy an inhuman situation but it overlooked African values, imposing a measure which was not only incomprehensible but made Belgians appear crazy.

Most Africans do not know or appreciate the value of saving. In fact, they do not even think in terms of tomorrow. They live for the present, day by day. The remuneration of their labor is spent quickly, in order to enjoy life, and life is 'today'. It may be a quality but it is also a defect. Very few Africans in Katanga have the 'savings' mentality; very few think of their future. Even Tshombe was making policy without considering what might happen tomorrow. A worker will spend his pay quickly and without thought or consideration of his family's future needs. Generally he buys a 100-pound sack of manioc flour, the basic "bread" of the natives, and believes his wife, children and other dependents are safe for at least two or three weeks. This explains some companies' policy of paying half the wages in food. Present conditions are rather sad, due to this lack of saving mentality, this lack of prevision. The African receives his salary and, if he has some concern for his family, buys the sack of manioc and then goes straight to a bar where he drinks until drunk. If his wife or relatives meet him at the factory when he is paid, then he will relinquish part of his money. When the African has no more money he demands from his "nduku" a loan or simply a gift, and they must help him because they may need similar help in the near future. This "nduku assistance mentality," of which I write so often, is extremely important. This brotherhood is a sacred thing with the African and he would not conceive of refusing to accomodate a member of his clan with money to drink or even to pay a mistress. Those who shun this traditional obligation and one day find themselves in a precarious situation are simply expelled from the clan and abandoned to their misery. A number

of ministers and high officials in Katanga have purchased farms to satisfy demands of their clan and, thereby, satisfy custom and obtain tranquility. I remember each time I entered Tshombe's residential palace (formerly belonging to the Belgian Governor General), observing in the yard behind the building many wives and children, all members of his clan and supported by him.

But, returning to the law for retirement pensions, I must add that many African workers do not understand why the company withholds a portion of their salary for pension purposes. It is useless to explain that this money will provide them a pension after twenty years of work. The worker will always retort: "This money you hold is mine. I have worked for it and it belongs to me. I have the right to spend it as I wish, right now, not in twenty years, or next year."

Vainly one tries to explain the reasons for such withholdings. Again he replies: "I do not know how long I will live and I do not want to see either my wife or my children taking advantage of my money, my work, after my death."

It may seem a paradox that a person from a clannic society would feel this way. But that's how it is. After death, the African has no obligations to his family. Inheritance has another meaning and is for personal belongings only, not for money. He knows, indeed, that his clan is obligated to care for his family after his death. So why should he do it?

The white employer had to be astute to maintain the pension system and make the withholdings seem logical. He often contributed a good percentage in addition to the employee's withholdings as in Western countries. When the employer preferred to pay the entire portion himself, he might have to hide the real salary scale, telling the worker only what he would receive in cash. Otherwise, the worker would feel cheated, seeing his salary reduced by all sorts of withholdings, taxes, pensions, etc. The worker is still unable to understand the difference between gross and net salary. He does, however, understand the fines imposed by the Belgians to prevent absenteeism and other irregularities frequently committed by workers.

In connection with paternalism, one should note that African workers and their families also enjoy free medical care and drugs. But how difficult it is to mold European social reforms, legislation and political regulations to Africans' habits. It is precisely why the social welfare performed by the Belgians in the Congo is impressive.

Let us say that the natives have many admirable qualities. They learn everything rather quickly, and have an extraordinary ability to imitate. With the proper environment they will soon be able to attain a fair level of civilization. (By civilization I do not refer to European culture but to a broader sense of the art of living together amicably and working for higher standards that will benefit everyone.)

Before the Belgians arrived the Congolese knew nothing of reading and writing. A few traders associated with the Arabs who made slave and ivory raids into the territory, may have seen or attempted Arabic writing, but Congolese culture itself had produced no code for communication of thought.

In the Congo they will need several generations of educated people and a close, sincere, and conscious cooperation with whites to achieve our lowest level of general understanding of ideas. If by arrogance and impatience they try to rush this assimilation, their evolution will be uneven.

It may be that the white was too long paternalistic to the African. It is the African, not the white, who would now prolong this relationship. He has now become a chronic beggar with relation to the white. Whether a high official or a lowly servant, the African is less a friend than a solicitor. He does not realize that now that he has independence he should assume responsibility. Regardless of the fact that he now has money and a good job he thinks of the white as richer and therefore somehow obligated to him, like a father to his son. The heads of the new nations follow the same role—with few exceptions. They are like badly brought up children who although they have reached their majority refuse to go to work and expect their former fathers to keep them

in the style in which the latter live. If you loan an African money he will rarely pay it back and grow indignant when you ask for it.

In their speeches at the UN, African leaders often make outrageous demands—like children make to their parents. Some contended that no space explorations should be made by the West until African demands had been met! One speaker declared that "Europe had prevented African development by occupation and therefore owed them reparations!" One could ask unkindly what the Central African had been doing about his development during all the long centuries before the arrival of the white. Why were there no written languages in Bantou Africa aside from Amharic in Hammitic Ethiopia and perhaps Vai on the West Coast? Why had there been no literature, scientific experiments, labor-saving devices or social elegance developed in the countless ages before the appearance of the Belgian white in Central Africa less than a century ago—or at the most, four hundred years ago if you count white penetration with the arrival of the Portuguese? When the European arrived in any numbers he brought with him the stupendous gifts of steam locomotion, sanitation, medical science, higher education, philosophy, mathematics, codes of all kinds, to barter for the raw materials of Africa—labor, ivory, gold, rubber and minerals. It was as fair an exchange as there ever is. Slavery was the way of life in Africa long before the white arrived. It was the way Africa disposed of its war prisoners and surplus population. The white did not invent slavery. But he put an end to it which neither the Arabs or Africans wanted to do.

One day the caddy master at the Elisabethville golf course, a 23-year-old ex-paracommando, came to my hotel and asked for a loan of 500 francs (\$10) in order to pay the fine of a friend of his who had been arrested for driving without a license. This African, half soldier and half golfer, was not lying since I went to the police station and freed his friend after paying the required fine. It was in fact, not a fine, but a bribe or "tip" to the policeman. From that day on every time we met the caddy master would ask for a tip, a "matabisch," for himself! Each time I would reply:

"First of all repay me for the 500 francs which I paid out for your friend—then I may give you a matabisch."

Without flinching he would contend that the 500 had been a loan, not a tip, and quite another thing.

"But why should I give you a tip?" I would inquire.

"Because you are a chief, you are my master! And because I like you!"

African childishness—for what else can you call it?—is illustrated by his attitude towards work. He works only when he needs to eat and drink. The white works, too, in order to live, but has also the pleasure of workmanship, a professional conscience, the desire to create new things and to improve his surroundings. When an average native collects his salary he vanishes for a few days while he lives it up. The foremen have considerable trouble keeping their employees steadily at work, once wages are paid. Many employers avoid paying a worker everything at one time, preferring to give him small amounts all along so that he will come to work next day.

It is very difficult to withhold a worker's pay, since he may complain to the police or even threaten the employer with nasty reprisals. Advances on salaries is a common habit also.

AFRICAN REACTIONS TO PATERNALISM

I believe that the Belgians generally consider the Africans to have reached only the mental age of puberty. I do not say that some leaders are not remarkably educated and wise, but in contrast with the mass they are an exception. We will see more and more African intellectuals but the mass is still mentally at a pubescent stage.

I remember an African "evolue," a relative of Tshombe and a known trader, who promised an European to transfer 100,000 Katangese francs to a Belgian bank for him. He received the 100,000 francs but did not have a checking account in a Belgian bank, as he pretended, nor the intention of reimbursing the money. In juridical terms the act was synonymous with swindling. I followed

the trial during which the white lawyer explained to the judge that his native client was ready to reimburse the sum entrusted to him, therefore the charge should be dropped. The white lawyer, helped by a black apprentice lawyer, pretended that their client should be freed since, according to African customs, once the stolen item or money was returned to the plaintiff everything was settled. The European judge was very embarrassed but he knew the Africans' mentality and customs, and temporarily released the defendant. After all, he was only a hired judge in an independent country and was subject to local pressures and customs. To me it is impossible to render justice according to primitive customs while African leaders pretend to introduce civilization and desire treatment on the same footing with whites.

The reactions of Africans to paternalism, and especially to "the immatriculation card" and the payment in food of half of their salaries, have been rather violent. If at the beginning the registration card was eagerly accepted and with pride, the "evolué" later became dissatisfied. He realized that his card did not give him a status similar to the Europeans. Therefore, his interest in the card vanished and he imagined the Europeans making fun of him. He wanted everything, and quickly, and was convinced that "he" deserved to be the equal of whites. It is indeed impressive to see the nonchalance of Africans who enter a luxurious restaurant or night club in the Congo. In Katanga, frequently the African waiter who served me dinner after his work would sit next to me on the terrace of my hotel in Elisabethville. He ordered a beer or whiskey and soda and talked to me without reticence. His colleagues who were working at that time, did not look shocked at his familiarity. Many times I saw servants, workers from my garage, and extremely modest civil servants entering the choicest bar in town, during the day or in the evenings. Generally such Africans are correctly dressed, perhaps better than some Europeans. This probably gives them the courage to approach anyone, to enter anywhere and to believe that they have access everywhere. I am in favor of social classes so far as it does not injure others. These Africans of modest extraction or even high officials were, of course, in their own

country. But this does not allow them to be abusive and to enter any place just because they are well dressed. Many "evolués" enter big restaurants, luxurious night clubs and bars, bringing their children, their wives and their mistresses at all times of day or night. Each woman carries a child on her back. The babies are half strangled by the cotton shawl in which they are kept; they are crying, vomiting on the chairs and on the mother's dress. The men drink lots of beer and dozens of whiskey-coca cola and the atmosphere is rarely pleasant. The average African has an extraordinary spirit of imitation and may give you the impression that he is an educated person, but after the third glass of whiskey, or the second bottle of beer, he reveals his primitive background.

At the beginning workers were very happy to receive part of their wages in food. They were well fed and their children looked healthy. They were not what one would say rich people; they had no luxurious dresses and suits, but their families had a sane, agreeable life. Now, since politics and independence entered their life, this tranquil, healthy evolution has been upset. The African felt vexed to be paid partially in food. Somewhere he had heard the famous slogan, "equal work for equal pay," and interpreted it as deserving to be paid fully in cash as were Europeans. Under pressure of the Belgian Government, the Administration, the Union Minière, and all employers in Katanga had to give up this paternalist method, however justified it may have been. Today, anyone can see the consequences: the children are hungry and life for the natives has been upset. The worker gets his salary and immediately buys a shirt, a pair of shoes, and a carton of beer. With the crumbs of his salary he buys some food for his wife and children. He is always short of money so he begs from his "nduku" or, more easily, steals from his employer, whether it be a private businessman, the Government, the post-office, or the police. Theft and drunkenness are at present the most visible social evils of African Independence.

On the eve of independence, the Congo did not have leaders experienced in politics or administration. They did not have army officers or police officers to give orders and to be obeyed. The Congolese were a people of clerks and typists. There were, of

course, "politicians," trade-union leaders, and traditional chiefs, who realized maybe the hugeness of their country but not the obstacles they would have to face once they became leaders. Their ambition was so great that they over estimated their future position in the most frivolous way. Some irresponsible people encouraged them in their ambitions. Lumumba and other Congolese leaders were certain that the obstacles could be solved in one way or another but without knowing how and when. Independence was the way to get power, to acquire fortunes, and to have the glory of being ministers and statesmen.

CHAPTER III

BANTOU "PHILOSOPHY"

Placide Tempels is Reverend Father of the Scheut Mission, with Socratic face, who wrote a book entitled, "The Bantou Philosophy." Father Tempels has lived in Katanga for more than forty years, studying life and thoughts of Africans in the course of his work. His book was almost unobserved by whites although explanation of the Bantou soul is the basis of any sociological or philosophical essay on Africans.

"Bantou", in the native language, means the African world or community. It is the plural of "muntu" meaning the African man. It is interesting to note that they do not call each other Bantou but give themselves the name of their respective tribe. A native of Kongolo region in North Katanga will tell you that he is a Muhemba and that his brothers are Bahemba. A Muluba will say that he belongs to the Baluba tribe, and so forth. I have never heard an African using the expression of Bantou for designating his origin or the people to whom he belongs.

The book of Father Tempels explains in the clearest way the conception of the Bantou philosophy. According to Tempels the philosophy of the Bantou is based on the idea of force. Men, animals, trees, natural phenomena are all manifestations of force, each with varying potentials. In other words each human being, mineral, animal, or vegetable element has its vitality, its force. The life of a human being is a superior force, or as Tempels puts it, "vital force," in contrast with the force of trees, stones, etc. The

deceased, their spirit, the souvenirs of ancestors are also forces but diminished forces. In Bantou Philosophy, therefore, force is the principal element, and there are degrees of forces: superior forces, inferior forces, and diminished forces. To the African everything depends upon force and life is a struggle to increase his own force. If one translates this as power it becomes logical. This is not a true philosophy. It is merely a conception of life. Philosophy implies a study of human thinking, of the human being's actions and reactions. I tried many times in conversation to find out their views about life or something resembling a full philosophy. But the multitude of superstitions I found proved to a large extent that to him forces rule everything. In all justice it must be said that this has a certain validity and is in accordance fundamentally with a scientific view of energy, or the German philosophers' Will to Power, as an explanation of life. But it precludes all religious concepts of pity, forgiveness or hope. For the Congolese believes the vital force cannot be controlled and this traps him in a kind of fatalism which defeats self-discipline and compassion or sacrifice for the future.

After two years in Katanga, observing the native in all conditions and situations I doubt that the Congolese ever thinks of mankind in general or speculates on the origin of life or the consequences of his actions. His universe is narrow—and but for the clannic spirit—selfish. But understandably so.

I am convinced that in time he will discard his conception of force as the sole and complete meaning of life.

It is very difficult to gain the understanding of Africans through the Europeans who should know them best. Each time I tried to discuss the Congolese mind I got unacceptable answers such as:

"I have lived here all my life and I do not yet know what Africans are thinking and I will never know."

In other words, the African is a mystery, an enigma. But this is not according to my experience. He is a human being and as such can be understood by sympathetic observers. His intelligence is keen and if he does not think like urban Europeans it is due to a difference in their environment, not to difference in the physical

structure of the brain—as some physicians in the Congo declared. They even contended that the “negro” everywhere showed this diversity. Of course, one has only to mention the American Negro who has shown himself equal in every facet of civilization to destroy this theory. The American Negro is no longer a pure Bantou, and perhaps never was an average African since he underwent a series of natural selections hardly equalled by any other group in history so that he had to be a very superior type to survive these ordeals. Then he further underwent so many mixtures with American Indian and European that he is no more than a distant cousin to Africans in the Central Congo bush, if that. Nevertheless he is an example of fast evolution.

The most you can say about the Central African’s difference is that he is immature because his experiences have been limited. This has been called childishness for lack of a better word. His ability to imitate or “play act” is termed thus but it is really an admirable talent which self-conscious whites have lost to their detriment and will greatly facilitate his maturity.

TRIBALISM AND CLANNISH SOLIDARITY

The Africans’ sympathies are confined to the limits of a clan or tribe. They cannot fathom the reasoning of a statesman who preaches the concept of a nation. And their appreciation of Christian piety is limited.

The clannish principle is still extremely strong. There are nearly thirty tribes, in Katanga, and before Tshombe came on the political scene no African, even Tshombe, conceived of calling themselves Katangans. If they called themselves Congolese, it was only to be distinguished from an African from Senegal, but they were not conscious of belonging to the Congolese nation.

The black masses in Katanga do not know the history or the borders or the concept of ‘Katanga’. There is no Katangese language. Even now, when they speak to each other, they do not say, “I am a Katangan”. Rather, I am a Lunda, or a Muluba, or a Musanga. The Bantou mentality is strictly tied to the idea of tribalism.

If there is any philosophical trace in Bantou mentality, it stands on a very narrow vision and does not embrace the thinking, the knowledge and the action of man as a whole but only those of a tribe or several tribes.

Before the Belgians arrived in the Congo, the native lived in a village in the midst of a forest or on the bank of a river, and was often nomadic. When the land became exhausted and hunting poor, his clan moved to another place, to another river bank. His preoccupation was eating and sleeping. He was a hunter or farmer, but he also depended upon pillaging rival neighboring tribes. As a child the African is very inclined to sleep; because of the hot climate or because his appetite has been satisfied, the native has nothing to do and therefore lies down to sleep. I have never seen a native meditating. Many primitives carved the walls of their caverns with drawings, a tree, a beast, or a silhouette but the Congolese never had this habit. In contact with Arabs, Congolese started a form of craftsmanship which fully developed when white men became interested. He sculptured ivory and wood expertly and he manufactured weapons. The Congolese culture, the customs, the history, the primitive laws were transmitted orally by old people who could remember them. It is, therefore, difficult to know the past and the actual history, since oral transmission has altered many things.

Within a tribe community spirit was well developed. The native worked for the community and respected its properties and its customs. In the milieu in which they lived, harmony undoubtedly existed. The chief was obeyed and the people had to work or hunt to provide food, wood, and skins to dress themselves. Those who infringed upon village customs or disturbed its peaceful life were either punished or simply expelled. It was for the peace of the whole tribe and everyone knew that breaking this peace meant to suffer heavy consequences.

The tribal mentality has both benefited and suffered from the influences of European civilization, particularly its penal laws. The Belgians did not meddle with individual rights so far as their behavior did not infringe upon public order. Thus, they did not

try to regulate marriage and divorce among Africans. The Belgians did not impose divorce alimony but, at the same time, struggled to prevent bigamy. They refused also to pay family allocations for children born illegitimately. From the conflict between Belgian law and African customs, the Bantou mentality has changed. Not completely however since Africans still kill twins or a madman when possible.

After independence, following the suppression of Belgian authority, the Bantou returned to his ancestral customs. Thus, they are now reinforcing tribal spirit and organization by founding politics on it. When the Belgians organized elections in Katanga, several months before independence, the deputies of both parties, CONAKAT and BALUBAKAT, received the votes of their respective tribes. The Conakat Party, with the majority, formed the Katangese Government of Moise Tshombe. Each minister was selected from a different tribe, but if the cabinet appeared detribalized, the departments were not! Tshombe made some exceptions to this but the Lundas had favored position all over Katanga. This clannish nepotism has never been destroyed by the Belgians, in spite of all attempts. Europeans tried in vain to convince Africans that to lie was a bad habit. But the natives quickly realized that white men were frequently lying to each other, that a husband was often lying to his wife, and vice-versa.

I remember the story of Sebastien, an African typist, working for the International Institute in Elisabethville. He had been reared by the Salesien Fathers, and seemed to be a good Christian, 20 years old, married, with two children. Sebastien's older brother was lucky enough to be sent by Tshombe to Spain for a six month study of administration courses. He returned to Katanga and was appointed chief deputy of the censorship bureau. He was getting a good salary, in fact about twenty times more than poor Sebastien. Consequently, Sebastien was frequently asking him for money, as the custom was among "nduku". The elder, finally determined to discourage his begging brother by capitalizing upon his gullibility. I learned of this when Sebastien came to my hotel, knowing that I was leaving for a short trip to Europe, and asked me to

bring him a talisman, one identical to what his older brother had. Upon further inquiry he described a black wallet with several compartments. "And why do you call it a talisman?", I queried rather intrigued. "Because this talisman helped my brother to be a rich man." And Sebastien explained the whole matter: "You see, in his wallet my brother keeps 1,000 francs bills. When he buys something he takes out one note of 1,000 Francs and the change he gets he never puts back in his wallet. In his pocket the 1,000 francs note grows back in his wallet." Out of humorous curiosity, I asked Sebastien what happens when what his brother buys costs exactly 1,000 francs. "Well," said Sebastien, "my brother did not tell me this. At any rate I can assure you that money grows back in his wallet and that he is never short of money."

In spite of his eight years of school Sebastien did not want to believe me when I tried to explain his brother's astuteness in refusing him money. I promised to bring him the famous wallet-talisman, but assured him that he was filling himself with illusions to think a wallet could replace the money spent by its owner, as the herbs grow in the jungle.

The Bantou mentality seems to be more of a totality of reactions dictated by instinct than the result of personal reasoning. Each time he acts contrary to good order he will tell you that it is because of his "Bantou mentality". That may be why they call us by another name: they want to stress that we belong to another world, to the Basungu, in contrast with the BANTOU, "their" people.

CUSTOMS, BAD HABITS; INFLUENCES, EXCUSES, AND REALITIES

Europeans in the Congo insist that the native does not have a sense of gratitude. Personally I think that he is grateful to you but his gratitude is of a very short duration. Contact with whites has, in addition, falsified some of his natural reactions. The white man came with both good and bad manners. Due to his imitativeness the African tries to compete, to have a similar life, so as to enjoy the same materialistic possibilities and advantages as the European.

It is shocking to see, therefore, the damages wrought by alcohol. Since Independence an increasing number of blacks are spending their time drinking. Alcoholism is one of the cancers of Africa, abetting the degradation and decay of Africans. The native cannot drink moderately he does not have the habit and cannot resist alcohol which quickly destroys him. Physically, he looks strong, but it is only in appearance. He is, in fact, a lymphatic person since his food is inadequate and incomplete. Generally, he suffers from liver and spleen disorders because of chronic malaria. The masses can now enjoy a better life because they are better paid. The high officials in any case make as much or more than the whites. Therefore, they can afford most anything. Before Independence, the Belgians tried to prevent drinking among the natives by forbidding its sale to them. But once they were allowed its purchase, drinking became their main amusement. Men and women daily consume beer and whiskey with stupendous rapidity. Moderation should be one of the reforms to be preached, but which African leader would dare preach such reform and be obeyed.

In Katanga, there have been two ministers who killed themselves because they defied moderate behaviour. After Independence, they completely changed their mode of living. One was the minister of Education and a person very gifted in music. Joseph Kiwele composed the Katangese National Anthem and an African mass. He died at 35, from over indulgence in food, drink and women! He weighed more than 250 pounds! According to one of his physicians, he died of explosion of his intestines. Another tragic case was the Minister for Economic Affairs who, besides drinking also enjoyed the company of women, particularly whites. This dignitary, who had traveled in Europe, was an admirer of Paris and of the Parisien peripatheticiens. He returned to Katanga in the middle of 1961 with several call-girls from various night clubs, and his major preoccupation was to play the rooster among white fowl. . . . It must be said that most Africans are very attracted by sexual life. They are sensualists and because of this, quickly grow impotent and sick. As this minister could no longer face the usual obligations towards his "secretaries" (all had been appointed as typists)

he went to the hospital to see a doctor. Unfortunately for him, the doctor was not in and he found only a native nurse. The minister knew that there were some miraculous drugs to stimulate sexual vigor and ordered the nurse to administer one. The male nurse made the injection but the minister handed him two more vials asking him to continue. The nurse attempted to discourage him, warning about the danger. But as our minister had a very busy schedule that night with his . . . secretaries, he threatened the nurse with arrest if he refused. So the nurse obeyed and gave him three solid shots, one after another. Several hours later, the minister died.

It would have been inconceivable before Independence, to see a native using this sort of stimulant and entering a hospital to demand such a thing. The Belgians closely controlled the Africans before 1960, by preventing them from drinking and by punishing trouble-makers.

An incident happened to me involving the wife of an African high official, which I have found difficult to understand or relate. At an evening cocktail party given by a foreign Consul, I encountered some friends, including an African official and his wife, both quite drunk. I tried to part company since they were too noisy and embarrassing. But in shaking the hand of the African lady I felt, in my hand, something like a paper ball. Discreetly, I opened my hand to see what she had deposited there. It was a 100 franc bank note. I thought to return it but I was ashamed to do it in front of her husband and other guests. When I left the party, I remembered my car being out of order and I knew I would have to walk to my hotel some distance away. Hesitating a moment, I saw my African friends staggering to enter their beautiful American car while their African driver opened the door. So I asked them to drive me to my hotel, and they very amiably accepted, putting me between them. In front of the hotel, while stepping from the car, I was caught by the wife who bluntly demanded in front of her husband and the driver: "Give me some money; I want to have a drink." Her husband did not try to excuse her, so I took out of my pocket the 100 fr. note and slipped it in her eager hands.

Since there is question about the African woman, I should add that she is predominantly a beast of burden. It is amazing to see the grace of her carriage while walking, carrying up to 100 pounds of weight on her head. She can carry a 100-pound sack of manioc, or a case of 12 huge bottles of beer, I remember unforgettable scenes of women carrying a sack of potatoes and several bottles of beer in a basket balanced on their heads, walking behind their husbands. On her back would be a baby wrapped in a cotton shawl; in one hand she would have a second child, and with the other she would push her husband's bicycle. Everyone owns a bicycle. I have seen the bicycle pushed by the wife while the husband, in front, carried the air pump. In Katanga bicycle stealing is frequent, but it is easier to steal the pump. So every bicycle owner takes the pump while entering a shop or office, leaving his bicycle in chains, outside. One cannot help comparing these Africans walking proudly with an airpump with stiff British officers carrying their swagger sticks. But this picturesque scene illustrates how the African treats his woman and that it will take time before he realizes that she is not a beast of burden.

Characteristic of Bantou mentality is their lack of foresight, and their vascillating behaviour. Since he respects only force he quite naturally joins the strongest element or group, even if it was previously his worst enemy. His admiration for force, makes him changeable, cowardly, and inconsistent.

Fetishism is still very much in use in the Congo notwithstanding 80 years of white presence. Cannibalism, too, is practiced occasionally. They believe that by eating the flesh of an enemy, they become stronger, invincible. Witchcraft, together with varieties of superstition, dominates a large majority of Africans. Many political leaders for example when they are sick consult recognized physicians and eventually take the prescribed drugs, but in secrecy they let their magician cure them with primitive remedies. Each time Tshombe came back to Katanga from Leopoldville where he was either arrested or maltreated, several magicians were mixing in the crowd and in the street, proceeding to their rituals in order to spare him the evil spirits he could have met during his political

struggles. I remember, too, that many Katangan gendarmes fighting the UN were persuaded by their magicians that if they wore boots without laces, bullets could not kill them. The Balubas were convinced that they were safe from enemy bullets if they drank a certain alcohol made from hemp. In fact, they were simply drugged by this beverage becoming almost insensible to grave wounds for varying periods of time.

In one respect European civilization and techniques have greatly influenced the Africans; they anxiously dream of being automobile drivers and owners. If the European passed from the phase of a pedestrian through the horse, the cart, the bicycle, the train, the car and the plane, the African has jumped from the stage of a "tree climber", bicyclist, quickly to the car. Today, the independent African is no longer interested in the bicycle. He wants by all means to drive a car. He will give up or do without most everything if he can have and drive a car. He finally buys a new or second-hand car. But his sense of mechanics is nil. He does not know how a car runs but he has extraordinary ways to keep it running, under most any conditions. If he turns to the right, he will use the left red signal and vice-versa. Sometimes he drives slow as a snail, other times he runs at 100 m.p.h. through crowds. The cars owned by Congolese are quickly in ruins. Everything falls off beginning with the doors, then bumpers, seats, and finally, even the wheels. Their cars never have a muffler. A terrific smoke comes from the engine, which makes the most incredible noise. A car with 8 cylinders can be made to run on only three. Many times I have jumped out of bed hearing terrific explosions in the street, convinced that another war has started. But it was always an African starting or stopping his car in front of the hotel terrace. The African who owns a car knows that in order to make it run he must put in gasoline, but that is all he knows. The manager of a transportation enterprise was telling me that last year he bought twenty trucks and all had had their engines ruined by the lack of oil. Their African drivers simply did not understand the need for lubrication while driving 1,000 miles through the bush in hot weather. Of

course, he went bankrupt and swore never again to enter the same business.

Cars driven by natives are in such miserable shape that you wonder how they can still function. In a matter of weeks he destroys his car by lack of maintenance or by accidents. The number of auto accidents in such a small town as Elisabethville is incredible. I knew a Katanga minister who ruined eleven new cars in one year through accidents. He was minister of the Information Department and very poorly informed in his job and not at all in traffic rules. He died, ironically, in a hunting accident.

In independent, secessionist Katanga, when Tshombe's administration had money, the government bought thousands of vehicles. After two months of use, most of the cars and trucks were simply junk. The Gendarmerie was buying trucks, cars and jeeps and after several months, no one could repair them. An African's concept of automobiles incorporates his basic idea of "force;" a car that functions properly represents a force. When it ceases to operate its "force" has diminished. If his car lasted only two weeks, this meant that it had only two weeks of life. He buys another car hoping that the new one will have more life.

Another change in life of the Congolese is manifested in the status symbols of wealth and power. Once he has money the African buys suits, shirts, shoes and ties at weekly intervals if possible. A civil servant working in the Police Department, earning 15,000 francs monthly, boasted his "civilization" by telling me that he never washed his shirts. Once they were dirty he would throw them away and buy new ones. The Central African dresses himself elegantly and is very proud of his suits. In comparison, a European has the appearance of a poor relative. Several ministers and high officials asked me how many suits I had; I lied saying probably a dozen, and saw the pity they felt for me. One invited me to his home to see his "grade-robe". He had, indeed, more than 40 suits and for a moment I thought I was in the dressing room of a Hollywood star. Many young women, whose husbands are ranking civil servants, now dress in western fashions. The older women still wearing their pagna, several yards of cotton wrapped around their

body. On their hips they wrap another two yards to accentuate their figure. On their back they carry a baby wrapped in a shawl. The pagnes (indigenous dress) and western dresses worn by African women have striking colors and designs. I have seen pagnes with unusual drawings, from alarm clocks and Tshombe's photo, to tomatoes and oranges. Katangan women were frequently involved in politics and nationalism. They even fought UN troops with sticks and stones.

African men dress themselves with good taste. Men like the pointed Italian shoes with high heels, but it is a drama to see him walk. His feet are extremely calloused having been without shoes most of his life. The soles of his feet are so thick that he can walk on broken glass without being hurt. One can imagine his difficulty in wearing shoes when the feet are so calloused.

While on the subject of African exigencies in dress, I remember that in June 1962, a score of African students who distinguished themselves in studies at the University in Elisabethville, were offered a trip to Europe by Tshombe. But before leaving Katanga, student spokesmen requested in the name of their colleagues, an additional 3,000 fr. for each student as a special bonus for buying a suit. What student from France or Belgium would dare solicit money for such a purpose? They were accommodated.

The dream of every African is to become a civil servant which he envisions as working in an office as a typist thereby making him an intellectual. When children are asked what they would like to be when they are adults, they tell you bluntly, 'I will be a minister or a typist'. For them minister is something like a typist but with more money. The Africans are less and less attracted by the manual work which is one of the reasons for the Congo's economic difficulties now. The average African is not a hard worker, either manual or intellectual. Agriculture, for example, is practically neglected. Before independence the Belgians compelled them to cultivate a piece of land. Now this compulsion has been dropped and the African seems happy. He has the tendency of many European peasants and farmers to seek work in big towns and urban centers. There he hopes to find an easy job, especially in an office. He also

hopes to dress elegantly, to wear glasses, and to be considered an intellectual. Indeed, to wear glasses is a sign of learning for many Africans. I was impressed to see the number of people wearing glasses, ordinary or sun-glasses. They never part with their glasses, as, for instance, Munongo, the former Minister of the Interior, whose eyes are continuously hidden behind sun-glasses. It is true that their eyes are generally weak due to various eye diseases, infections, and dirt. But I believe that if someone compiled a tally of people wearing glasses, the record would be held by the Congo. This fashion appears to stem from Lumumba, the former leader, who pretended to be an intellectual.

The professional consciousness and work capacity of Congolese are very questionable. The central African has no sense of responsibility and his work is extremely slow. Europeans contend that three or four Africans are required to do the work of one white. It is, therefore, a myth that African labor is cheap. The average salary of an African worker is 3,000 francs but he can make 7,000 or 10,000 if he is very capable. But since any enterprise in the Congo uses three times more workers than one in Europe, the personnel expenses are very high. The patron also pays all sorts of taxes, social securities, allowances, etc., for the African worker. There are workers who demand family allowances for twenty children since the law grants him the right to have several trusteeships. The slow working habits of the African is, sometimes, aggravating. A male house servant, as an example, will require eight hours to wash eight shirts, and another eight hours to press them badly. He needs hours to wash the dishes and days to adequately clean a three-room house. In the office it is the same story; the clerk drags, giving you the impression he is working. I never have seen in Katanga more than a dozen capable typists.

The most vivid desire of the African is to be an "intellectual," to work in an office, although he does not know how to write or read adequately. So he attempts to get a job in an office and with disarming candor. Whether he has ever seen or used a telephone in his life does not matter; he will apply as switchboard operator in a hotel. In the Hotel Leopold II in Elisabethville, where I lived

two years, there have been a score of African operators but none capable of dialing the number you ask for. I quickly abandoned this fantasy, since I was going crazy. In addition, you had to wait half an hour to get a line. Admittedly the telephone exchange of the hotel was in pitiful shape; the Swiss owner promised us a new one for two years. Another striking contrast is the impoliteness of the African operators. They did not understand French but you were always guilty if you nervously tried to repeat the number. I do not say that the African lacks respect or politeness, but in various jobs they simply believe they are doing you a favor, although they are servants or employees in a hotel. Many African employees, especially those who have unmerited jobs, are impertinent and arrogant because they are sure of being important people. In Katanga, politeness was not a common rule among Europeans or among Africans; life was very tense and the people's endurance was ebbing. In South Africa, in Rhodesia, in Angola, and in some former French colonies, you were immediately impressed by the orderliness. But in Katanga, after the independence, everything went to pieces; there was disheartening sloppiness in shops, in restaurants, at the hotel, in the garages, everywhere. You were a beggar, not a customer.

The African black is an emotional person, and rather charming. He has an extraordinary visual memory, and as mentioned before an extremely developed talent of imitation. He is also willing to help, obliging when he receives good tips. The Africans have an uncanny ability to scrutinize a white man's character, his qualities, and his defects. Instinctively, they evaluate you as mentally strong or incapable and weak. Africans are extremely well informed about what happens in his town or city and often they know events before the whites have heard of them. The African boy will tell you that your friend has already arrived at the airport, although you didn't expect him until evening or the next day. He eagerly listens to radio news and is interested in politics as much or even more than we are. But if he has an excellent visual memory, he quickly forgets whatever does not interest him, particularly, whatever you told him. It is rare to meet a waiter or a servant capable of doing

his job with precision. He cannot do two things at the same time. If, for instance, you ask a waiter for coffee, one bottle of beer, and two boiled eggs, he will come with the coffee and eventually the eggs, but he will forget the sugar, the spoon, or the glass. Everything you order in Congo bars and restaurants must be written down on special food and drink lists. The system is extensively used by all bars and restaurants to accomodate forgetful or non-French speaking waiters. If the African waiter is slow, the African customer is very impatient. He gets nervous, shouts and protests, and believes that the waiter gives preferential service to whites.

The Congolese are very sensitive, demanding people, and hard to please.

Due to premature independence, they have too rapidly attained the "easy life." There is basis for fear that because of this quick change and the circumvention of social and technological development, the Congolese African may become a spoiled child, an insufferable adolescent with the mentality of a "nouveau riche." He may become pretentious, making his new life even more difficult for him. It is the demagoguery of his leaders that has pushed him into the conviction that he is ready and prepared for modern life. It is the Communist agitators with their criminal propaganda, and the progressivists living in libraries who incited them to claim total independence, rather than let them be satisfied with gradual independence and freedom in a country with a mixed administration and a mixed government. I strongly fear that due to the rapidity with which they have become master, that they may become the typical "fainéant," attracted by luxury and lacking responsibility for work and towards society. I am afraid that the children of rich civil servants will become "fils-a-papa" . . . young men with influential fathers, men without worries, without a working conscience and irresponsible in life. This situation reminds me of Eastern Europe after the downfall of the bourgeois regimes. The new Communist regime promoted the poor classes to important jobs and to riches overnight. This class, and especially its young generation, became disgustingly spoiled. In Katanga, I recall that the son of a government minister stole one of his father's

cars and disappeared in another town with a mistress. He was 17 years old. The parents knew where he was but never found the courage or the wisdom to compel his return.

The whites now have very little to say about the life and manners of Africans. Unless responsible leaders prevent unqualified people from getting meritorious jobs, the new African generation will face tremendous troubles in growth. This is also common in countries where the Soviet Union has imposed Communist regimes, after liquidating the bourgeoisie. The new class in these Communist countries has suddenly scaled the social ladder, enjoying a rich life. The Communist Party members retained all important functions. They became ministers, high officials, diplomats, managers of industries and factories, university professors, and so forth. All were incapable and had to work through advisers and counselors recruited from bourgeois, and, even worse, the opportunists, the adventurers. The Communist officials knew nothing about their jobs, the advisers were doing it for them. So it happened in the Congo; Africans got most of the important jobs, but advisers stood behind their chair. Some advisers were good and honest, many were dishonest adventurers. Nobody could control his job and everything was troubled. As in the Communist Countries, a former watchman of a factory got the job of manager, the cart driver became Minister of Communications and Traffic. In Katanga a clerk with the Income Tax Bureau has been boosted to Minister of Finances, the former sergeant of the Police Force who could not read a map and hardly clean a gun, was appointed Chief of the Katangese Army Military Staff.

RESPECT FOR FORCE

The Bantou Philosophy, described by Father Tempels, as stated is based on the idea of force. For the Bantou force is the primordial element of life. It may be an excuse for weakness or a goal to pursue. The African considered Europeans at first as Gods, but later discovered that whites, too, have defects and that Caucasian force was not always superior to his own. Gradually the white man

lost the respect he had enjoyed, and the cooperation between the two races crumbled. Before Independence, Europeans still represented superior force. They made decisions without the African's advice. They acted without fearing the consequences.

I remember that one day I invited a Lunda chief to dinner, who was the son of Lunda's emperor and brother-in-law of Tshombe. He arrived two hours late and did not even try to excuse himself. I was offended and reproached him for his lack of consideration in front of my other guests. The African chief, encouraged by them, started rather angrily to inform me that "with Africans, the guest has all the privileges; he can arrive late or not at all, but the host cannot say anything. He must receive him anytime and under any conditions. This will happen to you if you are invited to dine in my village." "You are a chief," I replied, "not a villager; you are an educated person dressed in European manner, you also have a social and political role in your country, and you cannot live among whites by acting as a bushman does. Either you bluntly refuse the Western civilization and go on living in the village according to your ancestral customs, or you must abide by other laws and customs." The Lunda Chief was almost convinced, but my Belgian friends started to defend his customs. They were pale and could not accept my remonstrances of such an important personage. Again I argued that I would certainly respect their customs if I lived in a village as a guest of a villager. I would sit on the floor and eat fried caterpillars as they did. In Spain, people eat late and you embarrass them if you come too early, but this does not mean that you are excused if you come the next day or not at all, and give no explanation. After this admonishment addressed to the Lunda chief, who was also a National Senator, he never again missed an appointment or an invitation with me . . .

I realized that if Africans had excuses to act according to their customs, some Europeans, without excuses, were beginning to develop the African mentality. Once, I invited two University professors from Elisabethville to dinner. They, in fact, wanted to talk to me about political events I had covered in Katanga, and

about which they were writing a study. They never came to dinner nor excused their behavior.

The Africans have benefited enormously from contact with Europeans and their civilization, but unfortunately they did not always have irreproachable masters. I mean that Africa has not been colonized only by men devoted to kindness, politeness, love, and generosity. Africa also has been colonized by badly educated, egotistical, and vicious people. The coarseness of certain white settlers in the Congo was shocking, and I understood why many Africans, in turn, are treating their own compatriots, their own wives, with cruelty and misunderstanding. It is not for me to judge the Belgians, since the most severe label comes from one of their own kings, Leopold II, who created the Belgian Congo and who knew his subjects. He said, "Small country, small people." Some of my Belgian friends were even more severe towards themselves and they were asking me: What do you want from us, we are a people of "epiciers" (groceres)? I do not agree with such cruel criticism. I met, as elsewhere in the world, Belgians with outstanding moral qualities and values, but it is certain that in Africa, it was, not always the elite who migrated. I was frequently warned about the poor education of many Europeans living in the Congo. I personally noticed the bad behavior of white children, for instance, particularly toward Africans. Their parents, modest people, never had servants in Europe. They arrived in Africa and they could afford to have servants for the first time in their lives. They had the opportunity to master, to give orders, and to have subordinates for the first time. In Africa their life changed radically. They were better paid, they had big houses and servants, and they occasionally treated them with duress, insulting them and proving a lack of understanding and humanity. Their children, after seeing this treatment given to servants, behaved even worse than their parents, using even worse insults. A native servant was supposed to take care of a white child but he dare not talk to him severely or slap him. It was forbidden. Well, once you entrust someone with the care of your child you must give him the authority to correct his bad manners, too. The Africans would have certainly

appreciated this and, thereby, learned many things, too. I must say that two particular categories of children have shocked me because of their bad behavior: Certain American children and those of certain whites in the Congo. The average modest American has some excuse for his inappropriate manner of rearing children. He says he fears to inhibit the initiative, independent feeling, and courage, of his children. The American generally hesitates to give his child complexes and, therefore, is less demanding, less severe with him than other parents in other parts of the world. This is why in America a child is sometimes too demanding, and this can spoil him.

It is rather interesting to note that the African was not atheistic prior to European influence. His religion, his beliefs were, of course, vague and confused, but he imagined the existence of a superior force of a God, the strongest among strong. It is true that the evil spirits were more important in his life; he was more concerned about evil than about God. And this is probably the essential difference between Christianity and the Africans' belief. According to Father Tempels, the Africans had a limited religion. They did not believe in a celestial life and they did not have religious ritual. They gave considerable respect to their ancestors and the souls of the dead. God in the native languages is expressed by "MUNGU." HE existed in the minds of Africans, but EVIL was more preoccupying. The Africans were, therefore, struggling to protect themselves from evil spirits and forces. In view of nature's hostilities and the adversity of life, he was compelled to believe that evil forces were stronger than his force, than even God's force. Hence, the use of magic, fetishism, poisons, and similar ritualistic sorcery.

We have spoken previously of the Bantou philosophy as materialistic in nature, with a variation of forces. First of all, GOD vis-a-vis EVIL. Then the so-called vital force, the human being, who has a soul. (The soul in his language was called "the small man, the hidden man.") Finally, the minerals, animals, and vegetables. The African term for "things;" i.e., non-living matter and items deprived of "vital force," is "KITOU, or BINTOU."

To perpetuate and increase his force seems to be the basis of life, the goal of Africans. We have the same tendency manifested in our desire for knowledge and education. For the African this tendency, while obvious, does not follow a clear manner. They have a hierarchy of forces, with the desire to attain the summit of the hierarchy. It seems to me that the African does not attempt to overcome this hierarchy of forces, except in regard to the human (vital) forces. For other forces he is resigned, fatalistically submissive to them. Whereas, we attempt to surmount natural obstacles, the African is a fatalist. It is possibly an explanation for his enduring primitivism.

The African pursues an earthy, terrestrial happiness. He is, therefore, a sort of Epicurean, a materialist. We at least pretend to pursue higher goals as idealistic people, seeking celestial happiness, also. The average African is interested only in life in the present. He does not yet think in terms of the future, not even in terms of tomorrow. The present force has attraction for him and therefore, you would assume that he is a happy human being. He is not; he cannot be, because he is constantly afraid; he fears evil, he fears everything he does not know and cannot control. It is a paradox; a fatalistic human being is generally serene; his tranquility coming from resignation. The African is a fatalist, but always an unhappy one. . . .

Lately in Katanga in spite of independence and new privileges, an increased number of suicides have occurred among Africans. Generally, the African commits suicide by hanging himself, and he does it for minor reasons: after a simple argument with his wife or with a friend. One would believe that the African who lives so close to nature, is so serene in his ignorance, would never attempt to kill himself. The African is of extreme susceptibility and sensitivity. He is also inconstant in his sentiments, quickly discouraged and quickly enthusiastic.

When I arrived in Africa, my first stop was Kenya, where I rented a room in the new Stanley Hotel in Nairobi. The receptionist, a white, gave me two keys saying, "Sir, one is for your door, the other is for the wall cupboard." He did not add another word

... I did not immediately understand the significance of two keys, but upon entering my room observed a warning notice: "Be careful, put under key your valuable items." The hotel personnel was mainly African.

In Katanga, on the first day of my acquaintance with the country, people immediately warned me that the African was a thief. I could only assume they knew, better than I, the African's character and defects, and I was initially on my guard. But as I rarely change my daily habits and in particular my manners towards servants, I left everything open in my hotel room. My suitcases, the cupboards, everything was open in the hands and the trust of the African boys who were cleaning my room and washing my laundry. I was never robbed by any African with whom I trusted my possessions. I remember that one day I left my wallet in my room containing a large amount of money, my boy's salary for nearly two years. When I realized this, I rushed back to my hotel, climbed the stairs and hurried to my room. In front of my door, the boy was waiting for me with the key in his hand. "Bwana (Sir), you forgot your wallet, it is on the bed. I closed the room and I took the key so that nobody may enter." And he handed me the key.

In my opinion, the African is no more or less a thief than a white man. He is possibly more ingenious than us, but not in a spectacular way. He will steal alcohol, but not a whole bottle, just a bit to pass unobserved, he thinks. If he sees money or an item he likes in your house, he will hide it in the room itself. Several days go by and if you do not notice its absence, then he steals it. But if you noticed the absence and draw his attention to it, he will naturally look around and will take the money or the item he has hidden behind an armchair or under the shirts, and hand it to you. Or, he may bring it the next day telling you nonchalantly that he has found it, but no other explanation will be given. He will ruin a shirt while washing hoping that you will give it to him because you cannot wear it anymore. But if, instead, you give it to someone else, he will never try it again.

The Belgians, since independence, live in constant terror of

being robbed, and it is true that at the present time robbery is taking a terrific toll. In Leopoldville in early 1963 several hundred policemen, who were previously fired following a mutiny, have organized themselves into gangs and are robbing and killing whites and Africans. The chains have been broken by Independence; the police are no longer effective, the Africans fear no one. Before Independence stealing was rather unusual; Africans were afraid and the police were efficient and severe.

I was initially impressed to see that houses were devoid of fences and enclosures. One could enter the yard. Lately, however, people are installing fences around their houses, are buying dogs or installing electrical alarm systems. Whites, and Africans also, no longer dare go out for dinner and leave their homes unguarded. The explanation has been given above; before Independence the law was enforced, the thief was punished. After 1960, there were few European police officers, and the towns became crowded with refugees, vagabonds, and teddy-boys. At one point ten safes were robbed in Elisabethville within a matter of days. The thieves were mainly Baluba refugees protected by the UN in their famous camp near Elisabethville. The UN had a great responsibility in this situation since under the pretext that these Balubas were "political refugees" the UN officials and troops were giving them protection. Piles of stolen bicycles and other stolen goods were found by the UN troops in camp when it was finally abolished and the refugees evacuated. Each time the Belgian district attorneys complained to the UN about thieves or killers who sought refuge in the UN camp, the reply was: "Do not bother us, they are political refugees."

Africans are no different from the rest of the world when it comes to appreciating a tip. In fact, they have developed the habit of expecting a tip when simply addressing you with "good morning." Belgians cautioned me about being too generous with Africans, and that the "matabish" (tip) should be given parsimoniously and for precise reasons. Thus, the accepted standard tip for waiters and servants in restaurants and hotels is only 5 per cent, rather unique in the world of hostelry. In Europe the service is

never less than 12 per cent. One may wonder why the Belgians introduced such a low service pay; I suspect that it is because some of them are rather stingy. I remember the many times they were criticising my normal manner of paying reasonable tips. They even suggested that by so doing, Africans would believe that I was a feeble, stupid white.

They talked so much about the Africans' propensity to steal, and their ungratefulness, that a personal experience occurring in my first weeks in Katanga remained deeply implanted in my memory. One day I lunched with a group of Belgian friends in Kipoushi, about 20 miles outside Elisabethville. The topics of discussion included native stealing habits, ungratefulness, and my insane generosity. We had almost finished lunch when the conversation turned to the mistake made by Belgians in failing to teach French to Africans. I was accusing Belgians of persisting in the error, and to illustrate my point, I called their attention to a 10 year old African boy sitting on the stairs of the restaurant; "You see that boy, he must be going to school. I am sure he does not speak acceptable French." So I called the youngster and talked with him. I must admit that he spoke rather good French for an African. He was, however, an exception. In order to thank the youngster, I asked him if he would like an ice cream. He nodded happily and I gave him 10 fr., enough to buy 2 or 3 ice creams. Among my friends, there was a famous (and stingy) district attorney who had seen my gesture and remarked: "What you have done with the African child is a stupid gesture. You gave him ten francs for doing nothing. He cannot understand your gesture and will go home to tell his parents that a crazy white man gave him 10 francs for nothing." That may be true I said, "I did not expect by tipping him to play God. I liked the way he answered me and I had the pleasure of buying him an ice-cream. I have no intention of analyzing my gesture or the boy's reaction." So we left the table. I was approaching my car parked one hundred feet away when the African boy pulled my jacket sleeve saying: "Sir, here is your camera, you forgot it on the table." I thanked the boy and got in the car with a casual glance at the DA; he was searching for some-

thing and suddenly bellowed: "My camera has been stolen. Where is my camera. I had it and it vanished." I presented his magnificent camera, about which he had previously boasted, relating that it was not I who found it but the African boy. The district attorney eagerly took his camera and said nothing.

It is interesting to note that some African tribes are matriarchal; i.e., primary respect is given to the mother and her brothers rather than the father. Some will contend that matriarchal tribes are more primitive than the patriarchal tribes. It is a fact that mothers educate the children in all tribes, but as far as organization is concerned the matriarchal system can influence the character of a tribe by imposing a less disciplined social build up. In addition, the women were in less contact with the white population and, therefore, the education given to their children was minor, compared to European civilization and progress. Since the African woman was so isolated, she is a real enigma for us. Thus, one cannot say if African women in the Congo are as dishonest as men or as inclined to steal. But very few women are imprisoned in the Congo's jails.

The African males, however, be they high officials, typists, ministers, or clerks, will take money wherever they find it. They steal from their patron or the Government, whenever they have the opportunity. Fraud, swindling, and larceny are ordinary matters in the Congo today. The African is honest only if he does not handle money. Otherwise, sooner or later, he will steal.

In my opinion, the Belgians committed a mistake by accepting the African's refusal to let their wives work as servants, maids, or nurses. Had they done so, native women would have learned French and considerably more by their association with Europeans. Since Independence, more and more African women are participating in the social and even political life particularly where the matriarchal mentality prevails. Congolese women today attend movies, go shopping, and sit at terrace bars with their men. The Church realized the neglect of women's education and has begun organizing social homes, nursing schools and professional schools. The social homes for women are increasing in Katanga, but the

men still monopolize all jobs in offices, private homes, industries, shops, and factories. There is not one African woman working in Elisabethville's largest cotton mill which employs 1,200 workers.

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND ITS PARADOXES

There is much talk around the world today about discrimination, and before Congo's independence the Belgians practiced it extensively. There were no grounds for mixing . . . social, intellectual, or political. Europeans lived within their enclaves, where they felt secure and safe; and the Africans lived within their own enclaves. However, there was free passage and circulation through each other's area unless trouble warranted restriction. The Union Minière followed the same pattern in constructing homes for its colored and white employees. An African could rarely live in the European enclave unless he worked as a "boy" for whites and had, therefore, a small house, a "boyerie" in the yard. Likewise, it was rare to see an African entering a restaurant or hotel unless he had a "carte d'immatriculation d'évolue." Today it is different; Africans have invaded all luxurious bars, restaurants, and hotels, and Leopold II seems to be their predilection in revenge, for previous interdiction.

The Belgians are gregarious people, but they discovered mixing with Africans was involving risks and, in particular, a bad influence on their children. Not that the African is immoral, but his principles are often opposed to our concepts. Europeans feared the primitive education of the African and did not want to take any risks by co-habitation or social intercourse. They considered the African as a child, backward, and a bit dangerous, and were, therefore, keeping a distance between themselves and natives. Those Europeans who were going out in the company of African women were castigated, ostracized, and usually expelled or fired. The number was not small. But to see a white woman in the company of an African male was unthinkable before independence. If that happened, the African was jailed if they persisted, while the women was sent to Europe by the first boat. Whites who violated

this racial discrimination were severely criticised and sooner or later fired. The only relationships with African women which were "acceptable" were by Belgian bachelors working in the interior, where Europeans were scarce and unmarried white women unknown.

In my opinion, racial discrimination, which still exists in the Congo, is due less to the color of the skin than to the discrepancies in education, mentalities, and morals. When the African is very intelligent, very educated, and very sympathetic, he will be adopted into the European milieu. Of course, there are people who look at skin color first, but this tendency will disappear. The barrier of racial discrimination evolves, in my view, mainly from the differences of culture and education. It is also discrimination provoked by a lower social standard of living. In Europe, where all have the same color skin, how many Catholics do not want to mix or marry with Protestants, how many Greeks refuse to marry non-Greeks, and how many Jews refuse to marry Gentiles. There is inherent distrust toward foreign mentalities, foreign educations, and other religions. Discrimination is racial in name only; in reality it comes from a fear of intimate association with different education, a different mentality, a different religion. So people prefer not to take risks and mix only with people of the same extraction.

The racial discrimination in the Congo began to attenuate by the end of 1958. Africans were entering European towns and shops, their children were entering European schools. The Belgians, however, very rarely married African women, and then she was generally a half-breed. But the Belgian living in the bush, working as a civil servant, and a bachelor, frequently took a mistress from among Africans. The woman was called a "house-keeper." During the day, or when friends came to visit, the woman was never present. She left the house while still dark and went to her family in the African compound. This house-keeper, in French "*ménagère*," was always very discreet and never asked for marriage or that children be adopted by the father. Such a "*liaison*" was never punished by law. The Colonial administration closed its

eyes to the single agents in order to allow them a normal sex life in the heart of the jungle.

Although racial discrimination has been introduced to the Congo by Europeans, I am convinced that Africans, in turn, have similar practices. The African likes to mix with Europeans, to drink and eat with them, but he is rarely at ease in their company. It is very hard to mix with Africans, since they have a suspicion and even contempt toward whites who live in a black milieu. I noticed that Africans despised a white man who lives with or marries an African woman. At the beginning, as a sign of respect, the African gave an European his own wives, but this does not mean that they expected to see them running after their women. It is viewed as a lack of dignity for a white man to love a colored woman, and he is considered an inferior white.

If before independence, the whites were taking colored mistresses, now the African officials have their white mistresses. There was practically no minister or leader who did not have his white secretary or secretaries . . . Tshombe, at one time had eight. One of them, the most influential, was Mrs. X, called by Europeans: "Mrs. President, "La Pompadour" Madame la Generale, etc. She always accompanied Tshombe on his trips and thoroughly mixed in politics influencing Tshombe's tough, secessionist political line. This "Pompadour" made many political and diplomatic blunders during the short history of the Katangese struggle for independence. No European adviser succeeded in taming her in order to cooperate more closely with Tshombe. She had immediate entrance to all Katangan high ranking officers. She was warning or alerting them each time a UN patrol walked in Elisabethville streets, near Tshombe's residence. She was arranging Tshombe's audiences and opening his mail. This secretary, "half politician" and "half menagere," several times spread panic among gendarmes and Ministers, phoning them to be alert for a UN armored car seen approaching the center of the city, this in times of peace. There were other white secretaries as devoted and as fanatical as Mrs. President, about whom people were joking. It was the fashion to have white mistresses and it still is today. But here, too, I would like to illust-

rate the racial discrimination practiced by Africans themselves. Many times they did not accept mixed marriages or even "liaisons," when it seemed opposed to their culture. I remember, for example, that the heir of a tribal chief took a white mistress. The heir had been gentle, kind, and a good father to the children from his African wife. But seeing ministers and high officials playing around with white secretaries and mistresses, he dared one day to do the same. So he found an unemployed secretary whose boss, a minister, died in 1961. I can still see his blue car proudly driven through Elisabethville with a bleached-blond mistress sitting next to him. They would stop at the hotel, have a drink or lunch, and often leave with a cold bottle of champagne. He was prevented by the tribe from assuming leadership because he was a disgrace by African standards.

It seems to me, therefore, that racial discrimination in the Congo is mutual. Both races are practicing it, and no spectacular change can be expected in the near future. Since Independence, the Africans want to get rid of whites and when they have the opportunity they do not hide their hatred or contempt. Africans practice discrimination because they have an inferiority complex, justified or not, while we have a superiority complex, reasonable or not, also. At any rate, the present mentality and cultural level of the average African does not allow him to mix with Europeans, and several decades are still necessary for him to attain an equitable level. Contrary to what many people say, the color of African skin has been influenced by the climate, the sun. All people who live under a burning sun have rather dark skin. And, seeing the progress of medical science, we should not be surprised if one day we can give our skin the color we like. Medical experiments in this sense have already been made and some results have been impressive.

I have no prejudice towards the African, but I found that it was rather difficult to be their friend, to mix with them, to live in their company. I consider myself a very gregarious person, and I have no prejudice whatsoever towards other races. But I realized in Africa that I could not find a complete easiness, a full understand-

ing, a lasting pleasure in the company of educated Africans. It is the same when you meet some Caucasians, from whom you cannot get away too quickly because there is no communication, no sympathy or feeling between you. I have talked with many natives in Katanga and other parts of Africa, often inviting them to dinner and my room to talk and become friends. I trust I have friends left there, but it is a peculiar friendship, never complete or unburdened. Many African friends liked to drink with me, bringing their wives and children. But after several drinks, they become different people . . . noisy, drunk, and their children begin to break things. They do not know how and when to leave. They stay on for hours. If you tell them to leave, you vex them and they are resentful. You invite an African to dinner and he comes with two brothers and five children. One day, while dining in a restaurant with some African friends, a child sitting in his mother's arms started to cry then to vomit on the table. The mother was not embarrassed, she did not leave the table, she went on drinking.

Finally, you invite African ministers, who come with their wives. Few speak French, few have anything to say. The atmosphere is heavy, you have to speak, to entertain, to do lots of things to please them. The African does not say much, but when he speaks, he knows everything better than you. You must be extremely careful while discussing politics or education, or anything peculiar to Africa. They are supersensitive and easily vexed. How do you establish a deep friendship? I speak like this, because I like Africans, and I know them. The African who knows something tries to impress you with his knowledge. Whites, of course, often do the same, but you dare to stop them. With an African friend you must use endless precautions, prudence and tactfulness all the time. It is very hard sometimes. They are poisoned by racial discrimination and believe that everything you say against their views is due to prejudice. One night I invited to a night club the native District Commissioner and his wife. Both were very sensible when they did not drink, and they were completely sober. The Commissioner was pleased by the invitation, and Belgian friends warned me that the night club was too "chic" for them. During the course

of the evening, I was sincere when inviting his wife to dance. Whereupon, he went straight to another table where two European couples were sitting and invited one of the wives. She obviously refused and the Commissioner returned to our table thundering about racial discrimination. His wife also criticised the other woman's behaviour toward her husband, "an important personality," as she put it. I tried in vain to explain that it was impolite to invite a woman sitting at another table, and her refusal was justified. The African leader and his wife listened to my explanations, but they obviously found it hypocritical or just a way to calm them and repair the "blunder" made by a prejudiced white. This example illustrates their own prejudices and morbid sensitivity. Of course, there is excuse for both. Their present position, thrust upon them by history, would confuse any people. But the Central African must be made to understand that independence is not just his rightful inheritance being returned, and handed to him almost on a golden platter (where other peoples who have proven themselves of more value, have had to fight and suffer for theirs) —but the test of his responsibility and worth.

How often I was amazed by the effrontery of some Congolese with his new job, American car and white secretaries! He might not have the slightest conception of the responsibilities of his office and have to be "advised" at every step by a white, yet he delivered long diatribes on the state of the world.

Most Africans have a rural, simple, natural, uncomplicated culture and have not undergone the changes and cross-currents of history that Westerners or Orientals have. They are gifted in music, dancing, carving and have great artistry in minor matters. Some of their masks are magnificent and their drumming is unsurpassed. But in all the thousands of years of their history before the coming of the white they added nothing original to the stream of human culture and made almost no improvements even in their daily life. A few important cities were established on the West and East coasts when their migrations collided with that of more cultivated Arabs. It takes a collision of diverse cultures to produce civilization and progress. Any people who have a secure yet re-

mote territory remains backward. The great civilized areas of the earth were at crossroads—and those who have been repeatedly conquered often turn out well. The Belgians were only in the Congo about 80 years—no time at all really—but in that short period they changed the face of this area and brought it from mud huts to modern architecture worthy to stand in any American city. They changed cannibalism and fetishism to Christianity; a rat-skin loin cloth to Bond Street suits; head-carriers to motor vehicles; superstitious ritual to some of the best hospitals in the world, gave them a variety of food, schools, cinema, clinics, social forums, sanitation, dams, railways, newspapers and a real identity—then handed it all back to them without bloodshed! There have only been a few instances in history of such generosity.

A Latin philosopher once said: "*Festina lente*" (hurry but slowly). All nations which hurry to take from others rather than create themselves have big troubles. It is as true for nations as individuals who want to skip from kindergarten into college. The gaps in their education constantly haunt them, give them an inferiority complex and eventually defeat them. The Central African in particular must learn some humility and set himself big tasks. He must educate the masses and end tribalism. There is no time for drunkenness, flashy cars and endless palaver.

The Bantou mind is as bright as any other but like every other it needs intensive training. For a long period Europeans have had a favored position due to many historical elements; this has given them on the whole a great maturity. The African is indeed fortunate to have come in contact with the European when he did. But now he thinks only of accusing his benefactor for conditions which were ancient and indigenous to Africa itself—slavery, exploitation, conquest. In this hue and cry against Europe why are no voices raised to accuse the Arab who was a slaver long before and long after the European? England had to fight many battles on the East Coast to curb the Arab slave trade. In fact, it really officially ended in some Arab countries only in January 1962! It was then that Saudi Arabia passed a law against slavery—these slaves were black Africans, transported across Africa by plane and

camel caravan—youngsters of both sexes stolen and sold for sexual abuse out of Kenya, Sudan, Nigeria, Mauretania, Etc., and taken through Khartoum, Nairobi, Aden, Addis Ababa to the slave marts of the Moslems. It was a British protest in Parliament on July 14, 1960, bringing it into public view, that forced the Arabs to quiet the trade and to pass a law at last against internal slavery. Yet to hear the new African nations declaiming at the UN you would never suspect that their "friends," the Arabs, were far more guilty than any European in African slave history. In return for the short period in which slavery was permitted by Europe, the white made ample restitution by bringing hospitals and modern techniques to Africa. Only recently, have Moslems ever built clinics or welfare homes in Negro Africa. In Kenya, there is now one built by them, that is excellent. But this can be multiplied a thousandfold by those erected by Western powers. Why then this fury against the West? And this friendship towards the Arabs? It is a manifestation of cowards and ingrates. It is, without a play on words intended, blackmail.

The so-called philosophy of the Bantou is one of ruthless force. It is understandable that an individual in a tropical forest should arrive at such a philosophy due to the insecurity of his life, the mysterious forces of nature which have kept him in the greatest of all slavery, that of powerlessness against famine, disease, and every known catastrophe, insect and wild beast. It is surprising that the Central African even survived. But, since he has and since he possesses now a great new state to unite and carry on, he should get down seriously to the business of cooperation with those of good will who have already shown that they can and will help him.

CHAPTER IV

REASONS FOR PREMATURE INDEPENDENCE

Considering the educational and political immaturity of the Congolese people, one cannot resist wondering why Belgians granted independence to 14 million Africans whom they regarded as having hardly attained the mental age of puberty. It is a question I have tried to answer many times and have found it rather difficult because of the many controversial explanations. Some Belgians will agree with the conclusions I reach, while others will contradict or deny them. Nevertheless, the reasons which I shall enumerate have collectively triggered chaos in the past, and augur an uncertain future, at best, for the Belgian Congo.

It is popularly believed that Belgians gave up their colony for financial reasons. It is a fact that Congo administration and the social work undertaken was becoming very costly for the Belgian Government. When viewed by itself, the fiscal budget for the Congo yielded a five percent surplus for Belgium, and, as such, was hardly a burden. But the picture is incomplete because the government inaugurated a Decennial Plan (1950 to 1960) with the purpose of social improvements in the Congo, the cost of which ran to 43 billion francs (nearly one billion dollars). In other words, the Congo's ordinary budget was balanced, but following the Decennial Plan, the budget became grossly deficient. Belgium financed this plan by borrowing money from private savings through an internal loan against Congolese bonds. It was, thus, an internal debt and a rather pressing one. It is therefore possible

that the Belgian Government, taking into account the excessive cost of the Belgian Congo, decided to rid itself of the burden. Since 1960, Congolese bonds have been worthless because the Belgian Government refused to reimburse them pending a financial settlement with the Congolese Central Government. The Independent Congo has admitted the debt and thus owes Belgium, as damages, compensation, reparation, loans, etc., nearly 37 billion francs. The settlement has not been solved, and it is still called "the Belgo-Congolese contentious." Adula, in March and July, 1963 promised again to pay the debts, but as yet nothing has been accomplished.

ATHEISTS AND CHRISTIANS IN COMPETITION

Many Belgians believe that their Government suffered pressure from atheistic-socialist Parties as well as from the Catholic Church in connection with the independence for the colony.

The Socialists, without even mentioning Communists, whose bad faith is legion, are notorious for interpreting history and concluding that by inciting under-developed people to hasty political aspirations, progress is thereby accomplished. They believe that even untimely independence can be beneficial to the peoples: They equate independence with happiness. A childish and stupid interpretation.

The Belgian Socialists who controlled political power in the Metropole also had followers in the Congo. Local adherents observing the striking difference between European and African living conditions hurried to criticize and to inject solutions which were, at best, inadequate reforms. There is no doubt that three decades ago there was considerable opportunity for improvement, but before someone develops sweeping solutions, he should have thoroughly studied the existing differences, the background, and the manifestations of change. Only then is he equipped to spade ground for attenuating discriminations and inequality. As it was, no one of responsibility in the Congo estimated a reasonable date and developed a logical sequential plan for independence which was imminent. The date for independence was decided as 30 June

1960, only short months before at a conference of native Congolese leaders held in Bruxelles. It is, of course, laudible to seek the abolition of life's inequities, and no one can be blamed for such a samaritan feeling. But in playing with the fate of a country by granting premature independence, these idealists have acted without responsibility, like unconscious parents who let their children of 14 years drive autos in congested streets. Protecting the African worker from exploitation could have been done by means other than creation of trade unions. The syndicates are weapons with a double-edged razor; many can cut themselves. The Belgian Government could very easily have required of its Colonial Administration adequate laws to protect African workers from exploitation by greedy colons. We have learned by experience that trade unions in the hands of workers unprepared and uneducated for responsible leadership have been transformed into furnaces of riots and revolt. It is exactly what happened in the Congo; the African syndicalists led all the agitations and political riots.

When someone speaks about the Socialist influence in the Congo, it is necessary to remember the support given by Christian Socialists or the church. Strangely enough, atheists, Christian Socialists and Catholic missionaries were all in competition for the African mind, to inculcate him with political, syndical and nationalistic aspirations. The Christian Socialists and the missionaries were supported in their efforts by the Belgian government holding power in the Metropole.

The political agitation among Africans in the Congo started immediately after 1950. At that time (in Belgium) a homogenous government was formed by the Social-Christian Party which lasted until 1954. The PSC (Social Christian Party) was known previously as the "Catholic Party." (I make this remark to illustrate the Catholic's tendency toward socialism.) From 1954 to 1958, two years before the Congo's independence, the Liberal Party and the Socialist Party governed Belgium. From 1958 until 1961, the power in Belgium was shared by the Liberals and the Social Christian Party, still a socialist formula but with the Christian Socialists in the political arena. Today, the socialist alliance is

rather solid since the Government in Brussels is formed by Socialists PSB and Christian Socialists PSC. Thus, the Liberals have been replaced by Socialists. The Liberals, (which are in fact, the conservatives) bear equal responsibility with Socialists and the Christian Socialists for the syndicalist and political movements in the Congo. On the eve of independence, Mr. de Schrijver was Minister of Colonies, assisted in Economic Affairs by Mr. Scheyven, while the Prime Minister was Mr. Eyskens, all prominent members of the Social-Christian Party. We should recall that Mr. Scheyven at that time was busy playing the tourist behind the Iron Curtain, particularly in Soviet Russia. He subsequently announced in a conference that "the most appropriate economic system for the under-developed countries is the Communist one." That the Socialist Party encouraged Communist ideas in the Congo does not surprise us, but that a Christian should be the mouthpiece, is quite unaccountable. One should note that the majority of the Belgian Socialist Party is of Walloonian extraction, while the Social-Christian Party has a Flemish majority. This latter party assembled, under the same label, people of all political convictions, with a common tie of Catholicism. Flemish people constitute the majority, with its members coming from the old Belgian aristocracy, an important part of the middle class, and from among Christian trade-union members, (sometimes as Marxist as the socialist syndicates.) The University of Louvain had professors who were defending true Marxist theory in economic matters. It is rather easy to understand why Catholic missionaries in the Congo had incited Africans against colons. Louvain University is the cultural center for Catholics. The Roman Church did not want to make the same mistake in Africa that it had in South America.

I am not against social progress but I give these examples in order to illustrate the confusion which reigned among those responsible for Congolese education. They were all Belgian Catholics or Socialists and did not realize that their propaganda and political agitation among Africans would one day jeopardize their own presence and lives in the Congo. Indeed, Africans understood only one thing from their agitators of socialist or Catholic extrac-

tion: that they were ripe, prepared for being independent, and had no need for white men.

In this undermining action directed against a wise evolution of the Congolese towards democracy, the American missionaries, mostly Protestants, made their unfortunate contribution. While proselyting among Africans, the Protestant American missionaries occasionally mixed in politics and criticised the "rather unchristian" behavior of the Belgians, and were especially critical of the Catholic Church, which they hoped to replace. The American missionaries gained African friends by criticising the Belgians and their colonial administration. Before Independence, the Catholic missionaries, the Protestant missions and the Social Christian Party members all worked overtime to disillusion Africans and rouse them to what they called "Equality before God": equality which was not respected by many Christians, as they put it.

The first trade unions organized in the Congo in 1952 were Christian. A year later, the socialists became active in this sphere, and competition between Christian and Socialist Syndicates to gain African members began on a regular scale. Of course, each syndicate resorted to promises and propaganda to incite nationalism and encourage political aspirations. Several years ago, the socialist, Louis Major, speaking to African workers in Elisabethville, compared the mines of the Union Minière with those in Belgium, saying: "African workers as well as Belgian workers are the victims of capitalism, both work for the same patrons." You cannot translate into native language the word "capitalist" other than by using "whites." So the colons became without exception the patron, the exploiter, the man to be condemned. Many Catholic missionaries were so intent upon converting Africans to their Church, that they incited Africans to independence in hopes that they would undermine the Anti-Catholic competitors—the Socialists and the Protestants. They were afraid that when the Congo became independent, elements which had not backed their aspirations would be, if not banished, at least persecuted. The Belgians living in the Congo prior to Independence, remember a tract called "African Conscience" which had been printed in 1956 and was signed by

some Africans but actually written by white Catholics. In this tract, the Congolese were bluntly incited to claim independence, while the Belgian administration was violently criticised. The tract described the miserable Congolese life as due to European exploitation. That the Catholic Church should try to ameliorate the fate of its parishioners is acceptable and desirable, but when it competes with atheists and socialists, only to keep from losing members, this is very grave. As mentioned before they recalled painfully that they had backed the wrong horse in the Latin American struggles for independence and almost lost that continent. They hoped to save their prestige this time. It was, of course, a ticklish situation for everyone but to poison the African with slogans of freedom, equality and independence, when he was not yet prepared to differentiate between good and bad, was simply to pit him against the white colon.

Capitalism is often condemned today but it has proven to be the only quick and human road to progress, to civilization. The mistakes it makes are far less costly to humanity or the working class than revolutions and their accompanying dictatorships, secret police, and slave labor camps.

There is no way to prepare the African—or anyone for that matter—for Christian Socialism without ending up in the bed with the Communists. It may be that a very literate sophisticated electorate, and a highly industrial society like England or Belgium, can get half way down the tiger's throat without being wholly swallowed, but even that remains to be seen. To try to spring a rural, mostly uncivilized area into a Socialist utopia is inviting disaster because there are no grounds upon which to appeal to the masses to work except force. In free enterprise those who have initiative can see the advantages to themselves and the state and set an example for the others to follow.

We cannot conclude without recalling that in light of African realities, the organizers had been compelled to compromise and, hence, to violate the principles of equality in work. The basic principle of labor organization, is, indeed, equal pay for equal work. But, European workers were given advantageous contracts

especially when hired in Europe, in contrast to Africans who were considered unskilled workers. Among Africans themselves, there existed inequality of abilities and skills, but how do you explain to a sensitive native worker that he receives a smaller salary because he is less intelligent, less capable, less productive than his white brother? . . . A final discrimination which trade-unions had to accept related to the legislation in indemnities in case of accidents at work. When an African worker was killed while working, his beneficiaries received a certain indemnity; but the beneficiaries of a European under the same conditions, were entitled to at least ten times more. The European worker was being paid more than his African colleague because he had to live in Europe according to other standards of living which were of course, more expensive than that of the African worker. I give this example to show that the trade-union movement in the Congo was either hypocritical or inadequate to protect African workers' rights. Existing circumstances confused honest trade-union activities. I remember the innumerable damage claims made by Africans in regard to auto accidents, compared to the same actions by colons. If a European driver killed an African, the latter's beneficiaries received an indemnity, of course, but only one-tenth of the amount awarded to the family of a European killed in a similar accident. However, to give the parents of a child accidentally killed in a car accident, a substantial sum of money is simply to encourage such accidents. Some African parents will deliberately push their child under the wheels of a car for the resulting indemnity, on which they could live the remainder of their life.

The African has far less respect for human life than his counterpart in America, and it is easy to imagine what sort of commerce or racket would have been encouraged covering all people without qualification. In vain, we aim at equality, but it does not always work. Even in a litter of animals, some are stronger than others, more beautiful, more adaptable.

METROPOLITAN BELGIANS VS. BELGIAN COLONS

In granting premature independence to the Congo, the Belgian Government has been influenced also by its citizens from the Metropolis. Belgium is a democratic country and public opinion has significant influence. However, for many years there has been considerable misunderstanding between Belgian Colons and their compatriots at home, dealing not only with politics and administration, but basic modes of living. For years Colons have referred to their brothers in Europe as "Les Belgicains," the Belgicans, in a derogatory and sarcastic sense. The Colonizer viewed himself as the 'real' courageous Belgian, while his compatriot who stayed home was, obviously, one of the poor, narrow-minded, jealous, humble folk. Relations between the two groups have been affected by their respective environments and living conditions. Belgians from home feel jealousy, envy, and a certain contempt for their adventurous brothers in the Congo. They indeed regard them as "the new-rich," as "colonists" who make their living by exploiting the Negroes. In their minds, Colons were, more or less, unscrupulous slave-traders who became rich by sheer exploitation. This judgment was encouraged by the colonists themselves, in a way, because when they returned to Belgium on vacation, they shocked their compatriots with luxurious living and their waste of money. Colonists were considered idle good-for-nothings who lived in golden splendor, earned for them by the sweating natives at the end of a whip. It would be redundant for me to reiterate the severity and hardship of life in the Congo. It is sufficient to say that when a Belgian civil servant completed three years of service in the colony, the government was obliged to provide him a six-month vacation in Europe with round-trip transportation paid. Since independence has been granted, both the overseas term and the home leave period have been shortened for civil servants. The Belgian Colon was better paid than his counterpart in Europe, making two- or three-times more for the same qualifications and rank in the administration. If a government worker at home was paid 150 dollars in the Congo, he could earn 300 to 400 dollars monthly, plus

free housing, free six months vacations, and free round trip. Had he lived modestly during the three years term, he could save at least 3,000 dollars and afford a very nice vacation in Europe. He frequently bought an elegant American car, which he would proudly display to his kinfolk in Belgium. The vacationing Colon and his family could easily enjoy a luxurious sojourn in Belgium, boasting of their intention to spend a month on the French Riviera in some palace. While at home, the Colon encountered his former friends and co-workers who were driving motorcycles and dreaming of a small second-hand car. Or the worker coming from the Belgian employees of the Union Minière received equally large remuneration. In the eyes of the Belgians at home, a "colonist" was like a man falling from space, inexplicably rich. There had to be some explanation for their fortunes; obviously, they had become unscrupulous adventurers, exploiting the poor natives . . . possibly even slave traders! This impression of colonists soon became widespread with Belgians at home and eventually gave seed simultaneously to envy and contempt for everything relating to the colony . . . its policy, administration, and problems.

The Metropolitans went even further with their accusations, regarding Colons as adventurers and misfits who could not hold a job at home and, hence, went to the Congo for carefree, indulgent living. In turn, the colonists accused their brothers at home of jealousy and ignorance, charging the home folk with witting and purposeful designs to sever all responsibilities in the Congo, to get rid of the Congo, so that these inhuman, un-christian adventurers, with its attendant problems and wealthy colons, would be expelled.

It must be added that Belgians in the Congo had no political rights. They were civil servants and employees but there were no elected representatives from the Congo in Parliament at Brussels. The Congo was a colony under complete control of the home Government. Belgians in the Congo had no voice in politics relating to the colony. Those who attempted political activity were expelled, or, in any event, warned to abstain if they did not want to lose their jobs and return home. All Europeans in the Congo worked under

regulations of the Administration, whose orders came directly from Brussels. Deprived of political rights and thousands of miles from the seat of Government, the colonists were justifiably depressed when the Belgian Government imposed laws and regulations contrary to existing local conditions, and harmful to Belgian interests. After sending some observer-tourists to investigate and report on the Congo, the government in Brussels unilaterally decided upon the necessary social reforms, including labor unions, which would civilize the Africans and eventually warrant independence. The Colonial Administration had warned Brussels about inadequate reforms and decisions, and asked them to proceed slowly with plans for independence. This intra-governmental struggle over the political and administrative problems of the Congo went on for years, but Brussels was always the winner. It finally culminated in Brussels' decision to grant independence without consultation of the colonial administration. The Governors sent by Brussels to the Congo were generally obedient functionaries who ignored advice and warnings from local colons. It is interesting to note that in Angola the situation was different, in this respect, since there were Portuguese colons and even some Africans as members of the Metropolitan Parliament who, thus, had a voice in Angolan affairs. The Governor in Angola was a member of the Lisbon Cabinet and kept other ministers apprised of Angola's conditions.

Belgium is a nation composed of two different races, Walloons and Flemings of about equal size. There is no resemblance between the two and, I dare say, no friendship, either. The Walloon speaks Walloonian, also called Belgian French. He has a Latin spirit and a quick mind, but is less disciplined than the Flemish. The latter is of Germanic blood, very disciplined and a hard worker. Together, they have created the Belgian Nation and the Belgian Congo. If ethnic differences lead to minor fights and dissensions at home, the Congo environment has the opposite effect, instilling harmony and cooperation. In Belgium there is a continuous struggle for political and linguistic hegemony, but in the Congo, no real misunderstanding is noticeable. In the Congo, they joke about

each other, and, except for language differences, there is no real friction between Walloons and Flemings.

Probably because of their language and character, the Flemish are less sympathetic to Africans than Walloons. Their cold manners and unintelligible language have rendered the Flemish less popular than Walloons among Congolese. Africans considered the Flemish language a secret code used by Belgians so that others could not understand their conversation. The Flemings are fervent Catholics, more than the Walloons who are sometimes against the church and rather socialistic. In the Congo, however, Walloon and Flemish united to preach syndicalism and social rights to Africans in order to convert them or simply keep them with their church.

The above digression on frictions, relationships, and misunderstandings is necessary in evaluation of the anti-colonialist attitudes generated in Belgium and their effect on government policy toward the Congo. Public antipathy discouraged the government from prolonging its leadership and investment in the Congo, even though continued presence and development was certainly to the nation's advantage. Public opinion influenced responsible leaders to withdraw troops from the Congo in the event of serious troubles lest their sons be killed preserving the rich unscrupulous life of colons. There were 100,000 Europeans in the Congo before independence, of which nearly 70 percent were Belgian subjects.

Due to public opinion, Brussels hesitated to suppress the riots occurring in the Congo before independence. Anyone reading the more liberal Belgian newspapers during the Congo's transition would quickly perceive that Metropolitans were generally content to have rid themselves of the colony.

The relationship between Belgians at home and in the Congo is coincidental with that existing in other colonial powers (Great Britain and France) with their respective colonies. In other words, Europeans at home regard their brothers in the colonies with instinctive distrust, envy, and ultimately contempt. Their political ambitions are generally different, with the Metropolitans inclined to quick reforms, independence, and abandonment of the colonies,

while the colonists wish to prolong their control and the evolutionary process.

KITWALISM AND KIMBANGUISM

The Christian contributed of course toward awakening Africans to political consciousness by preaching that all human beings are equal in front of God. Protestantism, in particular, allows a wider interpretation of this Christian truth than the Catholics. Protestantism stands for greater freedom in the interpretation of doctrine and in the organization of church in contrast with the Catholics' rigid and strict internal rules and doctrinal principles. Thus, Protestantism inspired the rise of several sects, among which "the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society," ("Jehovah's Witnesses") an American organization, became quite popular among Africans. The Society sent apostles to Africa, in particular Central and South Africa. A Parisian faction of Jehovah's Witnesses, penetrated the former French colonies. Since 1940, this sect has existed in Katanga and the Eastern Congo, where it is known as "Kitwalism." This religious group incited its converts to establish a social organization resembling a state. The organization would be formed by Africans after the overthrow of the atheistic European society, dominated, as they put it, by EVIL. The white man represented evil since its spirit was implanted in white Christian society. Kitwalism was a degeneration of the religion preached by The Watch Tower adherents, and became an autonomous African movement of a religious-political nature. The British tolerated this sect in their colonies and succeeded in preventing agitation. However, the Congo Administration proved rather intransigent and during formative years arrested Kitwala followers, exiling them in various parts of the territory. Gradually, this religious movement began preaching real principles of social behavior. The Kitwalists promoted the religious revival of Africans and adopted three rallying slogans; the religious principle of "Equality among races;" the socialistic principle of "Equal wages to equal work;" and the nationalistic slogan of "Africa to Africans."

Some religious rites of the Watch Tower sect were adapted by Africans and incorporated into rituals of magic and fetishism. Among Kitwali's followers, some recommended complete asceticism, while others used their meetings for real orgies. "African vestals" were accompanying male adherents to meetings in the bush where the most daring acts were permitted. This organization, half political-half religious, held ties with some American Negro organizations, to which it paid subscriptions. Kitwalism was very successful in recruiting new converts. If an African refused to join, he was "exposed" to the authorities as a Kitwalist, whereupon he was summarily exiled. As Kitwalism grew in 1958-1959 their behavior became more daring, openly accusing colons of hypocrisy and pharisaism because they regarded Africans as inferior human beings, and mainly because white men had killed Jesus Christ, they said. A baptism of sorts was used, consisting of formal, solemn promises to fight the colons and to keep the organization a secret. They were organized in cells or units (not unlike the Communists), which were led by priests; nocturnal meetings were the rule. The Kitwalists believed in the re-embodiment (reincarnation) of Africans in Europe, where all would have a white skin. Each cell had its magician and a treasurer, and mutual assistance was practiced among adherents.

The Belgian Administration tried to stop Kitwalism (after 1951) but failed because its secrecy was so well preserved. Apparently, they used secret codes, and special police units were charged with the protection of the members. Kitwalism was very popular in the Province of Equator and Katanga, but less in the Kasai region, although many leaders were recruited among Kasai tribesmen.

At about the same time, another sect entered the social and political scene in the Congo. It was KIMBANGUISM, named after Simon Kimbangu, an African apostle who was born at the turn of our century. Perhaps, because of his oratorical talent, Simon Kimbangu was revered as a sort of Black King or god. The Kimbanguists freely interpreted the Christian catechism, and adopted the nationalistic slogan, "The Congo to Congolese." It was a

purely Congolese movement whereas Kitwalism found its inspiration in a world-wide religious sect, Jehovah's Witnesses. The two movements, Kitwalism and Kimbanguism, quickly identified themselves and both aimed at the destruction of the existing hierarchy, the elimination of white men from Africa. Kimbanguism, in addition, pursued the political and economic emancipation of the African and the liquidation of primitive magic and sorcery. But, realizing the principles and goals of these sects, one can imagine the influence they had in various parts of the Congo on native aspirations for freedom, equality, and independence. Communist agitators were not inactive either. African sailors were secretly disembarked on the African coast after they have been indoctrinated behind the Iron Curtain. After independence, the reasons for existence of these sects have disappeared since their goals have been attained. But the damage had been accomplished since more and more Congolese leaders were demanding liberties and independence while inciting hatred against whites.

The two religious-political movements mentioned above illustrate the atmosphere which reigned in the Congo prior to independence. But one should not conclude that these were true dangerous or terrorist organizations. The sects were unknown in parts of the Congo and the organized cells were not numerous in the rest of the territory. Their activities were sporadic and lacked real centralization and direction.

In Katanga, due to the peaceful temper of the Lundas, there have been no political assassinations or significant troubles. In the rest of the Congo a few colons have been killed each year by Africans, but it is difficult to link them with the Kitwalist or Kimbanguist movements. The best evidence that these movements were not too dangerous is that the British have tolerated them in the Rhodesias and South Africa. The Belgians controlled them by arrests and exile, less because they were dangerous than because of the peace of mind it afforded.

ANTI-COLONIALIST PROPAGANDA AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS

It is very difficult to estimate the extent to which anti-colonialist propaganda from the Soviet Bloc and the United States has influenced the decision by the Belgian Government to grant untimely independence to the Congo. What is unquestionable, however, is that the Belgians, French, and British consider that the independence movements in their respective colonies has been, if not dictated by America, at least, vigorously encouraged. Europeans have been less disturbed by Communist anti-colonial propaganda than by American foreign policy regarding under-developed nations and colonies. The existing anti-Americanism in Europe and Africa stems mainly from this conviction. The French sincerely believe that they lost Indochina and Algeria because America encouraged both nations to independence. Belgians, too, think the Congo has been lost to them because of American influence. This accusation is only partially true; it is very difficult to convince them that the main responsibility for the Congo's premature independence is the Belgian Government itself. Europeans have forgotten that after World War II, Soviet Russia launched a vigorous campaign of anti-colonialist propaganda and subversion. This propaganda affected many Europeans as evidenced by the fact that the largest Communist Parties in the Free World are in Italy and France. At any rate Belgians forget their own mistakes in the Congo which we listed above. Belgians will tell you bluntly that American policy has anti-colonialist objectives and clear intentions of economically supplanting Western Europe in Africa. American foreign policy has certainly spread confusion and dismay among Europeans. America's encouragement of nationalistic movements in Africa and Asia began about 1948 with a desire to counteract the Communists' anti-colonial propaganda, basically competition in the struggle to win friends. America did not want the world to think that Communists alone were concerned with the freedom and independence of underdeveloped colonial areas. Soviet Russia's

concern in this respect is, of course, insincere, and many Europeans and many Americans have fallen into the trap.

America has always preached liberty, independence, and humanitarian principles, which form the basis of her Constitution. During the past decade America has been rightly chastened for hypocrisy, and at the same time challenged to clean its own house of racial discrimination before preaching independence and equality for Africans and Asians. America probably thought there was no time to lose and rushed forward to counter Communist gains, to appear in the eyes of underdeveloped nations as the champion of liberties. Squeezed between Soviet propaganda and internal racial problems, Americans tried to fight two related problems on vastly different levels. Thus, America acted too quickly and with a bit of hypocrisy in its drive to end colonialism.

In contrast, American foreign policy towards the Eastern European countries "colonized" by Soviet Russia has been fatalistically permissive. Eastern European countries which were sovereign states twenty years ago, now live under complete Soviet domination. I believe that anti-colonialist propaganda by America and the world should be directed first to countries which have lost their independence rather than to new nations. It is more noble and pressing to liberate former independent countries than to concentrate on people who are not prepared for self-government. The assumption is that the literate states seized by Communists had the opportunity to fight and stop the advance of Communism had they wanted to do so. This is not true. Literacy often aided the take over by making it easy to infiltrate organs of opinion through the device of upholding free speech. These little states, too, physically were at the mercy of the tentacles of the giant octopus that was reaching out from Moscow. The tactics in Africa are, as in Eastern Europe, to use nationalist aspirations as the bridge to nationalization of industry, and when that does not work, it is made the excuse for a complete Communist take over.

There is no doubt in my mind that Soviet colonization and exploitation in Eastern Europe is the most abject, intolerable variety. Russian troops entered modern, civilized countries in order to reap

benefits of developed wealth. It is this form of colonialism that must be feared and fought because it does not bring progress or civilization but atheism and sheer oppression. Terror rules behind the Iron Curtain where jails are filled with political prisoners, and the nation's wealth is spent for subversion and propaganda, for space-vehicles and war-making potential. In comparison, European colons in Africa have cleared the bushlands and built new nations, not with confiscated life savings, but with their own investments. The only reproachable behavior of Western colonial powers is their exploitation of African labor. But even this must be defended, in that it helped teach Africans to work for themselves and for their budding nations. Rumanians, Poles, Hungarians and all captive nations behind the Iron Curtain have no need for forced labor since they knew, long before Russians, the meaning of civilization, freedom, and independence.

But returning to the effects of anti-colonialist propaganda, it appears that Belgians simply lost their heads. America, as world leader, should probably have stopped Belgians and others in their panic, by encouraging them to hold their colonies and complete their plans for economic development and self-determination. But such a recommendation from America is highly improbable. American leaders fear that support of colonialism would generate antagonism and raise the risk of a world conflagration. The Belgians and French were eagerly awaiting American encouragement and support in their gradual process of colonial emancipation. Portugal was less impressed by America's policy and decided to remain in Angola to finish their civilizing action and policy of integration.

It is interesting to note that America, in espousing lofty and humanistic policy statements, has once again overlooked its own not-so-moral history. Europeans analyze American immigrants' treatment of indigenous American Indians and conclude that their behavior in Africa and Asia is certainly no worse, and generally quite superior in comparison. Africa, not unlike America, is becoming a melting pot of races and creeds, enveloping not only Europeans and Africans, but also Hindus and Chinese. And the

continent's present population of 200 million is meager when compared to its potential. So, European colons are quite justified in shattering the "Africa for Africans" slogan, and insisting upon their rights and privileges much as did American immigrants in the New World.

Many suggest that had America permitted France and Britain to resist Nasser during the Suez Canal crises, Africa would have been saved from the chaos of nationalistic movements and premature sovereignty. If this is true, Europe was guilty, in the same decade, of not resisting Russia in Hungary when the people rose against their oppressors. Who can be sure that by withholding Russia from Hungary in 1956, Nasser would not have collapsed and Soviet Russia have been mortally injured? European and American infidelity to Hungary was not only a blunder but a crime.

But America found that the way toward peace is easier through friendly countries, i.e., by sacrificing Free World interests and letting Soviet Russia play her game freely. Americans think that insistence upon the liberation of the Eastern Countries will make war with Russia unavoidable. This is just speculation. Soviet Russia has its troubles and wants war no more than we do. Moreover, the Soviets know that a war means their total ruination. The occupied countries are not reliable and she cannot count on allied peoples. But the Free World fears war and, therefore, we can see in the middle of the 20th Century, the Communists building a shameful wall in the heart of Berlin, separating brothers and sisters, parents and children.

So America found it easier to speak of Algeria, of Indochina, of South Africa, and Angola. There was no risk of war. If a nation pretends to be moralistic, it should apply its convictions in every situation, not only where it is convenient and safe. Let us stick to our principles for freedom and liberty, but let us apply them all over the world.

THE CONGOLESE BET

In 1958, General de Gaulle visited Brazzaville, which is located on the Congo River exactly opposite from Leopoldville, and was

the capital of the French Congo. During the stay, one of de Gaulle's official acts consisted of offering the tribesmen some independence. In the Belgian Congo, de Gaulle's offer was grossly misunderstood. African leaders and labor chiefs concluded that now was the time for the Congo to claim political rights. Soon thereafter, the air in the Belgian Congo was humid with talk of "liberty, equality, rights, and independence." There developed some strikes and riots. Suddenly in January 1959, during a sports event, a demonstration erupted in which dozens of Africans were killed or injured by the Belgian controlled "Force Publique." Although trouble had thus far been confined to Leopoldville, the Brussels government and Belgians in general became quite disturbed.

Up to this point, the only official mention of emancipation occurred in an innocuous and palliative speech by Belgian King Baudoin paying tribute to Africa's eventual right to independence. A target date probably never entered his mind. But each of these minor events nourished the latest seed. Socialists and Communists, Catholics and atheists began speculating on the future. A few small Belgian leaders recognized the opportunity to make history as authors of Congo independence. In the colony, the most prominent leaders were Kasavubu, now President of the Congo Republic, and the fanatical Lumumba whose influence over Leopoldville masses was obvious. Other leaders included Moise Tshombe, Ileo, Bolikango, Bomboko and Kanza; mostly small clerks or instructors (*moniteurs*) who all were already dreaming of the day when they would become ministers. Brussels decided to organize colonial elections and permitted the Congolese to form political parties. Lumumba established his "Le Mouvement National Congolais"; Kasavubu organized the ABAKO (Association of Bakongo tribe); and in Katanga two political groups emerged: the CONAKAT of Tshombe and the BALUBAKAT of Jason Sendwe. Because of traditional loyalties, as I have previously mentioned, these "political parties" were little more than the respective tribes behind glorified new titles. The elections which followed illustrated the same allegiance.

At the beginning of 1960, the Belgian Government convoked a Brussels Round Table Conference on the Congo, which assembled 80 Congolese leaders including Kasavubu, Lumumba, Tshombe, Kalondji, Kamitatu and Ileu, to mention the most influential. This Conference ended several weeks later amid a series of disputes and schisms. Behind the scenes, Lumumba proposed his idea of a united Congo which, in contrast with Tshombe's "Federation of the Congo," was encouraged quickly by the Belgian Government. Belgian leaders were convinced that the only way to maintain their influence in the Congo would be to sustain its unity and to grant independence quite soon. The Federalists, Tshombe and Kasavubu, failed to sell their ideas to the Conference. Some Belgians were disturbed and regarded premature independence as incongruous, but the Socialists were unmoved by these warnings. In due course, several Belgian Ministers decided that the moment had arrived to effect an historic act, and the Congo became a sovereign nation. With the decision, a personal "bet" evolved between several ministers. A few held that it was a dangerous decision, but most believed that by a quick independence, the Africans would be satisfied and remain loyal to Belgium. They also asserted that by delaying independence, riots and other troubles might occur in the Congo creating a total deterioration of relations between Africans and Belgians. The Prime Minister, Mr. Eyskens, pacified his ministers and the conservative press by assuring them of the Public Force's strength and its capability to prevent any troubles after independence. Some African leaders also assured the doubters of future peaceful cooperation and of their controlling influence over the masses to prevent trouble. In Brussels many leaders seemed convinced that Congo Independence would culminate in a spectacular brotherhood between Africans and Belgians. With this conviction and the unofficial sporting "Congolese Bet," the Belgian Government signed the birth of the Independent and United Republic of Congo and fixed the baptism for 30 June 1960. It was madness. The Congolese had no concept of allegiance to a nation, no idea about what independence meant.

The consequences of premature independence will be seen in

the following chapters. In the Congolese arena, a true circus began in which colons and Africans played their parts. The circus tent is flapping in the wind, with precarious security for those inside. But there is another circus next door where Soviet "business men" adroitly await the show's failure. The show they envision will feature a Red Star with many lion tamers and cages.

CHAPTER V

CONGO INDEPENDENCE AND THE SECESSION OF KATANGA

On 30 June 1960, after eighty years of Belgian presence and domination, 14 million Congolese became politically independent. On 11 July 1960, Moïse Tshombé announced the secession of the Independent State of Katanga.

But first let us chronologically review the political developments in the Congo on the eve of independence and immediately following. In August 1958, General de Gaulle had offered French Equatorial Africa autonomy within the French Community. It was essentially a compromise on the part of France to avoid total independence. In the Congo de Gaulle's offer to Brazzaville was construed as full independence, which became the guiding star of African leaders. Kasavubu, chief of the ABAKO, was interested in leadership of his Bas-Congo Province and, therefore, favored a Congolese confederation of States or Provinces, even though he did not know how it would develop. He propounded the authority of tribal chiefs, hoping to be the leader of the Bakongo people, who populated the Leopoldville area, Brazzaville, and Northern Angola.

Patrice Lumumba, recently freed from jail, was increasingly jealous of Kasavubu's growing popularity in Leopoldville. More by trial-and-error than by conscious reasoning, Lumumba finally realized that the idea of Congolese unity was backed by most African leaders and by the government in Brussels. Confederation

was a repugnant formula to Belgians and constantly attacked by African leaders impressed by the idea of African unity and the slogan of "Africa to Africans." In December 1958, a conference of African leaders was organized by N'Krumah at Accra, in which Lumumba participated as an observer from the Congo. Attendance at this conference was not insignificant because of the popularity and recognition by other Afro-Asian representatives. Kasavubu was originally picked to attend, but illness shifted the honor to Lumumba. In November 1959, Lumumba was arrested by the administration for subversion and racism. He was not unfamiliar with penal confinement, when as a clerk in the Stanleyville Post Office, he was sentenced to two years in prison for theft of public funds. But after six months, the Belgians freed him for good behavior. But more probably because they wished to use him to keep the Congo unified.

The colonial administration finally organized elections in the six Congo provinces. Lumumba's party, centered in the Oriental Province, received the majority. In Katanga, the Conakat and Balubakat parties shared the votes remaining from Tshombe's slight majority. Meanwhile, Kalondji, Ileo, Adoula, and Mobutu had a dispute with Lumumba and formed their own party, also called Le Mouvement National Congolais, but adding Kalondji (MNC-Kalondji). Lumumba retained leadership of the other fraction, and his party was named MNC-Lumumba.

In January 1960, the Brussels Government held the famous "Table Ronde" with the participation of 81 Congolese leaders. Most of them had their white advisers. Lumumba quickly rallied the majority of the members by preaching immediate independence and the unity of the Congo. Kasavubu was furious and left the conference. Tshombe and other supporters of a confederate Congo were in the minority, and did not hide their dissatisfaction. The Belgian Government and its adroit lawyers, among them Van Hemelrijck, made no attempt to discourage Lumumba in his claims. On the contrary, Lumumba became the "man of the hour," for Congolese unity and the brotherhood Belgo-Congolese co-operation. Kasavubu, Tshombe and other realistic leaders who en-

visioned a confederation as best suited for the obstacles of independence were pushed to the background.

In early June 1960, the discussions between Belgians and Congolese for the creation of a Central Government got under way. Lumumba had in his pocket the famous Fundamental Law, prepared by Brussels experts, a sort of Constitution with innumerable articles and paragraphs. The Fundamental Law made provisions for six Provinces, each one having a Government and Provincial Assembly and prerogatives for the Republic Chief, for the Central Government, for everybody. This constitution, the longest I have ever seen, seemed intended to confuse even more the minds of the immature Congolese. Just after independence, Lumumba made a trip to the United States, where he slept in Washington's bed at Blair House, as a guest of honor. Belgian colons violently criticised the invitation extended to Lumumba. The reasons for this honor granted to a would-be-Communist are rather obscure, but certainly the Brussels Government contributed to the American gesture by praising Lumumba as the most trustful and prominent Congo leader. It is probable that, had the Belgian Government warned Washington not to invite Lumumba, our government would have changed its mind, as it did when Tshombe wanted to visit the New World. Lumumba formed the Central Congolese Government, while the moderate Kasavubu became Chief of State, President of the Congo Republic.

Lumumba was a third-class employee in the colonial administration, an accomplished orator who knew how to inflame an audience. People in his acquaintance spoke of him as intelligent with a particular talent to impress the crowd by his words and gestures. Lumumba was a born demagogue, with a reputation for dishonesty, cruelty, and a vague education. He would change his opinions with remarkable facility. In his political manoeuvres, Lumumba was backed by a few disreputable colons, but mainly by socialists and crypto-Communists. These advisers assisted him with his election propaganda, confident that they had chosen the best card.

So, Lumumba became Prime Minister of the Congo with Kasavubu as President and the independence ceremonies were or-

ganized with great pomp. Four days after the festivities, the Congo Police Force of nearly 23,000 Africans rebelled against their 1,000 Belgian officers and non-coms. In Leopoldville, the mutiny assumed large proportions when the African soldiers started to pillage, rape, and assassinate. The revolt spread throughout the Congo, and complete panic reigned among Europeans. Some colonies had sensed imminent trouble and evacuated their wives and children. But the majority stayed in the Congo hoping that nothing serious would occur. Several hundred Belgian paracommandoes were stationed nearby at the military bases of Kitona, Thysville, and Kamina, with other units in Ruanda-Urundi, all of which helped appease the fears of resident Belgians. The Belgian Government relied upon the public police force, which, according to its Commander, General Janssens, was a reliable and loyal force. But it happened that the force itself started the whole affair, terrorising the whole European population for several days, torturing and killing officers and civilians. Lumumba, instead of strong intervention, seemed rather pleased by the mutiny and promoted all soldiers to a higher rank, excepting, of course, the officers and non-coms. The terrorism of the Public Force spread through most of the Congo destroying everything it touched like a visitation of locusts. Europeans, in a desperate action for survival, quickly organized aerial-bridges and armed convoys to evacuate practically all women and children to Rhodesia, Brazzaville, Angola, and Belgium.

Meanwhile, Tshombe, at the head of Katanga's Provincial Government, was enjoying independence in complete calm. But the mutiny reached his quiet province several days later. It was not a large scale mutiny among Katanga's Public Force, but five Europeans, among them the Italian Vice-Consul, were machine-gunned in the neighborhood of Elizabethville. The Union Minière became panicky for the safety of its installations and employees, while Belgians everywhere in the Congo were begging their Government to intervene by sending troops to protect them. Brussels eventually, ordered all local Belgian units into action, including those from Ruanda-Urundi. But it was already too late. Several

hundred women, nuns and young girls, had been raped, scores of Europeans were atrociously killed and thousands of homes and shops were ransacked and burned. The Brussels action, although hesitant in the first days of the mutiny, had saved the majority of the European colony in the Congo. In Kivu, however, the situation was more dramatic since farmers were scattered about the vast territory and evacuation or protection was rendered impossible. But there, too, Europeans with a gun in their hands, jumped in their cars and crossed the bush roads to the nearest airport or border. Lumumba was, in fact, principally responsible for the mutiny since he had been advised by General Jansens that intervention was possible with his loyal officers and non-coms, but the Prime Minister opposed any measure against the rebels. Instead, Lumumba promoted all the rebels to a higher rank, distinguishing them for murder and the rape of nuns.

The small revolt in Katanga was quickly tamed by Belgian paracommandos from Kamina and other military bases. These Belgian troops were supposed to leave the Congo after independence, and were, in fact, in the process of evacuation when trouble erupted. In Katanga, as contrasted with Lumumba, Tshombe vigorously encouraged Belgian troops to intervene. Tshombe proved his clear-sightedness and responsibility as a leader by immediately launching an appeal for help in restoring order. It is a gesture that no one should forget since he saved the lives of 25,000 Europeans and prevented chaos in his province. This is one of the main reasons why colons were grateful to Tshombe. But people easily forget such gestures and Tshombe later became the No. 1 public enemy.

REASONS FOR THE KATANGAN RUPTURE

By 9 July, Katanga's relatively short uprising had been checked and peace restored. The remainder of the Congo, however, was being flooded with tribal warfare, terrorism, and general chaos. Intervention by Belgian troops succeeded in restoring order in some areas, but their presence was grist for Communist propaganda

technicians. Through their mouthpiece, Lumumba, accusations were spread which charged Belgium with having activated troops in the Congo for the purpose of resuming power. Brussels could hardly be called to account for its action to save 100,000 of its citizens and millions of dollars worth of property and investments.

In spite of the Belgian troop's presence in Leopoldville and other parts of the Congo, order was far from being restored. Thus, Tshombe, realizing an opportunity to profit from the chaotic situation, decreed the secession of the Province he was legally governing. It was 11 July 1960. This secession passed almost unobserved at that moment, so huge was the marasmus which shrouded Lumumba's Government and the five other Provinces. In addition, Lumumba was strengthening ties with the Communist Bloc representatives and the Soviet Embassy was extremely busy establishing a foot-hold in the Congo. Lumumba, obviously embarrassed by Belgian troops maintaining order, demanded intervention by the United Nations and its military forces to rid himself of Belgian units and permit him to run the Congo as he pleased. America, together with other Western Countries backed his demand in spite of protests from Brussels which vainly explained the reasons for intervention and promised to withdraw the troops as soon as order was restored. But the United Nations, with authorization from the Security Council, stepped into Leopoldville, commencing their activities in complete ignorance. The initial action was carried out by "neutrals" from Ghana, Guinea, and Morocco; countries frequently aligned with Soviet Russia or against Europe. The UN troops aimed first at expelling the Belgian forces and in their spare time attempted to maintain order. From all parts of this infant nation news was reported of tribal fights, murdered Europeans, pillage and brutality, but the UN did not seem eager to intervene. The United Nations finally succeeded in preventing a worsening of conditions in Leopoldville, but its presence also permitted a strong Communist infiltration. All Communist diplomatic representations had been granted permission to establish a rather coordinate action against European influence, under Lumumba's smiling complicity.

UN troops had not yet entered Katanga inasmuch as the situation did not require such intervention, but more truthfully because the UN did not have sufficient troops and officials, nor had they resolved their attitude toward Tshombe and his secessionist province. Several attempts were made to send units into Katanga which were personally requested by the late Secretary General Hammarskjöld. But Tshombe politely refused his assistance, justly asserting that order had been restored to Katanga and that the UN certainly had more urgent problems in other parts of the Congo, where public order was far from a reality. Tshombe and his advisers were extremely reluctant to permit any UN troops in Katanga, their hesitancy was not unfounded. It was clear that the UN action had the Soviet Bloc's blessing, because Communist infiltration was greatly facilitated by its presence.

Katangan leaders and their advisers, both Africans and colons, witnessed the UN's inability to quell the disorder in Leopoldville, and Lumumba's resulting demand for assistance from the Soviet Bloc. This was the final straw that broke the Congo's unity; Katanga seceded. It was an obtuse attempt to preserve Katanga Province from Communist agitation. The secession was not, as some critics espoused, an ad-hoc invention to shield against Lumumba's supporters, nor was it a naked grasp for power. Katanga's decision had much deeper roots. The distance between Leopoldville and Elisabethville is 1,400 miles, which, in light of existing communications and transportation facilities, is a significant separation. During the colonial period, authority was vested in a General-Governor residing in Leopoldville. Distance alone complicated the administration of outlying provinces, but Katanga was even more difficult because Katanga was different. Katanga was the Union Minière, a powerful company with mines, money, big business, financial independence, and . . . arrogance. Throughout the colonial period a very unhealthy relationship has developed between Katanga and Leopoldville based on misunderstanding and bordering on contempt. An obvious reason for discord is the furor with which Katangans witnessed 40% of their income being used by the colonial administration to modernize

and civilize Leopoldville. Indeed, a comparison of Elisabethville and Leopoldville is quite shocking. Leopoldville is a modern, luxurious capital with many multi-storied buildings, wide avenues, elegant shops and hotels. In Elisabethville, the highest building, not yet finished, has four floors. The center is shabby, the small shops resemble barracks, and everything reminds one of the year 1925. In such an environment there could hardly be cordiality between the poor, sophisticated intellectuals of Leopoldville and the rich, worldly businessmen of Katanga. Understandable or not, this rivalry grew and became even more potent after independence. When mutiny and riots broke out in Leopoldville, the moment was ripe for Katanga to think independently and build a country commensurate with its inherent wealth.

Before 1935, the Belgian Government understood the peculiar situation in Katanga and granted limited decentralization through the appointment of a Vice-General Governor exclusive to Katanga. Subsequently, however, Brussels reversed its decision and organized Katanga as the sixth province, under the orders of the General-Governor in Leopoldville. The Katangans have never forgotten this affront. Colonialists in Katanga had had enough of Leopoldville's tutelage and after independence they were eager to terminate the exploitation of their wealth. In Leopoldville, general chaos was disrupting communications, and jeopardizing rail and road transportation. Katanga's affairs would only have worsened if they should be directed from erupting Leopoldville. Tshombe, even before independence, dared to speak of autonomy for Katanga, although he was almost arrested by Vice-General Governor Scholler, who had been re-appointed to Katanga in 1959. Thus, for an entire year preceding independence, Katanga had a resident Vice General-Governor. This appointment also encouraged the secessionist spirit of Katangans.

Ethnically and geographically, Katanga has many peculiarities in contrast with the other provinces. As a notably industrial province, Katanga is inhabited by thirty tribes. In the rest of the Congo there are 170 tribes with nearly as many languages and dialects. These tribes and their leaders are still not fully conscious of the

extent and variety of tribalism. An African from Leopoldville visiting Elisabethville is unable to be understood if he speaks only his native language, the Kikongo. French is still little known by Congolese Africans. There are, however, two vehicular languages: the Kiswahili, spoken in the Eastern part of the Congo, and the Bangala (or Lingala), spoken in the Leopoldville area. Kiluba, the Baluba's language, and the Kikongo, spoken by Bakongos, are moderately common but not sufficient to be considered as vehicular. However, for an African traveling throughout the Congo, these four languages are necessary to make himself understood. He can get by if he speaks Kiswahili and Lingala, in towns, but in the villages, he will encounter troubles. In Katanga, everybody speaks Kiswahili and for that reason, one can see a certain homogeneity. Kiswahili is a hybrid mixture of Arabic and native languages. Lingala is spoken by the Force Publique soldiers and now by the A.N.C.

Due to the language problem, the African does not like to travel. In addition, there is not too much curiosity about what happens in other regions or to other tribes, although the construction of roads and railroads has facilitated the migration of Africans. Previously, however, excursions into neighboring territories were only by warriors for the purpose of pillage, or to steal women and cattle.

Although we have said that Katanga contains thirty different African tribes, in terms of ultimate control these may be grouped into three traditional empires . . . the Lundas, the Balubas, and the Bayekes which migrated from Tanganyika. From these three empires have evolved Katanga's two contemporary political parties, the Conakat and the Balubakat. When indications began pointing to the possibility of independence, the Union Minière expediently began financing both parties to ensure its continued influence. In this game, Belgian Socialists and Liberals attempted similar intervention. When the Balubakat turned to Lumumbaism, the Socialists and the UM men who had backed the Party were compelled to leave Katanga. Thus, the group DOUCY from the Socialist Institute Solvay, notorious for its leftist ideas, fled Ka-

tanga and established their headquarters in Leopoldville, where from they conducted anti-Katangan propaganda.

When elections were held preceding independence, the Conakat party obtained a slight majority. Tshombe formed Katanga's provincial government by selecting his ministers from among all the tribes, even among Balubas. This latter move succeeded in splitting the Balubas' resistance and gaining support from Kasongo Nyembo, a chieftain from Kamina who enjoyed full authority over nearly 1/3 of the total 600,000 Balubas. The majority of the Balubakat remained loyal to Sendwe and other Lumumba leaders and, following independence, began attacking anyone suspected of affiliation with Tshombe. Many territorial administrators and policemen sent to this area by Tshombe were atrociously killed as a result of, or following, primitive tortures. The Balubakat youth in particular would cut the legs off of these unfortunate Africans and, after nailing sticks into the bone stubs, force them to walk. Pictures taken at that time by newsmen were grim proof of the Balubas' cruelty.

THE WAR OF UNIVERSITIES

After independence, Tshombe sought to consolidate his small empire. He hurriedly put his men, of both races, into all parts of the administration throughout the province. From the very beginning, Tshombe preached cooperation between African and Europeans and declared open war on Lumumba and his supporters in the Afro-Asian Soviet Bloc. His father was a well known merchant, having made and lost several fortunes resulting in Tshombe's vainly trying to preserve the family estate. His personality, charm, gregarious and amiable manners were of invaluable help in his political career. Tshombe was very popular among his tribesmen and among Europeans. Europeans expressed particular gratitude to Tshombe for his action during the police force mutiny. Without colons and without Union Minière revenues, Katanga could not exist and Tshombe was lucid enough to understand this truth. It was partly fortune, but mostly intelligent action that prevented

this province from falling into the same chaos and disorder as the rest of the Congo. The small population, full employment and rather peaceful tribes also limited the extent of disorder.

The Secession of Katanga was, therefore, an accomplished fact. It had been made possible by Tshombe's courage in building close cooperation with Europeans. One cannot blame either the colonists nor Tshombe since, at the time of their attempt, trouble and confusion were flooding Leopoldville. For them, the shortest road to peace was secession. Moreover, the principle of self-determination preached by the United Nations and America was perfectly appropriate to their circumstances, for they sincerely desired independence: to live and be governed according to their own wishes. A strong backing for independence was indirectly given by the Union Minière, which, through the University of Liege and some professors, acted in the framework of the local university. Therefore, a paragraph about Elisabethville University, its past and its manoeuvres in Katanga seems necessary.

FIVE PROFESSORS FOR ONE STUDENT

In 1950, discussions were held in Belgium concerning the creation of a university in the Congo. The Liege University representatives proposed only one institution with the participation of teachers from all four Belgian Universities: Liege, Gand, ULB, and Louvain. Liege representatives wanted to avoid, thereby, repetition of the rivalry existing between these four institutions. The strongest opposition to this proposal came from Louvain, which wanted its own branch in the Congo. Louvain is the Catholic University. Initially, both arguments were satisfied, i.e., a single institution was established and the Catholics provided the support; it was built in Leopoldville and named Louvanium University. Subsequently, however, the Liberal-Socialist Government (1954-1958) decided to create another university in Elisabethville, Katanga, with the impressive title of "The Official Belgian University of the Belgian Congo and of Ruanda-Urundi." The opening of this university occurred in 1956, after which U.L.B. (*Universite Libre*

de Bruxelles) attempted, and largely succeeded, to obtain control of the institution. An American magazine writing an article about African Universities in 1958, stated that of all the universities located south of the Sahara, only two have maintained close contact with their "alma-mater": LOVANUM with LOUVAIN and Elisabethville with the U.L.B. One should note that the seizure of Elisabethville University by the U.L.B. was possible only with the tacit consent of Louvain. There is perfect understanding and complicity between these two Universities, which are mutually struggling for financial support to the detriment of their poorer antagonists, Gand and Liege.

A number of U.L.B. professors known as the "Doucy" or "Solvay Group," became unfortunately involved in Elisabethville politics from 1956 until 1960, when they were expelled. The "Doucys" were the advisers, in fact the managers, of the Balubakat Party. Without fear of contradiction, we can assert that the failure of a coalition between the Conakat and Bulubakat after independence was mainly the result of this group. The Doucy men predicted a Balubakat victory in the elections, but the Conakat won the majority. Furious at this development, the Solvay-Doucy Group left Katanga, after trying all possible means to prevent an accord between the two parties. After independence, Tshombe wanted to put an end to the political meddling of the Doucy group and, with a decree, placed the Eville University under patronage of the two Belgian State Universities, GAND and LIEGE, conditional upon their acceptance. The Superior Council of the University was to be composed of two professors from Gand and two from Liege, thus excluding all representatives from U.L.B. or Louvain. While the Gand didactic body did not answer Tshombe's offer, Liege accepted it immediately and rushed two professors, Mr. Jean Paulus and Mr. Joachim Frenquiel, to the Congo. Frenquiel was elected as Recteur and later served as political adviser to Tshombe. In late 1960, the Government required all professors to apply for new contracts, and although the majority were re-hired, it explains why they have U.L.B. backgrounds. The professors whose contracts were not renewed, left Katanga to lead

the opposition against Tshombe and the University from Belgium or Leopoldville. The Rector of Lovanium University, Monseigneur Gillon, is similarly in opposition to Katanga and its University. When in 1962 Eville University first opened its doors with an appropriate ceremony, the Louvain branch in Leopoldville did not send a representative or even cable. At the present time, the Doucy group is trying to gain influence in Elisabethville with the complicity of the Lovanium management. However, the Recteur Joachim Frenquiel succeeded in getting support in Leopoldville and preserved his position in Katanga's University, for the current year at least.

Elisabethville University now has 40 professors, assistants, and lecturers for nearly 200 students, of which 40 are Whites. Louvain University in Leopoldville is similarly staffed, but has twice the number of students.

In my opinion, the creation of two universities in the Congo, Louvanian in 1954 and Elisabethville in 1956, was a premature and useless action. At the beginning, there were practically no African students, while the abundant didactic staff was very costly. The Congolese would have been better educated if given a scholarship in Europe or Belgium. Living in Europe would have been very beneficial and through contact with Europeans, Congolese students could have become intellectuals by European standards. In addition, it would have been less costly for the Belgian Government to furnish 1,000 scholarships for Africans to study in Belgium than to maintain two universities in the Congo, where strange conditions and problems arose. In Elisabethville University, for example, professors often had trouble plucking an African student in an examination or refusing to award a distinction to a student who thought himself deserving. Endless varieties of pressures were used by African students and also by Europeans. African students viewed it as their university, and, therefore, at the full service of their government and of themselves. As far as the European students were concerned, no doubt that their education would have been better and less costly in Europe too.

At the present time, the two universities in the Congo are

frantically "beating the bush" to find just several hundred new students annually. It is not extraordinary for a professor to have but one student for a course.

We have previously mentioned the traditional ethnic friction and rivalry between the Walloons and Flemings, and the fact that living conditions in the Congo had partially negated their mutual antagonism. When questions of education and curriculum arose, however, ethnic prejudice flamed anew. This first reached the universities in 1958 when a Flemish student petitioned the Brussels government to receive university instruction in his native language, a privilege, in fact, supported by Belgian law. Obviously, this request received support from Flemings throughout the Congo and Belgium, and five Flemish-speaking professors were sent to Elisabethville for one "discriminating" student.

If I persist on the subject of higher education in the Congo, it is to recall the influence which young professors and lecturers exerted in Katanga's politics. I have personally met many of these young (28-35) educators of wide and varied backgrounds. If I say that they were filled with enthusiasm for Katanga's cause, I must qualify this with their ignorance of international politics and their simple conceit. They were all recently graduated from long periods of academic seclusion, but under the leadership of an older professor, succeeded in developing an empirical political action for Katanga. Professor Clemens, "the Boss," was a teacher of sociology and played a rather notorious part in Katanga's history from 1960 to its capitulation in early 1963. Professor Clemens and his aides bogged in a marasmus of political tactics, confident of being able to build or demolish states with equal facility. On my arrival in Katanga, I almost decided that the Africans and Europeans who were governing Katanga were more or less informed and well organized. After several months I faced reality and fully understood the fragile organization, the lack of serious plans, and the whole political empiricism of leaders and advisers. Each time I dared to show them a reality, they stubbornly refused its belief. The "professor," for example, was ecstatic over the thought of Katanga's Gendarmerie; and he almost collapsed the

day the UN troops entered Kipoushi town and not one gendarme or mercenary fired a single shot.

ANTI-LUMUMBIST CRUSADE

Katanga became an "independent" state in July 1960, and being intent upon consolidating their new State, commenced active warfare against Lumumba's Baluba supporters in the North. In the northern part of Katanga, Lumumbism was extremely popular with Balubakat youth, who exercised complete control over the bush, wantonly killing or mutilating anyone suspected of Conakat affiliations. Tshombe and his advisers knew that their army was in its infancy; except for the 100 European officers and non-coms, none of the recently recruited ten thousand gendarmes had the slightest knowledge of modern weapons. But, rather than permit the North to degenerate into complete chaos, or fatalistically evacuate the colons and Africans who were in danger, Tshombe had the audacity to retaliate with aggressive warfare to suppress the lawlessness. This action was laudible in my opinion, but rather beyond the scope of the Katangese Army. Meanwhile in South Katanga, everything was calm, with order and prosperity prevailing. The Union Minière regularly paid their royalties to Tshombe, and this substantial sum in hard currency permitted a normal life for the entire population. Rifles, machine-guns, and ammunition passed the Rhodesian border into Katanga while airplanes and several light jet aircraft were on their way. Only a few months had passed since independence and the Katangans' involvement in the anti-Lumumbist crusade before Tshombe began looking for aid from the Free World. The money received by Tshombe's regime gave an impression of strength and ostensible progress. But Katanga vainly solicited recognition as an independent state and membership in the United Nations. Other African Governments, Europe, Asia, and the United States pretended not to hear. But Tshombe and his advisers were hopeful, always hopeful.

In Leopoldville, a chaotic situation still existed. Prime Minister

Lumumba was flirting with the Communists, and had broken relations with other moderate and pro-West leaders. Seeing the Soviet influence and the impending arrival of Soviet military material and technicians requested by Lumumba, the UN groped for an understanding of the situation with American backing. The Western powers and particularly America, were now terrified by Lumumba's influence and his daring "love-affair" with the Russians. Lumumba had impertinently broken relations with the Belgian Government. Belgium, which had built and financed the Congo, was now asked to sever relations and withdraw its subjects. Belgium obligingly withdrew its diplomatic personnel from Leopoldville, and fatalistic resignation replaced animated reaction.

Several Belgian Government leaders, seeing the Congo slipping through their fingers, quickly realized the danger of leaving Tshombe and Katanga alone in the struggle against Lumumba. An immediate decision was made to dispatch an anti-Communist technical mission to Katanga. Belgian personalities such as Count d'Aspremont-Lynden and one of the Rothschilds, Chief of Spaak's cabinet, apparently initiated this action. Brussels was now fearing Lumumba and possible loss of the entire Congo, and it wanted to save something, at least Katanga and the copper mines. Certainly the Union Minière and the Societe Generale set in motion influential people within the Government to preserve Katanga and its wealth. Lumumba, the Prime Minister who knew neither the history nor the aspirations of his country, was smiling at all Communist ambassadors and agitators, while making a long nose at Belgium which had promoted him as the most "prominent Congolese politician." The anti-Communist convictions of the members of the Mission Technique were genuine, but most of them had no conception of fighting Marxist propaganda and subversion tactics. The anti-Communism of these technicians was limited to the desire for building an independent pro-Belgian State, but without envisioning a plan to prevent Communist penetration and the Afro-Asian Bloc cupidity. In fact, their anti-Communism was localized and egocentric. They wanted to preserve Katanga and nothing more. They did not care about what was happening

around them. If Tshombe's advisers had understood the cold war and the struggle in the Congo, they could have been satisfied with Katanga's *de facto* autonomy, while awaiting developments and repercussions of their announced intended secession. They might have encouraged Tshombe to act on a Congolese-scale in order either to replace Adoula or to cooperate with him to lead the whole Congo. Unfortunately, these phony anti-Communists were too busy with their role in Katanga and their small local successes.

The whole world had recognized the Central Congolese Government of the united Congo. However, although Belgium imposed the formula of a united Congo, its technicians in Katanga worked for a confederation. The Belgian Government had sent 2,000 technicians to the Congo, of which 800 (technicians, officers, NC officers, and teachers) were in Katanga. In terms of politics, these technicians lived in complete confusion; Brussels had made no requirements nor issued any statements regarding official policy toward unity or confederation of the Congo. This was the result, unfortunately, of Brussels failing to have a clear definitive policy on the subject. Through its technicians, Brussels could have easily imposed its policy, whatever it may have been. As it was, technicians in Katanga backed the secession, while others in the rest of the Congo struggled for unity. Brussels certainly knows the international political game with its cold war restrictions and, thus, could very well have guided their technicians in politics. I am convinced that had the Belgian Government firmly backed them the Congolese affair in respect to secession would have been solved or precluded. The Congo would have been united or federated in a matter of months without trouble or war if only the Belgian Government had had a specific policy. But Belgium, like the whole Free World, seems to fear to take a position and cherishes hesitation in politics; while Soviet Russia launches definite projects. Russia, therefore, backed the unity of the Congo and directed the entire Afro-Asian Bloc to preach it, obviously because Lumumba was their man. Moscow did not want this unity for altruistic purposes, but simply because through pro-Comm-

nist Lumumba, the Congo could have fallen into the Soviet sphere of domination. Later, the Soviets insisted on unity because Gizenga was also pro-Communist and there were hopes that he might replace Lumumba. It is precisely why the Afro-Asian Bloc, the "neutralists or non-engaged nations," shed tears at the UN for the Congo's unification and engineered a violent action against Tshombe, the pro-Western leader. One may wonder why no African Nation recognized Katanga's idea of a confederation as worthwhile. In Africa, there is a fashion among various leaders who, naively or not, believe in the unity of all Africans. To encourage Katanga's independence would have required considerable courage for a pro-Western leader such as Foulbert Youlou since other African statesmen would have accused him of betraying African unity and solidarity.

Nevertheless, immediately after independence of Katanga, few people could foresee the road that the Congo would follow in politics. Tshombe, his chance companions, and official advisers were even less aware. In the North, the Balubakat youth were resentful of Tshombe's election victory and started to raise their heads to the extent that Tshombe's authority extended only as far as the territory of his loyal tribes. For personal prestige and for general peace in Katanga, Tshombe, therefore, decided to end the Balubas opposition and killings.

Poisoned by Lumumba's political tactics, the Balubakat youth had previously killed most of the traditional chiefs in order to create a new country, a nation guided by politicians rather than by traditional leaders as in the past. When the massacres perpetrated by these young Balubas became known, Tshombe's military advisers were eager to start a crusade to discipline the North. The atrocities served as a pretext and the war was officially conducted for the purpose of liberation and pacification. The war was finally conducted by Belgian officers and mercenaries with the support of several thousand African soldiers. Notwithstanding their logical non-interest, the mercenaries fought valiantly in this conflict, many for sheer idealism since they hated Communism and Lumumbism, its surrogate. It is from this anti-Lumumbist,

anti-Communist crusade that Tshombe and his policies were aligned to anti-Communism. In Katanga, walls were covered with tracts which boasted Tshombe's anti-Communism and attacked Soviet neo-colonialism. It was indeed a comforting feeling for an anti-Communist to see a country so overtly and violently opposed to Marxist tyranny.

The Gendarmerie was under the command of a Belgian Colonel, while another Belgian, Major Weber, who brought down the revolt of the police force of Elisabethville, served as Tshombe's military adviser. Major Weber was apparently the only adviser with the courage to give Tshombe his opinions, and with this candor organized a brain-trust of advisers. Each morning, Tshombe was briefed by Weber who had previously consulted the other principal technicians, and served as "Chefs de Cabinet" of the Katangan Departments' Heads. Major Weber, a tall hefty Belgian with black mustache and impeccably dressed in his Belgian uniform was a constant companion of Tshombe. When Major Weber left Katanga, having been recalled by the Belgian Government under UN pressure in July 1961, he was escorted to the airport by crowds of Belgians in tears.

The war against the Balubas took the shape of another massacre. In Africa, any drive to peace and order must unavoidably pass through harsh repression. In fact, had the Balubakat won the elections, they would sooner or later have conducted a similar campaign against Tshombe and his followers. This war, which started in late 1960, terminated after the integration of Katanga and resulted in a stalemate without conclusive victory or defeat. Tshombe, however, benefited from war through the cooperation of grand chief Kasongo Nyembo from Kamina, who with his 200,000 subjects, reinforced Katanga's secessionist cause. Tshombe and Kasongo Nyembo succeeded in controlling all towns in North Katanga, but the bush remained in the hands of the Balubakat youth. These youth were not mere pranksters; their savage reprisals against Tshombe left traces pervading the remote areas with dozens of mutilated bodies of men, women, and children. The gendarmes commanded by Belgian officers and European

mercenaries made frequent incursions into Baluba territory reinforcing and evacuating Tshombe sympathizers. Well informed Belgians contend that Baluba casualties surpassed 10,000 men, but one should not consider the gendarmes and mercenaries solely responsible for that statistic. The Baluba youth were, themselves, responsible to the extent that they started the atrocities and moreover, during actual skirmishes they were drunk and doped beyond sensibility, thereby hastening their demise. Baluba leaders and magicians gave their youth a native alcohol drink made from hemp which was purported to immunize them against the white man's bullets. The Balubas were so excited and insensible that they would march directly into gendarme machine-guns without stopping until a vital organ was hit. Armed with African jungle knives, spears and bicycle chains, they would cut to pieces anyone encountered during the drunken marches. It appears that a burst of machine-gun fire in the chest of a stupified Baluba could not stop him because the hemp concoction gave him incredible physical resistance. The Lumumbist chiefs intentionally gave their men hemp alcohol preceding any attack, and the only way to stop them and save one's own life was to open fire with all automatic arms until the cannon became red hot. One of the Belgian officers whose machine-gun jammed during an attack was atrociously butchered.

After several months of action Tshombe and his army acquired major control of Northern Katanga through capture of the towns, which reaped prestige from Leopoldville and in the rest of the Congo. The Congolese National Army, the ANC, arriving a year later in North Katanga with UN help, was so scared of the Katangan gendarmes that they never fought them at a close range.

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The reasons for the Katangan secession should, therefore, be sought in the history of the Belgian Congo. It was only partially a white man's affair, the consequence of competition between Socialists and Catholics, leftist and rightists, the Union Minière

and the Central Government. The totality of these forces enflamed the imaginations of both Europeans and Africans pressuring their decision to secede, to administer their rich country as they pleased. The Union Minière felt safer with the friendship of Tshombe and his Lundas, who were indigenous to the mining regions, than with the Central Government sitting 2,000 kilometers away in Leopoldville.

Nationalism is the easiest to sell merchandise. Tshombe and his collaborators were quickly attracted by the idea of a Katangese nation, by the label of an Independent State, a rich State, formerly deprived of its wealth by the Colonial Administration for the sake of Leopoldville.

Europeans who became involved in Katanga's policy of secession should have been aware of the ramifications of their actions and put a brake to Katangese nationalism before obstacles became insurmountable. But they, too, were blinded by the excitement of their political action, the dream of creating an independent pro-Western state, and forgot all modesty, moderation, and precaution. They clutched at a desperate defensive tactic which finally led them to complete capitulation. I cannot reconcile the nationalistic spirit of my Belgian friends in Katanga with their repeated claims that the Congolese are not prepared to be independent, that they cannot govern themselves yet, that they do not deserve the independence. And I agree that under these circumstances independence was a mistake, a blunder and regression for all. But the same persons who denied the political maturity of Africans in general, were frantically inciting Katangese towards secession and independence. Katangese nationalism created countless problems and difficulties to Katangans and Europeans, and several times jeopardized the order it sought. Evidently, the whole world opposed Katanga and its secession, and the country could not succeed in its dream against such resistance. Alone, the Katangans courageously opposed avalanches of propaganda, public opinion, and armed force. Could this country have preserved its independence had it received Free World recognition? Unfortunately, the question is purely academic, but I shall present my answer at the conclusion.

CHAPTER VI

THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS INITIAL ROLE IN THE CONGO

In July 1960, the Brussels Government activated its paratroops based in the Congo to quell the public police force mutiny. This justified action generated violent protests by Lumumba and the Afro-Asian Bloc, accusing Belgium of attempted recolonization of the Congo. The United Nations were approached by the Congolese Central Government and entreated to intervene immediately. On 17 July 1960, the Security Council, backed by the United States, decided to send 4,000 troops by Globemasters from Ghana, Morocco, Guinea, and Ethiopia to the Congo. These troops belonged to the New African Nations, and they quickly arrived in Leopoldville.

At the outset, the purpose of the UN in the Congo was to maintain order and expel the Belgian paratroopers. After several protests, Belgium agreed to withdraw its soldiers, and by the end of July, except for a hundred officers and NonComs in Katanga, all Belgian military bases in the Congo were cleared. The United Nations' task was, from the beginning, directed against Belgium which had built the Congo, had brought in civilization and prosperity, and which generously granted to Congolese their independence. The United States Government did not use its UN veto right in this shameful affair. America, by the way, has never used it in spite of a hundred Soviet vetos in less than twenty

years since the UN Organization was founded. So America lacked the courage to back Belgium in its Congo police action.

In Katanga, nevertheless, there was no question of allowing UN troops to penetrate their territory. And they were not wrong since these troops came from Ghana, and Guinea, both Communist countries, and from Ethiopia and Morocco, nations with a not-so-brilliant standard of civilization and known for anti-European sentiments. Katangans realized that the UN formula for the Congo, and for them in particular, was dangerous: troops of leftist flavor were attempting to strangle the pro-Western Katanga while helping Lumumba to spread Communism over the Congo. Tshombe had maintained one hundred Belgian military men in his army and was feverishly recruiting mercenaries in Belgium, Rhodesia, France and South Africa. Among these "mercenaries" there were volunteers, Belgians, and other Europeans who had lived in Katanga for years. The one hundred Belgian officers and noncoms, in any case, did not deserve the label of "Affreux," or mercenaries, since they were paid by the Belgian Government and temporarily loaned to Katanga as military technicians. Moreover, when independence was granted to Congolese, Belgium had preserved the right to maintain paratrooper units in different military bases to be withdrawn only when the situation permitted, that is to say, when order and calm would have rendered their presence superfluous.

The United Nations obtusely commenced its work: tense quietude replaced the disorder which had existed. Except for Katanga, Congo life was laden with anxiety and danger, from which many Europeans massively fled. Very few dared return to the areas where they had lived for many years. In Katanga, once Major Weber and his paratroopers broke the mutiny, the European population, which had left for Rhodesia, returned to their homes.

The UN, rather than uniting itself to its objective of maintaining order, ignored most fratricidal fights, neglected the protection of Europeans and their property and played the part of the blind and deaf, except for abetting Lumumba's movement which was shaking the whole Congo. By mutual agreement, America and

Russia abstained from sending either Western or Communist forces into the Congo turmoil, resulting in a decision to send "neutral, non-aligned" troops and representatives. It was better than nothing, and the solution was spurred by the fear of provoking another "Korea." Unfortunately, the neutralist troops engaged in political manoeuvring on Lumumba's side and America reaped the trouble of controlling and correcting the leftist errors.

In August 1960, Dag Hammarskjöld, the late UN Secretary General, made a speech asserting that "the Katangese secession is an internal political problem of the Congo. In this affair, the UN, as a Peace Organization, cannot take one side or the other: The sending of UN troops to Katanga does not mean at all that we take position in this affair. The United Nations cannot afford to influence the weight of personalities, groups or doctrinal schools which might prevent a solution of this internal political problem. I am convinced," added Hammarskjöld, "that everything can be avoided if the United Nations will act firmly, clearly and tactfully within the limits of its goals."

Sincerely or not, the late Secretary General wanted to appease the Katangans' fears to enable UN troops to enter their territory. Hammarskjöld's statement did represent traditionally noble UN principles and coincided with its official purpose in the Congo: few doubted his sincerity. But Katangans were instinctively suspicious and wanted other guarantees. On 12 August 1960, UN Headquarters in New York officially declared that "their organization could not be used for the benefits of the Central Government and thus to force on Tshombe's Provincial Government a specific behaviour." The same day, Hammarskjöld obtained Katangese permission to land in Elisabethville in order to apprise himself of the uselessness of bringing UN troops to Katanga, and to discuss the problem of Belgian officers and mercenaries serving with the Gendarmerie. Hammarskjöld took advantage of this authorization by bringing a company of Swedish soldiers, the first UN men to touch Katangese soil. Hammarskjöld alibied that the soldiers represented his personal escort. Thus, acting by surprise, he forced Tshombe to accept the escort, once again, re-

peating his formal guarantees. It was promised to Katangans that no other UN troops but Swedish, Irish and Danish would be brought to Katanga, and that "neutralist or pro-Communist" soldiers from Ghana, Guinea, etc., would be prevented access to this part of the Congo. But Hammarskjold failed to keep his promise and soon after Moroccans, Indians and Ethiopians arrived by plane in Katanga. Tshombe later on, succeeded in obtaining the withdrawal of the Moroccans since the Gendarmerie seemed ready to attack.

As a matter of fact, it was not Hammarskjold alone who persuaded Tshombe to accept Caucasian UN troops in Katanga. Among local Europeans, many trusted Hammarskjold's promises to refrain from politics and especially not to bring other troops than Swedish, Irish and Danish. Moreover, local Europeans and colons currently favored the presence of white UN troops in the possible event of renewed riots and disorders. They almost persuaded tough anti-UN heads by expressing their conviction that Swedish or Irish troops would not act against whites and could be useful if future protection was necessary. The arrival of the first UN troops in Katanga with Tshombe's consent was, therefore, due to a mixture of astuteness and infidelity by Hammarskjold, and also the trust by colons of other whites in UN Headquarters and Military Forces.

The Free World knew, however, that at UN headquarters the "non-engaged Nations" were always voting for the Soviet Union thesis. In 1960, when the UN was asked to intervent in the Congo, there was no doubt that the organization had become the property and tool of the Afro-Asian countries. It seems useful, therefore, to insert a paragraph or two about the errors committed by the Western World, and America in particular, in connection with this organization.

When the United Nations Organization was created, the Soviet Union was given grossly unjustifiable privileges which it was to use and abuse soon and frequently. It is amazing to review the irrational childishness of America in creating this organization, which would one day become hostile to her. America has one

voice at the UN: Soviet Russia has four voices. America is a democracy under a Federal Constitution uniting 50 states (48 at that time) with the Federal Government in control of foreign policy. Soviet Russia is an uncontested dictatorship ruling behind a facade of federation of several states. Soviet Russia was incredibly given 4 voices at the UN contending that Bielo-Russia, or Ukraine and two other phony Republics were entitled to a voice at the UN because their foreign policy was independent of Moscow control. Thus, while America, France, Great Britain, Canada, nations who are democratic and responsible have one voice each, the Kremlin has four, plus the veto privilege. In light of Soviet Russia's political structure with its arbitrary and omnipotent Communist Party Central Committee, the naive kindness attending America's acceptance of Moscow's impudent contentions have provoked the indignation, discouragement, and consternation of all conscious people in the world. It was unthinkable to see the Soviet totalitarian regime with 4 voices at the UN while America, a free country where a State Governor can oppose, or even order State troops to oppose, the Federal Government, has but one voice. The attitude of America regarding Soviet pretensions at that time, illustrates the naivete with which the whole Free World conceived the UN.

Had America been less naive, she would have categorically refused Moscow's claims of 4 voices and would have imposed a strict admittance rule. At the above time, the UN had 108 members representing democracies, monarchies, republics, theocracies and dictatorships. (It now has 111.) After the last World War, in which America had substantial participation, Americans should have assumed clear, definite control over the UN Organization and refused the veto right to Russia. But very gradually, the UN has received into membership newer and more under-developed countries, dictatorships, and marionet governments. A mass of delegates from the Eastern European countries occupied by Russian troops, representing their absurd puppet governments, have dared to defy America, to attack the Western Europe and to insult the Free World. These delegates represent the will and whim of

Soviet Russia. After evidence of the Hungarian revolt in 1956, I do not believe that a rational person can consider the Kadar Government qualified to speak at the UN. There is no doubt that America, the father and mother of the UN, should have quickly revised the UN Charter and qualified the admittance of new members by free elections under UN control for governments claiming admission. Once the captive nations, or more precisely their tyrants, were accepted by the UN and given a voice in the name of their oppressed people, another avalanche of newly independent states requested admission and were accepted. It is astonishing to see America, and especially France and England, conceive and promote a world organization with delegates representing governments and not nations or people, unless one believes that Kadar speaks for Hungarians and not for Moscow. Hungary, Poland, Rumania and every other country occupied by the Soviet Union has no right to representation at the UN. Governments installed by force may convoke a body of United Governments, but sit without credentials in a United Nations Organization. These delegates of phony governments, are now deciding the destiny of the world, in concert with neutralists, non-engaged and under-developed nations which together constitute a majority in the UN General Assembly.

America should initially have imposed stricter qualifications to bar admittance of undesirable and unworthy members, and to accept new members only temporarily pending verification of their true representation as indicated by free elections supervised by the UN Organization. The United Nations should have given new countries the privilege to participate in debates as observers, but without voting rights since justice and wisdom seldom prevail when young states deal with international politics. But Western Europe and America acquiesced to participate in an international organization in juxtaposition with dictatorial regimes and immature nations, and to abide by majority rule when the destiny of other nations and of the world was involved. Such myopic and indulgent behavior by the West has precipitated decay of the organization, and its dominance by the Afro-Asian Bloc. We have

created a weapon which has become an instrument of our own destruction.

Under these circumstances the United Nations came to the Congo to solve its problems. Troops were loaned to the UN mainly by Ghana, Morocco, Ethiopia, Tunisia, India, Malaysia and Nigeria, while a battalion of Swedish and Irish, and a score of Danish and Norwegians completed this heterogenous international army, giving the impression that only neutralists were dealing with the Congolese affair. An observer might wonder if there is not decay in the white race that they must resort to Ghanaians and Ethiopians to preserve peace and order in a troubled area. Is it not a condemnation of our society to partially convert, partially civilize peoples and then abandon them before qualified to govern or discipline themselves?

When Lumumba was eliminated by his compatriots, the Soviet Union, to cover its followers at the UN, declared that she was against the UN action in the Congo and she refused, with the most incredible hypocrisy and impertinence, to support the UN financial problems in the Congo. There were two good reasons for this: first, to hide the fact that she was directly influencing the neutralists and non-engaged UN members in an affair led for Russia's benefit, and secondly, because she observed that America was clumsily presenting herself as the principal protagonist and financial supporter. Thus, the responsibility and eventual accusations following a failure of the UN in the Congo would be imputed solely to America. The composition of the UN forces permitted the Soviet Union to act through the susceptible underdeveloped nations.

The UN entered politics; abandoned its initially limiting task of maintaining order and of being a peace organization. We shall see how and why the UN acted as a political instrument.

LUMUMBA IS DEAD, LONG LIVE LUMUMBA

With Lumumba as head of the Central Government moderate leaders such as Kasavubu, Ileo, Mobutu, Bolikango and Tshombe

understood that there was no issue to the Congolese crises, and that in spite, or because, of the UN presence nothing could be settled as they wanted. The cold war had reached the Congo for everyone to taste, since the Soviet Bloc sent its messengers and agents who were fomenting disorder, disunity and insecurity. Kasavubu, as President of the Congo Republic revoked Lumumba, and Lumumba, in turn, revoked the Chief of State, Kasavubu. Everybody was doing whatever he pleased, and the new Government of Ileo accepted by Kasavubu looked very ghost-like. Meanwhile, Lumumba had already sent his "Armee Nationale Congolaise" (ANC), hurriedly recruited from among former police force mutineers and unemployed Africans, to South Kasai for the purpose of liquidating his enemy, Kalondji, who had just declared the independence of his Diamond State.

In Stanleyville one of Lumumba's closest aides, Gizenga, was making life unbearable; practically all Europeans had left the area and "jungle law" replaced previous tranquillity and prosperity. Under these circumstances, Mobutu, a debutant journalist who had become a full colonel in the A.N.C., suddenly arrested Lumumba following Kasavubu's dismissal of "general" Lundula. But Lumumba managed to escape and sought protection with the UN, and more exactly, with the Nigerian unit in Leopoldville. Lumumba, however, was angered by the UN's failure to liquidate his rivals and antagonists; Kasavubu, Mobutu, Tshombe, Kalondji, nearly the whole Congo. If Tshombe accepted in his territory only European UN troops, Lumumba, in contrast, asked the withdrawal of all white UN units. Lumumba accused Dag Hammarskjöld of being the Colonialists' tool and immediately accepted Soviet aid in the form of 30 Illyouchine planes and hundreds of technicians. Fortunately, Mobutu, seeing the lethargy of Ileo's government in getting rid of Lumumba, executed a coup d'Etat and formed a "Conseil Universitaire"; in fact, a government of Congolese students or recent graduates from College or University. Lumumba's Government refused to relinquish its power. In Leopoldville, Lumumba was always under UN protection where he started, without success, to agitate the masses and the army

against Mobutu and Kassavubu. During the middle of November 1960, Lumumba attempted a flight to Stanleyville but soldiers loyal to Mobutu caught him en route and returned him to Leopoldville. The Congo and the Free World was relieved; but Lumumba's affair had not yet run its course. From his cell, he continued to stir up African supporters and it was obvious that his control was not insignificant. There was no sign of tranquility: in Stanleyville several anti-Lumumbist supporters of Kalondji were massacred under the impassible eyes of the local UN unit. Kalondji, who decreed himself King of S. Kasai, did not hide his desire for revenge. A plot to kill Lumumba was under way in Leopoldville between Mobutu, Kasavubu, Kalondji, Bomboko and other Congolese leaders exasperated with Lumumba's political mess. Kalondji proposed to put Lumumba on a plane and fly him to Bakwanga, capital of the newly autonomous Diamond State, for deportation. Lumumba was put on board a DC4 piloted by a Briton, by which several officers from Kalondji's army undertook the task of deporting him to Kasai. However, the plane could not land in Bakwanga because UN troops had been stationed at the airport. Thus, after a short conversation with Elisabethville, and unforeseen accident, the pilot changed heading, eventually landing at the Luano Airport in Katanga. Meanwhile, aboard the aircraft, Kalondji's officers had played "football" with Lumumba and his two companions, the ministers Okito and Npolo. I was informed that a dozen wooden cases of beer were thrown at the prisoners heads and, at one point, the "game" became so violent that the pilot had to caution the guards lest they jeopardize the flight. During this savage fight between Lumumba, his aids and Kalondji's men, the pilot received permission from Elisabethville to land there. This was early January 1961. At Eville airport, Lumumba and his ministers wounded and dying were carried out of the plane in front of Munongo, Katanga's Minister of Interior, who observing some white officers approaching the scene, ordered them away, saying it was none of their affair. The prisoners, or what remained of them, were taken behind the airport to the farm of a Belgian colon. There, according to my informants,

Munongo said to Lumumba, before the later gave up the ghost: "We shall see if you are as immortal as people say." Then he plunged a bayonet into Lumumba's chest. Even before, Lumumba was very near death since he could not talk, move, or even groan. A mercenary later claimed to have shot Lumumba in the head in order to spare his agony. However it was, all agree that he was already mortally wounded on arrival.

For more than two weeks the secret of Lumumba's death was scrupulously kept by Europeans and Africans in Katanga who knew the story. Not until 11 February did the Katangan Ministry of Interior issue a press communique announcing that Lumumba had escaped, and that a good reward was offered for his capture. A drama of verification was arranged in which Munongo showed journalists a cabin in the bush where Lumumba and his friends had been imprisoned, and from which they escaped by stealing a car. Nobody really believed this. But an explanation by Katangan authorities had to be given. Several days later, Munongo announced to the press that Lumumba had been caught by villagers near Elisabethville and killed, together with his two supporters. In late February at the dinner honoring some friends, Kalondji presented the ears and glasses of Lumumba, his trophy. Lumumba's body was burned in sulphuric acid so that no trace of his tomb would remain. In this manner, and according to African traditions, Lumumba was positively dead and powerless because his body could not be found.

The facts surrounding Lumumba's death have lost their significance. But of continued consequence was the fact that Lumumba did not die aboard the plane, but rather finally expired on Katangan territory. Tshombe and Munongo were, therefore, automatically responsible for the pro-Communist chief's death. The Soviet Union and its Afro-Asian barking dogs started a violent propaganda barrage and a concerted campaign against Tshombe, his country, and all who sympathized with Katanga. Nobody can approve or condone political assassination but for the Soviet Union to decry such action is truly incongruous. Lumumba was a demagogue, a sympathizer if not a Communist,

and moral author of death, rape and mutilation for hundreds of Africans and colons. The Kremlin leaders, who are recognized experts in political assassination, dared to bemoan Lumumba's death not because he was a human being with the rare gift of human life, but rather because he was an easy tool in Russia's design for control of the Congo. Tshombe was completely guiltless in the whole affair.

Mobutu encouraged the formation of a new Ileo Government and offered Tshombe the job of Vice-Prime Minister, Tshombe, assured of considerable autonomy by Mobutu, did not exactly refuse the offer but proposed, instead, a Conference of all Congolese leaders with the purpose of creating a Congolese Confederation of States. On the 28th of February 1961, Ileo and Kalondji came to Elisabethville. Together with Tshombe they agreed to tell the UN that its presence was no longer necessary in the Congo, and, moreover, it was considered dangerous for Congolese. The three leaders decided to hold the Conference as soon as possible in Tananarive, the capital of Malgassy Republic headed by Philibert Tsiranana.

In Stanleyville, meanwhile Gizenga was thundering his allegation of being heir to Lumumba and chief of the legal Congolese government. The Soviet Union rushed to Gizenga's aid hoping to cultivate the same friendship she had enjoyed with Lumumba. Moscow knew that a solution was far from fruition, but meanwhile she could fish in troubled waters where hungry fish will grab at any bait.

On 8th of March 1961, in Tananarive, Tshombe's proposed Conference was held. Tshombe led the debates as initiator of the confederation formula. The Katangese Constitution issued on 11 July 1960, indeed, permitted the formulation of a Congolese Confederation but stressed clearly the Katangans' aspirations to be associated with other Congolese Provinces providing they are politically organized with respect to rule by law and order. The most prominent figures at the conference were Tshombe, Kasavubu, Ileo, Kolondji, Adula and Bolikango who all agreed in creating a Congolese Confederation. Gizenga had been invited

to the conference but, obeying the advice of Moscow, refused his participation. Everybody returned to their homes and everything seemed arranged between Congolese leaders. But the UN had something to say about confederation, and the Soviet Union was setting the tone for its puppet chorus to cry for unity of the ex-Belgian colony.

The Tananarive Agreement was an impressive attempt by Congo leaders to run their own country without outside interference or help. Had it been encouraged by the United States and the Free World, it would have succeeded in avoiding three UN wars and would have legally consolidated the Congo.

But it was blindly scorned by the United States following the lead of Brussels which visualized a unity based upon a document called the Fundamental Law, which had been written by Belgians with a view to cooperating in the future with a Centralized State. If Belgium was animated by a certain egotistic idealism to maintain a united Congo, it proved equally ignorant of the tribal structure and of the impossibility for independent Congolese to live under an African Government sitting hundreds of miles from their territories. As we said at the beginning, the Congo had an homogeneous administration during Belgian colonization but it never had the qualifications of a nation. The two hundred tribes living here believed that after independence there would be equality with Europeans, subsequent expulsion of the colons, and ultimate sharing of their properties. They expected from political independence a life free of working duties and free of problems, where everybody was entitled to act as he choose, and while obeying only the authority of the local traditional tribal chief.

When Belgium quit its colony and left behind the slogan "Unity and Lumumba," America concurred, thinking that the Belgians knew what they were doing. This is the origin of the United States policy regarding unity of the Congo. Later on, under Afro-Asian pressure for the maintenance of unity, America entered the conflagration and, within the UN, took up the torch for unity. It is probable that by supporting the UN action, America expected some measure of control over the UN force, but, more signifi-

cantly, she expected to form a Central Government with pro-Western leaders. There is still another excellent reason, i.e., to deal with one incapable Congolese Government rather than with a dozen federated or confederated governments. This calculation is perhaps sound, since the balkanization of the Congo would have multiplied the opportunities for Communist penetration.

On the other hand, a centralized regime is easier to take over in one coup, which probably won Russian support.

But had the Tananarive Conference succeeded even a little, the UN would have lost face and its stock at this time was already very low. The United States could not permit either Kennedy or the UN to appear to have fumbled the situation. But here was their opportunity to show a spirit of impartiality and good will. It would have encouraged Africans to stand on their own feet and to stop acting like children who must be helped over every obstacle. Instead, they used every device to scuddle the agreement.

America, although initially misled by Belgian behavior, reacted generously but not always in the best interests of the free world. Russia made the developing crises an excuse for non-payment of its dues to the world organization. Too many in the Free World are naive enough to continue grasping at Khrushchev's Pavlovian straws of honesty. At any rate to cover the nefarious activities of pro-Communist Lumumba, the Kremlin's propagandists more shockingly impressed the world with the death of one African than with our knowledge that millions have been executed or worked to death behind the Iron Curtain.

O'BRIEN, TOMBELAINE AND CO.

The initial task of the UN in the Congo, as described by the late Dag Hammarskjöld, was certainly in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. But the United Nations should not have rushed to immediately expel the Belgian troops. Belgium had its obligations not only to its subjects who were in danger, but to the Congolese themselves. The United Nations should have taken into account the realities, the obligation of the Belgian

Government in the Congo, and thus, have shown some understanding, by being firm with Lumumba and his acolytes who were insolent, and demanding.

The United Nations action in the Congo bore a great responsibility. This organization is seeking world prestige, responsibility and authority, but before these are possible, the UN must understand the country wherein it is to intervene. The UN, by which I mean the Secretariat and its permanent staff at Headquarters, should have thoroughly known the difficulties and conditions they would encounter by entering the Congo. Consequently, the UN should have assembled all prominent, popular Congolese leaders through skillful, moderate and diplomatic means; even more through friendliness. The UN vainly pretended that it came to the Congo obligingly, which was continually stressed through their porte-parols voices. The UN was certainly friendly to the Central Government but not to other important leaders and people, who also had ideas and opinions regarding unification. The UN sent to Katanga, several ambitious and presumptuous civil servants who, from the very beginning, expressed their hostility to Tshombe and to Belgians; representatives such as O'Brien, an Irish intellectual but very tactless and obtuse; or Tombelaine, a sort of messenger whose specialty was press conferences and insulting Tshombe and his government. Such lack of diplomacy in its representatives precluded a UN solution to the Congolese crisis and Katanga's secession. I hesitate to generalize or criticize all the UN staffers, but I was firmly convinced while living in Katanga that few among them were genuinely concerned and that most, in fact, pursued personal gain and ambitions. As functioners of the world organization they were very well paid and frequently too zealous in their rigid application of policy. In order to keep their positions, they blindly accepted orders received from headquarters, even though contrary to existing conditions. An organization of this nature must be sufficiently flexible to arrive at the best solution even though possibly contrary to preconceived policy.

In one particular shift of UN personnel, Dumontet, a moderate and understanding French teacher with measured influence over

Tshombe, was replaced by O'Brien and Tombelaine. Dumontet had quickly realized the difficulties of the Congo crises and tried with moderation and tact to find the best solutions. But his kind was replaced by men like O'Brien, Tombelaine and the Indian General Radja, whose presence and policies are responsible for the two wars which burst in September and December of 1961. I have met Tombelaine, a product of the French Bourgeoisie, who openly expressed his hatred of Katanga and especially Belgians. I remember the evening I was introduced to Tombelaine in the lounge of the Hotel Leopold II. I have never seen anyone so tactless in human relations as was this man. He did not spare a word of criticism on every facet of Belgian accomplishment in the Congo. Although a recent arrival in the Congo, I was obliged to interject that if Belgians had committed errors, it was not the UN's mission to piously gloat and castigate in retrospect, but rather to mend and repair. On the basis of his Western European background, I questioned whether he felt compelled to prevent UN support, if not complicity, with the Communist Bloc; whether he believed that selection of troops from Ghana and Guinea would perpetuate Communist policy; whether it is the duty of the Free World, through the UN, to prevent the terror of Communism from reaching Africa. I directed queries toward possible replacements for the expelled Belgian technicians, because if the UN staff was to fill the gap I doubted not only their sincerity, but their ability to analyze local problems and their desire to guide the Congo on the path of democracy and freedom. I believed that Ghana, Guinea, and Egypt could do great damage to Africa. With a disdainful smile, Tombelaine replied, "You are a fanatic, you see Communists everywhere. I can assure you that there is no Communist infiltration in Africa; that Ghana, Guinea, and Egypt are not even pro-Communist countries." I quote this conversation to illustrate his naivete or his dishonesty to admit his obvious sympathies. This UN official, according to his friend O'Brien came from the *Haute Bourgeoise Francaise* but he wanted to become an American citizen and, had married an American.

UN representatives, both civilian and military, deported them-

selves as conquerers in Katanga. When I first arrived, I had no understanding of the atmosphere or group relationships. But one fact became immediately apparent; the clash between colons and the UN staff. In attempting to resolve the conflict I found errors on both sides, but was still shocked by the calculated crudeness of certain UN officials and military units. Tombelaine, during his frequent press conferences, bombarded us with eulogy and pleasantry on the United Nations while castigating Katanga. He also attended Tshombe's press conferences purposefully attired to show disrespect and contempt—without a jacket or tie or socks, just trousers, open sandals and a transparent short-sleeved shirt. Through the sandals his big toe constantly fidgeted showing an inner nervousness, possibly from being an unwelcomed guest. I can still visualize Tshombe's shocked expressions at Tombelaine's shoddy attire.

THE UN AGAINST TECHNICIANS

One task of the UN's mission, as outlined by the Security Council, was the expulsion of all European and Belgian officers, non Coms, mercenaries, and "political advisers." The European advisers were called "technicians," which they were, indeed, each a specialist in his particular field. There were 400 Belgian civilian and military technicians and 300 European teachers in Katanga. The true military and political advisers numbered no more than a dozen, but they served as Cabinet chiefs for Tshombe and his ministers, and hence, in reality, guided the entire Katangese Administration.

In July 1960 the Belgian Government had decided to send Katanga a technical mission to help the Government organize its departments. The chief of this mission was the future Minister of African Affairs, Count d'Aspremont Lynden, assisted by Spaak's Chief of Cabinet, Rothschild. Both agreed in the appointment of a professor of Sociology from Liege, Mr. Clemens, to lead the work of the technical mission, who, in turn, hired ten assistants, most of them former students. The mission arrived in Katanga soon

after independence, prior to which Tshombe's advisers consisted of several local merchants, several colonists, one or two lawyers. These men had prepared the secession. After independence, Belgians from other parts of the Congo who served with the Colonial Administration were hired through the Belgian ministry for African Affairs for Katanga, while some had served the colonial government for years.

In sending the Clemens' Mission to Katanga, the Belgian Government apparently wanted to avoid the economic and administrative chaos of the rest of the Congo, and, although silent, was probably equally interested in unity, including Katanga. But on the latter subject, Brussels remained sphinx-like, without instruction or even recommendation. They were similarly reticent toward Clemens' Mission, and the military and civilian technicians regarding activity in Congolese politics. The only one who seemed to have had instructions was Rothschild who, after a dispute with professor Clemens, returned to Belgium. Rothschild sought to implement the policy of his government, namely, cooperation with the UN and national Congolese reconciliation, while Clemens followed the policy of independence preached by Tshombe and by his advisers.

Clemens remained in Katanga as a political adviser and member of the Belgian Technical Mission. But he was not the only political adviser, for Tshombe had a real pleiad of consultants, both official and occult. I must reiterate that Tshombe's advisory staff, both political and military, never exceeded a dozen. But the UN officials were convinced that the only obstacle to Congolese reconciliation was the presence of European technicians including those dealing with social, economic or administrative matters. During 1961 the UN struggled to expel the real advisers, but also unoffensive technicians, officers, non Coms and mercenaries. They never completely accomplished this goal. Other Belgians would replace those expelled, while the covert types—the merchants in their warehouses and shops, selling soap and cars by day and received by Tshombe after dark—carried on undetected. The official counselors had their names on the doors of their offices

in each department and were known by everybody, except by the UN which was feverishly preparing daily a list of new "dangerous" advisers to be expelled, forwarding it to Tshombe. The vast majority of technicians in Katanga were former civil servants of the Colonial Administration who had the status of any Belgian State functioner and was entitled to promotion, vacations, retirement and pension. One third of their salary was paid by the Belgian Government while the Katangan Authorities paid two thirds. Therefore, all these technicians under direct supervision of Brussels, were paid and administered without a modicum of political guidance.

Officially, Belgium favored Congolese unity, but unofficially, backed Katanga's cause by permitting its officers and mercenaries to serve with the Katangese Gendarmerie. Officers loaned to Tshombe did not lose their privileges to promotion or retirement and they received their regular pay. From this confusion in the attitude of the Belgian Government towards its military men and technicians, a sharp fight resulted between the latter and the UN, and a fratricidal fight between technicians. Moreover, hostility became apparent between Katanga's technicians and those of the Central Government: both groups were Belgian subjects. The UN, of course, took advantage of the confusion and dissensions between Belgian technicians, and obtained lists of advisers and Belgian officers serving with Katanga from Brussels itself. Until the middle of 1961 Belgian officers and non-coms wore their Belgian uniforms and were easily recognized. They even participated at the head of Tshombe's Gendarmes units in the parade celebrating a year of independence in July 1961. The military parade was very impressive with jet-planes flying overhead—a veritable small army.

TECHNICIANS AGAINST TECHNICIANS

There is no doubt that the expulsion of scores of advisers and one hundred Belgian officers and non-coms resulted from Brussels having furnished the United Nations with the names of all

its employees in Katanga. To expel them, the UN frequently resorted to force, as when Irish troops entered the house of a Belgian colonist suspected of being Tshombe's occult adviser, arrested him after mistreating his sons and even firing several shots. The UN officials contended that their men had had to protect themselves against a ferocious dog who attacked them. On another occasion, the UN encircled the unfinished city hospital building and arrested 50 mercenaries and Belgian officers who, by the way, offered no resistance. These men left Katanga several days later from Luano Airport: many were accompanied by their wives and children.

In April 1961, Tshombe was arrested and made a prisoner in Cocquilhatville. He was traveling there, against the advice of several European consultants, in order to consolidate the agreement reached in Tananarive on Congolese confederation two months before. Arriving in Cocquilhatville with his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Evariste Kimba, and with political adviser Belina, Tshombe was received like a king by crowds of people. He distributed piles of cigarettes, shook hands left and right, greeted the African population and retired to the airport lounge to confer with the Central Government messengers. Among them were Ileo, Bomboko, Bolikango, Adoula and others. According to later rumors probably encouraged by Leopoldville, Tshombe was too sure of himself, and egged on by the forceful Kimba, arrogantly treated his colleagues with tactless disregard. But more likely he smelled a rat and became anxious. It is unusual for Tshombe to seem arrogant; it is not his nature. He was understandably anxious to finalize the agreement which they had all signed at Tananarive. He also had found on arrival that the Leopoldville leaders had brought a huge entourage, which he had not done, and which was unnecessary. He was later accused of trying to impose his viewpoint without listening to the arguments of the others. But these arguments had already been made and disposed of and his manner and words implied this. That his co-signers sought an excuse to delay and renig was obvious. It had evidently been planned. The Leopoldville leaders suddenly arrested him at gun-point. He

was taken into custody, suffered various vexations from his guards and was put in solitary confinement. The UN and the United States instead of offering their services to help seek a fair decision remained strangely silent.

In Elisabethville, many soon gave up hope for his safety, fearing his guards would surely shoot him. At UN Headquarters and within other circles hostile to Tshombe, it was thought that a prolonged detention meant the crumbling of Katanga like a castle of sand. They had under-estimated Tshombe's real popularity and Katanga's strength. Katanga stood fast for several months. Munongo, Minister of Interior, assumed the leadership of a triumvirate and started manoeuvring to obtain the release of Tshombe.

Tshombe's absence, however, allowed for various blunders by Munongo who, although a modest man, had no political or diplomatic proficiency. He unfortunately succumbed to poor suggestions by his own advisers. Some wanted to see Munongo become the Prime Minister and even the President of the State in Tshombe's prolonged absence. A group of Frenchmen, a press correspondent and Munongo's chief of Cabinet were encouraging him to decree himself the dictator of Katanga. But Munongo proved to be a modest man, loyal to Tshombe. Moreover, in his desperate wish to free Tshombe, Munongo tried to generate sympathetic influence with the UN.

The Afro-Asian Bloc in its eagerness to discredit the Tananarive Conference which had succeeded in spite of them almost to complete ratification, now that Tshombe was a captive tried to drag out the Lumumba murder and pin it on him. But they dropped it like a hot potato when the ramifications of the plot led directly to Adoula, Kasavubu and Mobutu! Discreet negotiations between Munongo and UN officials through the intermediaries brought to light the UN's real intentions and hand in the intrigue, when they suggested a barter: Tshombe's possible release in exchange for a large force of UN (Indian) troops in Katanga. Following the bargain, several thousand Indians under the command of General Radja landed in Elisabethville, establishing

strong positions around the airport, digging trenches and filling them with machine-guns and mortars.

Heretofore, Katanga had seen only two battalions of UN forces—one Swedish and the other Irish. By April relations between UN and Katangans were very tense. Advised by Professor Clemens and Belina, the Katangan President had declared a state of enmity vis-a-vis UN. Tshombe prohibited shopowners from selling to UN troops. He ordered the water and utility companies to cut water and light supplies to Swedish living in the airport area. On the 4th of April, Katangans seemed decided to throw out all UN troops. An impressive political demonstration was organized on the Main Post Office Square and several thousand Africans armed with guns, "Pou-pou" guns, spears and jungle knives were determined to march on the Airport and dismember all UN soldiers. An incident had occurred on the previous eve at the airport when some Swedish soldiers wanted to disarm Katangan policemen who were standing guard duty next to the UN troops. There had been no injuries other than dented egos; a simple fight for prestige, rather childish, provoked the tension. In the afternoon of the 4th, a formidable crowd began marching against the airport located 10 kilometers from Elisabethville. I jumped in my car and arrived at the Airport before the crowd. The first rioters were already there, looking cruelly at the poor Swedish soldiers crippled by fear; they had ripped the UN Flag and they were sharing the rags, laughing, dancing and showing their trophy. Fortunately Tshombe also preceded the mob, arriving at the airport with several police platoons. Tshombe talked to the crowd and the policemen gently dispersed the rioters by telling them that any incident could be fatal to them. But the UN troops were really scared and several weeks later taking advantage of Tshombe's arrest in Coquilhatville and of Munongo's bargain, massive Indian troops arrived in Elisabethville. UN officials, however, did not raise a finger for Tshombe's release, breaking its promise to Munongo, which was unofficial of course. Tshombe was finally released, however, resulting primarily from a huge bribe given General Mobutu, which proved sufficient to support the entire National

Congolese Army for several months. But the two months of Tshombe's absence permitted the expulsion of his advisers, and costly mistakes made by Munongo. The principal adviser to Munongo had previously been Munongo's superior in the colonial administration and was disdainful of Tshombe's advisers, particularly Major Weber. UN officials pressured Munongo to expel Tshombe's advisers, and Munongo abandoned them to their fate.

When Munongo and his advisers realized that the UN did not want to help the liberation of Tshombe, their thoughts turned to blackmail. Since America apparently did not want to back Katanga's secession with its anti-Communist orientation, the alternative was to offer the Soviet Bloc some friendship. In a press conference, Munongo announced the impending dispatch of messengers to the Iron Curtain for contacts in view of future economic and cultural cooperation. But Moscow did not bite. Whether the Kremlin did not know the Katangese situation (or perhaps saw through the technique) or because it was difficult to change its position in regards to Lumumba's executioners, the fact was that the Soviet Union remained silent on the offer. Tshombe returned to Elisabethville after Mobutu's direct intervention and was received by his people with impressive enthusiasm: Africans and colons were almost delirious over his liberation.

* * *

A good friend, a technician and a close collaborator of Tshombe, related to me several months ago that the worst enemy of the technician is the technician. I personally observed, during my stay in Katanga, countless varieties of intrigues between technicians. There was a fight between Belgian and Non-Belgian technicians and then a fratricidal fight between Belgians themselves. In Katanga the pandemonium among Europeans was equally provoked by the presence of UN troops as by the presence of several groups of technicians. These were the "true founding fathers," who had come to Katanga long before thoughts of independence, and were "alone" loyal to and worthy of Tshombe and the secessionist cause. Then there were "the imported ones" who came from Belgium

with the Technical Mission—"the Clemens's boys." The latter did not have the sympathy of the older group who regarded them as adventurous children with their suit-cases already packed if the situation becomes dangerous. There was another category of "imported technicians" who worked in the Congo before independence, but not in Katanga, and joined Tshombe's cause only after 30 June 1960. As a matter of fact, this group became more zealous, more fanatical supporters of Katanga's secession than any other faction. There was also a fourth category of technicians, the non-Belgians; Frenchmen, in particular, but also Swiss, Italians and Jews. Against this category, the unity of Belgian technicians was solid, with concerted effort to ostracise or exclude them.

Thus, Kibwe (Christian name-Jean Baptiste) the Minister of Finance, was strongly criticised for his reproachable activities of having opened accounts in Belgian banks totaling several million dollars, and hiring as personal advisers a group of itinerant, professional Swiss economists. This Swiss group had served in Argentina for Peron and in Egypt for Nasser, and in Katanga they tried to bleed the Union Minière and increase government revenues. The Swiss experts were constantly prodding Kibwe and other Katanga officials to threaten the Union Minière with reprisals and possible nationalization. The group's ulterior motive was to enrich a small Swiss Bank, since one of their requests was that Katanga deposit its money in hard currency in their bank, where, of course, they were stockholders. But the Union Minière did not succumb.

Then there were the French. The first to make his mark in the Congo was a former Colonel from Indochina, Trinquier, who in March 1961, with a score of mercenaries, attempted a coup d'Etat to expel Belgians and seize control of Katanga. Belgians replied by asking Tshombe to dismiss Trinquier. Another Frenchman by the name of Martin was hired by Samalenge, the Minister of Information and Propaganda. He arrived in Elisabethville after Trinquier's dismissal and wanted to control the radio and the whole Information Department. This French technician who claimed to be a former reporter with Radio Europe No. 1 was quickly unmasked and when his phony biography was disclosed to the local District

Attorney, he fled to Rhodesia to avoid arrest. A third French "expert" on propaganda was a certain Letellier, a 35 year old with a nervous condition of biting his nails to the bone. He controlled the Information Department after Samalenge's death and became Tshombe's first counselor during the crucial hours of late 1961, when war was at floodtide.

If French technicians were graft-ridden opportunists struggling to overthrow Belgian control, the French mercenaries, in contrast, exhibited a valiant attitude and were the pillar of resistance against the UN attacks during December 1961.

All things considered, the UN took advantage of fratricidal fights and dissension among technicians in order to expel all non-Africans who possessed any influence or control in government. Once deprived of its counselors and its European corps, Katanga, and the Gendarmerie in particular, commenced a painful struggle for survival. Although other technicians replaced those expelled, and new mercenaries were recruited, most of these were less capable than the first and their responsibilities and relations with Katangan leaders were less consistent. These new technicians seemed to fear the insecurity of their positions and proved less candid in their advice. In my opinion, Tshombe and his African collaborators were initially fortunate to have courageous, responsible advisers such as Major Weber who dared to bang on Tshombe's door and threaten resignation if they were not obeyed. But when this "cadre" was expelled, all of Katanga suffered from the insecurity, indifference and political ignorance of the new advisers.

After independence and until August 1961, Tshombe had what is called "a brain-trust" of counselors. But even then, one could feel the growth of internal dissension and the budding intrigues. No African Minister had had the courage or desire to defend an adviser or to hide or protect him from expulsion. Without hesitation or regret, the ministers permitted deportation of the very men who wrote their speeches and press communiques, who taught them all they knew as politicians, statesmen, and heads of departments. It is easy to recall the vascillating temper, the complex-

ridden character of the African politician who attributed his success to his own capabilities.

Tshombe, alone, seemed to understand the use of white technicians and opposed, as much as possible, their expulsion. Thus it was Tshombe who defended the necessity of having non-African judges and district attorneys. He knew that whites were rendering justice vis-a-vis Africans, that Belgian judges and prosecutors were men of integrity who were not taken in by favoritism and tribalism as were African civil servants. Actually, an African suspected and arrested for theft or murder preferred to be interrogated and judged by whites than by his own people. Were he a member of a different tribe than the African district attorney or policeman, he knew he could expect maltreatment or jail, even though innocent. Tshombe finally accepted the Africanization of his justice corps but the 7-8 African judges and prosecutors were adequately controlled up to capitulation by their European colleagues. Without a predominantly non-African staff, justice in the Congo does not exist. For theft, robbery, embezzlement, and similarly common felonies, only colons are as yet qualified to render justice to infringements of the law and of human rights. Until the majority of Africans have cultivated acceptable standards of responsibility, loyalty and integrity, the Congo must continue to employ whites as book-keepers, cashiers, judges and district attorneys.

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If upon cursory examination an outsider was initially influenced by Katanga's military and political force, and continuity of thought and purpose, he would soon perceive an inverted background of petty rivalry, improvisation and generally inept administration. The Congo's drama and tragedy is partly a result of Belgium's technicians having abandoned their primary purpose of administration to assume a voice in policy and politics. In Katanga, they perpetuated the separatist movement which was to prevent any consolidation or constructive progress in any field. In Katanga, everyone was involved in politics; everyone had an opinion. There was admittedly a healthy pro-Katanga spirit, but it suffered from delu-

sion and fragility; it disintegrated the day that Katanga displayed its political and military weakness in the face of United Nations' action to crush forever the Katangese secession.

CHAPTER VII

THE UNION MINIERE AND KATANGA

If at this point you were to conclude that the "Union Minière means Katanga," I would be inclined to correct you with "Katanga is the Union Minière." Without this mining company with its investments and its profits, there would be neither Katanga, nor independence, nor wars. The Union Minière brought happiness to its country but the profits of copper also rained misfortune.

We have previously discussed the circumstances by which King Leopold II discovered the copper deposits and in concert with Belgium's largest commercial enterprise, the Society General of Belgium, began to exploit the wealth. The association thus formed was called the Company of Katanga. The British, meanwhile, were not sitting by idly, although they had unwittingly permitted Leopold to grab the copper concession as a result of mistaken identity by the local reigning chieftan.

The British, Sir Cecil with Rhodes' Company which was already developing Rhodesia and South Africa, knew that Leopold, alone, was unable to consummate such an adventure. The copper deposits are 2,000 km. from Africa's eastern coast and there were no transportation facilities. Britain recognized that before the deposit could be worked, tons of excavating and processing equipment would have to reach the area; every pound of machinery imported and every ton of processed copper exported would have to transit one of the adjacent British colonies to reach the sea. With this thought in mind, Rhodes began construction on a railroad through Angola

and Mozambique subsequently suggesting to Leopold a sharing of facilities providing he would extend the line through Katanga. The Belgian monarch accepted, of course, and in exchange for use of the British railroad, permitted a London firm, "Tanganyika Concessions, Ltd.," to participate in the Company of Katanga on the basis of 40% of financing and profits. The compromise permitted the British to share in the exploitation of the mines, but assured the availability of access to the sea for the latent wealth.

Since the Company of Katanga had several types of enterprises, in 1906, the associates created an exclusive mining company entitled, "Union Minière du Katanga." The initial capital investment was 10 million Belgian francs collected by the issue of 100,000 shares, divided equally by the Societe Generale and the Tanganyika Ltd. 60,000 additional shares have been granted to the "Compte Special du Katanga" while another 40,000 were offered to Tanganyika Ltd. as encouragement to its own exploration. When, in 1908, King Leopold donated his share to his country the Belgian Government replaced the King in the company. At the present time, the Union Minière has nearly 1,200,000 shares issued with a capital investment of inestimable value. What is certain, however, is that since 1911, when the first copper ingot left the plants in Elisabethville, the total revenue has been roughly one-half billion dollars. The net benefit of the Union Minière in 1960 was nearly 36 million dollars.

Following the Congo's independence, Union Minière stock plunged from \$320 to \$26 for one-tenth of a share. Today, Union Minière stock is owned by the following five general categories of investors:

Societe Generale de Belgique	5 per cent
Compagnie du Katanga	9 per cent
Tanganyika Concessions Limited	15 per cent
The Central Congolese Government	19 per cent
Private shareholders	52 per cent

These figures are, of course, approximate since there is always fluctuation in the market. Nevertheless, it shows the relative participation in the company's activities. The Societe Generale holds

a portion of the Compagnie du Katanga stock, and also controls many shares ostensibly owned by "private shareholders." In this category, some French financial groups have a 25 per cent holding from the total of 52 per cent. We should also note that the Societe Generale owns shares in Tanganyika Concessions, Limited.

With the advent of independence, the Central Government assumed rights in the Union Minière previously held by the Brussels Government. Since 30 June, 1960, the Union Minière had paid royalties, taxes and benefits which formerly had gone to the Leopoldville Government to the Katangan Authorities. Katanga had an intrinsic but no legal right to these revenues but the Union Minière could not gamble with the secessionists who did, in fact, control the region and could conceivably curtail or terminate their operation through strikes or forceful occupation.

It is ironical that in the activities undertaken by the Union Minière, British and French groups are directly and substantially interested. But the Union Minière and its shareholders, Belgian or non-Belgian, had no real interest in Katanga and its independence. The Union Minière could not care less to whom it pays 19 per cent of benefits, taxes, etc., as long as it can peacefully develop the mines. For that peace, the Union Minière paid the revenues the Central Government should have gotten to Moise Tshombe precisely because they could work and cooperate with the local authorities. When the Central Government succeeded, with UN help, in crushing Katanga's secession, it offered the Union Minière even more advantageous conditions, and Union Minière's management quickly shifted its tribute.

THE TRUTH ABOUT KATANGA'S FABULOUS WEALTH

The Union Minière is rather effortlessly developing half a dozen mines in South Katanga. I said "rather effortlessly" because in contrast with other mining centers around the world, the copper in Katanga is practically at the surface of the ground precluding deep, costly excavations. The Union Minière operates in the open air, so to speak, and 300,000 metric tons of copper are processed an-

nually from plants. In addition, the company annually produces 9,000 metric tons of cobalt, zinc and manganese. The copper mines in Katanga are estimated to have reserves for 200 years. But, the particular significance of these deposits is the fact that the mined ore, the "malachite," contains 5 to 15 per cent pure copper, whereas, in Chile, America or Canada, the relative yield seldom exceeds 1 to 1.5 per cent. This means that the Union Minière productivity is nearly 10 times greater than other copper mining operations in the world with the same amount of workers and equipment. Katanga's total copper production ranks sixth in the world, following Rhodesia which recently doubled Katanga's production.

During the last World War, the Union Minière made a fortune in a matter of years by supplying America with the uranium necessary for the production of atomic bombs. With rare inspiration, UM's manager, M. Sengier, decided that sooner or later America would buy his uranium. So confident was he that he ordered large quantities of uranium sent to the U.S. and stored for subsequent need. When the United States demanded that the Union Minière supply her with uranium, Sengier replied to US officials, who were feverishly prodding him for production, that large quantities of extracted ore was waiting their pleasure in an American warehouse and proceeded to explain his foresight. You might imagine the awesome shock to "responsible" American leaders at their own lack of vision and planning.

The cobalt produced by the Union Minière is principally sold in the United States which, according to Union Minière officials, has already stocked more than 60,000 metric tons; it is no longer a rare metal for the USA. The Union Minière supplies 70 per cent of the whole Free World's production of cobalt. The exportation of copper and other minerals by the UM represents a gross income of 240 million dollars per year, from which the Katanga Government received, in 1961 for instance, more than 100 million dollars. The Union Minière's production costs, payroll and capital investment also totals nearly \$100 million yearly. This leaves a net profit for dividend distribution of roughly 2 million dollars. However, during 1960, UM profits reach 36 million dollars; an envi-

able return in any financial circle. The Union Minière, and especially the Societe Generale, control a multitude of subsidiary companies in the Congo ranging from hydro-electrical plants and railroads to manufacturing plants like METALKAT. The three dams constructed and owned by the Societe Generale and the Union Minière — MWANDINGUSHA, FRANQUI and DELCOM-MUNE—represent one of Africa's greatest present needs; namely, electricity. The Union Minière investments in Katanga are officially estimated at 300 million dollars.

The Union Minière's revenues, from which Katanga has substantially benefited, look fabulous in comparison to other African countries with trifling hard currency incomes. Nevertheless, these revenues are not spectacular by worldly standards: it represents the revenue of a half day in the United States. Greece has a yearly income of more than 150 million dollars solely from tourism. Before independence, Katanga's revenues were filling the budget of the colonial Administration to the extent of 40 per cent. With this money, the Belgians have built Leopoldville and other cities, roads and harbors, but left Elisabethville in pitiful condition. Finally, if 100 million dollars per year looks excessive for the needs of this province, one should note that since independence Africans in Katanga are spending more, because their wages and needs have perceptibly increased. Of particular significance, however, is the fact that the 20,000 colons and 1.5 million Africans of Katanga subsist mainly on imported goods; everything from flour to butter, from oil to shirts, ties, shoes, radios, bicycles, cars. In terms of agricultural production, Katanga is barren, with the exception of stock farming which has precluded the importation of most meat products. Before independence, when Belgian authority prevailed, most Africans were somehow gainfully employed, with many producing manioc, corn, palm oil, coffee and cacao. Today, the Congolese stand with their arms folded: The plantations are abandoned. The flour mills and factories have curtailed production, as have fishing companies—there are no workers. The whole Congo survives on imports, whereas previously the Congo enjoyed a healthy balanced budget.

The natural desire of Africans is to raise their standard of living, and to do so rapidly. Modern life and sophistication are equated with the numerous exotic imported goods, none of which are made in Central Africa. The African quickly learns the meaning of progress; if several years ago he could travel 20 miles per day by foot, today he is barely satisfied with a bicycle, preferring a motor bicycle or a car. Due to the mineral wealth, Tshombe permitted his compatriots to enjoy the life of a "coupon-clipper." Money flowed steadily into the State chests from the only real producer—the Union Minière. Colons, undoubtedly, also benefited from the wealth since they were well paid, able to save money and to take advantage of transfers at the official rate.

When the Central Congolese Government assumed power through independence, they also inherited the Belgian government's interest in the Union Minière, amounting to 19%. Tshombe effected a similar transfer when he declared secession, justifying his seizure on the basis of self-determination of a nation of people; and contending that he had saved the province and the UM investments by the same token. Tshombe had, in fact, prevented chaos and disorder when he resisted the mutiny of the police force, which led him to believe that nothing was more normal than to seize the mining revenues so that the Union Minière became the cow with milk for only Katanga.

Leopoldville could boast of no Union Minière but there were a multitude of small companies and plants which were processing palm oil, coffee, rubber, wood, peanut oil, etc.

One might say that the Union Minière is for Katanga what the Casino of Monte-Carlo is for Monaco and its handful of subjects. If the Monte-Carlo roulette wheels would stop there would be no money in the Principality chests and the citizens would experience difficult times in trying to keep their economy alive. It is the same for Katanga. The day when the Union Minière chimneys cease to smoke, Katanga will die like the ghost towns of western America. The great majority of enterprises exist because of the Union Minière and its needs. Some natives recall that during the last war mining operations temporarily halted; and his very existence

was threatened. Only tragedy can result from Katanga's failure to continue its farm production; they must now import rice from Burma, manioc from Rhodesia, palm oil and corn from Angola. All these products are essential to the African diet and were previously produced in sufficient quantity to be exported; but today they are purchased with hard-currency. The economy suffers from deficit spending, debt, and unfavorable balance of trade. The Congo is living on credit and charity from Belgians and Americans.

SOCIAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

The Union Minière is equally significant in terms of social progress as in economics and finance. Some figures will illustrate this fact. The mining company employs 20,000 African workers and nearly 2,000 colons. The 20,000 non-whites, in turn, provide a living for more than 100,000 souls since the average family has at least 4-5 children. The average worker lives with his family, and often his entire clan, in a two-room house provided with water and electricity, which the Union Minière has built and financed for all its workers. The company has built and continues to support 125 elementary schools, nursery schools, professional schools and even several Gymnasiums. There are approximately 25,000 students enrolled, with about 800 studying at the Gymnasiums (secondary schools). In addition, 3,500 adults are attending evening schools. In the field of education, one can see that the Union Minière plays an important role in the African's life. Moreover, the UM prints 25,000 copies of a weekly newspaper "Mwanashiba" (Our copper) for its agents and workers in the native language (Kiswahili).

In terms of health, the Union Minière has built and supports five hospitals and a score of dispensaries and maternity clinics staffed with 32 European doctors, one hundred white nurses and one hundred African nurses. The medical care given the sick is worthy of any civilized country, particularly considering that when any native is hospitalized, the whole family appears and camps in the yard, often fed by the hospital.

The houses which have been built for African workers will become their personal property after twenty years, or less, by monthly payments equaling 8 dollars. For its European agents, the company has built a total of 1,000 houses of 2-3-4 rooms with all modern comforts. But these houses are put freely at the disposal of its agents. The social work accomplished by the UM for the benefit of its African workers is estimated to have cost more than 100 million dollars. One must walk in the Company-built African cities and districts to realize what this company has accomplished in the past 60 years for Katanga. The UM has left extensive evidence of civilizing action, Christian spirit, generosity and constant concern for improving the African's life. The Union Minière has perhaps committed mistakes in other fields, but in terms of the African's welfare it is above reproach.

These activities and accomplishments of the Union Minière are omnipresent in South-Katanga. The asphalt roads, churches, schools, hospitals, swimming pools and sports stadiums have generated pride in the minds of company personnel, too frequently developing into snobbery. I have observed that high ranking personnel of the Company rarely mix with other Europeans working for the Administration or in private enterprise. Many UM agents have had their calling cards printed: "Mr. ——— from the Union Minière," as the company is the Royal Family of Belgium.

The fabulous copper mines of Katanga have become a legend, and in the process have been greatly exaggerated. Admittedly, the Province is not poor, but it is less richly endowed than Rhodesia, South Africa or the rest of the Congo. Katanga's relative affluence can vanish with a super-production of world copper as occurred after the last world war. And if modern technology should find an inexpensive substitute Katanga will have no buyers for its copper. Even now, the Free World's copper requirements are largely supplied by America, Canada and Chile. There is apparently increasing saturation of the world copper market and the UM resists competition because the quality of its mines is a bargaining factor. The UM has generally succeeded in selling its copper production but sometimes there are delays for lack of consumers. Thus, from last year's

production they stocked 50,000 metric tons of copper, and with America stockpiling 60,000 metric tons of cobalt, Katanga's annual cobalt production (9,000 metric tons) might find prospective buyers scarce.

As a result of Katanga's inherent wealth the Belgian Government administered its colony with little financial burden until 1950. The taxes collected from Africans were comparatively trivial, even when discounting the pervading tax evasion practiced by the natives (a seemingly universal characteristic!). The Belgian Administration exasperatingly resorted to corporal constraint against Africans who refused to pay the minor amount of taxes; if caught, he was to work in lieu of his unpaid taxes. In certain regions of the Congo an entire village would flee into the bush when it was known that a tax collector had arrived. Often, the collectors had to give up because regardless of their precautions to arrive unannounced, the tom-tom telegraph would always precede them, and the village would be deserted. Some Territorial administrators became so angered by the rapidity with which the tom-tom announced their whereabouts, that they even thought of prohibiting its use.

In order to pay its agents and to cover other local expenses, the Union Minière must bring in hard currency to be exchanged at the official rate with the National Bank of Katanga (The transaction must now pass through an intermediary—the Congolese Monetary Council). During the colonial period and even a year after independence Katanga's currency was sound, but with secession, confusion, war and worry, the local franc is worth but one-tenth its original value. But the Union Minière still converts to Congolese francs at the official rate of 50 fr to \$1. I was assured that the Union Minière management had never exchanged its currency on the black market, in sharp contrast to United Nations personnel who dealt with the black market from the beginning.

Katanga's geographical location is a consequential factor in its political behavior, especially when thoughts of independence are harbored. Katanga depends upon copper, and copper depends upon transportation which must be borrowed from neighboring Angola,

the Rhodesias and the other provinces of the Congo. The resulting uncertainty coupled with the general lack of government control over the Union Minière prompted one zealous African Minister to suggest to his advisor that they compel the Union Minière to sell its copper on the local market—on Katanga soil. The advisor did not understand so the Minister explained his “ingenious” idea with comparison to the African villagers who come to the open market and sell their tomatoes, peppers, mangoes, bananas, etc., questioning why the Union Minière could not proceed likewise and place its copper on a local market where Americans, French and Belgians could come to buy. The Adviser politely but carefully replied that 300,000 metric tons of copper would be most difficult to display on the market. Another African Minister, questioned the efficiency of paying transportation costs to Rhodesia and Angola when this money could remain in Katanga. When his adviser requested clarification, the Katangan leader meditated briefly and declared that the Minière could afford to buy airplanes and transport the copper directly to Brussels as Sabena Airlines does with passengers and freight. The anxious Minister was not convinced that the freight potential of the entire world’s air fleet could probably not accommodate Katanga’s annual mineral production. This idea of transporting the copper by plane was deeply implanted in heads of various high officials in Katanga. I once dared to suggest to a good African friend that even though Katanga might succeed in its independence, it could never be really independent because it must depend on good neighbors who would let Katanga transport its copper to the ocean. The African dignitary bluntly told me: “In that case we’ll send our copper by plane, we have lots of planes. . .”

POLITICAL DUPLICITY AND POLITICAL STUTTERING

If Union Minière’s social, educational and industrial accomplishments defy criticism, the company’s post-independence political role is totally out-of-character and deserves critical analysis. It is indeed astonishing to note the UM’s lack of political influence over Tshombe and his government. Such an important and responsible

company could very well have influenced policies which would have saved Katanga from many troubles. Since July 1960, the UM has been constantly harassed by the Katangan Government and especially by the Finance Minister and its group of Swiss advisers. Incited by his Swiss expert, Finance Minister Kibwe incessantly pressured Tshombe for larger revenue demands from the Union Minière. Two particular schemes were proposed, popularly known as "the two pipelines," for the purpose of extracting a 100 million dollar advance. The first proposal would have required a deposit with the government equal to the total value of the copper before export—similar to a bond. Whereas previously, royalties were only paid after the copper had been exported and sold. The second attempt to produce revenue would have required royalties on all minerals which were being stock-piled, rather than waiting until they were sold and removed from Katanga. Although the total-value-bond proposal is obviously preposterous, the second idea apparently has its counterpart in other mining and petroleum companies who pay revenues on products which are stored for future sale.

Charges of dishonesty and business stupidity were heaped upon the Union Minière when they refused to accept these changes, but from the company's perspective there was little justification for confidence in the integrity or the very future of Tshombe's government. Tshombe's regime had received no official recognition, nor was it inherently stable. Finance Minister Kibwe was considered the most intelligent of Katanga's leaders, although his background and experience was as a clerk. His honesty and integrity were not above reproach and he was certainly not the economist which his position required. Kibwe had heard that a delegation from the European Common Market was intending to visit Katanga and he sought an explanation from his advisor. The explanation revolved around the gradual suppression of trade barriers and the attendant advantages and disadvantages of such a system. Kibwe apparently understood and with serious tone concluded: "Very well, I see. Consequently, besides the Common Market there are two others, three markets in all . . . There is the Common Market

you just spoke about, then the open market and the closed market." Now it was the advisor who needed an explanation. "In the indigenous City we have the open market, in open air, where people sell and buy vegetables, fish, etc. There is also the closed market that you Europeans created in Elisabethville, the same market but with a roof."

This was the mentality of the African economist who desired to monitor the Union Minière's business transactions and accounting system. Needless to say, a number of Katangan officials who would have liked to check the UM transactions in hard currency did not know its meaning; their advisers had to explain "hard currency" and the banking operations necessary to use money. Among the "eager-to-check" were those who would have wanted to sell copper in the local open air market. And how can we speak of economic and financial experiences of the new African leaders without reference to UN officials like O'Brien, who envisioned the nationalization of the Union Minière to entrust the enterprise to "open-air-market" supporters. Cruise O'Brien, conspicuously insisting that he was not a Communist, had an obvious dislike for capitalism.

During the 2½ years preceding January 1963, when Tshombe's government capitulated, they had obtained roughly 240 million dollars from the Union Minière in payment of royalties, taxes and other assessments. The largest expenditures were made for the Gendarmerie—rifles, sub machine guns, mortars, grenades, trucks, cars and airplanes. The 30-odd airplanes purchased ran the gamut from Fuga Mystere and Vampire to Dornier, Comanche, Harvard, DC3, DC4, Piper-Cub and helicopter. The money spent for air power was literally wasted because nominal pilots quickly ruined the equipment and those craft which could fly were rendered useless by UN air superiority. The Katanga "Air Force" was abnormal, if not a farce; good mechanics were a rarity and spare parts were equally elusive. One pilot of Canadian origin had single-handedly demolished a dozen aircraft in the relatively simple routine of "takeoff" and "landing;" he was never injured. The Mercenary Corps and newly appointed African officers reportedly expended

millions of dollars for the purchase of trucks and jeeps. The remaining income was spent between various companies, factories and importers for goods and services, and for the transfers of Europeans working in the Administration. And if the merchants or traders had trouble obtaining hard-currency and import licenses, they had merely to cultivate the friendship of a Katangan Minister. The "margoulins," as they were called, had their pockets filled with import permits, and traded in a variety of commodities but usually in Rhodesia or Angola, wherever the currency exchange rates were most advantageous. Profits of 300% were not uncommon.

The Katangan Government never released a reliable financial statement. For the first six months of 1962, the National Bank of Katanga asserted that its income from royalties, taxes and revenues had been nearly 37 million dollars. The Government was always "short of money" and the budget unbalanced, which was intended to give Leopoldville the impression that there was no money to be shared. The secessionist government published an official budget which everyone accepted with tongue-in-cheek. Authoritarian regimes have never given reliable account of their monetary affairs and Katanga was no exception.

HAD THE UNION MINIÈRE ACTED FIRMLY

In the game of tennis, a player seriously handicaps himself by playing mid-court—half-way between the net and the baseline. Similarly in politics an individual or interest group must become fully involved or completely withdrawn; there is no effective mid-court. Had the Union Minière been as intently adept in politics as it was in business there would probably have been no story for me to write. But the UM persisted in mid-court political maneuverings, exhibiting timidity and hypocrisy. Their officials violently denied any participation in Katanga's policy saying, "Our policy is to produce copper." It was not true. The Union Minière became involved in local politics with a half-hearted, amateur spirit. The mining company began political activity during the pre-inde-

pendence elections by extending financial and moral aid to both contesting parties, the Conakat and the Balubakat, since it was not sure of the outcome. A few Union Minière directors were backing Tshombe while others were secretly financing Sendwe. Once Tshombe had gained the elections, financial support to the Balubakat was less important but the UM maintained good relations with Sendwe and the Central Government for precaution. "Let us have friends all over the place," was the prevailing attitude.

Sendwe led a violent campaign against Tshombe among Balubas and succeeded in creating a North Katangese Province with the capital in Albertville. At the present time, Katanga has been split into three provinces; the North, the Lualaba and East Katanga. Union Minière mines are located half in East Katanga and half in the Lualaba Province. The decision to split Katanga was made by the Congolese Parliament in June 1963, with the intention of ruining Tshombe's authority by requiring new elections. If Tshombe enters future elections, he might become a Provincial President, but with only a fraction of the money or authority he previously commanded. Balkanization of the Congo, which was seemingly the major issue against Katanga's secession, has now been practiced in extensive proportions. There are 23 Provinces in the Congo compared to 6 following independence. (Though it is an administrative balkanization it is not unity as first envisioned by any means.)

But returning to the Union Minière, we recall that when Tshombe decided to secede, the company overtly encouraged him because, basically, the Gendarmerie was the only semblance of protection, security or stability in the area. With the risk of shocking many anti-capitalists and crypto-Communists, I should say that as a matter of opinion the mining installations and the resulting profits do not belong to Congolese or to Katangans. Neither group has had a significant role in developing this industrial complex. It was created by Belgians with their own money. Granted, the Congolese have participated to the extent of supplying workers but this implies no entitlement to ownership, either full or partial. For the labor rendered they have been paid, whether adequately

or not is another question. Admittedly, the copper was and is on the territory of this or that African tribe, but by what right does a population contend ownership of facilities built on its territory by others? By the right of independence? Communists will say by the right of nationalization. Independence does not mean nationalization or even participation in the benefits of an enterprise created by foreigners. It is the drama of our world, of common sense in reverse. It is the mistake of the white race to be taken in by such daring claims. We are for equality and the prosperity of all human beings, but today equality often means robbery in the name of nationalization. I sincerely believe in progress and justice for all people, but this does not permit a newly independent nation whose very existence stems from the economic progress initiated by foreign development of their resources, to piously confiscate all the enterprises and investments of colonizers and foreigners. There are legal and equitable procedures for obtaining control of business companies, but nationalization is not among them. Africa's present potential for economic growth is limitless, and there is sufficient space for Africans, Europeans, Chinese, Indians and any other race or creed interested. But for the emerging sovereignties desiring progress, let them develop the virgin jungle as did the early colons—with their own ingenuity and bare hands. Of course, it is much easier to simply expropriate the ready-made, if unearned, conveniences and facilities, while encouraging new, inexperienced entrepreneurs to bring their money and equipage to develop the fabulously latent wealth (which will be confiscated tomorrow.)

We shall soon see them nationalizing the Union Minière and other industries and factories built by colons. And when the wheels of industry collapse from disrepair or fail from inexperienced handling, whites will be returned to restore the damage. According to the principle of nationalization, we should not be alarmed if one day descendants of the Ottawa Indians seek to become a nation and exercise their right of confiscating General Motors, because their ancestors once camped in that area.

While accusing the Union Minière of timidity in politics, I must recall that they did offer Tshombe a radio station of 100 kw

power. Radio Katanga, in spite of a powerful transmitter, was doing pitiful work, completely at variance with the policy of an independent, anti-Communist state. The Union Minière should have corrected this situation by reorganizing the station, recruiting competent personnel and sharply improving the programming quality. I discussed the glaring deficiencies of Radio Katanga with several mining officials hoping to persuade them toward revamping the station. Their reaction? "We do not mix in politics." What hypocrisy—what unconsciousness. . . . The UM mixed in politics through covert activities of advisors and officials; the UM was involved in politics when it paid Tshombe's regime the revenues belonging to Leopoldville. The Union Minière mixed in politics when it attempted to persuade Tshombe to fire various advisors who advocated increased taxes for the UM or adoption of the "pipeline" systems. Unconsciousness, because the responsibility of a huge enterprise in a relatively helpless and underdeveloped nation does not cease when social and economic progress is made. The company, if genuinely interested in the indigenous population, must monitor and promote intelligent political behavior to achieve peace and security for everyone.

Fearing the accusation of having made marionettes of Tshombe and his ministers, the Union Minière denied any political influence while acting secretly and timidly. The company had nothing to be ashamed of with regard to its social and economic benevolence. I remember a conversation with one of the mining directors in which I expressed my concern of never having witnessed on American television a program about the Union Minière's contributions to Katanga during the past 50 years. An American company would not think of keeping such commendable activities from wide dissemination. Of course, the director agreed and assured me that the Company was seriously envisioning some publicity. If it is still being envisioned, it is too late.

In July 1961, the Union Minière, together with other local companies and the government, organized an international industrial and commercial exhibition. In spite of political problems and friction, rather impressive displays were arranged purportedly depict-

ing Katanga's industrial and commercial strength. Whatever the original intention, the net result was an increased emphasis toward independence and belief that the world would quickly recognize their potential. But the exhibits and displays were exaggerated and misleading; industrial and commercial strength of this magnitude did not exist except in limited degree with the Union Minière.

In another example of political inactivity, the Union Minière gave tacit acceptance to the appointment of a Liege University sociology professor to lead the technical mission and serve as advisor to Tshombe. To hear the eulogies chorused by his entourage, one would imagine Professor Clemens to be a political and diplomatic genius. His knowledge and understanding of Africans as gathered from several previous short visits in the Congo may have been adequate although I observed that he was devoid of all organization and had difficulty in gaining Tshombe's confidence. By the end of 1962, through the influence of the Rector of Elisabethville University, Clemens had succeeded in establishing his position and influence. My criticism of Clemens' group applies less to their overt anti-Americanism than to their complete ignorance of the possibilities and impossibilities of which the USA is capable in international relations. Each time I talked with one of Clemens' aides, I would hear violent attacks on American policy and I realized that they knew little of the capacity or limitations of America in international politics or, even more inexcusable, of politics in Western Europe and their relation to Katanga. Clemens and his group of disciples were prejudiced by the eagle on my passport, immediately concluding that as an American I was incapable of understanding the situation in Africa; they were sure of their facts and decisions. They were convinced that America coveted Katanga's copper wealth and wanted all Belgians out of the Congo. They also believed that Katanga's cause would eventually triumph, that Western Europe, particularly France and Great Britain, would support them, even against America if necessary. Sometimes they were convinced that America would change its policy toward Katanga overnight, that she would ignore the rest of the Congo and the Afro-Asian Bloc and risk everything with an abrupt change

of policy! The Professor's followers could not focus on the selfishness and cheap interests of Europe in connection with the Congo, but were certain that America was the nefarious perpetrator of their ills. The combined effect of misinformation about America, fanatical idealism, and tunnelvision with respect to Katangese politics led them on a restrictive path of immediate goals abruptly culminating in unconditional surrender.

One year earlier, when Katanga was yet strong and feared and on equal footing with Adoula, there would have been few obstacles hindering a satisfactory agreement. Even after the wars of September and December 1961, they could have persuaded Tshombe and several capable leaders to join the Central Government and propagate from within a federalist drive. Nobody wanted to make a conciliatory political step. Most every Katangan, regarded it as utopian and feared that Katanga would crumble in Tshombe's absence. Supposedly, Tshombe was the only possible leader for Katanga. Obviously no single man is that indispensable; Katanga did not exist just because of Tshombe but also because of the whites who were silently and unceremoniously guiding the whole administration. During Tshombe's absence other ministers proved that they were able to maintain order and to sign whatever was given to them for signing. I considered Tshombe to be an exceptionally charming African personality with common sense, who was equal, if not superior, to Adoula. Western Europe and America were favorably disposed to Adoula for his pro-Western political outlook. The Free World would have liked to reinforce Adoula's Government with Tshombe, but he and his advisers feared cooperation and compromise, primarily because it would mean forfeiting a portion of their revenues. They wanted to keep everything they had won and continue living in their rich enclave without care for the rest of the world. Fixation of goals and single-mindedness had blinded them to believe that their equipped but untrained army was capable of resisting any possible enemy. Katanga's leaders used a standard reply to unsolicited advice: "You may be right, but we are stronger than Leopoldville."

In retrospect the reader may feel some of the incongruity which

I experienced in attempting to convince my Katangese friends of their solitary stand on secession, in comparison to Leopoldville which enjoyed support from virtually the entire world; everyone subscribed to the unification of the Congo. But Tshombe and his advisers persisted in their ideas and even began offering small fortunes to anyone promising to effect official diplomatic recognition of Katanga. Fulbert Youlou apparently took advantage of this generosity, but bowing to the desires of his benefactor, DeGaulle, recognition was never forthcoming. DeGaulle had opposed the UN action in the Congo and, together with Youlou, had given the impression of backing Katanga, but they lacked the courage or intentions of dealing with them officially. This example and similar recollections typify the naivete and experimentalism rampant throughout the 2½ years of Katanga's secession. No effort was made to solidify the "country," to organize and streamline its administration, or the army or the police force: the combined effect would have produced a vastly superior bargaining position in the inevitable negotiations for unification. Why had everyone lost sight of local and immediate considerations? Because the whole governmental community was caught up in the glory and intrigue of foreign policy: there was no time remaining for domestic affairs.

In terms of anti-Communist propaganda in Katanga—it was non-existent. One consuming goal hypnotized the new nation: keep the copper revenues for Katanga. All other considerations—the future of the Congo, turmoil and depression in neighboring nations, Communist agitation—were of relative unimportance.

Katanga's enemies were strong with United Nations support, and therefore Katanga's defensiveness took the aspect of suicide. Katanga could have breached its stubborn position and temporarily abandoned its secessionist aspirations. They could have participated in the Central Congolese Government by raising the flag of Congolese unity and watching the UN leave the Congo after satisfying the Afro-Asians pressure. Then in privacy and stability Katanga could have worked toward their desired goals from a position of financial, military and provincial power.

It was painful to see a capable leader like Tshombe refuse to

enter the Central Government from pretentiousness, and become the prey of propaganda from N'Krumah, Sekou Toure and Nasser. But Tshombe and his African friends were too much interested in Katanga as a life of comfort and wealth: and the Union Minière was silent. I came to Katanga full of enthusiasm and hope at the prospect of seeing for the first time since World War II a country which would stand erect in the world rotten with political prostitution and dictatorships. But Clemens and the other nominal anti-Communists were common egotistical men, afraid of decisive action, narrow in vision, and hypocritical in thought. From the day I landed in Elisabethville I was continually shelled with the idea that Africans were not ready for self-determination. But colons and local Belgians fought 2½ years for the independence of Katanga with its 1.5 million Africans.

President Kasavubu exhibited more rationality and common sense than the Belgians when in 1960 he entreated DeSchrijver, the Belgian Minister for African Affairs: "Excellency, I am compelled to request the Congo's independence, but for goodness sake do not grant it to us." Kasavubu knew, of course, the consequences which independence would bring to his compatriots: that without the colons the Congo would revert to primitivism, much as it was eighty years ago. Such truths are discomfiting to certain African leaders but if they had their country's interests at heart they would educate and lead their countrymen to an appreciation of the white man's accomplishments in Africa and the continued need for his presence. But independent Africans, from cabinet Ministers to the lowliest of workers, are now the masters in their country and the colons who have educated, elevated and civilized them are without rights. The white man has no recourse to grievances or justice: he is tolerated.

If in the 11th hour, President Kasavubu acted with political maturity and responsibility, the Union Minière did not. By displaying a not uncommon quantity of courage, initiative and generosity the UM might have successfully given Katanga, if not independence, at least considerable autonomy and tranquility. Aside from the ideological percepts for unification, the obvious reason

for the Congo's resistance to Katanga's secession was the fact that the copper-rich province was the financial backbone of the Central Government. Therefore, the Union Minière could have logically quieted the Central Government with a monetary sap of several million dollars, because, according to a local truism: "In the Congo, money will buy anything you want, body and soul." The Union Minière was in the best position to know this reality. The availability of funds was the least of the problems involved had the Central Government accepted the bribe. The mining company could have afforded the expense itself, if only to insure the tranquility of future operations, since, as it was, the ensuing wars required intermittent interruption of production.

In terms of public relations the Union Minière had overlooked another golden opportunity. The company was indirectly providing scholarships to African students through the Katangan Government for study in Europe and at Elisabethville University. Thus Katangan students in Europe were persuaded that Tshombe himself was paying their studies, while, in fact, the benefactor was the discreet Union Minière. But the Katangan students were unaware of the UM financial help and with their recent educations proceeded to bite the very hand that fed them.

The Union Minière was everlastingly defending itself against a small special interest group or faction in Katanga. And most of its difficulties can be traced to timidity of purpose and indecisive action. For two years the UM was unable to make Tshombe sack his Swiss financial experts who were poisoning the UM-government relationship with the threat of nationalization: the means were available but never used. The Union Minière erred miserably in failing to realize that the paternalism practiced in social and economic spheres was not equally necessary in politics. They never mustered the courage to impress Tshombe with the fact that the interests of the Union Minière were the interests of Katanga.

CHAPTER VIII

TSHOMBE, HIS MINISTERS AND HIS MERCENARIES

Moise Tshombe, with but eight years of formal education, had already had an illustrious and financially successful career. Fateful circumstances have been favorable for him, beginning with his education by a Protestant mission which automatically tended to elevate him. Tshombe is one of seven children born to Kapenda Francois, a merchant and shop owner in Sandoa, and later a wholesale dealer of various and sundry items for natives, with his headquarters near Elisabethville. The elder Tshombe must certainly have been a shrewd businessman to have left an estate of \$100,000 in Katanga. As the first-born, Moise inherited the business at his father's death several years ago, thereafter he mixed in commerce and later politics. With his socio-economic standing he had no difficulty marrying the daughter of Mwata Yanvo, Emperor of the Lunda tribe.

Tshombe, at the age of 44, is not particularly handsome but he does possess a particular charm. With his sense of humor and a characteristic politician's smile, he conveys the image of wholesomeness vital to the success of elected representatives and leaders. Tshombe is one of the few affable African politicians who harbor no inferiority complexes in regards to colons. Kimba and Munongo were not in this category. Tshombe's gregarious character and non-chalance made him extremely popular: even with newsmen and reporters who often raised embarrassing questions, he always had a smile and handshake. He was usually surrounded by his corps of

friends and consultants, which, at one time, included eight European female secretaries. Those who dealt with Tshombe were impressed by his charm and natural manner and some European secretaries and advisers literally adored him. I may sound over-impassioned because it is rare to hear of real affection of a colon for an African. But Tshombe was in fact endeared by colons in Katanga, as well as loved by his own people.

Half merchant and half politician, Tshombe assumed leadership of the Conakat Party prior to independence when Munongo, the incumbent, decided against relinquishing his civil service position with the colonial administration. (Colonial civil service and local politics were officially incompatible.) The Lunda tribe gave him their support inasmuch as he was a Lunda and son-in-law of Chief Mwata Yanvo. With the latter's death last May, and the election of his uncle as new Mwata Yanvo there is no doubt that Tshombe will continue to command extensive Lunda support. At any rate, Tshombe became the No. 1 leader in Katanga, with support from most Europeans and, of course, the UM. His political ambition was not solely encouraged by virtue of his sterling qualities as an African leader and statesman. Even before independence, Tshombe publicly envisioned the secession of the province, almost triggering his arrest. A significant percentage of his friends and advisers were colonist traders, merchants and lawyers who believed that their future was brightest in an independent Katanga: that far-removed Leopoldville was apathetic to Katanga's needs and represented a possible danger to the advantageous import permits and exchange rates. Undoubtedly, among his friends, a few realized that their friendship with Tshombe and the government through secession could present opportunities for rapid fortunes, and to this end they proudly called themselves "Katangans," wore miniature Katangese Flags and the small "croisette," the country's identification.

Tshombe's rising popularity and support among both Africans and colons left little doubt for the pre-independence elections. During this period, the increased activity in and out of his office became delightfully impressive to Tshombe: the very activity seemed more important than the substance because he developed

a habit of signing anything put before him, impervious of its contents. Of equally damaging consequence was Tshombe's complete trust in humanity and his gross indulgence towards friends and ministers: he could never refuse a request regardless of the impropriety. But after approving a scheme and realizing its significance, he would often instruct his lawyers to find legal means of circumventing its effectuation. In terms of will and conviction, Tshombe can be compared to a weather cock which conforms to the direction of the most recently prevailing wind: he invariably subscribed to the opinions of the last person to have left his office, or he was so amiable he seemed to agree.

A particularly strong influence was exerted on him by one of his female secretaries, popularly known as "Mrs. President" or "La Pompadour." While in his favor, she never let him out of her sight and, indeed, determined who would be permitted to see "the Boss." "Mrs. President" reigned until December 1962, just preceding the third UN action, when she was seriously injured in an auto accident while transporting important documents to Sir Wellensky in Rhodesia. She was rushed to Paris where she was treated in an American Hospital. (She hated Americans, by the way.) She left the hospital in March and was joined in Paris by Tshombe, who was there for political and medical purposes. Both returned to Katanga where the Central Congolese Government would subsequently arrest her. But Mrs. President had, you might say, her "ups and downs" in her career with Tshombe; she was sometimes temporarily replaced in Tshombe's favors by other "secretaries." Thus, a local merchant, and a personal friend of Tshombe, wanted to exert a similar influence through one of his secretaries and therefore boasted of her attractiveness and "qualities." The secretary was hired and quickly became Tshombe's favorite, since other advisers approved the change if only to get rid of the tough "Mrs. President." This Belgian secretary accompanied Tshombe to Leopoldville and Brazzaville and the understanding seemed accomplished. But her career was of rather short duration. She was fired and expelled by Tshombe when he heard that she had mistaken a minister's door for Tshombe's, and spent the night with

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another. The poor "secretary" had a very legitimate excuse, however; after all, how does one distinguish one African from another in the dark?

Tshombe is at this writing, in Barcelona, in a sort of exile snubbed by the Central Government and by the UN. Tshombe fled to Europe after an attempt of poisoning by his enemies in Katanga. In his half-voluntary, half-compelled exile Tshombe waits for his return to politics since the elections scheduled for 1964 will certainly try to bring him back to the Katanga stage. On the whole, his behavior as a statesman has been impeccable. Even though his anger at the United States at times induced some intolerant statements, he had been pushed almost beyond human endurance. His nature is not naturally intolerant or vengeful. Contrasted to leaders like Lumumba who was often under the influence of hemp, he is unusually sane.

Tshombe's Government received several setbacks during its first year in the unrelated deaths of three of its ministers: one was killed in a hunting "accident" by a jealous African collaborator; the second experienced a real explosion in his stomach due to pantagruelic meals; while the third succumbed to an overdose of aphrodisiacs. All Katangan ministers and high officials were, however, of poor health; their excessive drinking and ignorance of nutrition sped them quickly to physical ruin. One had tuberculosis, another liver troubles, a third heart troubles but all continued in their luxurious life.

It was not easy to work with these ministers following the UN action of expelling the European advisers. The vacated positions were logically filled by natives. For every colonist government employee, there were scores of Africans who were either boasting of their suits, or deserting the office in order to shop or to have a drink in a nearby cafe. When they became tired, they returned to the office to peck at the typewriter—to learn typing.

One could write a book exclusively about the peculiar mentality of the new Congolese civil servants class. As an example, a particular government minister was scheduled to undergo a minor and insignificant operation on an epidermic cyst at City Hospital. He

was shown to his room by a nurse who returned later to administer an injection, for which he was asked to lie prone upon the bed. The minister categorically refused saying that as a minister he did as he pleased and the shot should be given to him while standing up. The nurse smiled and accepted the man's fantasy. The next day, as time approached for the operation, the nurse came in with a special shirt which, according to hospital regulations, had to be worn by everybody entering the operating room. The minister, rather angered, berated the nurse and reiterated his identity and significance, for which reason he was not an ordinary man, and therefore would not wear the shirt. In afterthought, he ordered her to bring a bed-pan. When she emphasized that he was ambulatory and capable of using the adjacent restroom, he merely repeated his demands. With her patience wearing thin, the nurse left the room, and, of course, ignored his request. When she returned 30 minutes later to accompany him to the operating room, the minister was standing in the middle of his room finishing his physical need: a large puddle on the floor. . . .

The main preoccupations of African dignitaries in the newly independent Congo was the purchase of big American or German automobiles, and the drinking of whiskey and champagne. There was no party without champagne and several European secretaries who took part in these soirees.

In early 1962, the Katangan Government received a visit by an American Negro purporting to be a "military strategist" with the rank of colonel which he obtained in Ethiopia with King Selassie's Army. He was nearly 60 years old and with the nickname of "The Black Eagle" became a very picturesque figure in Elisabethville. In the characteristic heat and humidity when everyone wore light, airy clothes, the colonel was arrayed in frock-coat, starched collar, white gloves, a red carnation at his button-hole, a monocle in his eye and a black umbrella on his arm. He would spend hours on the terrace of the Hotel Leopold II wearing his bowler hat, and resembling a picture from a men's Tailor Magazine of 1900. "The Black Eagle" was suspected by the UN of being a weapons trafficker for Katanga's Gendarmerie, and was finally ex-

pelled and imprisoned in Leopoldville for several months. In actuality, the "Black Eagle" was simply an impressively adventurous charlatan who had promised Cadillacs to various African dignitaries and was also paid to furnish weapons which were never delivered. In that respect, there were many swindling opportunists offering planes and even rockets to Katanga. Katanga boasted of having 400 rockets which the UN gullibly believed: It was, in fact, easier to persuade Katangan leaders to buy guns, planes, and army clothing than flour and gasoline. Local leaders never quibbled with a merchant requesting a license to import whiskey or champagne, but he would have a herculean task to convince them of the general need for paper and pencils. But, of course, they were more familiar with the usefulness of Scotch and Soda than of writing.

For an observer from a Communist dominated regime, the resemblance between Katangan Ministers and officialdom, and their counterparts from behind the Iron Curtain was shocking. Both had a brevity of education, and were previously employed as watchmen or modest workers. But both categories now adore champagne, big American cars and a luxurious life while the masses continue to live in rags. Throughout Africa, independence coincides with dictatorship of the new class. In Katanga, Tshombe's authoritarian regime was backed by just over 50 per cent of the population, while rival tribes were persecuted unless they preached cooperation with Tshombe. Even then, however, rival tribesmen were suspect and subject to arrest at the whim of any policeman who disliked the victim's language or his eyes; maltreatment and being forgotten in jail were their common lot. Belgian district attorneys made frequent visits to jails to free these hopeless victims of arbitrary arrest.

What can be said for the safety of Europeans who continue to live and work in the Congo? They live at the mercy of the African police and the Congolese National Army, most of whom are unpredictable and dangerous. The presence of a white woman in a group of Africans is often sufficient to precipitate their assault upon her. A colon who drives a car and incurs the misfortune of an accident wherein an African is injured or killed is in danger of

being lynched if he cannot escape in time. Not only are white drivers thus endangered, but also African drivers. In Elisabethville an African driver injured a 10 year old African girl, for which the crowd would have killed him had not the police intervened and escorted him to the hospital. Several hours later, the clan of the injured girl came to the hospital and killed the driver in his bed. In February 1963 a European Railroad agent attempted to photograph a group of Africans who were dancing in front of the residence of Ileo, the Congolese State Minister in Elisabethville, after the integration of Katanga. Four ANC soldiers arrested him and atrociously beat him under the perusal of their officers and leaders. Adoula, for whom Ileo was hosting a party, came to Elisabethville that day. Nobody could persuade the soldiers to stop beating the amateur photographer, who was later sent to Leopoldville and accused of fomenting the demonstration against Ileo and Adoula (which had effectively occurred in Elisabethville that morning.) The Railroad agent was sent to Leopoldville on the same plane with Adoula but no one had the courage to enlighten Adoula with the circumstances surrounding the bandaged passenger sitting several seats away.

As an individual, the Congolese is relatively sympathetic and disciplined, but in a group Africans become hypnotized and cruel with their mass power. No one harbors illusions about the treatment given by the police or the National Congolese Army; in Katanga, intervention had to be requested from Tshombe or Munongo personally, whereas in Leopoldville, even executive control over their soldiers is specious. Thus, while the Railroad agent was being beaten by ANC soldiers in Ileo's garden, a minister attempted to intervene; the ANC soldiers told him bluntly: "f . . . nous la paix"—leave us alone," in polite translation.)

"LES AFFREUX" AGAINST THE UN MERCENARIES

In Katanga, the mercenaries hired by Tshombe to train his Gendarmes and to fight for Katanga against the Balubas and the UN troops, were also called "les Affreux" (the atrocious, the

frightful). Tshombe never used more than 300 real Mercenaries. Several dozen served on a voluntary basis because they were either "colons" born in Katanga or had worked and lived there for years. When wars broke out, the volunteers offered their services. Mercenaries were recruited in Belgium, France, the Rhodesias and in South Africa from among former military men, adventurers, and the unemployed. The French mercenaries usually were connected with OAS (Algerian Secret Army Organization) or were veterans of the Indochina war. There were also some Germans, several Poles and Hungarians among them. A mercenary made from 50,000 to 100,000 Belgian francs (1,000-2,000 dollars) monthly. During their service, they lived on Army rations and alcohol was freely supplied. They spent their money only while on leave and then mainly in bars, restaurants and night-clubs. They would exchange their salary for Belgian francs on the Black Market which often brought three times the official rate. The mercenary was often thriftless. Most of them had costly sports cars. Some were married and fathers. If they were killed, their families got up to 20,000 dollars indemnity. If they were seriously injured, they received an indemnity and a pension. African soldiers also benefited from pensions and indemnities. The UN troops have almost the same benefits, especially the Swedish and the Irish.

The nickname of "Affreux" was apparently given to mercenaries by European women who saw youngsters in military paratrooper uniforms and wearing an audacious beard strolling through the town. From the time Katanga declared her independence to the middle of 1961, many Belgian mercenaries risked their lives with a deep idealism. The Balubas were Lumumbist and it was a kind of anti-Communist crusade in which they were involved. It was therefore a "Holy War" for many. Some among the mercenaries were not real soldiers. They avoided fighting as much as possible and were constantly attempting to get medical leaves and official missions behind the front line. The mercenaries were generally good subjects for the international press which often exaggerated either their number or their military value. As I said previously, there were scores of "colonists" among the mercenaries who were

fighting for their own country, Katanga, and who did not deserve the derogatory term. They fought courageously against thousands of UN soldiers in September and in December 1961.

Mercenaries in Katanga could be seen all over in Elisabethville and other Katangan towns, in bars, restaurants, shops and night clubs. When the UN started to hunt them they wore civilian clothes. I remember during the September UN action, seeing mercenaries accompanied by wives and children shopping between fights in the local supermarket in Elisabethville. In the evening, these mercenaries would harass the UN troops hidden in the Main Post Office Building or in their Headquarters at the Claire Manoir. Those who knew the town could easily identify the mercenaries. They sat, nonchalantly, stretched legs on chairs, at various cafe terraces, sipping a Scotch and soda or a beer. They boasted of their military prowess, making grand gestures while dressed in short sleeves, blue-jeans and leather jacket. When the UN received orders to arrest them, each one shaved his beard. "The Affreux" had vanished. During all the Katangan wars, from 1960 to the end of 1962 against the Balubas and the UN troops, the mercenaries lost about 35 men; among them several Belgian officers.

The mercenaries were a common aspect of Katanga's life. Everybody knew them except the UN which finally got a complete list from informers and from the Belgian Government itself. When the UN arrested one, it was not easy to identify him as a mercenary; most of them had false papers and claimed to have a regular job as a bartender, a clerk or a businessman. A dozen were hired by the Union Minière itself and were of course regarded as very respectable people: UM agents.

In spite of mutual hatred and war, there were similarities between the two categories of mercenaries: The "Affreux" and the UN men. Both were very well paid, both spent their spare time and money in restaurants and night clubs. Both enjoyed whiskey, soda, and sports cars, both were eager to make money as quickly and as much as possible without risk. I remember one night that a Swedish soldier, rather drunk, was telling me that he already

had 10,000 dollars, that he had bought an MG car and once repatriated would open a bar in Stockholm.

Very funny scenes occurred between mercenaries and the UN soldiers. One took place before my eyes in late November, 1961. It happened in a bar, opposite the Hotel Leo II. This bar, the Riviera, owned by several Italians, sold everything from alcohol to American cigarettes. One evening, several Swedish soldiers who had come from Kamina for a short leave were drinking and relaxing. At another table a group of Belgian mercenaries and colons were also drinking their whiskey mixed with Coca-cola. Mercenaries are generally polyglots, the UN mercenaries were the only exception. The Swedes however were speaking some English. That evening, two Belgian mercenaries were drinking whiskey with two Swedish soldiers, who were visibly delighted to exchange some words in English while carrying on some black market business. The affair seemed settled and the Swedes, leaving the Belgian's table, told them politely: "Good bye fellows, we'll see you soon." To this, the Belgian mercenaries replied in chorus, but in French: "Au revoir, et bientôt on va vous casser la gueule." (Good bye and soon we'll smack your face). Needless to say, the Swedes seemed very pleased with the mercenaries' greeting thinking that it was the French way to exchange politeness.

The UN, through ignorance or merely to justify the presence of 20,000 men in Congo, of whom more than 11,000 were in Katanga, exaggerated the "Affreux" numbers. In the UN corridors in NY or in the papers which printed UN news, it was given in figures like 3,000-4,000 mercenaries who were welded into an extremely efficient tactical organization. The truth was that there were only 300 men of all nationalities among whom only 15-20 per cent had any real military value. I take permission to make this appraisal because a Belgian Captain who with his men took Manono town in 1961 from the Balubas, told me one night: "Believe me, 15 maybe 20 per cent among us can be considered military men. The remaining are little better than gendarmes. And the blacks," said he, "run away at the first shot. We whites have

to stay behind to prevent them from fleeing and to protect ourselves. If we stay in front, we risk being shot by them. They are so bad."

The African soldier, the Congolese at least, is not a courageous fighter. He fears the noise more than the bullets. I can say that among the 24,000 Katangan gendarmes (representing its highest number at the end of 1962) only two battalions of Bayeke had any military value. If, according to the Belgian captain, such was the situation among his comrades and soldiers, what can we say about the other mercenaries, the UN troops, Irish, Swedish, Indian, Ethiopian, etc? They were even more frightened than the others. They were on enemy territory, they did not speak French, or a native language, and had no desire to be killed. The Swedes were so scared during fights that they played ducks, throwing themselves on the ground or the house floor at the first machinegun burst and then opened fire with their sub-machine guns in all directions without even looking. But we shall discuss the value of the UN men later when we look into the journal of the two wars. However, the Katangese mercenaries and the UN men were well recompensed for their fears.

Sooner or later, the question of whose side was the right side, mercenaries or UN forces, becomes overwhelming. It is rather difficult to answer because we cannot foresee yet all the consequences of the UN intervention in the Congo. If the Congo is not penetrated by Communism because of the UN, the action may be justified. But, if, on the contrary and as I fear, Communism comes to the Congo through UN complicity or inactivity, one might say that its cause was only good and right . . . for Moscow. In addition, the presence of UN troops has not yet solved the Congo's crisis. The chaos is still going on, the economic marasmus is still there. For two years and a half, the Congo knew disorder, misery, confusion and fratricidal fights. The Afro-Asian troops in the UN relentlessly denigrated the Europeans, sometimes inciting the Africans against European inhabitants and properties. The basis of understanding between Africans themselves and between them and whites was seriously shaken and one cannot say that the UN suc-

ceeded in encouraging harmony. This African colony was built by whites and not by Afro-Asians and I do not think that the UN can enforce peace, happiness and prosperity on this area. There are people who will say that both causes are arguable. Perhaps. The Katangan mercenaries, in my opinion, were fighting for a cause lost in advance because the Western World did not back it. But the UN also fought for a lost cause because uniting the Congo by force seems as vain as marriage by constraint. The unity of the Congo cannot be preserved with UN troops, and after their departure conflict will erupt again. Though certain Katangese mercenaries, particularly Belgian officers at the beginning, had a large portion of idealism, it is rather difficult to say that the UN soldier had ideals. The organization, of course, pursued a goal, a controversial ideal, so to speak. At any rate most UN troops had no idea what happened in the country and did not know why they should be willing to die for the Congo. They obeyed orders and accomplished their tasks without any concern about the future of the country where they fought. They did not care about Africans, nor Europeans and their work. For the UN troops, whites were the primary enemies. It is enough to recall the massacre perpetrated in December 1961 by the ANC (Congolese National Army) against 21 Christian missionaries in Kongolo. It is sufficient to recall the massacre committed by the ANC against 13 UN Italian pilots in Kindu. These UN European servants were cut to pieces by African soldiers under the passive eyes of certain other UN troops, non-European, of course. The United Nations was responsible for these atrocities; few voices were raised against the Africans, none against the UN that permitted it. Many UN troops were not reliable and acted savagely and barbarically. Some UN troops senselessly killed men, women and children, other UN soldiers raped and murdered European women. The only thing we can say is that any army in war commits brutal acts, except that the UN army is different, or is supposed to be a different one, an army of peace for a Peace Organization. Instead, this organization conducted a war, several wars in the Congo, and not for its own protection, but solely for political reasons.

*SPECULATION WITH THE FRANC, TRANSFERS
AND BLACK MARKET . . .*

In Katanga there were roughly 20,000 Europeans, of those, nearly 6,000 were working people. Over 2,000 Union Minière personnel while 800 were technicians, civil servants of the Katangan Government, teachers, etc., loaned by the Belgian Government and partially paid by it. Those remaining were private businessmen or employees of private businesses.

An aspect of life typically Congolese, was the transfer. It was, I would say, the capital preoccupation of all Europeans since transfers represented a substantial advantage, a way of saving. Before independence, Belgians in the Congo were generally paid twice and three times as much for similar jobs than those working at home. Take the example of a 30 year old District Attorney. Had he remained in Belgium he could make 12,000 Bf (240 dollars) monthly, receive almost free medical care and other social security advantages, pension, family allocations, etc. From his salary he had to pay his rent and of course pay for family necessities. The same District Attorney coming to the Congo made during the first term (three years of service) 20,000 Bf (400 dollars), had free housing, completely free medical care and double family allowances. The European who worked for a private business sometimes made even more than the young DA and certainly three times more than his colleague in Belgium. After 6 years of service, the second "term," the salaries were, of course, bigger and at the end of 9 years in the Congo, while having a pleasant life the Belgian was saving monthly the equivalent of the salary he would have made had he worked in Belgium, 10-15,000 f. This amount of savings, compared to possible savings made by Belgians at home, was substantial enough and incentive enough to attract Europeans to the Congo. Of course, the European in Africa had to be better paid than those staying home where sickness was not endemic and where security was rather insured. After Independence, the pecuniary situation of the Europeans, civil servants or private employees, improved as their work became

harder and their security more precarious. Because of the portion of their salary paid in Belgium by the Belgian Government, Europeans made a sort of compulsory saving in hard currency. At the beginning of 1961, the salary in Katangan francs allowed them to live a pleasant life. The Katangan Government which replaced their former employer, the Belgian Government, in regard to civil servants, was even more generous, granting a quicker promotion and permitting the transfer of Katangan francs into Belgian francs at the official rate.

A technician like the DA had right to transfer 45,000 Katangan francs on special forms, A, B, etc., and about the same amount through the Belgian Consulate as an advantage offered by the Belgian Government to its loaned technicians. Summing up, the financial situation of the average technician was the following: 12,000 Bf paid by the Belgian Government, 18,000 Katanga fr, by the Katangan Government from which he transferred 4 to 5,000 through the National Bank of Katanga and another 4 to 5,000 through the Belgian Consulate. At the beginning the official rate of the Katangan francs was the same as the Belgian franc, \$1 = Bf or = 50 Kat. fr. but after the first war with the UN, the franc lost its value and attained in late 1962 a ridiculous value—50 Kf = 8-10 Bf, or 1-0 cents. Officially the rate was maintained, however, \$1 = 50 Kf and 50 Bf. Thus when I left the Congo, the local franc had lost 80 per cent of its value. This difference between the official rate and the black market price permitted the technician or the European to transfer 10,000 Kf in one way or another and have 10,000 Bf in his bank. Selling the 10,000 Bf at the black market price, he received 40,000 Congolese francs. Those who had connections could by a system of "Round-trip" transfers multiply their savings. This speculation with the Katangese and Congolese franc, which was half legal and half illegal, seemed identical to the speculation of the "Piastres" by French in Indochina 9 years ago which enriched many Frenchmen. The savings made by technicians and other Europeans in Katanga and in the rest of the Congo were rather important when compared with what people in the Free World, in America, e.g.,

can save. Since the Belgian Government paid part of their salaries in Belgium technicians were "forced" to save, so to speak, and they rarely touched their savings unless it was for speculating in Congolese Francs.

The European in a newly independent African country nowadays lives a moderate life compared with what he had before independence when he did not think too much of saving and enjoyed a luxurious life, new cars, parties, etc. Today, the European's great pleasure, his only luxury, is to have some friends around and drink a bottle of whiskey or go to a movie each time a new film comes. Today people either do not spend money or cannot spend it because shops are empty, food in restaurants is scarce and bad. The European now does not dare to leave his house because of robberies and keeps an eye on his car parked in his garage or in the street.

Because of insecurity following the wars and the presence of so many UN units, the black market flourished in the Congo. Each war disintegrated the economic life, bringing scarcity of various articles and an atmosphere of discouragement and instability. On the other side, the UN troops had plenty of dollars in their pockets and were spending money without any restraint, thus increasing the cost of living. The UN finally gave up the official exchange of dollars in Congolese currency through the National Bank and used the black market channel, as a punitive measure against Katanga. The UN has, therefore, a large part of the responsibility for the devaluation of the Katangese franc and the disorganization of economic life.

After two years of work in the independent state of Katanga, most Europeans, technicians, businessmen, UM agents, etc., saved as much money as a former colonist saved after 15 years of a colonial career. In spite of certain dangers, wars, shooting, insecurity, vandalism, etc., it was an advantage to have a job in Katanga. Life was sometimes monotonous but people, even among dangers, were able to live and earn good salaries. Those technicians and businessmen who had good connections among African ministers and influential advisers were able to obtain im-

portation permits and transfer authorizations and made fortunes in a matter of months. These profiteers worked both legally and in the black market, through traffic of influence and commercial astuteness and unscrupulousness. There was a real race to get importation and transfer licenses and certain whites and blacks who had the right to authorize them were asking 15 to 20 per cent commissions. Price control was non-existent and the Swiss group in particular, because it guided the Economic and Finance Departments, was largely involved in this speculation of the franc. One of the Swiss technicians killed by UN troops when he passed their lines in December 1961, trying to escape to Rhodesia, had on him a large sum of money.

The Katangan ministers formed two groups in regard to their sympathies toward Europeans. Some, like Tshombe, liked Belgians, others distrusted them and only counted on Swiss or French. Thus the former minister of the Information Department, a reveller who enjoyed life in Paris night clubs, returned to Katanga with two prostitutes and a "social" cameraman. The two girls became secretaries while the "cameraman," the official News and Movies "cineaste." Ministers like Niembo and Tshizand also preferred French to Belgians while Kibwe, the Minister of Finance, the Katangese "margoulin," was in business with Swiss experts. His Cabinet Chief, arrested for usage of false titles, offered 60,000 dollars as a bond in order to be freed and expelled.

The control of transfers was very badly organized. An European merchant succeeded in transferring during a year a monthly 2,000 dollars for each person of his family. He had seven children and made a fortune through this stratagem. Another opened three checking accounts in three different banks and obtained, by slightly changing his name, regular monthly transfers.

These transfers were possible because of Union Minière revenues in hard currency following the sale of Katanga's copper. And commercial life had been very prosperous during two years. There was no bankruptcy, no European working for peanuts . . . A small example may suffice. There were three barbers for Europeans in Katanga. They were in such demand that customers were treated

like beggars. One of them when shaving a customer in his shop, would, if he chose, leave him half shaved and go next door to a bar. I had the imprudence to let this barber cut my hair during the December troubles. He was always drunk then and by a miracle I saved one of my ears from his scissors which he handled like a sabre. I, of course, envisioned the possibility of losing my life by UN bullets or being eaten by a Baluba but never did I think to be butchered by an European barber who enjoyed discussing political and military strategy.

Because they were making a lot of money most shopowners in Katanga were arrogant with their customers. This reminded me of life in countries with Communist regimes. Behind the Iron Curtain where the Communists had nationalized all private enterprises, factories, shops, workshops, etc., the salesmen, and saleswomen had become state civil servants, and state employees. There was a scarcity in all goods and the state salesmen thought they were real kings. They sold rare articles to whom they wanted, they were arrogant, dishonest and impolite because there was no control and they could not care less if a customer entered a shop or not. There were too many customers for very little merchandise. So the shopowners in Katanga treated their customers as beggars. The opening hours of shops were never respected and you were thrown out of the shop if you complained about something or discussed the price or the quality. "That's it," said most of them. "Take it or leave it." At one point after the integration of Katanga, you could not buy anything important without paying in dollars or Belgian francs. Few still accepted Congolese francs and only for certain food articles. Prices were tremendously high. Some African dignitaries too looked only after dollars and getting currency in travelers cheques or by transfers. The main concern, as I said was: "how to get a transfer." Whites and Africans alike were tormented by this dream . . . Those entering liberal professions, like lawyers, architects, doctors, etc., declared twice or three times as much as they made to the income tax bureau in order to obtain legally the transfer of half of their earnings.

An importation license meant the authorization to import a

bottle of whiskey for 120 Kf, and to sell it on the black market for 700 or even 1,000 Kf. Others imported against Katangese francs and sold the item against Belgian francs or dollars. Nobody trusted the Congolese franc.

The important gains in business and transfers had, of course, a particular influence on the patriotism of certain "Katangans." These defended Katanga's cause because they wanted to prolong a favorable financial situation. One cannot blame such an attitude too much; it is human. These people were afraid that the integration of Katanga would bring to their country the same economic chaos, the same monetary devaluation as in the rest of the Congo. They feared for their devaluated salaries, for the transfers which would vanish. They were right. After the integration of Katanga transfers became rare and importation licenses obsolete. I could not say exactly to what extent Europeans' love for the country was involved in their patriotism toward independent Katanga. I believe that half of them were pro-Katangan for material interests only, the others shared idealism with their pecuniary interests.

ELISABETHVILLE, THE CAPITAL OF COPPER

One cannot speak about Katanga without mentioning Elisabethville, its capital. But it is not by examining this city that one can know Katanga the Fabulous. Compared to Leopoldville, the Capital of Copper is a provincial town from the 1925 era. The center looks strangely like a Greek village. It is no coincidence that it was built by Greek workers since they were the only masons available at that time in Katanga. All shops in the center have arcades and columns, and again arcades, archways and columns. Several buildings around the Main Post office are of an incredible ugliness. What a pity that the UN did not blow it up when it attacked this building in September 1961. It would probably have been the only useful UN action in Katanga.

There are several beautiful villas in the European residential district of "Les Roches" near one of the most beautiful golf courses in the whole world. These villas were built by private busi-

nessmen or by various companies for their managers and high employees. The rest of the town seems to have been built by people who quarrelled with good taste or by architects with very peculiar diplomas. The Hotel Leopold II, the pride of the Evillois (Elisabethville inhabitants) was ugly, full of archways and columns. It had a hundred rooms, furnished with cheap chairs and beds and bugs and rats flourished day and night. We rarely had hot water since the heater blew up constantly. The telephone was a marvel; you needed an hour to reach a number and that one was wrongly dialed by the operators, all Africans. In this hotel, where I stayed two years with all other newsmen, from 10 o'clock in the evening on it was impossible to get a glass of water or a cup of coffee. There were no more servants. Often I returned to the hotel late in the evening and the only employee who worked was the young African, who was the porter, and the receptionist, who often received one in underwear or even naked, yawning and slapping his face, and his naked body to kill embarrassing mosquitoes. To be honest, before independence this hotel, as well as several restaurants in town, was very well managed. During the wars, we newsmen were the only ones who enjoyed hot coffee and something to eat. This was only because of Mr. Blatter, the admirable Swiss manager who provided for us in spite of bombing and scarcity of food. This hotel, which cost a fortune to be built and later renovated, was forbidden to Africans before the independence. After 1960 the tables were all filled by Africans who were drinking beer by the dozen. When there was no more room in their stomach for beer, they urinated on the palm trees planted on the sidewalk in the front of the hotel. The dirtiness of the town in late 1962 was incredible. Abandoned dogs were loose in the streets, barking and fighting. Yet Elisabethville, compared to other Katangan cities like Jadotville, Kolwesi or Kipoushi, was a sort of Paris because of its shops, restaurants and several night-clubs and coffee terraces. One of the night-clubs, "Le Relais," had at one time an excellent orchestra and in a very European atmosphere, hundreds drank and danced, especially on Saturday nights. Mainly whites came to this night-club, which before 1960 was a

favorite of tourists from Rhodesia and South Africa. In this night club mercenaries and UN soldiers drink "mazout" heavily (whiskey and Cocoa-Cola). Once they left the bar, they would fight in the yard; but no shooting. There was another night club, mainly visited by Africans, "Le Lasso," where the new aristocracy drank and danced every day, not only on week-ends. It was indeed humorous to see Africans drinking. They keep the empty bottles on their table during the night as a sign of wealth and enjoyment. There was also a small, clean bar, "Le Beaulieu," where we could have a sandwich and "soupe-a-l'oignon" at any hour in the late evening or early morning. This bar was managed by two very polite Belgians.

One is astonished when told that after independence, in this fabulous Katanga, no house, no building was built—except one house by a crazy fanatical European who could not transfer his money and who kept hoping in the future. In spite of the money wasted by Tshombe's regime for Gendarmerie, cars and suits, the Capital of Copper did not improve. On the contrary, following the wars, the bombardments, the shootings, windows have broken glass, roofs are full of holes, walls are ruined. There is a certain sad fact in this newly independent country, that most Africans, even if they have money, do not build houses, do not invest their money in other than cars, suits and shoes. Several ministers bought villas or farms but that is all. The high officials, all important civil servants, have houses given to them freely by the Government. These houses had been built and furnished by the Belgian colonial administration. The City Hall building commenced by the Belgians is unfinished because of lack of money. It is true that the UN military intervention and destruction caused Europeans not to invest and build. It will be interesting to see what will happen to the Congo in this field if the African persists in neglecting building, and especially when money will become even more scarce.

It seems obvious that the granting of independence to many African countries has removed any European interest in investments and that this will bring a regress. I cannot see Europeans investing sums of money now for building factories or even a

house in the Congo. Almost all who stay and work there do so with the goal of saving as much money as possible and then leaving.

After each war Elisabethville lost a little more. Restaurants and nightclubs sometimes closed for weeks, other times forever. The shops were empty. After the integration, the city was dead. The UN first set curfew at 10 o'clock in the evening and later, set it at midnight. But the night life was non-existent. People who returned home late in the evening risked being arrested by the ANC or by UN Ethiopian units and being robbed or only beaten up, if they were fortunate. Several were killed. The Tunisian battalion which insured order before it left in late March, 1963, had done a good job. After them the Ethiopians were feared by everybody. The city looked like a sea resort out of season. But the Belgian is stubborn. He clings, hopes, and goes on living and working under any circumstances. In spite of the insecurity, the food scarcity, the robberies, never was Elisabethville more crowded by Europeans. Recently, though, many started to leave or to plan to leave forever. During difficult moments, Belgians tried to get whatever they lacked in Rhodesia. Since it was sometimes possible to get an importation license, people had stocked everything they could and now sold it on the black market against dollars or Belgian francs. One could buy whiskey, for instance, in the jewelry shop, or from the butcher's wife. Suits or shoes were sold by a barber while champagne could be bought in the shoe store.

It is easy to criticize whites who today live in the Congo. But, their life is not secure or easy, and after the troubles and the wars, Africans become restless, arrogant and even wicked. In addition, Africans are constantly dissatisfied, constantly demanding something. It is not a good life now for Europeans to live in the Congo, he must be prepared to suffer vexations, robbery, and the possibility of murder by a nervous African soldier or policeman, or by an UN Afro-Asian "peaceful soldier."

PART TWO

CHAPTER IX

THE UNITED STATES AND THE DIS-UNITED NATIONS

I remember the night,—it was between the two wars in 1961,—when I was invited to a party given by Elisabethville high society. It was a late evening barbecue party, held in a beautiful garden in the Roches district. We had broiled chicken, delicious “boudins and brochettes” and we were discussing politics, as usual, and Katanga’s present and future. Suddenly, I was caught in a corner of the garden by a Belgian of an excellent family who had a name with the usual nobiliary particle. He knew I was an American and he told me bluntly: “Monsieur, you Americans are low scoundrels (crapules).”

This artistocratic Belgian of Flemish extraction who was using such an unaristocratic vocabulary, worked in Elisabethville for a company which sold both live and butchered cattle. So, actually, I was talking to a butcher . . . I have nothing against this noble profession but this gentleman-butcher was very concerned about politics and bombed me all night with criticism of Americans, using at least twenty times the word “crapule,” which I particularly dislike.

—“Sir,” he insisted, “believe me, Americans are low scoundrels.”

—“How do you know,” I replied. “Have you ever visited

America? Do you know many Americans?"

—"No," he said, "but my wife is Canadian . . . My wife knows them and I know them, too."

—"A very peculiar way, to know America," I said. "However, I do not agree either with your vocabulary or with your impression about Americans. I am ready to admit that there is not much difference between Americans and Canadians, and your charming wife could eventually confirm it, but the epithet you used . . ."

—"Low scoundrels," . . . he reminded me.

—"Does not seem at all to fit Americans." And since the Canadian spouse of this gentleman with the aristocratic particle did not say a word to defend her race, I, the Rumanian, the Latin blooded, recently an American, had to begin the defense. But the Belgian "butcher" started to butcher Americans, saying: "The American Government's intentions toward Katanga are sordid.

Americans are businessmen, and a mercantile people. They heard that in Katanga there is a lot of money and they would like to get hold of it. American's hatred against secessionist Katanga derives from our prosperity which competes with their business and so they would like to strangle the Union Minière and its copper production."

I give an account of this stupid conversation as an example of what many Europeans in Belgium and in the Congo think about America. I was shocked to see a representative of the Belgian aristocracy criticizing America in such an incredible way for its goals and policy in the Congo. The opinion expressed by this Belgian who was a kind of intellectual despite his butchery was shared by all Europeans in Katanga, with very few exceptions.

AMERICAN POLITICAL FUNAMBULISM

Since the Congo's independence, the American Government pursued a very simple policy. Perhaps too simple. Americans inherited the myth of unity of the Congo from Belgium. It was the Belgian Government which granted independence to the Congolese which set up 'Loi Fondamentale,' a Constitution establish-

ing a Central Government ruling an indivisible territory. The United States agreed to the Belgian thesis. She could not believe that Belgians did not know what they were doing with their former colony. Besides, the unity of a country is a cherished idea to Americans who abhor secession, an ugly souvenir from their own history.

Some maintain that American idealism is visible in regard to under-developed nations even to the detriment of America itself and of her allies. The same people maintain that Americans are hypocritical since they themselves were colonialists who exploited and drove out the native Indians in order to create a nation, America. I think that American idealism is sincere. The only thing one can reproach them with is that by pursuing idealistic goals, Americans generally follow the easiest road, the one which passes over friendly countries. President Kennedy himself stated some time ago that America's policy might be contrary to its allies but that he would go on supporting under-developed nations in their aspirations. The American Government's attitude toward Katanga was from the beginning rather explicit. The Belgians in Brussels were for the Congo's unity and against Katanga's independence, America backed them. Belgium was backing Lumumba, it trusted him. In Washington, responsible leaders probably thought that America could not doubt Belgian judgment in this matter because after 80 years of administration they certainly should know the Congolese realities. America quickly realized that the Soviet Union and the Afro-Asians were also in favor of unity and that there was no reason to have a different point of view. One should, however, admit that the American Government information about the Congo and about Katanga before 1960 strangely coincided with Belgium's opinions. America was trusting the Belgians' experience and their willingness to maintain a united, independent Congo.

When several months later, Lumumba disclosed himself as a pro-Communist and was finally liquidated by Colonel Mobutu and his University Commissars, the American Government understood several things. First, that the Congo was ungovernable as there were no capable, experienced, educated Congolese to control

this huge territory. Secondly, America found out that the Afro-Asians were backing Congo unity, hoping for a Central Government controlled by Lumumba. Squeezed between Moscow's pressure and the Afro-Asian Bloc, America, wanted to triumph by forming a pro-Western Central Congolese Government, thus foiling both groups. The American calculation which, I am convinced, was the same as the Belgian Government, was not so far wrong but because of the Afro-Asian barrage against Katanga's secession and because of its timid, fearful policy, America had to compromise in order to install in Leopoldville a Government of pro-Western, Africans. America therefore backed Mobutu's coup d'Etat and the creation of a Government opposed to Lumumba and to his pro-Communist policy.

At last, Americans started to understand, little by little, the Congolese realities and were terrified by the tribalism, confusion, chaos and by the possible creation of a multitude of independent Congolese Governments based on Tshombe's model. Americans thought that it was certainly wiser to deal with one Government of incompetents than with seven or twenty secessionist governments as incapable as the Central Government and all of which would use blackmail by flirtation with the Soviets, thus giving the Free World an unbearable problem. America, of course, wanted to prevent Communist penetration in the Congo, and avoid a cold or a hot war as in Korea and to preserve this former colony in the Western World orbit. In order to block Communist infiltration in the Congo, the United States felt that the only legal method was to let the United Nations intervene, hoping that through this organization she could guide Congolese Affairs. Lumumba had already appealed for Soviet technical and military aid, turning his back on Belgium and the Free World. The Soviet Bloc had their hordes of subversive agents and agitators in Leopoldville and America had to act quickly. Fortunately, Colonel Mobutu and other Congolese leaders decided to stay on the Free World side and to liquidate Lumumba.

The secession of Katanga was without doubt endangered as soon as Lumumba vanished from the Congolese political scene.

Katanga could very well then be satisfied with an autonomy as a province in order to spare itself from social and economic chaos. If at the beginning, they had justification for their secession, later on, considering the international political game, they would have done better to revise their aspirations. The Katangans stubbornly insisted on independent views although the West, through the UN, was backing the unity of the Congo. But, if the West had accepted Katanga's secession, it would have had to accept secessionist movements of other Congolese Provinces in Kivu, South Kasai, Equatorial Province, etc. It is precisely what the Katangans, whites and blacks did not understand, namely that their independence could not be recognized by the Free World unless it wanted to risk a Korean type war in the Congo. Hence, America and the West in the beginning were not particularly against the secession of Katanga. They were against any secession which would encourage the creation of several pro-Communist Congolese states. Katangans and the advisers Tshombe surrounded himself with did not understand this policy and they seemed convinced that America was against Tshombe just because Katanga's copper production was competitive with American interests. It was a labour lost to explain to Katangans that their copper meant nothing and that the American Government was not guilty of such a sordid, useless policy. One should insist on the fact that most Europeans believe that American foreign policy derives solely from its economic interests. The most wide-spread opinion in Europe is that America fears the European Common Market and that she wants to destroy it by weakening or annihilating West European economic influence in Africa. People easily forget the billions spent by America through its Marshall Plan, her efforts in rehabilitating Europe after World War II. In Western Europe, today, people look less at America's military, diplomatic and humanitarian reasons and are regarding Americans as mercantile adventurers, evil traders and low scoundrels as the "noble" Belgian butcher in Elisabethville thought. While strongly defending America from the charge of being solely interested in economic interests, I cannot entirely accept the US

Government policy in the Congo. This is why I will analyze its errors which seem like political funambulism.

From the moment America decided to back the Central Government and not the secessionists, she could be certain of controlling the Congolese politicians in Leopoldville. Today Adoula seems to listen to us more or less. But there is every possibility that one day this government may be overthrown by another which will pass "arms et bagages" into the Communist Camp bringing a united Congo on a silver plate to Khrushchev. America believes that Adoula is a Free World man. However, he re-opened diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and other Communist governments. As far as Adoula's popularity is concerned, it is rather fragile and in Parliament there is still a strong pro-Lumumbist opposition which has the support of federalists. Knowing, I think, the African mentality, I would say that political fickleness in the Congo is a common thing and if by misfortune the Central Government falls into the left, American and Western European representatives would be expelled. Should we have one ally or several? I will not say that Katanga was an anti-Communist country but it strongly cooperated with the West and kept the Russians out of their territory. Katangans prevented any Communist Consulate from being installed in their province. Tshombe and his supporters wanted to preserve Katanga's wealth for themselves but also decided that Africans needed a close cooperation with the West and primarily with Belgium in order to build their country.

At one point, through despair, indignation and confusion, Munongo, head of the Interior Department, who was ruling during Tshombe's imprisonment in Leopoldville, wanted to take revenge on America and offered to establish relations, "economic and cultural relations," as he said, with the Soviet Bloc. Katangans and some Belgian advisors were resentful towards us, of course, but they seemed unconscious of the bad timing of the gesture. Fortunately for us, the Soviet Union was afraid to commit itself probably aware of the inconsistency of Africans and the possibility of losing Afro-Asian friendship. But, had the Soviet policy been more supple, more astute and courageous in 1961, I am convinced that

Katangans would have opened the door to Communists in exchange for recognition of their independent State.

A friend, a Union Minière official who visited America at the beginning of 1962, told me that on the plane he was sitting next to a passenger whom later on he discovered to be Gromiko himself. This Belgian friend had the imprudence to assure his neighbor, who admitted his Communist convictions, that had the Russians accepted Munongo's offer in June, 1961, Katanga would have let them in. Obviously Gromiko did not seem to take the Belgian statement too seriously, but, the fact remains that Katanga, so desperate was it, would have in exchange for Soviet Union support, passed overnight into its camp.

America's fear concerning the balkanization of the Congo was of course partially justified. But suppressing Katanga has not prevented it. Those who are aware of Congolese tribalism know that the secession of a province brings with it the secession of others. Today there is already a fragmentation of the united Congo into 23 provinces. This is not a fictional fragmentation—one cannot travel without passing various customs, borders and local regulations. Officially there are only provinces but in fact there is local autonomy, overt, deriving from tribalism, the African tendency to balkanization. The virulence of tribalism in the Congo is incredible, and it should be taken into account by those who envision a stable and united Congo. Today there are 23 Provincial Governments, each one with more than 10 ministers. What is the use of an united and weak Congo, torn by tribalism? It could be even more dangerous than a Congo shared between 6 confederated States as Tshombe proposed. A certain stability could have been insured and the administration and the maintenance of order more easily accomplished.

The Congolese mass does not yet have an idea of a State, of a Nation with its responsibilities and needs. The Congolese, for the moment, loves only his tribe, has obligations only towards it and hatred towards rival tribes. The Belgian colonial administration tried to strangle tribalism and to create a fraternity, a brotherhood among all Africans in the Congo. Belgians partially succeeded by

using force, punishment, but it could only be a temporary success. Once independence was granted to the Congo, tribalism coincided with politics. The Katangese secession has some of its roots in this tribal spirit.

After he declared Katanga's secession, Tshombe tried with the support of allied tribes to pacify the whole Katanga, that is, to dominate rival tribes by force to suppress tribalism by creating a Katangan nation. If Tshombe failed in his attempt because of the UN, one may question how the Central Government will dominate Katanga on the day when UN troops depart. The Central Government will use an army like Tshombe used against the Balubas. This is the brutal method. But the territory is vast and I personally doubt that a Congolese Army will be disciplined enough in any foreseeable future to accomplish this unity. A reasonable, constructive alternative could have been offered by Belgians, Americans and Western Europeans to Tshombe and his advisers and the error of insisting on independence and the necessity for them to participate in a strong Central Government could have been explained. To some extent, America tried to persuade Katangan leaders to enter the Central Government. Unfortunately, the methods of persuasion used to change Tshombe's mind about secession were timid, vague and never consistent. There were some American personalities who came to Katanga and asked Tshombe to play his part in the Central Government but others only tried to bait him. I believe that the American Consulate in Elisabethville could have played a major role. One of the American Consuls, Lewis Hoffacker, had quickly understood the realities and the diplomancy America should have pursued, that it should have made a friend of Tshombe, but others seemed to have a personal axe to grind in defying Tshombe and prevented any arrangements. Among those who kept Tshombe from becoming a Congolese leader rather than a separatist were some Belgian, French and British officials. Belgium, Great Britain and France all followed a policy of confusion vis-a-vis Katanga and were hesitant as well as careless. They gave Tshombe and his advisers the impression that they would back Katanga against the UN. Then they retreated leaving him holding the bag. As a matter

of fact, Tshombe's advisers did not realize the disunity among the Western Community and the timid attitude of Britain and France toward their secessionist country. People in Katanga were convinced before the UN started its military actions that Rhodesia and South Africa could substantially help their cause. Unofficially, many promises and much encouragement was given. France and Great Britain also assured Katangans of some support, particularly moral support. South Africa sold weapons and ammunition while Rhodesia let them cross the border. But this was the only support given by the two neighboring countries except for permission to recruit mercenaries.

This lack of overt support, this confusion created hope in the Katangan's heart and prevented them from facing the realities. During more than two years, Katanga lived with illusions, hoping for the intervention of France, England and even of America in favour of its secession. Some advisers were informed by Tshombe's office in New York that America might change its policy and eventually back Tshombe in his secession against Leopoldville. Tshombe's advisers completely forgot that the Government from Leopoldville had been recognized by the UN, thus by America, by France, by Great Britain and by Belgium itself. They completely forgot that all these countries backed the idea of a Congolese unity, that Tshombe was speaking for 1.5 million Africans while the Central Government, true or not, claimed to represent 14 million Africans. There is no doubt in my opinion that Tshombe and his advisers were misled by the political confusion of France and Great Britain. France appeared favorable to Katanga's cause as deGaulle was accusing the UN of "petit machin" and refusing to pay her dues for the Congo operation. Great Britain also was snubbing the UN by letting Sir Wellensky, the Prime Minister of Rhodesia, be prodigal with his promises. But neither of these two Western countries recognized Katanga. In addition, deGaulle certainly did not encourage Fulbert Youlou, the President of Congo Brazzaville, to recognize Katanga. Fulbert Youlou criticized the Central Government and the UN and received money from Tshombe but he never recognized the Independence of Katanga. Great Britain's leaders

made statements against the use of force and against economic sanctions by the UN and yet this country could have prevented both these errors made by the UN had it forced Wellensky to close the Rhodesian borders and prevented the sale of copper. It seems certain that if Rhodesia and Angola had closed their borders, and instituted an economic blockade, Tshombe and his supporters would have seen the futility of their resistance. France, Great Britain, Youlou from Brazzaville and even Belgium all flirted with Katanga, but none wanted to risk taking the trouble to open Tshombe's eyes and spare Katanga from useless suffering. These countries could very well have told Katangans that the independence could not be accomplished, either in 1961 nor in 1963, and that they should wait and be patient for a while. Katanga owed its existence to Belgians, to Europeans who live and work there. Without their presence Katanga's black population would return to the state they were living in before the Belgians arrived. The mines would be forgotten, there would be no more electricity, no more cars, no more surplus food. Katangans would return to the bush subsisting on bananas and mangoes. It is not polite today to mention this but it is the truth.

It is too bad that the ego of man often stands in the way of his progress. Were it not for vanity, Africans could see that their future depends on the cooperation of whites. The Red Chinese cannot feed themselves much less really aid Africans. Mao's industrial knowhow was so limited that he stripped his poor victims of their iron cooking pots to try to make heavy machinery with results that were ludicrous and pitiful. How then can he industrialize the new nations? How even can Russia do much when she must buy wheat from America to feed herself after over forty years of the wondrous benefits of collective farming! Who but the whites can help Africa? Why then insult those from whom you must ask favors?

When the United States was a young country it was set on the road of progress and industrial greatness by European capital and supervision. Ditto Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South America. Now it is Africa's turn to profit by this cooperation of

the skilled with the unskilled. It is no reflection that Africa is a late arrival on the industrial scene. In many ways it is an advantage. Africa will have the benefit of earlier costly experiments and profit by being born nationally into the Atomic Age.

But none of this prevents us from establishing the fact that America erred in the Congo. She had the opportunity of bringing the two poles, Elisabethville and Leopoldville, together peacefully for the profit of all. Tact, moderation, diplomacy instead of politics, could have drawn together the Queen of Copper with the Queen of the Congo without hurting the dignity of either.

But Adoula was flattered and Tshombe offended uselessly. The UN handled Adoula and his savage soldiers of the ANC with velvet gloves but made no effort to appreciate the responsibility shown by Tshombe.

THE UN: THE PLAYGROUND OF UNDERDEVELOPED NATIONS

The American Government's policy towards the Congo can only become judicious and profitable to the Congo, as well as to the West, under two conditions: First, if the United Nations itself could really become united and capable of impartially protecting the world against Communism and aggression. Secondly, if America could succeed in controlling the Central Government effectively enough to force it to maintain order and peace so that it could develop into a self-sustaining and responsible nation. But knowing the limitations of American philosophy and action I doubt this will happen. I am too well acquainted with the devious, clever, and ruthless manipulations of the Communists to see much hope. The only reason America has been able to succeed superficially in the Congo is her capacity to waste money and substance without being able to feel it yet at home. The Communists have sat back happily and watched the costly circus knowing that it will have to taper off at last, and that will be their cue to enter.

The French journalist, Remy Roure, once called the UN "The Under-developed." It is true that in the present configuration of

this organization the majority is under-developed as well as being willing tools of Moscow and Peking. They have not stepped from colonial status into manhood and responsibility but too often into banditry and beggary. They threaten with one hand and beg with the other in a truly appalling spectacle. Just as the pirates of North Africa once threatened the free trade of the Mediterranean so now new priates threaten what remains of free commerce.

America no longer has any control over this organization which she founded and substantially financed for 20 years. The UN is now the playground for adventurers and frauds who insult, criticize and intrigue against its benefactor day and night. It is incredible that a country with the evil and chaotic past of Algeria, newly independent, still disunited and under a ruthless dictator, could raise her voice against an integrated, peaceful, hard-working nation like Portugal which has a long and honorable history of exploration which benefited all mankind. This thrifty, industrious, tough little nation has enormously increased the food production of the world by carrying edible and useful plants far and wide and patiently tending them until they were acclimated and fruitful to new lands. Wherever they went they planted Christianity along with their life-giving seeds and it flourished in areas formerly poisoned by cannibalism, fetichism, ritual murder and constant tribal warfare. But now any upstart nation which never contributed a peppercorn to civilization can request her expulsion from the UN! This mob of hungry bandits can one by one rise to excoriate South Africa for its lack of democracy when not a single one of them but is practicing—or trying to do so—apartheid in the reverse. And at least South Africa's economy is efficiently run while theirs is not. It is a well known secret too, that those with the loudest denunciations of South Africa depend upon her for essential food-stuffs and play ball with her diamond cartel.

It is a fascinating sight to see Nasser surrounded by all sorts of white technicians boasting that he is the leader of African freedom and Arab unity. None of these nations can stand on their own two feet yet they would tear down all the nations that can. Radio Cairo loudly denounces America although it was America which

allowed Egypt to confiscate the Suez Canal. It has so exploited the words "white," colonialism that most Africans do not know there is any other kind. Their "dear friends" in Moscow and Peking are right now exploiting captive nations with the ruthlessness of Genghis Khan whose descendants they both are.

In the UN everything is permitted to be said against the Western powers, against America; but nothing is ever said by the newly independent countries about the forced labor, genocide, barbaric penal systems of the terrorist Communist regimes. It is pretended that the new nations are actually practicing democracy although their populaces cannot read or write and vote by choosing between the pictures of totem animals on the ballot to determine their leadership—yet these primitively chosen officials are now running the world because there are more of them! So it is that for the first time in history progress is being directed by the least progressive. The most backward nations have the final word on the most intricate questions. What a mad policy it is!

The UN, which has now become an Afro-Asian war machine, imposed a political solution by crushing the only part of the Congo which could function decently while ignoring the violences, mutilations, tribal wars, and cessation of work in Kivu, Kasai, Equator and elsewhere. Out of 20,000 men some 12,000 were stationed in Katanga where except for secession there was nothing to do or protect. If the future security of the Congo had been the UN's objective, rather than political prestige, it would have deployed its major troops in the less civilized sections and there would have been no raped nuns, mutilated babies, or tortured priests; work would have got back on its feet and Katangan wealth would not have been so envied and desired. Does a love of freedom and a desire for self-determination justify a cascade of wars? It was not so surprising to see the UN out to crush Katanga for it was now in the hands of the Afro-Asian Bloc, whose chief philosophy is centralization and dictatorship; but it was saddening to see America provide them with the means with which to do it.

It was well known that Adoula had threatened the West, just as Lumumba did in his time, and as Munongo tried to do when

he was desperate. This sordid blackmailing should have been ignored by a great nation like the United States. That would soon put a stop to it. But since this new con-game is so effective we can expect it to continue.

Tshombe in his press conferences retaliated by calling America names. Once he impertinently referred to American politicians as "betise congenitale." This was improper. But the leader of Katanga could not understand why the American colossus would lend all its might to the extinguishing of the light of freedom in little Katanga.

Why did America treat Adoula like the King of Persia when he was a mediocrity, accidentally and precariously in power, while snubbing Tshombe a superior man, who had shown ability in business as well as in politics? Is it that the Americans like the Communists, take pleasure in defeating men of quality? Is it that the rags to riches theme still captivates them?

There is one thing which strongly shocked me during my stay in Katanga. It was the attitude of the US Ambassador in Leopoldville, Mr. Gullion, who never thought it necessary to visit Katanga and meet Tshombe at home. It is true that Mr. Gullion was not at all popular among Katangans and his lack of courtesy was one of the reasons. But Mr. Gullion should have made a trip to Katanga to at least prove his goodwill and impartiality. Mr. Gullion at last came to Katanga, almost incognito, after Tshombe's capitulation in early 1963. It seems that he even expressed his desire to leave his visitor's card at Tshombe's residence. . . . It is difficult to understand the attitude of our ambassador in Leopoldville; who could have easily altered his reputation as enemy of Katanga and author of all maneuvers against Tshombe. Had Mr. Gullion shown some thought, regard, and some understanding to Tshombe, he could probably have gotten several concessions when it counted. But Mr. Gullion seemed terrified by the Adoula Government's blackmailing. Leopoldville apparently warned Mr. Gullion not to discuss anything with Tshombe, not to let him go to America and not to give him the impression that Americans regarded him as a valid leader and interlocutor.

There were, however, two attempts by Americans to persuade Tshombe to be more realistic and more moderate. The first endeavor in November, 1961, by Senator Thomas Dodd, who was called "Katanga's big friend" and was received like a king by Elisabethville, failed. Senator Dodd probably came too late since two days later the December war broke out. The second intervention was attempted by the Under-Secretary for Political Affairs, Mr. George MacGhee, in late 1962. This time, Tshombe made some concessions which he regarded as spectacular but which were in fact ludicrous. Katanga then offered 2 million dollars to Adoula!

America backed the unity of the Congo in order to please the Afro-Asians, among other reasons. As I said, President Kennedy in December, 1962, stated that American policy pursues its end even at the risk of displeasing her friends. President Kennedy was certainly referring to a possible friendship America could gain among Afro-Asians. As far as I can see a country as strong as America should not yield to blackmail in order to please enemies and to do so shows a lack of character. Egotism in politics is deplorable but servility is also bad. If no one dares to defy the mob rule at the UN freedom will be completely lost to the hoax of equality.

Adoula tried to justify his inability to maintain order in the Congo by saying it was all due to Katanga's secession and refusal to share the copper profits with Leopoldville. Anyone could see that the misery, unemployment and violence in Leopoldville and the rest of the Congo was not the fault of Katanga but due to lack of organization, authority, honesty and cessation of labor. But no one in the UN would stand up and say this. Katanga should have proven this lie by handing over large sums to Adoula so that the world could have seen that money or its lack was not the basis of the ills there. Had Katanga and the Union Minière been as crafty as their opponents they would have let money do their talking. It was well known that American money was the basis of Adoula's loyalty to the West. Had America not guaranteed the salaries of Adoula's soldiers, giving them the same pay as American soldiers, he could not have depended on them a week.

Tshombe and his collaborators played cards without using their

trumps. This stubborn ineptitude was the result of their sincerity in believing their cause to be a just one and that it therefore must eventually win! When it was too late they suddenly woke up to the realities and tried to bribe Adoula's opposition. This crowd purported to believe in a federal constitution. But this was only a device to trick Tshombe as well as Adoula. They were mainly the Lumumbists, Tshombe's worst enemies, and were led by Gizenga, Gbenye & Company. It was stupid of Tshombe's men to think they could afford to make even a temporary alliance with Moscow's tools. But by now they had lost their perspective.

WHEN UN PRESTIGE IS AT STAKE

America did not want the UN to lose face in the Congo and in Katanga probably hoping to use the UN one day under other circumstances to prevent a world conflagration. This American hope is not soundly based. The majority of this organization is already under the control of the USSR. This was shown even in 1956 when the UN did not raise a finger to help Hungarians against the armoured cars of the Soviet, nor did it attempt recently to stop Nehru and Khrishna Menon from forcing the Portuguese from their enclave in Goa although the result is religious persecution and lowered standards of living for the Goans. The aggression in Tibet by Red China is ignored when colonialism is mentioned. Criticism is nicely channeled by these experts of psychological smear. The idea is that if you emphasize a lie sufficiently it is better than the truth because it can be cut to a pattern.

In the UN, the Afro-Asians, the Ben Bellas and the Nkrumahs, raise their voices in constant condemnation of Portugal although each of them has problems he cannot solve of his own but they will give men and money to start trouble elsewhere. This is what peaceful co-existence means! A chorus of dictators demands that the Portuguese grant immediate independence to the Angolan population although the whole world has seen the Congolese debacle following Belgium's gift. It seems that now anybody can set up "a government in exile," acquire armament from dubious

sources, defy established government which keeps its people well-fed, clothed, educated and peaceful, and be taken seriously by the UN which then piously hands down ultimatums to it to vacate at once and allow the inexperienced, ill-sorted parvenus to take over!

"It is the trend of history," some people say. But chaos and confusion should not receive the blessing of the organization set up for the purpose of preventing just that.

In the Congo it became a war of prestige. Not of what was right or what would work. Adoula was jealous of his prestige and had to save his face rather than save his country. The UN was out to prove it was necessary to save the world from general conflict. President Kennedy's Administration had to prove that America had been right to back Congo unity. It also had to help save the UN's face for it had nearly lost its reputation in the Congo when the Congo leaders almost dispensed with the UN's services there for a time. No matter what some may say, the UN enlarged the gap between Tshombe and the Central Government purposely and, after December 1962, brought Katanga into economic ruin and social confusion. It will be a long time returning to the order and civilized functioning it enjoyed before UN arrival.

I am ready to believe that the American Government's intentions are not sordid and selfish like those of the Communists. But the fact is that these intentions generally were beneficial to Communists. America's juvenile conception of freedom greatly injures Western World interests, and the cause of liberty in general which the West upholds by safeguarding individual rights and trial by jury. For over a decade America has encouraged independence for all Western colonies—and in doing so has enormously curtailed individual freedom for millions in the world and enlarged the areas of state slavery. You have but to witness the iron-clad dictatorships of Sukarno, N'Krumah, Castro, Ben Bella, to see this devastation, and this is but to name a few. It was America that handed over Poland to Russia, Yugoslavia to Tito; who permitted the taking over of all Eastern Europe by her former ally although she knew there was no freedom in Russia; and who

gave China to Mao by refusing to support the war against him. Has America performed these enormous blunders just to gain the gratitude of the great unwashed? If so she has thrown away the hard won freedom of mankind for nought. Only highly developed people understand gratitude on a national scale. People who have contributed nothing to civilization are simply envious of those who do. Neither Africans nor Asians really want to be friends with us perhaps because we give them an inferiority complex. There is so great a difference between people in industrial nations and those of emerging nature folk that their diversity is like a simmering volcano which may explode at any time.

America can expect envy not gratitude from these people. Incapable of feeding or governing themselves in a first class way, they must constantly blame this on something else.

In their speeches at the UN the theme is: The West owes us aid because for a time we were occupied by them during which they gave us a taste of modern civilization. Now we demand more of their gifts but refuse any compensation in return.

They are much more at ease with the Communist nations who like them are poverty-stricken and envious of the West. Their noisy clatter against nuclear arms is only because they lack them. Egypt is trying its best to develop some atomic weapons while at the same time criticizing France and America for doing so. This world forum has become a club for hypocrites. Socialism has indeed triumphed and leveled mankind downward. In this Alice-in-Wonderland on New York's East river, wrong is right, State slavery is glorified, chaos is respectable, and freedom is anti-social.

The triumph of the UN in the Congo through the use of arms has put the stamp of aggression upon it forever and given it the boldness for future seizures. America is being used to defeat Europe for a long range Communist take-over. By its maladroitness in furthering UN aggression in the Congo when it could have used its influence to implement a working peace between Tshombe and Adoula, America is guilty by default. She paid the major part of the UN's expenses in this adventure by supplying planes, trucks and other equipment on which she did not bother to erase the

labels: "US Air Force" or "US Army." The Katangans, especially the black Katangans, seeing this insignia immediately assumed that America was attacking them, was machine-gunning women and children because she hated Negroes and desired their copper mines. Long after the war is over this memory will persist and the Communists who supported and benefited from our military action will now exploit America's misplaced generosity.

Actually, neither America, nor the Western powers knew what kind of unity they wanted in the Congo. A federal constitution offered at the beginning of the crisis would probably have gotten Tshombe, Kasavubu, Adoula and others together and something could have been worked out. But the West, particularly Belgium which was most involved, did not want a federal constitution. So Katanga was forced to kneel in blood for her presumption in maintaining that this alone would solve the Congo problem. And now, ironically, federalism in a disguised and primitive form, and not centralization as desired by Belgium and demanded by the UN, is creeping across the Congo.

In late December 1962, after his so-called success in Cuba over Castro and Khrushchev, Kennedy expressed through official statements his determination to end the Congolese crisis. Here was a state of affairs which he could successfully terminate without fear of reprisal. His world "image" greatly needed these two encounters for his reputation, like that of the UN, had reached a new low. Together they could topple cocky little Katanga and take a bow for "keeping peace in our time." This was gloriously accomplished by the two power giants, their only real casualty being freedom itself.

The Congo had been saved! Never probably in history has a country been so aided that deserved it so little. Here was the Central Government with its vague authority depending wholly on a foreign force which would soon be moving out now that unity had been established! Adoula was more frightened now than he had ever been. "Don't leave me alone!" he begged the UN. And as the months pass this continues to be his refrain. They are not ready to govern but they were ready to be free of Belgium. Due to money troubles of the UN more than half of its troops are now

withdrawn but none of those who justified the destruction of Katanga as the obstacle in the way of peace, want the rest removed. How long can this costly and artificial arrangement be maintained?

In Katanga, Tshombe's authority was undermined, by the UN. Tribalism was resuscitated. Katanga was plunged into the same fratricidal fights which existed all over the Congo. The Central Government founded a province in North Katanga where authority was vested in the Balubas, but on this territory are other tribes such as the Bahembas who are traditional rivals of the Balubas. Who will protect them? The Balubas hate the Lundas who live in the South, in the richest mining section. They will either aim to unite Katanga under their own domination or to take over the mines. Some important mines such as Kolwezi have already been given to them, although Lundas have long dwelt there. Tshombe will be replaced sooner or later by a Baluba leader and one should not be surprised if he attempts, once the UN leaves, the same secessionist movement as Tshombe. If the Balubas in the North appeared to be allied with Adoula and to back the idea of unity, they did it solely in order to overthrow Tshombe and take over Katanga themselves.

In conclusion, America's intentions in the Congo, as idealistic as we want to believe them, could end in dismal failure and the loss of the Congo for Belgium, for the West and for us. The African realities are far from being simple and the unity preached by Africans themselves is merely pretext for dictatorial regimes and exploitation of small, rival tribes. The united Congo cannot last unless the Central Congolese Government has a strong, impartial, well trained and well disciplined Army and Police to prevent tribalism, as the Belgians were able to do before independence. Even now with under 8,000 UN soldiers left in the Congo, calm, security, and order do not reign. The UN troops cannot control the bush, and they never enter African villages to prevent daily conflicts. Tribal rivalries today are no longer solved by the spear and the arrow, but by automatic weapons, by machine guns.

The Congolese National Army, unless it is well controlled by Europeans, will for years be an army of pillagers and savages. It is

essential in order to bring order to the Congo that a detribalized Congolese police force be maintained so that they may better prevent tribal disputes.

The best solution is to go back and reform the Congolese National Army with the Belgians help because they know the Congo and its ways.

Fortunately, Mobutu seems to understand this and recently requested the return of Belgian officers to train his army. The UN appears anxious to leave the Congo; at last realizing the enormous difficulties of trying to keep it seemingly united. Perhaps, the Soviet feels this will now facilitate their operations there. We doubt that the ANC can quickly become a reliable police force.

Many will claim that the return of Belgian officers is unthinkable because Congolese soldiers will no longer tolerate white commanders. Evidently Adoula and General Mobutu realize that this is their only solution and it will soon be tried if it has not already started. There is no way to maintain order there except with a strong army of disciplined men and without order there can be no economy. There is an over population in the Congo for a purely rural way of life. The Belgians brought the over 14 million Congolese out of the primitive bush and got them used to living in modern towns and cities but to feed and clothe an urban populace requires industry. Industry cannot take place without order. Nor can it be run without white technicians.

In March 1963, the Central Government had such troubles with rebels in Kasai that the production at the diamond mines there dropped drastically. There were also tremendous losses from theft of diamonds by African workers. The UN troops there seemed to fear to intervene and the economic situation became chaotic: famine, misery, unemployment and despair ravaged the area. The Europeans who had been quietly brought back to conduct the operations left once more because it had become unsafe again for their families. If the ANC cannot keep order in Kasai, how can it maintain peace in Katanga after the UN troops depart?

American tax money subsidized the Kennedy adventure in the Congo to the tune of 200 million dollars, and another 200 mil-

lion was dropped into Adoula's open palms and this does not seem to be the end of the donations. American machines and goods of every kind contributed free to the Congolese Government, become a source of great affluence for the Congo's ministers who sell it to surrounding countries at highly reduced prices. Our trucks have found their way across the Sudan in this manner; and along the borders of Uganda a flourishing business takes place of smuggled American gifts.

The UN troops remaining in the Congo are the less desirable ones: those from Ethiopia and Indonesia. These soldiers are well known as white haters. They lost no opportunity during the hostilities to harass the whites and incite against the West. So the ultimate accomplishment so far of the American-backed UN wars, and the expenditure of nearly half a billion American tax dollars, is to have strengthened race prejudice among the Central Africans by destroying or eliminating all of those friendly to us.

During the Congo crisis, whites found the Indian and Tunisian soldiers the most trustworthy, less likely to steal or rape and performing their duties with strict discipline. But Nehru's border troubles with his Red China friends forced him to withdraw 5,000 Indian troops despite the protests of Europeans in the Congo. Bourguiba, Premier of Tunisia, did the same with his 600 well trained men also needed at home for border disputes.

Border disputes from now on will in fact become the chief concern of all those countries which recently met in Addis Ababa to pledge themselves to support a united Africa. This conference has been hailed by the 18th UN Assembly as a unique example of African solidarity. The Foreign Minister of Togo, in his maiden speech before the august gathering, said that the African nations meeting in Addis Ababa had set an example of brotherhood for the whole world to follow. (It is to be remembered that Togo is the first of the new nations to assassinate its president; this Sylvanus Olympio was an able man but did not go along with his neighbor N'Krumah's power putsch.) And hardly had the delegates gotten down to castigating colonialism again when fighting broke out on the Algerian-Moroccan border. These two Moslem brothers are

in a bitter struggle over their European-gifted and designed borders. In fact every African leader is keeping a tight hold on the arbitrary boundaries of his own bailiwick. Their real brotherhood will soon be tested when we see how many will peacefully submit to a re-drawing of his own borders.

In conclusion it should be mentioned that all our aid will not make America popular in the Congo. Charity can only work when it is on an individual scale, never on a national one. A whole people through pride, vanity, and *amour propre*, never accepts charity without bitterness. If Europeans were not grateful for the Marshall Plan which lifted them from wartorn despair into the greatest prosperity they have ever enjoyed, how can one expect the Congolese to understand our generosity? Most Europeans say that Americans help others to keep their industries running and not from pure altruism. This may be partly true but it takes great ingenuity and a generous spirit to visualize and operate a system which will be so mutually profitable.

CHAPTER X

SEPTEMBER WAR

On 21st February 1961, the Security Council decided to expel Belgian mercenaries, together with political and military advisers from Katanga. By the end of August, the UN succeeded in throwing out of Katanga, by force, by intrigue and with the cooperation of the Belgian Government itself, "all undesirable people." Most responsible advisers and all true military men departed leaving the country in the hands of empiricists and adventurers. It was no longer the brain trust from the past but confusing voices sporadically advising. It is almost certain that had the UN permitted the Belgian Officers and NCO to go on training the Gendarmerie, incidents and conflicts between the two camps could have been avoided and peaceful solutions rendered possible. The Gendarmerie, deprived of real officers and career military men, had to rely on mercenaries who did not have a single commanding officer, but several chiefs with no ultimate responsibilities, no cohesion and no true military experience. The Gendarmerie was put under the command of a former African sergeant of the *Force Publique*, who was promoted overnight to full general. This "general" whose name was Muke attended press conferences, thrust out his chest and said in unintelligible French each time someone spoke about mercenaries, "Look at me, do I look like a man obeying the orders of a white?" General Muke had, in any case, learned at least two things during his long career as a sergeant: to sit straight and to stand upright. One would have thought he had swallowed a cane, he was so rigid.

He was convinced he was the Napoleon of Katangans. His general staff was filled up with other Africans, all high ranking officers, all former underlings among whom *Colonel Kyembe*, another distinguished FP sergeant, was the Chief. Nonetheless, this Gendarmerie was to give the UN many worries. Thus, when UN Indians and Swedish troops attacked the Post Office in September 1961, thirty African soldiers without a white officer were almost massacred even though they wanted to surrender. Attacked in the middle of the night by a rush of Indian Dogras, and frightened by their savage war shouts, the Gendarmes were so panic-stricken that one of them threw himself from the roof of a two-story building.

MUNONGO: THE SCARECROW OF THE BALUBAS

Immediately after the departure of Belgian officers, the tension in Katanga rapidly mounted. Belgians feared a revolt of the Gendarmerie as much as the vindication of Baluba refugees, who at the beginning of September began jamming by the thousands into the city of Ruashi and around UN quarters. Disabled by the expulsion of its white cadres, the Gendarmerie was evidencing signs of unrest. Each end of the month following the pay day, gendarmes were drunk and troubles were expected. The air was heavy with forboding while the Central Government, backed by the UN, violently attacked Tshombe and asked for his capitulation.

In Katanga, meanwhile, the reign of "espionite" took place which resulted in a tribal persecution. Munongo, the Minister of the Interior, mistrusted everyone and, in particular, the Balubas from the North and the Kasai, both regarded as Tshombe's opponents. Several hundred Kasai Balubas suspected of being UN informers, were arrested. Several scores left their skin in the hands of Munongo's policemen. In the African townships, the Kasai, carrying their luggage on their heads, ran through Elisabethville seeking asylum at the UN quarters. The climate was one of total insecurity and incidents were reported daily. Tombelaine, who was UN representative, had been arrested by Katangans, early in Sep-

tember while entering the Post Office Building. And Tombelaine, when freed several hours later, did not hide his rancour.

Finally, a former Belgian mercenary who had served with the Kasai Army of Kalondji and was later hired by the Gendarmerie, escaped to the UN after stealing money and a stamp collection from a Belgian friend. This mercenary, whose name was Crener and who several months later was killed by the ANC while attempting to escape from his Leopoldville jail, pretended to belong to Munongo's group of killers hired to assassinate UN officials. There is no doubt that Munongo and other Katangans considered the idea of shooting one or two UN officials. Several had apparently "volunteered" for such a job, with pay, of course but nothing had been attempted yet and the Katangans' courage was known to be of an uncertain nature. However, Tombelaine who liked to be regarded as a very important UN personage, organized a real show in order to draw world attention to the dangerous life the UN men were living in Katanga. While the idea was germinating in Munongo's head to assassinate UN men, such a crime could have been easily accomplished since Tombelaine walked around town alone, unarmed and unafraid. He chased after newsmen in order to supply them with the latest press releases blaming Tshombe for the strife and boasting of UN action. . . . Following the nebulous assassination plot, Tombelaine and his superiors asked Tshombe to dismiss Munongo whom they accused of being the fomentor of all troubles. Tshombe promised an inquiry and to let the National Assembly decide. Nothing happened, of course.

After the departure of the Belgian officers and NCO's, 150 young Africans were promoted over night to various ranks, from lieutenant to major and colonel. About one hundred among them had finished six-months training in Belgium, at the Arlon Infantry School. They returned to Katanga nattily dressed in Belgian uniforms, swagger stick under their arms, pompous and eager to command Katanga's battalions and companies. Most of them had no idea how to clean a rifle.

And the Baluba refugees' camp was swarming with thousands of starved men, women and children who seemed ready to seek re-

venge against Tshombe's tribesmen and supporters. The Baluba camp was massive but with no houses, no running water, merely the open sky covering an angered crowd. The rains had not started yet and the camp festered with horrid flies, bugs, rats, mosquitoes, dogs and vermin; these refugees were the best UN allies against Katangans. I remember going one day with a Red Cross truck convoy to the Balubas camp. We were greeted with rocks and gestures which clearly indicated they would like nothing better than to cut the throat of every white man. Meanwhile, the UN was feverishly planning an all-out attack against the Katangan Government building and to arrest Tshombe and his ministers. Fearing an attack, the Katangan Government installed a score of gendarmes in all official buildings, such as the Post Office, Radio Station, etc. We thought that the UN might be discouraged from acting by Tshombe's recent offer to meet Kasavubu. The Central Government wanted Tshombe to come to Leopoldville to bow down to its leaders but the Katangan President would not discuss such a meeting. He was ready to see Kasavubu in Europe or in some friendly African country but not in Leopoldville where several months before, he and his Foreign Minister, Kimba, were imprisoned and harassed. Besides, Kimba and Munongo offered strong opposition to any encounter, considering it as capitulation.

At the beginning of September another incident darkened the Eville skies. Hundreds of prisoners, mainly common law offenders, escaped from Kasapa (Elisabethville's main jail) and found asylum in the Balubas' camp. Together with other Baluba refugees, they were planning to attack the city. At that time, I had the opportunity one evening to talk to Munongo, the Balubas' scarecrow. "Monsieur le Ministre," I said to Munongo, "I am a foreigner and a journalist and although it is none of my business, I believe that you have acted very badly by arresting the Balubas from Kasai. You have given the UN the best pretext to intervene. I think that you should free those you arrested and assure the Kasai of their complete security." Munongo listened to me and vaguely said something. The next morning, 400 Kasai were freed by him but it was too late. The Kasai exodus had already started and fear of Munon-

go's policemen drove 50,000 to seek so-called UN protection, deserting their homes and their work. Among them were other tribes opposed to Tshombe and together they began living in awful conditions on the skirts of Elisabethville. Hundreds roamed the town during the night, stealing cars and robbing houses. They cut the roofs and doors from cars and used them for their Bidonville shelters, since the rains had started.

Although Belgian officers were expelled from official service, a score were living in the Belgian Consulate building, sleeping in corridors and waiting to be evacuated by planes to the metropolis.

On the eve of the September war, in Elisabethville, the confusion, the fear and the tension were high. Ministers had no more advisers, gendarmes no more European officers. Everything was disorganized, crippled. Only in the Administration offices were white technicians still around. African civil servants, were staying home. The UN troops stationed around Luano Airport were openly preparing for something. More than 3,000 UN Indian troops had unloaded their equipment and others were expected. The UN Air Force was extremely busy carrying in troops and military equipment. The UN Headquarters were installed in the center of Elisabethville, in a former luxurious restaurant, *Le Claire Mannoir*, between the golf course and Tshombe's residence. The UN had partially rented, partially confiscated, the Hotel Lido and its swimming pool, located East of Elisabethville about one mile from Tshombe's house, and several hundred yards from Munongo's. On the 1st of September, an important stock of weapons and ammunitions of the Gendarmerie was pillaged by the Balubas. At the same time, in Jadotville, 150 prisoners escaped from the city's Buluo jail, increasing the panic among inhabitants. Confident of their position, the UN officials decided to cut the tenuous diplomatic relations between them and Tshombe, obviously with the intention of frightening him. By the same token, UN patrols entered for the first time the African cities where inhabitants were terrified. Finally, the UN strongly demanded the expulsion of other technicians, magistrates, police officers, Surete advisers, etc. . . .

A DIARY OF HOSTILITIES

Let us look at the notes I had taken during the troubled period of September 1961:

5 September

— The Katangan Parliament, nearly 40 deputies, assembled today in the presence of foreign consuls and a dozen newsmen. Tshombe, pretending to be tired, was absent, but Munongo, Kimba and other Ministers attended the meeting. Speaking on Tshombe's behalf, Kimba reaffirmed Katanga's political sovereignty but proposed commercial relations, a kind of "Common Market," with the rest of the Congo. On the eve of the assembly, the Belgian Government officially opposed Katangese independence and asked America, France, and Great Britain not to recognize Katanga. Several deputies violently attacked Tshombe's Government for giving concessions to UN and asked for war. Kimba promises some draconian measures against UN.

— In the afternoon, Katanga's youth, the "JEUNAKAT" leads a riot against the American Consulate. Some 300 rioters stone the US Consulate and a UN car. Several shots by the UN. No injured or killed.

6 September

— New assembly of Katanga's Parliament today. 38 deputies, 10 traditional chiefs, and seven ministers are present. Tshombe also attends the assembly, asking it to decide on two matters: 1) Revision of Katanga's constitution; 2) Economic cooperation with the Congo. Tshombe asked the Assembly for its view on whether or not he must go to Leopoldville for negotiation. Majority of deputies propose a special Commission to analyze Tshombe's requests. The Assembly President, Mr. Mutaka, without much consultation with his colleagues, pulls a decision from his pocket, and reads it: "The National Assembly confirms Katanga's Independence, and instructs the Government to negotiate with the Congo on cultural and economic matters." Two deputies protest against the UN armored cars patrolling in the African cities. Another deputy asks the foreign consuls to back Katanga's cause while he attacks Bel-

gium and requests the rupture of diplomatic relations. Neither the Katangese Ministers nor the President of the Assembly seem to take the deputies' proposals seriously. The atmosphere in the Assembly is rather picturesque. Some are dressed for funerals, others in short sleeves as in a school. Everybody speaks but nobody seems to listen. If in French or Italian Parliaments, deputies sometimes throw chairs at each other's head, up to now, however, Katangans have demonstrated more dignified behavior.

7 September

— Several traditional Katangan chiefs, one of whom is Mwenda, Munongo's own brother, today publicly accused the Government of completely neglecting the internal problems of the country.

— Following the expulsion of Belgium officers and technicians, Katangan leaders fear that in the event of lack of discipline among soldiers and policemen, the UN may intervene and disarm them. In the administration there is a visible slow down in work.

— Munongo decided today to fire all policemen of Kasai extraction as unreliable. About thirty Kasai policemen had already sought asylum at UN Headquarters.

— Sir Roy Welensky, Prime Minister of Rhodesia, ordered his army to Katanga's borders. Unofficially, he promises to help Katanga against UN in the event of war.

8 September

— Bloody fights in the Baluba refugees camp today, between various tribes and UN guards. A dozen casualties among refugees are reported.

— A Katangese patrol approached Hotel Lido today. UN soldiers opened fire but gendarmes left the premises in hurry. No casualties.

— Press Conference by Tshombe. He denounces the UN intentions to disarm the Gendarmerie and to arrest ministers. Munongo frightened, leaves for Bunkeya, the Bayeke's capital.

— Young Katangan officers ask permission from Tshombe to massacre Baluba refugees and put an end to troubles.

— UN raises a barricade on the road to airport. Katangan troops on alert today. No military plan of defense but gendarmes seem ready to retaliate if attacked.

— Tombelaine, UN porte-parole, enters the Post Office with press identity card. Arrested by Katangans but freed shortly after.

— Tshombe assures his advisers of UN inability to control the interior of the country, but he thinks the UN can hold Elisabethville. Tshombe adds that Katangans are prepared for guerilla warfare against the UN. But both Tshombe and advisers hope that incidents may be avoided until 19 September, date of the Security Council meeting. They hope that in this meeting, Western Countries will oppose the intended UN attack against Katanga.

11 September

— O'Brien, UN representative in Katanga today sent an ultimatum to Tshombe asking for his immediate departure to Leopoldville for negotiations. Tshombe, after consulting his collaborators offers to meet Adoula but not in Leopoldville.

— In Jadoville, Katangese gendarmes plus a score of mercenaries surrounded UN Headquarters. UN protest. The Katangese Government offers to withdraw troops only if the UN accepts a Katangese police guard at Luano Airport.

12 September

— Several Belgian officers who remained behind give general, discreet advice to Katangan gendarmes. Since last night, Katangan patrols are checking the city.

— Mahmoud Khiari, UN official, asks Tshombe to come to Leopoldville and meet Dag Hammarskjöld, expected there soon. Tshombe, in a press conference, denied having been officially invited by Adoula or Khiari. According to one of his secretaries, Tshombe is ready to meet Kasavubu or general Mobutu, anywhere except in Leopoldville. Apparently a kind of agreement about a Congolese Federation has been reached between Tshombe and Kasavubu, through the intermediary of a former political advisor of Tshombe.

— Tension in Elisabethville mounts. Feverish military preparations by the UN at Luano Airport, 10 km. from the capital.

13 September

— At 4:00 this morning, UN troops attacked most Katangese official buildings: the Main Post Office, Radio Katanga, Radio Col-

lege, the Information Department, etc., all guarded for several days by gendarmes. From the terrace of my hotel room, I hear voices in French coming from the Main Post Office, 100 yards in front of my street. "Surrender, you have 15 minutes to surrender." And then automatic guns and machine guns burst. The shooting lasts until 5:45. I step out in the streets together with other journalists. Several UN armoured cars driven by Swedes are guarding the Post Office. Inside, at the windows, we see UN Indian soldiers, who point their guns at us. In front of the entrance, in two jeeps, three injured Katangan gendarmes are bleeding profusely. The driver of one jeep rests on the steering-wheel, probably dead. On the sidewalks another gendarme rests wounded in the legs, crying. We approached the scene but the Indians shout, ordering us to withdraw. On the other side of the Post Office, in the middle of the street, two gendarmes lie dead. Next to them is their jeep, its lights on and its engine running. Europeans and Africans forming a small crowd of about 150 people are insulting the UN troops: "Killers, assassins, macaques" (monkeys), one can hear from all sides, and then two, three bursts of machine-guns. The Indians opened fire on us. The Post Office square is empty in seconds. There are two wounded among us: one is a Belgian working for a local bank, the other a Rhodesian newsman. The Belgian has a bullet in his stomach and we take him to a pharmacy. A Swedish unit mounts Avenue de l'Estoire, approaching the Post Office Square. Someone asks the Swedish officer for an ambulance. The officer shrugs his shoulders and then takes from his pocket a bandage. The wounded man presses his stomach trying to stop the hemorrhage. He will die several minutes later while the newsman escapes with a slight injury in his leg.

— Two Katangan Red Cross ambulances arrive in the Square in order to pick up injured and dead gendarmes. The UN Indian units from inside the Post Office open fire on them without any warning. The ambulances are punctured with bullets; drivers and doctors run away to seek protection behind walls. We are all revolted. It is 9:00. The atmosphere seems to calm down, however. Two doctors and nurse, Red Cross flag in their hands, walk courageously to the

Post Office entrance and collect the injured and the dead, unafraid. The UN Indian unit lets them to their job now.

NOON

— Aware of last night's attack, almost the whole population of Elisabethville is in the streets, talking about the firing on the Red Cross ambulances and gendarmes. Tension is rising again. Insults against America and the UN are uttered. Europeans feel Katangans may well kill any UN soldier they capture. I know that in Jadotville, 150 Irishmen are surrounded.

— At the UN Headquarters, Tombelaine in a press conference accuses Belgian officers who are sleeping in the Belgian Consulate of having opened fire against UN troops from the Consulate's windows. The Belgian Consul, in another press conference, denies this accusation. Traces of bullets and broken glass are scattered around the Consulate corridors. The UN fired on the Consulate. Katangans seem calm, too calm considering their casualties. Europeans are more indignant and do not hide their threats. J. B. Kibwe, the Finance Minister, is in UN hands, apparently arrested. He appeals on Radio Katanga, now controlled by the UN, for Africans to lay down their guns. Tshombe afraid of arrest, sought refuge in the British Consulate, located next to his Residence. Meanwhile a Katangan para-commando unit, takes up position inside Tshombe's palace. In the Camp Massart, a score of Belgian officers and mercenaries have enlisted, and received weapons and command.

— At 16:00 Tshombe is back at his residence and calls upon the journalists. He accuses O'Brien of lying in the UN statement this morning that Katangans and Belgian officers provoked the incidents. In late afternoon, Katangan units are attacking Radio College held by the UN. I arrive one hour later on the premises. The gendarmes have re-occupied the radio station belonging to the Catholic Church. In the street two UN buses are burning. At the wheel of one of the buses, a European driver is almost carbonized to a flaky black. His body still smokes. At the corner of Ruhe Street, a UN light armoured car is abandoned.

— News from the Baluba Camp: Refugees have started to pillage houses near the Camp mainly in the Ruashi City.

14 September

— Violent shooting all during the night. From the Post Office the UN troops shoot heavy machine guns at invisible enemies. Impossible to sleep in the hotel where the noise is resonant with bullets ricocheting in the street. The machine guns crackling ceased at 7:00. From my terrace I see several mercenaries observing the UN at the corner of the street.

— The UN seems puzzled by the development of the situation. Its officials hoped to crack the Katangese resistance in a matter of hours but the gendarmes, helped by a score of mercenaries, are calmly reorganizing themselves. All Elisabethville entrances are under the Gendarmerie control. A broadcast by Radio Free Katanga announces the arrival of reinforcements from Kamina, Jadotville, and Kolwezi. The Portuguese Consul seeks refuge in the Hotel Leo II. UN Indians are digging positions in the yard of the Portuguese Consulate, on Avenue Astrid. There are a dozen dead Katangans and others in the hospital mortuary. In front of it, I encountered a hundred African civilians armed with spears and knives pushing towards Avenue Astrid, in order to attack the UN positions.

— In Jadotville, according to sources, the UN Irish Unit of 150 men is about to surrender itself. In Kipoushi, the Union Minière has stopped working but in Kolwezi, everything is normal.

— The Belgian Consulate asks all Belgian officers and NCO present in Katanga not to intervene in the hostilities. Several disobey Brussels' order. Lieutenant Degrelle takes charge of the resistance.

— An Indian unit which left this morning for Jadotville in order to free the Irish company is stopped on the road by Katangans and has to come back to Elisabethville. I hear from a good source that Colonel Egge, chief of UN Intelligence, had promised two days ago that UN would not attack Katangans. He said, leaving Tshombe on the 12th of September in the evening: "We shall meet tomorrow and discuss this again." From UN sources, I am informed that a Canadian officer of Italian descent has resigned as a protest

against UN action and asked to be repatriated. According to a secretary, Tombelaine phoned Tshombe at 3:00 in the night of 13 September, telling him that two cars had left Headquarters for his residence in order to bring him to the airport to depart for Leopoldville. The same Tombelaine spoke this morning over Radio Katanga, still in UN hands, asking Katangese gendarmes and civil servants to betray Tshombe.

— Snipers killed two Europeans today, apparently from the roof of the Post Office. The UN announces a curfew after 20:00. On Radio Katanga, Tombelaine states that any Katangese resistance is doomed. The UN, said Tombelaine, is determined to shoot without warning anybody circulating after curfew hours.

— In the Red Cross Hospital, next to the Belgian Consulate, the UN Swedish unit has installed two heavy machine guns. And Tombelaine begins his propaganda over the radio. He speaks now in the name of the Central Congolese Government. I wonder on what right the UN mixes in politics and who permitted Tombelaine to act as an agitator on behalf of the Central Government. Anyhow, Tombelaine's speech is full of mendacity. What a shame!

15 September

— One *Fouga Mystere* Jet of the Katangese Air Force last night dropped three bombs on Luano Airport held by the UN. At the airport, a special commissaire appointed to Katanga by the Central Government has already arrived. His name is Bochelay Davidson and according to reliable sources he is scared and asks to be sent back to Leopoldville. Together with this "commissaire" several technicians from Leopoldville have also arrived but remain hidden at Luano Airport.

— Munongo addresses the Gendarmerie and the police, inciting their patriotism. He offers to exchange several UN soldiers captured when Radio College was reoccupied for an Italian mercenary captured by the UN. Katangans started rounding up all persons suspected to be UN informers. An Italian couple is arrested and seriously mistreated by Katangans. The French Consul succeeds in freeing the wife who is of French extraction.

— From Kamina, it is announced that 2,000 warriors of Kasongo Niembo are ready to attack the UN airbase.

— Crackling of machine guns all day long. A mortar bomb falls on Hotel Leo II in the room of a newsman. The room is empty. O'Brien proclaims the curfew is permanent and will be rigidly enforced.

— Extraordinary spirit of organization among Belgians who organize the food and gasoline supply of the population. We now have fresh bread and food. The population seems calm.

— On the Radio, Tombelaine admits that the UN opened fire on Red Cross ambulances, but only because Katangan gendarmes and guns were hidden in the cars with the Red Cross flags. It is false. Under my eyes, the UN Indian Unit at the Post Office opened fire on regular Red Cross ambulances with medical personnel in the first hours of the battle and for the first time. Later on, anything could happen.

16 September

— According to information from the UN, O'Brien and Tombelaine are now waging a personal war against Katangans. It is said they have no more confidence in Irish officers and demand that UN headquarters be guarded by Indians whom both trust.

— The British Consul today attempts to persuade O'Brien to withdraw his Indians from the Post Office since the whole civilian white population is endangered by their firing.

— Two Europeans going to Rhodesia are taken by Katangans as UN spies because they do not speak French and seriously beaten up.

— The Union Minière management asks the UN to open the airport to civilian traffic so that UM families may be evacuated. The UN refuses.

— Lieutenant Degrelle, the heart of Katangan resistance, was killed today by UN bullets when he jumped out of an armoured car in the Camp Massart. He had a wife and two children. All Belgians are particularly distressed by the news.

— Journalists coming from the UN headquarters say that the In-

dian General Radja is furious and wants to continue the war against Katangans by all means.

— A beginning of panic among Europeans is noticeable today, as they realize the position of the Western countries. But over 100 mercenaries are now serving with the Gendarmerie, guiding the military operations. Tshombe officially recognized the Europeans' military ranks and ordered Katangans to obey them.

— Swedish pilots refuse to fly helicopters to Jadotville in order to supply the encircled Irish garrison. They pretend that the helicopters' engines are out of order. But in fact, they fear being shot by Katangese machine guns.

— Three Irish soldiers ran away from Radio College when it was re-occupied by gendarmes. They entered the house of a Belgian and threatening him, demanded civilian clothes and a car. Caught by Katangans, all of them are massacred. In late afternoon, six UN light armoured cars are crossing the town without shooting or stopping. The UN pretend that only mercenaries oppose its attack. This is false. During the first 24 hours, only Katangan gendarmes resisted the attacks. Later on, mercenaries joined their resistance.

— We can clearly see that the UN wants to impose a political solution upon Katanga and force it to surrender. UN demonstrates its lack of information every day. In Ndola, Northern Rhodesia, an official of the UN answered a newsman who inquired, before leaving for Katanga, about the situation: "You can go easily. Everything is O.K. Take a taxi to Elisabethville. Our troops have complete control." What control? The UN holds the Post Office, the Airport and Radio Katanga station. Katangans are everywhere else. All roads to Rhodesia are under Katangan control. The UN is confined to its positions. One UN helicopter is forced down by Katangans and lands near Hotel Lido, slightly damaged. From the Airport, I hear that UN Indians were terrified by the *Fouga Mystere* bombing.

— Kimba, Minister of Foreign Affairs, returned from Rhodesia and announced to his collaborators that Sir Welensky has promised

to send a train with supplies for the civilian population in Elisabethville.

—In Elisabethville, 26 UN white soldiers have been captured up to now by Katangans. The UN accuses Katangans of bad treatment of prisoners. Tshombe gives a press conference, denies the accusation and asks for an international commission of inquiry. And the shooting goes on. The morale of the population seems a bit shaken.

17 September

— Four days and four nights of hostilities. Gendarmes and mercenaries are harrassing the UN Headquarters with mortar fire. Several casualties.

— Troubles in the Baluba Camp of refugees. Swedish guards left the camp when gendarmes approached it, opening fire on the refugees. A score of injured and dead.

— All Foreign consuls in Elisabethville, except the US, seem revolted by the UN's stupid, inhuman, badly organized action.

— Extremely dangerous to walk and drive in Elisabethville for persons not speaking French. All people having an English accent are suspected of being UN men and are arrested.

— Beginning of mutiny among Katangese policemen over claims for beer and food. Chief Commissar Sapwe Pius succeeds in calming the dissatisfaction by supplying policemen with cigarettes, beer, etc.

— People seem happy hearing that Dag Hammarschjold will come to Leopoldville and will probably meet Tshombe in Northern Rhodesia. The Secretary General is expected soon in Ndola. According to reliable sources, he does not seem to approve the UN military action.

— Tshombe, over the radio, appeals to the Katangese youth organization, the so-called "JEUNAKAT"—l'enfant terrible—of Katanga. He condemns any act of brutality against Kasai men. He also thanks the Gendarmerie for its gallantry and kneels in memory of these who died. Tshombe asks Katangans to respect the prisoners' lives and ends with this sentence: "You can count on me as I count on you. Katanga will never bow in front of this force. . ."

— In a farm at 15 km. from Elisabethville, 23 Irish prisoners are guarded by a dozen Katangans, commanded by a French mercenary. They are well treated and fed, even better than we are.

— Trucks are leaving the beer factory carrying supplies to gendarmes. "If Tshombe's soldiers get drunk, the worst should be expected," I hear from all sources.

— Tshombe asks President Kennedy to recall the US Consul Canup from Elisabethville. He accuses the US Consul of giving false information on Katanga to his Government.

— Big protest by the Red Cross and all doctors in Elisabethville against the UN shooting the ambulances. The UN today evacuates O'Brien's private house in the Roches District. Apparently they fear they may not be able to protect it.

— Tshombe is reported on the way to Rhodesia to meet Dag Hammarskjöld. Munongo leaves for Jadotville in order to discuss the surrender of 150 Irishmen. Another 50 prisoners are now in Katangan hands.

— A bulldozer has been transformed by the Union Minière plants into an armoured car in 72 hours. The "Mamouth" as it is called, is 32 tons and apparently prevented the entrance of UN troops in Jadotville.

18 September

— Violent reaction in Paris and in Brazzaville against the UN and its action in Katanga. Fulbert Youlou, the President of the Congo-Brazzaville, says: "What legal rights has the UN to unify the Congo by force? How then, can the UN prevent Katanga from being an independent State?"

— Most foreign consuls and great numbers of Europeans envision the evacuation of women and children. The Hotel Leopold II also starts to empty. A terrific shooting occurred all night in the Post Office area and near the UN Headquarters. Several mercenaries approached the Post Office and harassed the Indians for hours. The UN troops replied furiously with all their heavy machine guns.

— Belgian doctors from the City Hospital are threatened today by African nurses because they took care of an injured Irishman.

18:00 Hours

— Brief cable from Ndola. Hammarskjöld's plane crashed last night near the Rhodesian border. Search for survivors has been organized. Katangans boast of having shot the plane. "Is it an accident or sabotage?" people start to question. Big blow for the UN.

— Midnight: From 21:00, four mercenaries who jumped on the roof of the hotel have been watching the Post Office. A tall Belgian mercenary, loaded with two sub-machine guns talks to us in front of the hotel. "Ce soir on va les em. . ." (Tonight we'll bother them) he says. Indeed, the shooting starts soon after. UN Indians return the fire. Infernal noise. Late in the morning I finally fall asleep. People get accustomed to anything. Both sides use tracer bullets from time to time. Looks like the 4th of July.

— Today, Tombelaine's voice on the Radio seemed definitely discouraged. He does not attack Tshombe anymore. Tombelaine said that the UN waits for Tshombe to order a cease-fire. In other words: "We at the UN have had enough, we failed."

19 September

— Dag Hammarskjöld and a dozen persons who accompanied him died in the crash of their plane several miles from Ndola. There is only one survivor, an American sergeant, seriously burned. I hear that Hammarskjöld boarded the same plane used by General MacKeown, last week. The plane of the UN Commander-in-Chief had been hit by Katangese machine guns while taking off from Elisabethville. In Leopoldville, UN mechanics had replaced one of its four engines. There is another version of what seems to be an accident. Hammarskjöld had discovered on the plane an African who was supposed to kill Tshombe in Ndola, during the meeting. The killer hired by the Central Government had to be disarmed by the Secretary General's orders. A fight started and the plane crashed. According to several sources, most of the bodies of UN personnel from the plane were riddled with bullets. These are however the two hypotheses: Fight on board between UN men and the killer; or explosion after the crash of ammunition which apparently was in the plane.

— Katangans had this afternoon attacked the Post Office building with machine guns and bazookas but the Indians fought back and

repelled them. UN Indian unit which occupied Hotel Lido left today by trucks. Driving on Boulevard Elisabeth, they shoot right and left in all directions and with no reason. All houses on Boulevard Elisabeth are screened with bullets. People passed a very bad half an hour because of this useless shooting.

20 September

— Almost all gendarmes left Elisabethville last night and are now hiding in the bush on the skirts of the capital. From time to time a platoon enters the city shoots at UN positions and leaves the scene. There is no military plan, just sheer harassment. In Elisabethville, Africans are now scarce. Several policemen and occasionally a platoon of gendarmes. All activities have stopped. Shops are closed. Very little food. Very dangerous to walk or drive through the city. Bullets are whistling constantly.

— Among African nations, Tshombe's prestige seems rising. Some African leaders accuse the UN, the whites of course, of wishing to massacre the blacks. In a press communique, the UN accuses mercenaries of having hindered its action. Strange excuse . . . 5,000 Indians against 100 mercenaries have failed. The UN Army covered itself with ridicule. In the afternoon, several UN light armoured cars passed in front of Katanga Police station and shot. The policemen ran away leaving several injured and two killed.

— The French Consul, Lambroschini, is injured by mortar splits. Last night UN planes attempted to land and to bring reinforcements. Most of them failed because of darkness and violent shooting by Katangese machine guns.

— New fights between Baluba refugees and Katangese gendarmes on Elisabethville streets. Casualties on both sides are reported.

— The Union Minière today started the evacuation of women and children to Rhodesia. In Jadotville and Kolwezi, the plants now have only two shifts of workers instead of three.

— In Ndola, Tshombe refused to speak to Khiari and to O'Brien, both considered by him as enemies of Katanga. Tshombe apparently trusts only Dumontet, reputed for his moderation and impartiality.

— In the Katangese Military Camp "Massart," General Muke pro-

ceeds to promote a score of African officers who distinguished themselves in the recent fightings.

21 September

— For the first time, the last evening was calm. Apparently Khiari persuaded Tshombe to sign a cease-fire. However, far outside Elisabethville, some shooting is going on. French Major Faulques is now directing the Katangese operations but there is no real "entente" between mercenaries. Each national group seems to act independently whenever it can.

— Tshombe returned from Ndola this morning. A Cabinet meeting is organized, followed by a press conference. Tshombe denounces Khiari as being the author of aggression against Katanga. He said that he accepted the cease-fire only to prevent useless bloodshed. Professor Clemens, one of Tshombe's advisors, returned from Ndola with his boss. From New York, it is announced that the UN is studying Tshombe's conditions for a cease-fire. Tshombe asked for the complete evacuation of all UN troops in Katanga, under the pretext that he cannot assure their safety any longer.

— Mixed commissions, UN-Katangans, for discussing the stationing of both armies and the exchange of prisoners. Tshombe refuses to discuss with O'Brien whom he referred to in a press conference as a "faux type" (false individual). Tshombe denounces to the press the atrocities perpetrated by Baluba refugees in the last days against Katangan gendarmes and policemen. At one moment, Tshombe said: "These savages had cut the . . . textual organs" of our people. An advisor behind Tshombe tells him the right word. Tshombe rectifies, "sexual organs. . ."

— The Katangans hold in their hands now nearly 200 UN European prisoners, mostly Irishmen captured in Jadotville. The UN captured about 50 gendarmes in Elisabethville fights.

— The Union Minière speeds up the evacuation of its agents' families. Last night a train with ammunition from Rhodesia crossed the border to Katanga.

22 September

— The Katangan Authorities prohibit shopowners from selling anything to UN men.

— New skirmish between Katangans and Baluba refugees around the Camp. Great tension among Europeans fed up with fighting and dangerous living.

— Tshombe renders visit today to injured Katangans at the City Hospital.

— Tombelaine confessed today to the French newsman Brignoux that he could not tell the truth to Tshombe prior to the UN action for military reasons. The French journalist has the impression that the UN is very badly informed about the situation. Several UN officials, says Brignoux, are convinced that the UN is victorious.

— Press conference by Tshombe this afternoon. He accuses the UN of having broken the cease-fire accord. Tshombe states that the UN shot Katangan policemen who tried to stop the Balubas pillaging in Ruashi and its neighboring areas.

— Reinforcements for the UN arrived by plane last night and today. The garrison of the Post Office is reinforced.

— Dissatisfaction among Africans following Tshombe's decision to cancel any action against UN. Tshombe boasts of the gendarmes gallantry, treats them as being victorious and promises to go on with the fighting if the UN attacks again.

— In Kipoushi 150 mercenaries are now reorganizing themselves by groups of 5-6 guerilla fighters. No more mercenaries in Elisabethville. They fear arrest by the UN. In Kipoushi and in Kolwezi, the Katangan Air Force received several "Harvard" planes, ordered sometime ago.

— According to official lists, Katangans have lost during the fightings: 58 dead; 118 injured Africans; 10 Europeans killed among whom 3 were mercenaries and 7 civilian. The UN refuses to give its list of casualties yet. Estimates give 40 killed and several scores injured.

25 September

— Left for Jadotville in order to visit the UN prisoners. There are 191 Irishmen and ten Italians. They live in "Hotel Europe." The Irish major, Patrick Quinlan, their commander-in-chief, tells me that his men are fed up and that they fear to be massacred by Katangan gendarmes who are guarding them. According to him,

the attack started on 13 September at 07:00. His unit had arrived several days before for a 48-hour mission only. The rations and ammunitions were thus to cover a 48-hour mission and they had to surrender because of lack of food and ammunition. The Irish major stated that the Katangan Fouga Mystere bombed and machine-gunned his men, but no casualties were reported. I myself see the traces of three bombs which fell near the UN Headquarters in Jadotville. The major continued his story: "On 17 September Munongo arrived and signed the cease-fire conditions, and we decided to surrender. But Munongo has promised us to let officers keep their pistols. We had only four slightly injured men. My men do not want any more of this ridiculous war." The major seemed very angered against the Headquarters in Elisabethville because they were sent without sufficient food and ammunition. He asked me to tell to the whole world that "His men had fought courageously." The major seemed anxious and insisted I talk Munongo into giving back his officers their guns, as he promised. In front of the hotel, Katangan gendarmes seemed nervous. They drink beer. In Jadotville according to Katangan officials, the fight which lasted three days and three nights brought them the following casualties: one French mercenary killed, two gendarmes killed and eight injured.

— Going to Jadotville, I visited on the road, the famous "Mamouth," the 32-ton bulldozer transformed by UM plant into an armoured car. Several European volunteers are serving it. Inside there are two heavy machine guns, rather old however, and a dozen sub-machine guns plus cases of grenades. The "Mamouth", according to its servants, prevented the UN Indian column from reinforcing the Jadotville Irish garrison a week ago. In Jadotville I am informed that 40 mercenaries, mostly volunteers, fought against the Irish garrison, helping the gendarmes.

27 September

— Tshombe orders distribution of weapons to all villagers in Katanga.

— Murderous fighting in Kipoushi between Kasai men and rival

tribes, chiefly Lunda and Babemba. Up to now 67 killed and dozens wounded.

28 September—11:00 Hours, in the morning

— September War has ended. Katangans boast of victory but so does the UN. Katangans have 200 white prisoners. It is the first time in the history of Africa that so many whites are captured. The war is ended but the after-effects are visible everywhere: nearly 50,000 Baluba refugees are packed in the Camp, starving, killing, pillaging, hungry for revenge against Katangans, whites, as well as blacks. Thousands of European women and children have been evacuated to Rhodesia or to Europe. Virulent hatred by Africans in Katanga against the UN and the U.S.A., regarded as being responsible for the war. Europeans openly back Katangans in their anti-American feeling. Taking into account this general emotion, the American Consulate decides to protect the building with UN guards.

LESSONS OF AN ABSURD WAR

The culpability of those responsible for the clumsy action against Katanga seems obvious and for several reasons. The UN started a military operation without being enough informed about the enemy potential and, in particular, without knowing its own military capacities. The UN ignored the morale of its own soldiers. They had no compelling reasons to die for the cause of Headquarters in Elisabethville, in Leopoldville, or in New York.

The UN attempted, like Hitler, a sort of "Blitz-Krieg" but on a ridiculous scale. One cannot crush a country by occupying the Post Office and the Radio. The military chiefs of this organization, without mentioning the civilians, were convinced they could sap Katanga's strength in two hours or so by checking the mail and the radio station. It was pure madness!

At last, the UN did not envision the troubles which could result from a prolongation of hostilities and the danger of having around 50,000 starved, vindictive Baluba refugees on their hands. The Balubas could have overrun the city and massacred all Europeans.

Fortunately for us Europeans, Tshombe, and his Katangans were prepared to face such eventuality.

But what amazed the observer of Katanga's affairs, was the conduct of some UN officials vis-a-vis Tshombe and his supporters. Before the hostilities, the UN had not tried to exhaust all peaceful means to persuade Tshombe to cooperate. From the beginning, the relations between Katangans and UN had been poisoned because of a lack of tact and diplomacy and I should say, even honesty. The UN put pressure only on Katanga and came to Katanga as an enemy. Tombelaine and his radio should have functioned long before but not for purposes of attacking Tshombe. UN Radio should have indulged itself in a serious broadcast to explain to Katangans UN goals and to gain friends. Instead, the UN encouraged tribalism, dissensions and the massive exodus of the Balubas in a camp which it had opened unconsciously. The UN should have dissuaded the Balubas from deserting their homes and work and thus prevented panic.

From a military point of view, the UN should have long before occupied all strategic positions in Katanga in order to check entrances to cities and to protect civilians. The UN could very well have occupied the Union Minière installations from the beginning, thus compelling Katanga to share its revenue with Leopoldville. Obviously, Tshombe and his supporters could have attempted to fight back by ordering strikes or even an attack, but the UN in a sincere and impartial cooperation with Europeans could have prevented such possibilities. A kind, friendly approach to Tshombe's advisers by the UN could have influenced the Katangan leaders who would have slowed down his stubbornness. At last, the UN did not control Katanga's airports in order to impede Tshombe's aviation from intervening. The Katangans with only one small jet plane were more efficient than the UN Air Force.

In conclusion: The UN initiated a political and military action for which it was not prepared. Its political objective was, at the very least, questionable.

- The UN did not have jet planes and anti-aircraft weapons.
- The UN shot at Red Cross ambulances. It also used the Red

Cross Hospital as a military position, installing machine guns and soldiers.

— The UN never employed real diplomatic means, a persuasive attitude, a friendly approach vis-a-vis Tshombe and his Katangans, whites and blacks. The UN officials sometimes lied to Tshombe and thus suffered the loss of their prestige and authority. The UN as a peaceful, impartial force did not intervene to free Tshombe when he was in Cocquilhatville and in Leopoldville in April-May 1961. Had the UN intervened, it could have proved to Tshombe its impartiality, and its desire to maintain order and peace among Congolese.

— The UN proved by an unprepared military action its military weakness; 5,000 soldiers, Indians, Swedes, and Irishmen were incapable of putting down one hundred mercenaries and several hundred untrained gendarmes.

— The UN, and in particular its officials in Katanga, is responsible for the military failure. Officials in Katanga should have been better informed and discouraged an action ordered by UN Headquarters in New York or Leopoldville. To illustrate the UN's lack of information and the ignorance of African realities, it is enough to recall that had the UN attack against the Post Office been attempted during daylight, gendarmes would have surrendered after token resistance. Indeed, the African is afraid during dark. He loses his control and in order to give himself courage he shoots, but only through fear, not through desire to fight. The UN action performed during the day with armoured cars and loud-speakers, against any Katangan building, would probably have succeeded without casualties.

Consequently, the UN action in Katanga had different results than those intended by its leaders. The *Katangese Nationalist Esprit* has been reinforced by the ordeal. The UN action encouraged the criticism of various of its members already less than steadfast in their devotion to the organization. The Belgian Government itself reconsidered its position regarding Katanga following the failure of UN action. Moreover, France simply refused to pay its assessment of the cost of the Congo operation.

But the UN action also revealed some weaknesses in Katanga's structure. Tshombe, for instance, was stating that he did not need nor want any more mercenaries while he was feverishly recruiting them. If politically speaking such hypocrisy might be excusable, the duplicity of Africans discouraged Europeans in their pro-Katangan feelings. Tshombe was playing with words and the African in Katanga believed whatever Tshombe was saying.

Another consequence of the UN action of September has been noticed in Leopoldville. Tshombe succeeded in proving by his resistance to some Congolese leaders such as Kasavubu and Mobutu that his cause was not at all childish and that a certain African solidarity should prevail in the future against the UN and its white supporters. At any rate, pro-Federalist Congolese seemed to react against UN action and U.S. influence over the UN.

In Elisabethville, the U.S. Consul, Canup, packed his suitcases and left, scorned by Europeans. The French Consul, Lambroschini told me several weeks later that he had encountered Mr. Canup in Ndola and that he refused to shake hands with him. The French Consul, as he told it to me and to others, has even insulted the U.S. Consul, with these words: "You are a coward and an inaccurate man"—(*Vous etes un lache et un homme incorrect*).

Katanga commenced rather quickly to bind up its wounds. The shops and the restaurants re-opened. Weapons and ammunitions were passing through the borders coming from South Africa and Rhodesia while mercenaries, in spite of Tshombe's denials, were hurriedly recruited.

In fact, the second round was . . . in view.

CHAPTER XI

BLOODY DECEMBER

One can say that the UN action in September against Katanga ended, "*en queue de poisson*." It fizzled out. . . . If UN officials defended their action, the Katangans openly regarded themselves as victorious; they had their dead, their wounded, but they captured 200 whites. . . . Moreover, Tshombe and his men were still the masters in Katanga while the UN had not gained a yard of ground. The UN even lost its garrison and its positions in Jadotville. UN troops were holding the Post Office and the Radio Station in Kilobelobe but this conquest had been costly and was growing precarious. The Katangans, in addition, had drawn international attention to their war and even gained some sympathy. Several African leaders, affected by the UN action, started to condemn America, saying, "Americans do not like Negroes and therefore they used the UN for massacreing our brothers in Katanga."

The September hostilities gave the Katangans excellent trump-cards: 200 UN Irish soldiers prisoners. There was no question of the UN beginning another adventure before settling the prisoner problem. Public opinion in Ireland was already stirred up and the Irish Government started to criticize the UN and to ask for action to free its men.

Of course, Tshombe again promised to renew discussions with the Central Government but according to his old refrain, he offered to meet Kasavubu or Adoula anywhere but Leopoldville. Fear or

political excuse? Anyhow, Tshombe had some souvenirs from his previous arrest and had no confidence either in his own brothers in Leopoldville or in the UN. It is true that the UN had not raised a finger to prevent Tshombe's arrest in April. As the UN itself pointed out, to intervene for Tshombe's life and safety would have meant to make politics. It was futile pretext, of course, since the whole action commenced by the UN in the Congo was a political one. The UN official's logic was therefore very peculiar.

After the September war, Katanga and the Central Government lived in a mood of confusion, ambition, and "amour-propre." Each side wanted to be regarded as strong, as acting legally, as being the right or the only valid Congolese interlocutor. Adoula bluntly refused to meet Tshombe in Brazzaville or in Geneva, on neutral ground. Between the two ambitious factions, the UN was concerned with the Irish prisoners. Negotiations were under way and finally on 26 October 1961, one month after the end of the September conflict, the exchange of prisoners took place following a rather dramatic ceremony. Irish soldiers were exultant, freed from fear and constant tension. But for the UN, it was a relief. For Katanga it brought anxiety and regrets, since they knew that the UN would now have free hands to put on the trigger of their guns again.

According to semi-official figures, the UN counted at the beginning of October: 15 dead, 25 missing, 64 injured, and 195 prisoners. Katanga had 58 dead (among whom were 8 Europeans), 128 injured, and 45 prisoners in Elisabethville. Meanwhile, the UN had captured in North Katanga, in Myunzu, 150 gendarmes, thus counter-balancing the Irish hostages. In addition to these casualties, in the Baluba Refugee Camp, due to skirmishes, fratricidal fights, and incidents with Katangans (without forgetting famine, sicknesses, etc.) at least one thousand Africans died. An impressive balance sheet, indeed, for a Peace Organization which was supposed to save human lives in the Congo...

After recovering its prisoners, the UN started its game again by reinforcing itself with men and material and by helping the National Congolese Army to occupy the North of Katanga. In

this way, the UN hoped to ruin Tshombe's reputation as: "Conqueror of the North." Katanga was busily engaged in propaganda among Western European Countries, in America and in Africa, while they were buying weapons. Arms traffickers were making fortunes by selling Katanga second hand planes, old ammunitions, trucks, jeeps, uniforms, stocks, blankets, shirts, and even parachutes . . . A French-made Fouga Mystere was bought for 120,000 dollars, three times its real price. Mercenaries were recruited, others were fired then hired again. Gendarmerie Commander-in-Chief, General Muke, believed Katanga was ready to face any eventually. The gendarmes, sure of themselves, established barricades, covering all exits from Elisabethville. The UN finally evacuated the Post Office Building. UN vehicles entering Elisabethville were searched by Katangans. Except for the Airport, the UN was in enemy territory boycotted by the whole population, Africans as well as Europeans. The UN's only "friends" at that moment were 40-50,000 Balubas who, by the way, had only one dream, to leave Katanga.

KATANGA . . . AND ITS MIRACLES

After the September War, Katanga enjoyed a relative peace, due to what we were calling the "miracles." The first was to see America wavering in its anti-Katangese policy under the diplomatic advice coming from France and Great Britain which were opposed to any new military action by the UN.

Katangans proved their humanity and their discipline by avoiding massacres of UN prisoners. On the contrary, the Central Government and its famous *Armee Nationale Congolaise* were giving signs of extreme unrest. Thus, in Kindu, in the north of the Congo, on 6 November 1961, 13 UN Italian pilots were arrested by the ANC, as they stepped down from their planes, and slaughtered. The unfortunate Italian pilots were then sold on the market, as meat is sold, to the population. This appalling crime strongly impressed international opinion but only for a while. It seemed to make little impression on the UN and was played down. Protests and accusations were directed against the Central Government.

The UN itself was under critical fire because the pilots had been arrested and massacred almost under the eyes of a UN Malayan unit which did not attempt to intervene. Tshombe was therefore entitled to say in his press conference: "Look to your ANC, look who wants to liberate us; these are the savages that you back. In my country, Katanga, such horrors are unthinkable."

Now that we are speaking about Tshombe and his press conferences, I should say that in no other country have I seen so many press conferences as in Katanga. I do not know exactly how much Katangans have learned from us whites, but their ministers, their high officials had certainly learned the importance of the press. This is why they saturated us every day with press conferences and press communiques. There was at least one press conference a day, sometimes two or three. Everybody wanted to speak to the press, starting with Tshombe and continuing with Munongo, Kimba, the Health Minister, the Communications Minister, the Agricultural Department head, the Chief of Police, Senator X, the National Assembly President and even the Katangese Women's Association. If one wanted to attend all these conferences, he would have to give up everything; eating, sleeping, working, or thinking. And the things they invented! A reporter had to listen, for instance, to the President of the Katangese Women's Association who through her interpreter was accusing Kennedy of being an assassin, Mrs. Kennedy, a blood vampire and copper eater, or the slaughterer of African children

Lamentations and again lamentations, invectives and accusations . . . Only the tom-tom was lacking. Apparently, European advisers tried several times to discourage their ministers from talking to the press for no reason. It was in vain. Press conferences were the fashion in Katanga, as was whiskey and "Simba," the local beer, American cars and French Champagne.

After the September hostilities ended, we lived in fear of a new war. There were too many armies, too many guns. There were the Katangans with their para-commandos, their Military Police, their Special Platoons, and their Youth Gendarmes. Then, the mer-

cenaries on Katanga's side and the UN with Indians, Malayans, Ethiopians, Turks, Tartars . . . Only Martians were absent!

In Leopoldville, by the end of November, the Central Government was in complete dismay, no authority, no money, no army . . . Besides, had it not been for the UN and for America which stood behind it, Adoula's Government would have long before been unemployed . . . Adoula, America's man, promised Gizenga, the former right hand of Lumumba, to accompany him to Belgrade where a Conference of "non-aligned countries" was to be held. Adoula had even promised to adopt a pro-Lumumbist policy, to shake hands with Communists and to turn towards Moscow, their Mecca . . .

But in Katanga, after the massacre of the 13 UN Italian pilots, people were ready to swear that the UN would withdraw its troops from Katanga in order to send them to Kindu to cut the throats of the ANC killers according to the Indian way . . . Nothing happened. The monstrous cannibalism committed by the ANC was quickly forgotten and forgiven . . . The UN asked for an inquiry, Adoula promised it and General Mobutu eventually sent a tough general to the scene to arrest a scapegoat, to pull off his ears and to bring back to Italy the bones of the unfortunate UN men. And the "dossier" was closed.

During the lull, however, Katangans were not sleeping. All sorts of chance airports were constructed in the bush. Planes had been ordered and some were on the way and for a while the Katangans' main subject was their "mighty, efficient Air Force." In truth, it was rather impressive by African standards: Bombers, light Jets, Harvards, Doves, Dorniers, Commanches, DC3, DC4, totaling nearly 30; but there was a lack of pilots and mechanics. There were no spare parts and no adequate maintenance. From an original three, Katangans had only one French Fouga-Mystere left. One crashed following an accident in which its Belgian pilots were killed, the second had been found on the airport and captured by the UN before the fighting. It is true that six other Fouga-Mystere's were ordered and paid for but not one reached Katanga because the French Government barred exportation. Tshombe's

private plane, according to Belgians, was in a great part the cause of the riot between Kasavubu and Tshombe. It was, in fact, the plane of the former Belgian Governor to the Congo and Tshombe, by a happy circumstance, inherited it. Kasavubu as the chief of the new Republic thought that it should have been his heritage. Several times he cried, asking Tshombe to give him back "his toy," but Tshombe pretended not to hear. In one case, certain confusion prevailed with regard to the exact number of Katangan planes. One of the Katangese airports was located in Kipoushi on both Katangan and Rhodesian territory for strategic purposes. If the UN wanted to confiscate Katangese planes, they were given as belonging to Rhodesia. Besides, in the event of an attack by UN planes against Kipoushi airport, the Katangans could put their planes under protection on Rhodesian soil by moving the border poles.

At the end of November, American Senator Thomas Dodd arrived in Elisabethville, where people called him "Tshombe's guardian angel." The presence of an American who extensively backed Katanga, meant for Tshombe and his supporters, "the optimists," that America was on the way to changing her policy in favor of Tshombe. The "pessimists," however, were praying that no provocation by drunken gendarmes would be made against the UN. Indeed, the UN troops were waiting for a pretext to resume firing. The UN officials in Elisabethville and particularly the military men were anxious to patch up their prestige. O'Brien, Tombelaine and Company had left, other representatives were now in Katanga; but the Indian General Radja, the "tough soldier of September," was still around and infuriated by his recent defeat.

On the 25th of November, the UN Security Council held a meeting and reiterated its intention of uniting the Congo by force if necessary. Tshombe and his Katangans bristled. They threatened to reply to force with force.

On 26 November during a meeting in the "cité" of Keynia in front of 10,000 Africans and one hundred whites, Tshombe decreed general mobilization. A leaflet signed by a Belgian, appealed to all compatriots to take up guns against the UN and to defend

Katanga, their foster land. In his speech, Tshombe accused America and its policy of "betise congenitale" but this time he did not confuse . . . the organs. Tshombe went even further in his incriminations by calling England and France, America's accomplices because both governments did not use their veto right in the Security Council choosing to abstain. In the African cités, barricades were built. The road to Rhodesia was cut in several points by other barricades held by gendarmes. But Senator Dodd was still in Katanga and many still hoped that his presence would prevent the UN from renewing its efforts to subdue Katanga.

In the evening of November 28, Senator Dodd and the US Consul Hoffacker were on their way to a dinner given by the Mobil Oil Company Director in Elisabethville, a man named Smith, married to a Belgian and pro-Katangan. However, the Smiths had unfortunately invited some UN officials to dinner at that same time; Yvan Smith and Brien Urkhart, one Australian, the other British. The dinner was given by the Smiths in their villa located several yards from General Muke's house which was strongly guarded by his gendarmes. The UN officials searching for the Smith's villa approached General Muke's house but finally found what they were looking for. Meanwhile the gendarmes saw a UN car in the area, and thinking that Muke was to be arrested, traced the UN officials to the Smith's house and burst in in the middle of the drinks. The gendarmes separated women from men and arrested the two UN officials whom they mistreated with the gun-butts. Senator Dodd arrived just then with the US Consul, escorted by Tshombe's personnel motorcycle guards. The US Consul and Senator Dodd were almost arrested too. Munongo and Tshombe were alerted and several hours later Muke freed the UN officials, one with a broken rib, the other bleeding profusely.

Informed about the unpleasant incident, Tshombe's advisers were dismayed. Indeed, Senator Dodd had come to Katanga in order to see the Katangans peaceful conduct and to plead the cause of a country where no one was persecuted, or endangered.

After several hours later, another "coup de theatre," occurred on Boulevard Elisabeth near Tshombe's residence. Coming back to

the hotel by myself and passing in front of Tshombe's house, I heard several shots. I encountered two jeeps loaded with gendarmes right at Tshombe's door. Mrs. President, "la Generale" was murmuring something to the Katangan officers. I turned and saw an empty UN Jeep in the road ditch two hundred yards away, on the corner of the U. S. Consulate. I heard cracking in the bush and I saw blood on the pavement. What had happened was the beginning of hostilities in December between the UN and Katanga.

But let us read once again the notes I was taking at that epochal period.

A JOURNAL OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY EVENTS

29 November

— Two UN Indians, a major and his driver have been killed by Katangan gendarmes this evening around midnight on Boulevard Elisabeth, several hundred yards from Tshombe's residence. The body of the driver was found several hours later in the bush but the major has vanished. Second incident with UN in one day.

30 November

— Autopsy of the Indian driver's body. A bullet in his back. No traces yet of the Indian officer. Nobody seems to be willing to tell the truth. Belgian DAs in cooperation with UN try to clear the mystery, but in vain. Complete secrecy. I hear the truth however. The major, after the shooting of the Indian driver, was brought alive to Tshombe's residence and beaten up. Later on in the night, he was taken into the city and killed. The UN asks Tshombe that the Indian officer be returned to them, alive or dead, but better alive. The Katangese Government very embarrassed promises to investigate and to punish the responsible. Munongo, gives a press conference, expresses regrets and appeals for discipline among the gendarmes, policemen and all Katangans.

— The presence of Senator Dodd, appeases the tension and for the first time in months one can feel some pro-American sentiment among Katangans, whites and blacks.

—All African cite's are closed by the gendarmes barricades. Check of identity papers of walkers and passengers aboard cars.

— Complete rift between Belgian technicians and the French Letellier who suddenly became the top adviser of Tshombe. Letellier arrived several weeks ago in Katanga and first headed the Information Department writing press communiques.

— Last night, the US Consul Hoffacker, prevented an all-out attack by the UN troops against Katanga as reprisals for the last two grave incidents.

— Senator Dodd seems to encourage an immediate meeting between Tshombe and Adoula.

1 December

— Tshombe today left Elisabethville for Brazzaville. Before his departure Tshombe greeted US Senator Thomas Dodd and his wife who are expected to leave Katanga today too. According to Letellier, Tshombe hopes to encounter Adoula in Dakar and to use as mediator the Senegalese leader Leopold Senghor.

— A clandestine broadcast, identified only as coming from Katanga, appealed last night to Europeans and Africans to fight for their homeland against the UN which it accused of provocations, aggression and assassinations.

— Vexations by drunken gendarmes against civilians, mostly African women are reported in the African towns. The Katangese Police hasn't the courage to arrest gendarmes. Only the Military Police attempts to maintain order, but in civilian clothes, after work, MP's provoke the same abuses against civilians.

2 December

— Incident at Luano Airport between Katangese policemen and UN soldiers. At the Airport bar, a drunken policeman discharged his automatic rifle in the ceiling. After a short panic, the UN disarmed the fifty policemen who had resumed guarding the airport.

— A new Katangan barricade behind Hotel Leopold II, in front of the tunnel opened to Kasenga road.

— Several shots this morning coming from Katangese Military Camp "Massart." Apparently drunken gendarmes disputing among themselves. No casualties. According to another source, Katangans

opened fire on a UN helicopter which flew over Elisabethville. Kimba and Monongo seem anxious about the situation. Both confess to their advisers that they fear lack of discipline among gendarmes. "What can we do," said both. "They got their pay and they are drunk, as usual."

3 December

— At 15:00 hours, on Avenue Saio, a UN black VW, without plates and carrying three Swedish soldiers, passed the Katangan barricade without stopping. The gendarmes opened fire, killing one and badly injuring the others. When several minutes later a UN armoured car arrived on the scene, all the gendarmes hid themselves in the neighboring houses. The UN today arrested all Katangan policemen who were disarmed yesterday at the airport.

— Radio Brazzaville announced today that Adoula refuses to meet Tshombe unless the Katangan leader officially recognizes the Central Government's authority over Katanga. Tshombe may be back shortly says Kimba. But another official tells me that Tshombe might go to Europe from Brazzaville.

4 December

— Secret meeting of a score of Belgian technicians. Some organize the resistance, others plan the evacuation of women and children. Unhealthy atmosphere.

— Sir Welensky has sent a message to Tshombe today encouraging him to resist the UN's eventual attack.

— Press conference by Kimba. He prohibits UN military men from entering armed into Elisabethville. Kimba promises in return to withdraw Katangese gendarmes barricades on Avenue Saio. Increased tension. There are reports that about 12 UN planes are bringing reinforcements to Elisabethville.

— The Gendarmerie seem nervous, arrogant, and conceited. Officers and soldiers boast of their intention to massacre UN men. It is obvious that beer plays the major role in this bragging. But they do not forget UN weakness during the September fights.

— Tshombe officially in Europe. Purpose: diplomatic contacts and financial arrangements with various banks.

— Critical situation. Letellier advises Kimba to bluff and to ac-

cuse the UN of provocations constantly. Letellier writes the Press Communique and makes the UN responsible for yesterday's incident when three Swedes crossed the barricade on Avenue Saio. Katangans' resistance seems more determined than in September. A vague plan for the defense of Jadotville and Kolwezi is established. Most troops withdraw to these cities, while in the Elisabethville area, 600 gendarmes and one hundred mercenaries remain. In the North of Katanga, mercenaries and gendarmes are now mining roads. Near Kimina, a UN Jeep with Swedish soldiers blows up on a mine.

5 December

— Gendarmes take up position on the road to Luano Airport at the fork to the Jadotville road. Gendarmes at the barricade have been reported "completely drunk."

— Persistent rumors that a UN attack is intended for today at noon. It is 11:00.

— Kimba announces a press conference for 16:00 hours, today.

— 13:30. Violent shooting in the direction of Avenue Saio. I rush into the bathroom and fill up the tub. As a "veteran" of Katangese troubles, I know that if firing breaks out, water and electricity will be cut out for weeks. . . .

15:00 Hours

— Press Conference by Kimba, replacing Tshombe who is in Europe. There are nine journalists. All Katangan ministers are attending the conference. Kimba reproaches us for having asserted in our cables that "all Katangan leaders have fled this morning" and that "panic reigns in Elisabethville." Some really did. Kimba declares that Katangans are ready to fight since negotiations are no longer possible and he points out: "We are disciplined and prepared for any eventuality." Leaving the conference, I hear that this morning the UN received several jet planes, the first since the operation in Katanga started.

— 9 injured Katangans today at 13:30 on Avenue Saio. Several UN soldiers were also wounded. Apparently the UN attempted to force their way through Katangan barricades. UN official Urkhart

has been refused protection to come to town in order to negotiate. Situation extremely tense and confused.

— I am told that the "Mamouth," Katanga's armoured car, left Jadotville for Elisabethville to reinforce the resistance. The Katangan Government calls upon all soldiers, warriors, traditional chiefs and policemen to be ready for fighting. The Government appeals to civil servants to come to work. All had deserted their offices when the shooting started. Katangans have the impression that another war is under way but still have hope, hearing that a rift developed between UN Indians and Swedes at the airport. Indians consider the Swedes cowards.

6 December

Nyembo Albert, Minister of the "Fonction Publique," takes over the Information Department.

— Last night, a Katangan plane, a light "Dornier," launched three "home-made" bombs on Luano airport. I am told that the co-pilot pushed the bombs through an open hole in the plane's floor.

— War has really started. An African woman and her two children were seriously wounded today by UN mortars. The ambulance stops in front of the Hotel Leopold II, en route to the hospital, so they may be seen by journalists. We are taking pictures. The scene is horrible. The woman of about 20 years of age is bleeding all over. She holds a baby in her arms; its stomach is cut open by bomb splinters. We can see his intestines moving. Another child, in the arms of an African man, probably his father, has blood on his face. He does not move but his eyes are half open and seems to plead for aid.

— Private cars and trucks carry gendarmes to Elisabethville. Three Katangese armoured cars cross the town. All are driven by mercenaries. There are old vehicles which belonged to the *Force Publique* in 1940. Violent skirmish between Katangans and UN Indian unit on Avenue Saïo. 6 Indians killed.

— Kolwezi airport was bombed this morning by UN planes. At 13:15, a Globemaster with US markings flew over Elisabethville trying to land. Gendarmes and policemen opened fire with their automatics and machine guns on the plane which is at least 3,000

feet high. The uproar is infernal. . . .

— Tshombe is expected back from Paris tonight.

— At least one hundred mortar bombs fell today on Elisabethville. The center seems to be the UN aim. There is no safe place in town. We are in the middle of the war zone.

17:00 Hours

— Two UN Sabre-jet planes and two "Cambera" bombers fly over the city. A Globemaster tries to land, coming through heavy clouds. Each time it can be seen, Katangans open the fire. On Boulevard Elisabeth, one mile from the UN Headquarters, I met four mercenaries installing mortars in the yard of the European villas. Gendarmes are carrying ammunition.

— A train with women and children left Elisabethville for Rhodesia today. Evacuation by Europeans was started. In a cable, the Katangan Government appeals to Western countries to intervene. The UN and the USA are called "aggressors." Kimba tells news-men that Katangans will fight and they will even use the "scorched earth" policy if necessary. Kimba attacks America as having a racial discrimination policy because she has given the UN planes to kill Africans. A Lunda traditional chief tells me that he and his compatriots cannot understand the UN action. The African leader seems extremely disappointed by America and the Western European powers' attitude toward Katanga. "We are anti-Communists," he says, "but the Free World does not want to help us. We shall join the Communist Bloc." The African leader is convinced that whites are against blacks and that the UN is strictly an instrument of whites under the control of Americans who, as he pointed out, "hate Negroes."

7 December

— UN troops reported approaching the tunnel on Kasenga road, one mile behind Leopold II Hotel, and the city's center. A group of six mercenaries in a jeep are rushing to encounter them. They have one bazooka, one mortar, and submachine guns.

— The US Consul in Elisabethville is ordered to stay in his consulate "under surveillance." Tshombe has not returned yet.

— UN planes blow up Kolwesi gasoline stocks used by Katangan Air Force.

— Nyembo, the new head of the Information Department, launches an appeal for "total war." It was written by his adviser Letellier. "Kill all Onusiens" (UN men), he said. Over the radio, Letellier, under the name of Michel Duran, encourages the resistance and violently attacks the UN.

— According to a Katangan source, several captured UN Indians have been massacred.

— A US Globemaster bringing reinforcements for the UN was hit by Katangan machine gun fire. The plane, however, landed safely.

8 December

— Tshombe arrived this morning in Ndola, Northern Rhodesia; should shortly be in Elisabethville.

— The French adviser, Letellier, incites Katangan ministers against the Belgians who hope that Tshombe, once back, will fire him. According to a technician in Ndola, Sir Welensky assured Tshombe of support. Other Belgian advisers tell me that even if Tshombe orders a cease-fire now, gendarmes will not obey him. Up to now, however, gendarmes seem disciplined, orderly, and cooperative with mercenaries. There is an impressive nationalist spirit among Katangans, both African and white. I am told that a French group of mercenaries has arrived in Rhodesia en route to Katanga. How many, I asked? "Probably a dozen. Tshombe came with them from France."

— Radio Katanga's antennas in Kilobelobe were destroyed today by UN mortars.

— Tshombe was in Elisabethville at noon. Press conference. He reiterates his anti-Communist convictions, and does not hide his amazement at America's attitude. But he assures American citizens in Elisabethville of full protection.

— The greatest part of European and African civil servants did not come to work today. Radio Free Katanga appeals to them to work or be fired.

— Unbearable crackling of automatic guns all day, all night.

— US Secretary of State Dean Rusk today reiterated America's support of UN action in Katanga. UN mortar fell on Albert town today. All inhabitants deserted it. All important European companies organize the evacuation of families. Last night, the US Consulate evacuated women and children and a group of Protestant missionaries. The US Consul joins other foreign consuls in protests against inhuman UN acts. UN officials refused a cease-fire to permit Red Cross ambulances to evacuate people living in dangerous war areas.

— UN Swedish unit last night attacked the Kasenga Tunnel. They occupied it. Two UN light armoured cars destroyed by mercenaries with bazookas. Katangan gendarmes apparently fled. In the Hotel lounge, I met the Chief of the Gendarmerie Military Staff. He tried to call his headquarters and asked the African operator to dial the HQ telephone number. "I need reinforcements," he said to the operator. "Everybody has deserted." But the operator does not know the HQ telephone number. The Military Staff Chief does not know either. . . .

— At 13:15, two UN "Camberra" planes machine-gunned the Main Post Office. Telegraph and all telephone communications are cut. Journalists are crippled. However, some cables are sent by colleagues who risk their life by driving to Rhodesia, through UN and Katangan lines.

— Katangans seem obsessed with the idea of espionage. Three Europeans were arrested near the gendarmes' Camp "Massart." One, a Reuters' correspondent is a good friend who was released soon after. He still trembles. Others are Rhodesian newsmen.

— Tsiranana, President of the Malgache Republic, protests UN action in Katanga.

— A Union Minière director and another European businessman are killed by UN mortars in their Elisabethville homes.

— Water and electricity supply was cut today at noon. We are in a mess. . . .

9 December

— Katangan mortar is falling on UN Headquarters in the Avenue Fromont. Violent shooting at Kasenga tunnel.

— Brazzaville Radio announces today that world opinion is becoming concerned and indignant about the UN action against Katanga. The Radio comments: "While in Kindu, UN remained inactive against ANC killers of 13 Italian pilots, the same organization stubbornly attacks Katanga to force its integration into the Congo." But war goes on. Mortar bombs fall everywhere in Elisabethville.

10 December

— Katangan morale still seems good. There is no immediate reason for panic since no serious offensive by UN troops has been attempted yet. In addition, people hope world opinion will force intervention in Katanga's favor.

— Katangan gendarmes prevented a train with women and children from leaving Elisabethville for Rhodesia. Africans feel secure as long as whites are among them. We are, in a way, Katangan hostages and UN victims.

THE UN TROOPS IN ELISABETHVILLE

From Brazzaville and Madagascar come protests against UN action in Katanga. Both African countries accuse America of desiring Africans destruction. I am afraid that America will lose the little popularity she still has among African countries of the French-speaking language. It is obvious now that the UN repeats the blunder it made in September. Its troops could very well spare many lives, had they the courage to start a decisive action by infantrymen and enter the city. Bombing with mortars or machine gunning from planes haphazardly is not courageous action.

— Evacuation by European women and children from Elisabethville will go on. Tshombe assured all companies of his permission. But this evacuation will certainly affect the population's morale.

— Kolwezi airport again bombed by UN planes with rockets.

— "Camp Massart," is being evacuated under a violent mortar fire. Fighting at Kasenga tunnel. Two mercenaries killed, others injured.

— One hundred Africans stoned the US Consulate.

— According to Katangans, the Fouga-Mystere Jet cannot be used because the UN Jet planes can easily shoot it down. The UN Air Force controls the skies over Katanga.

11 December

— Casualties in Elisabethville up to now are: 18 killed, among whom are 6 Europeans; 65 wounded (9 Europeans, 12 African civilians); the remainder are military men.

— The US Government announces 4 additional Globemasters to carry troops and reinforcements for the UN in Katanga. Heavy concentration of UN troops and military material at Luano airport.

— Katangans fired mortar shells on UN Headquarters but the firing was inaccurate. Katangans bought six Fouga Mystere jets but they are being blocked by the French Government from delivery. The planes are in France and Tshombe, during his last trip, vainly pleaded for their release.

— Press Conference by Tshombe. "The American planes kill us," he said. Tshombe also claims that America would like to ruin Katanga's economy and to take it over after.

— A train with 400 women and children has arrived in Rhodesia safely. The Union Minière telephone lines are put at our disposal. Tonight there is a movie shown by the owner of a movie hall in the Hotel Leopold II restaurant. People get accustomed to war and miseries. Outside the shooting goes on. Africans return to work in Elisabethville because they have no more money and food.

12 December

— The French Consulate was encircled by UN mortar bombs this morning. The UN believes that the Consulate is the mercenaries' headquarters. It is the second time that the UN aimed at the Consulate. During the bombardment, "the mercenaries" in the Consulate office were: the French Consul Lambroschini, two French newsmen, and myself. The UN very badly informed as always, harassing the Consulate. We are hiding in the toilet, the only safe place apparently. Horrible stench because of lack of water. . . .

— At Sabena's Guest House Restaurant, 9 Europeans were captured by the UN and accused of being mercenaries. They are the cooks, the manager and other employees.

— Demonstration in the African city of Keynia, near Elisabethville. Munongo and Kimba speak to the crowd, attacking the UN and telling Africans that whites are behind this organization.

— Visit at 13:30 today at the American Consulate, accompanied by the French Consul. While we are talking, a dozen mortar shells fall around the Consulate, a ramshackle place covered with sheet-iron. The US Consul Hoffacker, though very courageous, confesses that he would prefer to be the third US secretary in Paris than General Consul to Elisabethville now. I can understand him, and we start talking about Paris. . . .

Bread and food becoming scarce, Gasoline is rationed: the army, hospitals, doctors, consuls, and journalists have priority in supply.

— Shinkolobwe Hospital, near Jadotville, machine-gunned today by UN planes at 16:00 hours, apparently by mistake.

— Gasoline supply burned today on Avenue Industrielle, during shooting. The sky over the hotel is black with smoke. Another train with 500 European children and women is expected to leave tomorrow from Eville railroad station for Rhodesia.

— A score of mortar shells fell at 17:30 hours around the Hotel Leo II. Four European civilians slightly injured.

— Extraordinary hostility against America and the UN today among Africans and Europeans. The UN action has reinforced the Katangan nationalism.

13 December

— Press Conference by Tshombe in his residence. He launches a desperate appeal to the Free World, denouncing the UN which uses planes and bombs for political goals. While we attend the conference, two UN Camberras are machine-gunning the town.

— Swedish brutalities against Europeans from "Quartier Industriel" are reported today. UN suspects all Europeans of being mercenaries. Meanwhile, Katangans threaten to kill one American citizen living in Katanga for each Katangan killed by the UN. Very encouraging prospect for me and other US newsmen.

— I am told that the Italian Consul, seized by panic, left the Consulate and burned his cypher code. Other Consuls laugh at their colleague's hurry. Who cares about his cypher code?

enter Elisabethville while mercenaries go on with their harassment tactic. But it seems that less mercenaries are around today, perhaps forty.

The UN Ethiopian Unit controlling the Square Uvira area have killed several Europeans and Africans, all civilians. An European judge escapes the area and tells of the killing and the pillages performed by Ethiopians.

— List of casualties established by Katanga's District Attorney's Office: 32 military men killed, two African civilians, one is a child, 8 Europeans killed, 2 women and 3 mercenaries among them. 100 military injured, 35 civilians (whites) and 112 African civilians injured, mostly in the native city of Albert.

16 December, 5 hours.

A deluge of rain on the city. We suppose that the UN troops will enter Elisabethville which looks deserted by Katangans and mercenaries.

At 06.00 violent shooting from the UN. Several European technicians from Radio Katanga who live in the hotel left Elisabethville in a hurry taking refuge in the African City. They fear the impending entrance of the UN. At 17:00 two jeeps with 3 mercenaries each cross the city at a great speed. A dozen gendarmes, soaked by the rain, seek refuge in the hotel. They got something to eat and some encouragement. They leave, taking the Avenue Hemptine in the direction of the native cities.

Violent mortar fire on the maternity section of "Hospital Elisabeth" in the center of Eville. I drove my car to the hospital. Miraculously there are no casualties but the garden in front of the hospital is destroyed. Trees are uprooted, branches are falling, holes dot the landscape.

— Kasenga Tunnel position abandoned by Katangans. The UN can enter the city on this side without fearing a shot. I am told that the Katangan "Dorniers" plane cannot be used for lack of bombs.

— Attack by the UN at noon against UM installations and offices in Lumumbashi. UN planes cover the attack but the situation seems the same. No UN troops in town yet. Bombing by UN

mortar goes on, however, against the center of the city. I count 53 bombs around Hotel Leo II today.

— Gendarmes and mercenaries returned in Elisabethville in greater number. 30 mercenaries are now fighting backed by 200 gendarmes.

— The UN action today looks to me more and more dastardly. After an intensive bombing with mortar shells against the city, the UN troops are still outside the city.

17 December

— The night was relatively calm. Military situation identical. Mercenaries are everywhere and nowhere. The UN has not entered the city, but bombing by mortars went on all day. I am told that mercenaries are reorganizing themselves in Kipoushi and Kolwezi. The score still in town are for harassment purposes. The Katangese Government moves to Kipoushi. The road to Rhodesia is still open through the African city of Katuba, on the skirts of Elisabethville, but the UN opens fire with mortars and bazookas against cars which dare to cross it.

— No UN troops in town yet. Europeans, although violently hostile to UN, hope that its troops will enter the city and put an end to this shameful bombing. Considering the facility with which the UN troops can enter Elisabethville today, any delay, any hesitation by its military command means murder, since the bombing continues.

— Practically no gendarmes today in Elisabethville, only a dozen "Affreux."

— At the Foreign consuls' suggestion, Tshombe repeated his wish to encounter Adoula. Press conferences announced by Tshombe today for 15:00. Katangans seem scared; their morale is very low. Europeans are disgusted with bombing and fighting and very disillusioned by the conduct of the Western countries. Most hope to leave Katanga, but the roads are dangerous since both UN troops and Katangans shoot on cars. Africans accuse Europeans who left of being: "cowards, leaving the boat which sinks, like rats." It is unjust; up to now only whites have defended the city.

Most Africans went hiding in their native cities. Only whites suffered out the bombing and machine-gunning for 15 days.

— Tshombe appeared rather relaxed at his press conference in his residence. He wants to prove to us that he is always present among his people. Some newsmen had announced that he ran away. Tshombe condemns the UN barbarity because civilians are killed every day. He informs us that a director of the Union Minière, Derricks, was killed by Ethiopians this morning in his house. Derrick's mother, 85 years old, was also killed. Tshombe promises a counter-offensive by Katangans soon. He reiterates his intention to see Adoula and asks for the mediation of an African leader. Tshombe underlines that he does not want a white as mediator. He accuses America of being responsible for UN crimes since she finances this organization. Lastly, he thanks Great Britain and France for having criticized the UN military action.

— Very few Africans in town today. But Tshombe and several ministers are still among us. Africans in their towns demonstrated against the UN and America this morning.

— Still no water and electricity. We are in the middle of the rain season, but not a drop of rain today. The Electricity Company, "Sogelec," asks the UN for permission to repair the lines. The UN refuses.

18 December

— Calm night in most parts of the city except for Lumumbashi and Hotel Lido areas where mercenaries have harassed the UN for hours. One mercenary uses two machine-guns at the same time. Several mercenaries have put on civilian clothes.

— Suddenly no more shooting at 8:30. Several armoured vehicles, "barquettes," are reported entering the city on Avenue Churchill towards Hotel Leopold II. Then at 9.00 sharp, mortar shells fall around the Hotel Leopold II. I go out in the street to look. While I am going down the steps, a friend shouts: "In the name of God, stay in your room; do not drive in town, you will get killed." Several minutes later I go back to the hotel and enter my room. The mortar bursts seem closer, becoming more precise. I sit and try to write some words at my typewriter. It is 9.35. Terrifying

explosion on the terrace of my room which is now filled with smoke. A mortar bomb exploded on the terrace. I jump out into the corridor. According to people I was white as a ghost . . .

— Tshombe today ordered to cease-fire for noon. He then left Elisabethville for Ndola together with several foreign consuls. There are rumors about a meeting between Tshombe and Adoula in Kitona, the former Belgian military base near Leopoldville.

— 10 mercenaries in 3 jeeps are patrolling in town this afternoon. About a hundred National Guards and policemen also appeared. A score of policemen take up position around the Main Post Office.

Two Journalists and Kibwe's Swiss Adviser left the hotel this afternoon to drive their car to Rhodesia, through UN lines. Several hours later, the car was welcomed by a bazooka bomb from UN Swedes. The two newsmen are injured. The Swiss Adviser is dead. Tshombe, who has left, assured Letellier, his principal adviser, that he will discuss with Adoula the abolition of the 'Loi Fondamentale' and the impossibility of Congolese unity.

19 December

Two Ethiopian companies, backed by armoured cars, attempted to enter the town on Boulevard Elisabeth today, coming from the Golf area. A group of six mercenaries opened violent fire with machine guns halting the offensive. One mercenary was killed today by the UN, on Avenue Hemptine. Still no UN soldiers in the city itself.

My reserve of water in the tub is almost finished. For several days we have learned to drink whiskey and water with a soap flavor.

The British Broadcasting Company today announced that the Indian Army forced the Portuguese out from their Goa enclave. A Western resolution asks Nehru to withdraw his troops from Goa. The Soviet Union uses its veto in the UN. The Indonesian Prime Minister Sukarno also announced his intention to expel by force all Dutch people from Dutch New Guinea. Meanwhile, Indians backed by America, are making a war against Katanga for unification purposes . . . What confusion! Obviously the Free

World kneels in front of the Afro-Asians through fear and cowardice . . .

20 December

I can no longer hear Radio Brazzaville, the best informed radio in Africa. Since this morning atmospheric conditions all over Africa are terrible: Tornados and storms over Central Africa prevent reception. We feel cut off completely from the world, from any civilization. I am fed up with war, fed up with bullets, bombs and peaceful . . . wars of integration.

Several friends living in the Roches District were arrested and robbed this morning by Ethiopian patrols. Later on I heard that Ethiopians ransacked the Golf Course Club.

— In the city of Keynia, roughly 2,000 gendarmes are digging trenches.

— UN Swedish unit arrived at Square UVIRA today where Ethiopians killed and pillaged several days ago; the Swedes advised Europeans to shoot them if they again enter their houses. Some are asking for guns. The Swedish officer shrugs his shoulders: "Make out by yourselves."

— Munongo and Kimba declared today to newsmen that Katangans will go on fighting if Tshombe is arrested in Kitona as some fear.

— Several UN armoured cars crossed the city today but returned to their positions at the airport immediately.

— There will be no water or electricity for at least three weeks a Sogelec (Electric Supply Company) official said today.

21 December

— Tshombe in Kitona accepted all conditions put by the Central Government but made one condition: "That the Katangese Parliament ratify my signature." In other words: "I Tshombe have signed since I could not do otherwise." There is an agreement, however. The cease-fire became valid. The war ended. For how long? We shall see

Euphoria among population in Elisabethville, following the cessation of the hostilities. Belgians say: "We shall be able to evacuate our families and we shall see what the future will bring

to us" What future? "Well to recognize the independence of Katanga, this is the future," say some.

The 50,000 Baluba refugees from the UN Camp are now pillaging on the skirts of Eville. Those who are caught by Katangese are killed on the spot. Little by little, the UN troops timidly enter Elisabethville and occupy "Strategic positions" around it, preventing people from escaping. There are, however, several bush roads which lead to Rhodesia and which are not checked by the UN.

Tshombe has arrived today in Kipoushi. We shall soon see what exactly happened in Kitona. . . .

CHAPTER XII

KITONA AND ITS AFTERMATH

December's bloody war ended on Christmas Eve, 1961. Elisabethville had a pitiful air: houses and roofs were ripped up, bullet traces all over, broken glass, tree branches; bricks were littering streets. Electric wires were dangling everywhere along the avenues. All restaurants and shops, in spite of the approach of Christmas, were closed. People were staying home discussing the latest events and wondering if they should or should not leave Katanga and its troubles. But Belgians are close-fisted fellows. Women and children were evacuated; men stayed behind. They were, perhaps, right. How could someone abandon a country he helped to build along with his parents and his ancestors. There have always been troubles and insecurity in the Congo, and there always will be. This is life. Katangans will take care of their wounds, lower their heads for a while; and sooner or later they will again raise their voice, fighting for independence, autonomy, secession, and so forth. The UN, on its side, was already finding excuses for its actions. Officials in Elisabethville, in Leopoldville, and in N. Y. Headquarters were busily trying to justify several crimes, political and military blunders. But that will take some time.

Katangans and Europeans were waiting for the New Year, searching in their store of victuals for some canned food and especially a forgotten bottle of whiskey to wish themselves a Happy New Year: 1962.

"THE BIG PALAVRE" IN KITONA

The December war by the UN against Katanga ended with one result, a rather precarious one: Tshombe had to meet Adoula under UN and American pressure. Both America and the UN were, in their turn, compelled by Western countries and some African countries to seek by all means a cessation of the war. It was a meeting obviously imposed by circumstances. Tshombe reluctantly shook hands with Adoula in Kitona, knowing in advance that he could not expect anything from . . . his brother. He had left for Kitona, more or less resigned, aware that he had to say yes all the way through. Tshombe arrived in Kitona on 19th December, half an hour before Adoula, and was escorted by his Finance Minister, Jean Baptiste Kibwe, the man regarded as the most clever and the most diplomatic among all Katangan leaders. At Kitona's airport, Tshombe and Kibwe had to face the UN staff: Ralph Bunche, Deputy to the Secretary General, Robert Gardiner, Mahmoud Khiari, the old enemy of Katanga, and Adoula with three of his ministers, Bomboko, Nbegnye, Mwamba Remy, all reputed anti-Katangan. Thus, except for Gardiner, the African who seemed more or less understanding towards Katanga's cause, they were firmly opposed to Tshombe. In addition, the US Ambassador in Leopoldville attended the meeting as the principal organizer of the talks. At last, terms were presented to Tshombe which were surrender without conditions. Tshombe, after several hours of vain attempts to coax his enemies, had to sign the following agreement:

1. Acceptance of the Loi Fondamentale application as the Law of the United Congo.
2. Recognition of the indivisibility of the Congolese Republic.
3. Recognition of Kasavubu as Chief of State.
4. Recognition of the Central Government's authority over all parts of the Congo.
5. Acceptance of participation through a representative of Katanga Province in a Governmental commission having the task of preparing a new constitution.

6. To take steps to permit Katangan deputies and senators the performance of their duties as Congolese representatives.
7. To put Katanga's Gendarmerie under the authority of Kasavubu, the Congo Republic President.
8. To respect the resolutions voted by the UN Security Council and General Assembly and to facilitate their application.

Tshombe signed this protocol but pointed out that his signature was valid only under ratification by the Katangese Parliament. The UN officials and the Central Government representatives turned a deaf ear. And Tshombe returned to Elisabethville. The New Year was near, and everybody struggled to celebrate it with "*les moyens de bord*" as Frenchmen would say; namely, what remained in various cellars of wine, whiskey, and champagne. The Katangan ministers, in any case, were not complaining in this respect. Several days after Tshombe's return, a group of Katangan Provincial representatives led by Nyembo, the Information Department Minister, left for Leopoldville; a second group of Parliamentarians left Katanga a week after. Thus, article 6 from the Protocol was respected. For the rest, said Tshombe and his collaborators, "We shall see. Why so much hurry?" And they were not entirely wrong. Indeed, during the Kitona talks, the National Congolese Army, in complicity with the UN started the occupation of the North Katanga. The Central Government soldiers commenced pillaging, killing, and all sorts of punitive actions. At the same time, in Elisabethville, UN Ethiopians raped two European women. In northern Katanga, the situation was tragic. The ANC occupied the town of Kongolo just before New Year's Eve. Twenty-one missionaries were murdered under the terrified eyes of the African population. Who bore the responsibility? The UN of course, which permitted the entrance of the ANC in that area without escort. Ten thousand UN soldiers were massed in South Katanga in order to force Tshombe to integrate the Congo, but there was not one UN man in Kongolo. After this abominable butchery, another Christian mission was reported in danger near Kongolo, at Sola. A request was made to the UN to

dispatch troops to Sola in order that the missionaries, most of them nuns, be saved; but the peace organization's officials replied that it was too dangerous for a UN plane to land in Kongolo. At last, a British Major Lawson decided himself to land in Kongolo with a small plane. The brave British major grabbed the only survivor, Father Darmont, from the ANC killers and also evacuated the nuns from Sola. The massacre in Kongolo proved once again that the UN did not come to Katanga to maintain order but for politics and prestige. The UN wanted to integrate Katanga and did not care about Italian pilots or missionaries left in the hands of butchers in ANC uniforms.

On the 3rd of January, 1962, at Kasavubu's request, Katangan deputies tried to hold a meeting; but because of lack of electricity they had to postpone it. Previously, the Central Government had insisted on holding this meeting in Kamina, not because electricity was supplied there, but because Balubakat deputies opposed to Tshombe could sit in safety and even overthrow Tshombe's regime. There were 60 deputies in Katanga, among whom 35 were present at that time in Elisabethville. The remaining Balubakat members had escaped in July 1960 to Leopoldville or vanished in the bush. Tshombe refused to hold the assembly in Kamina as a matter of prestige and in order to protect the life of his own deputies, the Conakat members. The Parliament again held a meeting on the 4th of January, 1962, in Elisabethville. Tshombe was present. In front of Katanga's Parliament he accused the Central Government of having infringed on the *Loi Fondamentale* already and asked the deputies to decide on each article of Kitona's agreement for its acceptance or its modification. Tshombe indicated that Katanga must live in peace with the rest of the Congo but preserve enough freedom in order to decide its future and to prevent Communism from penetrating the country.

Meanwhile, the US Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Mr. G. Mennen Williams, stated without wincing that Katangese had invented horrible stories of the UN. He denied Katanga's accusations regarding UN shooting of the Red Cross Ambulances, bombing of schools, and other atrocities. For us who had lived

through the UN atrocities, the statements made by the US official left us depressed at this duplicity of a great nation or at best, shoddy evasion.

In Leopoldville, at the beginning of 1962, Belgians and Americans were finally very concerned about the Communist manoeuvres made by Gizenga and Gbenye. In addition to this, the Central Government was facing another secession in the country. Albert Kalondji, the Provincial President of South Kasai, decreed himself "King" (Mulopwe) of the Diamond State, claiming full autonomy. Kalondji had been the enemy of Lumumba and had been in fact the engineer of his liquidation. Adoula, squeezed between the opponent factions, arrested Gizenga, the heir of Lumumba, and Kalondji, the "King." After this spectacular development, Adoula, backed by the UN, asked Tshombe to expel immediately all mercenaries who fought in December. Tshombe partially agreed, and by the end of March 1962 dismantled the group of the French Major Faulques. Adoula wanted to exploit the prestige he acquired in Kitona by Tshombe's agreement, and came to the United States for an official visit. Of course, such visit was to crown with laurels his position as Congolese Prime Minister. Hearing about Adoula's intended trip to America, Tshombe asked for a US visa also, and the American Consulate in Elisabethville had to submit his application to the State Department. A rather embarrassing situation for America. Tshombe, of course, wanted to present to the American people his thesis, his federalist ideas, and the necessity of an autonomous Katanga. Adoula received his visa at once and arrived in Washington at the beginning of February 1962. The State Department denied Tshombe the same right offered to the Congolese Prime Minister. As a pretext, it was cited that he did not have a Congolese passport on which an American visa could be legally affixed. But during the same period, the leader of the Portuguese terrorists, Holden Roberto, was allowed to enter the United States on a contrived passport issued in Morocco.

In America, Adoula was received with great pomp, spoke at the UN and on television, and was guest of honor at a White House

state dinner which included the President and Mrs. Kennedy and other bigwigs. Adoula had a most cordial meeting with the Russian Foreign Minister as well which revealed more plainly than anything that his actions fitted in with Communist design in the Congo. Russia never wastes time or cordiality on those who are not cooperative. Adoula attacked Tshombe, threatened the mining company with expropriation, and demanded the money paid to Tshombe's regime since July 1960.

Adoula desperately needed funds to avert complete bankruptcy which prevailed in the rest of the Congo. The Central Government's expenses were growing every day while revenues were decreasing. After the first six months of 1961, Adoula's Government budget showed a deficit of more than 50 million dollars. America had already set up funds and promised several tens of millions of dollars, but this was not enough. Katanga obviously had a balanced budget, having spent 42 million dollars during the same period, that is to say its exact revenues. Nevertheless, Katangans, too, cried they were short of money but only to invoke pity in Leopoldville. But damages to Katanga during the wars of September and December surpassed 30 million dollars. This was forgotten, of course, and neither Adoula nor the UN cared. Tshombe was the big culprit in the Congo; it was he, they said, that had caused all the problems there; defeat him and the Congo would soon be a peaceful, orderly, hardworking and united nation. At least this was implied by directing all their best energy to defeating him when terrible atrocities were occurring elsewhere which they did not bother to run down or suppress.

One cannot ignore the autocratic denial by the State Department of Tshombe's application for a US visa. This great American nation which has received for one reason or another all the Communist satraps and butchers such as Castro, Lumumba, Ben Bella, Tito, Krushchev! Tshombe however was not entitled to set his foot on the soil dedicated to democracy in the world. American officials can hardly justify that visa denial. With or without a passport, Tshombe, as an African leader of great importance and particularly as a pro-Western one, was of course entitled to tell

his side of the story. Admitting that Adoula threatened America with reprisals if she granted Tshombe a visa, it is rather hard to conceive how a great nation could accept such blackmailing especially from a source which was begging them at the same time for funds for survival. The denial was a blow at the democratic system and its boast of freedom of speech; and of the right of its citizens to hear and judge all sides for themselves. It revealed the guilt of the Kennedy Administration which feared above all to have the truth told about the sorry affair.

*THE KATANGESE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND ITS
PRESIDENT: M. MUTAKA*

The eight points of the Kitona agreement were discussed by the Katangese Assembly which on 15 February issued the following communique, drawn up in the best Bantou manner, that is to say: "We agree on everything but we are opposed to everything we agreed." The communique was signed by the Katangese National Assembly President, Mr. Mutaka Wa Dilomba, a very strange personage about whom we shall speak later on. Let us read, first of all, the communique:

"Having examined the eight points of the Kitona statements and considering that the Congolese Prime Minister Adoula, contrary to what has been previously done in connection with the maintainance of order in the former Belgian Congo (sic) . . . Considering that a cooperation with the Central Government is necessary in view of restoring order and peace in this country; considering the urgency of elaborating a new Constitution; considering that a loyal application by all sides of the Katangese Assembly conclusions on the Kitona declaration should serve as basis for the settlement of the Katangese problem and should end the population sufferances:

1. Accepts the declaration of 21 December 1961 of Kitona as adequate to serve as object of discussion in view of settling the Congolese conflict, gives the authority to the Katangese Government to negotiate with the Central Government to find a solution

in the spirit of the Kitona statement and insists that the Katangese Government reach a solution through negotiation and peaceful means with little delay.

2. The Katangese National Assembly recommends the following:

A

MAKE the wish that the Loi Fondamentale be henceforth strictly observed by the six entities (provinces) as well as by the Central Government.

THAT the appointment of a State Commissary be done in the future through consultation with the President (Tshombe) or in his absence with the President of Katanga's Assembly (art. 181 and 201 of the Loi Fondamentale) while it is understood that the dispositions about Parliamentary privilege must be strictly respected.

B

RECOMMENDED that the article 7 of the Loi Fondamentale which fixes the number of entities composing the State and determining their borders be taken into account.

THAT Mr. Kasavubu is the President of the Congo as it is stated in article 7.

C

INSISTS on the fact that the Central Government must henceforth prove its understanding and will take into consideration the Katangese peculiarities. To this effect, the Central Government, in a conciliatory spirit, must avoid taking sanctions against any civilian or military person who obeyed the orders of the Katangese Government since 30th June 1960. It must avoid also sending to Katanga civil servants or military men who are opposed to the Katangese Authorities and will abstain from sending armed forces susceptible to spreading disorder and panic among the population. The Central Government should abstain from giving support to internal dissents in Katanga and will not oppose in any way the authority of the Katangese Government on the whole territory of Katanga. It must take steps together with the Katangese Govern-

ment for a Congolese balanced budget and should refrain from any monetary measure, fiscal or administrative measure capable of compromising the economic and financial situation in Katanga as well as the functioning of the Public services, etc., etc.

THE KATANGESE LEGISLATIVE RESERVES ITS RIGHT TO RATIFY THE FINAL ACCORDS WHICH WILL BE CONCLUDED BY THE LEOPOLDVILLE AUTHORITIES AND KATANGA'S AUTHORITIES ACCORDING TO THE MANDATE GIVEN TO THE KATANGAN GOVERNMENT.

Done in Elisabethville

February 15, 1962

The President of Katanga's Legislative Assembly
MUTAKA WA DILOMBA, Charles.

* * * * *

As one can see, the Katangese Assembly communique did not settle anything, did not ratify whatsoever but approved everything under condition. . . . What the Katangan deputies wanted was a new constitution, and this was more or less clear. They also wanted the Katangese Government to go on negotiating and to this effect recommendations were given: change the Loi Fondamentale here and there; do not accept a State Commissary unless he is our friend and unless, I Mutaka Wa Dilomba, am consulted; no balkanization in Katanga; no question of giving up our autonomy; no sanctions; no army; no civil servants; no monetary steps; etc.; etc.

In spite of such a confused communique, the Agreement in Kitona showed the stand each side was taking in the issue. The Central Government for the first time accepted the modification of the Loi Fondamentale in view of the elaboration of a Federal Constitution. It was already something for Katanga. However, if Adoula was speaking about a Federal Constitution, he meant the integration of Katanga, of its army and its currency. Tshombe, of course, meant the autonomy of Katanga. Each one was interpreting this in his own way. Adoula and the US Ambassador Gullion seemed satisfied while Tshombe and his advisers were also happy

because according to them, the key of the Congolese solution was in a Federal Constitution, which Kitona's protocol assured. It was illusion on both sides The most perfect Federal Constitution could not prevent covetousness, bad faith, or the inconsistent Congolese temper and even less the tribalism. The "palavre" is an endless habit of Africans. They discuss for hours, days, and years; and no solution is ever definitive. Tshombe hoped, however, that a Federal Constitution would prevent Adoula from mixing in Katangese affairs, from upsetting his administration and his authority over the Gendarmerie. But Adoula, knowing Tshombe's hopes and aware of the danger, insisted before any elaboration of a new constitution, on the integration of Katanga's Army and monetary system.

The Katangese Parliament presumptuously claimed for a long time its rights in all fields. Its president, Mr. Mutaka, escorted by several deputies, had toured Europe and had seen, as they put it, the white's democracy at work. Coming back from Europe, the Katangan deputies seemed convinced that they must enjoy the same privileges, the same prestige, the same rights as their European colleagues. In a democratic country, of course, the National Assembly generally reflects the people's will. In Katanga, Tshombe and several traditional chiefs (*chefs coutumiers*) had real authority over the people. Congolese could not care less about deputies since the grand chief of the tribe is the supreme authority. Thus, the Katangese Parliament was merely a county fair where each one pretended to play seriously his part and to be the people's representatives as in any democratic, civilized country. Therefore, they frequently attempted to dismiss some ministers and to take their jobs since they were better paid as ministers than as deputies. Many times I heard these deputies violently criticizing the Finance Minister, J. B. Kibwe, who was confusing his personal checking account with the State account, probably because both accounts were in an European bank

Mister Mutaka Wa Dilomba or the Excellency as he liked to be called, the President of this strange Parliament, knew his job pretty well and particularly his colleagues. I attended many meet-

ings, listening to shouts, protestations, even expecting a real revolt against the Government. Nothing happened in spite of the noise. Mutaka very ably let everybody cry and calmly proposed an extraordinary commission for the study of embarrassing motions, but he was always presiding over the special commission. In this position, he manoeuvred so well that for the moment at least everybody forgot the embarrassing problem. When he could not solve the problem, Mutaka nonchalantly closed the meeting, saying without a smile: "Honorable Deputies, since we all agree, I close the session." This "Mutaka Wa Dilomba" ("Wa" being apparently an aristocratic African particle) had tremendous patience with his colleagues. He spoke better French than any other Katangan Minister or deputy; he was very polite and never embarrassed. If, however, he himself criticised the Government, Munongo, the Interior Minister, put a thick dossier before his eyes where all his offenses against the common law and the penal code were documented. Munongo would probably say something like this: "KASAPA" (the local jail) or "KIMIA" (shut up your mouth).

Once I remember that a motion was presented by a deputy and a vote was decided on. There were 29 deputies in the Assembly. 10 voted for, 15 against, and 3 abstained; the last one was sleeping. And Mutaka, counting the votes by raised hands, decreed with a definitive voice: "Since the motion has been unanimously adopted, I thank you; and I close the session . . ."

Mutaka's dream was, and probably still is, to become the President of Katanga. Recently he has been replaced as head of the Parliament. He is very short, very ambitious, and always dressed carefully like a prince. Many times he spoke loudly, criticized and plotted against one or another. But Munongo was always present with the "dossier" and Mutaka calmed down for a while. In order to forget the "dossier" and his political failures, Mutaka would go hunting. One day in May, 1962, I believe, we heard with consternation that Mutaka, accompanied by a dozen gendarmes armed with machine guns, went hunting in the Game Reserve, the National Park of Upemba. It was too late to stop

him . . . thus he returned victoriously to Eville with several trucks loaded with antelope, impalas, buffaloes, and little elephants.

Mutaka, this would-be President who is not more than five feet, wanted to be seen and saluted by everybody. If he passed in front of officers, soldiers, or policemen, they had to salute him; otherwise, he arrested them. I remember that one day near the end of the September war, Mutaka proposed in a ministerial meeting a way for Katanga to get rid of UN troops. It seems that Mutaka, after he had consulted the sorcerers of his tribe, proposed to Tshombe and his ministers that they chase all the bees in Katanga from their hiding and let sorcerers persuade them to bite all the UN soldiers. According to Mutaka, the UN Indians, bitten by millions of bees, would have surrendered and the war would be over. A story with an African flavor but a true one . . . bees against machine guns.

And since we spoke about the National Assembly, its president, and his colleagues, let us look at the configuration of the mass of voters.

THE CONGOLESE FROM THE VILLAGE AND HIS INDEPENDENCE

The indigenous population from Katanga, and this is true of the whole Congo, belongs to three social classes: 1) the local aristocracy and "haute Bourgeoisie" so to speak, is formed by Ministers and high officials, civil servants, and army officers and of course by family "clans." This category cooperated more or less with Europeans since without them they could not perform their functions, write a speech, or make a decision. They had to be pro-white. Their position was dependent on the work of white advisors and technicians. This highest class, formed before the Independence, the "evolues" category; Africans with some education who worked as clerks, typists, and bookkeepers aides.

The second class is also recruited among "evolues" but primarily from the younger generation, Africans between 20 and 30 years old. Many have studied six months in Europe in various schools of

administration and social or military training. Once they returned to Katanga from Belgium, Spain, or Switzerland, these "stagiaires" as they are called, were convinced that they knew everything and that they should replace the older, first class whom they regarded as incompetent, holding jobs for political reasons with Belgian complicity. They envied Europeans and would like to have replaced them. These young Africans were reluctant to live in the African towns, desiring city houses, cars, and life. Many among them were recognizable by the fact that they wore glasses, which is now in the Congo, the inherent mark of the intellectual.

The third category is formed by the masses. For this class, independence did not bring any change. Apathetic in regard to politics, these modest Africans were still respectful to whites, and they remembered their former calm life, poor but without problems. Indeed, after the independence, since they were masters of their own, they knew only wars, worries, and a higher cost of living. In addition, they were more or less at the discretion of their own brothers who frequently were less understanding and more careless than Europeans. This mass lived on its painful life in villages, in the bush, bare-foot or wearing plastic sandals. The mass was, in fact, the "orphans" since the emancipation removed paternalism and the European had no more desire to take care of them. Unfortunately, this mass was under the influence of the young "evolues" and particularly the African "Teddy-boys" who can be dangerous. As I said, the younger generation is anti-white, impatient, and dissatisfied. The African masses undergo the indoctrination of the so-called "intellectuals" yet they remember old times with regret. A doorkeeper who worked in a ministry for a European technician returned to Eville and to his job after several weeks of absence. It was in January 1963. When the technician asked him where he had been, the African replied: "Bwana (sir), I was in Rhodesia and will return there."

"But why?" said the astonished technician. "Are you leaving your job, your independent country to live where Africans are not yet independent?"

"Yes," replied the African. "I am fed up with this independence, and I will go to Rhodesia where life is better."

"But soon Rhodesia will also be independent," said the technician.

"Who said so?" replied the African. "I know what I am doing. British will grant them independence in five years, maybe, and after I will go to Angola; and I know that I will live for years before Portuguese will give up this territory."

KATANGESE TALES AND UN MENTALITY

The Kitona Agreement brought peace for some time to Katanga. A rather uneasy peace, however. This false tranquility derived from the military incapacity of the UN to end the Katangan resistance and the troubles this organization brought upon itself. One of these troubles was the existence of the Baluba camp where 50,000 people were suffering. The UN began, finally, to evacuate the Baluba refugees to North Katanga and to South Kasai, by planes and railroad, and this took months.

Another UN trouble was a financial one. The organization badly needed funds: 200 million dollars for a year's operation in the Congo. Wedged between its poverty and the criticism it was facing from all sides, the UN vegetated almost a year after Kitona, until December 1962.

But Katangans also had their troubles. The atmosphere was heavy for months. The cost of living had increased and many Europeans were discouraged. Idealism became a rarity; everyone wanted to profit as much as he could from the situation. People discussed politics less and tried to laugh.

One day I learned the circumstances leading to the bombardment endured by the Hotel Leopold II, on 19 December 1961, when a mortar bomb exploded on my terrace. There have been many explanations for this useless, savage bombardment. Some pretended, using their imaginations, that the UN bombed the hotel in order to kill all journalists who criticized it. There were under one roof almost forty newsmen. Others said that the UN, through

an informer hidden in the hotel, learned that a Swiss advisor was about to leave the hotel by car for Rhodesia, and that the bombardment was intended to kill him. The most plausible explanation was given to me by a mercenary several weeks after the bombardment. "In the morning of 19th December," said this mercenary, "at 08:00 precisely, Radio Brazzaville announced that UN troops had entered Elisabethville and occupied the Hotel Leopold II." It is likely that Radio Brazzaville was badly informed that day or that it confused Hotel Leo II with Hotel LIDO which was indeed occupied by UN troops, and which was located at the opposite side of our hotel. At any rate, 15 minutes after the broadcasting, mortar bombs started to fall around the Hotel Leopold II. Here I quote the mercenary: "You know that most Katangan gendarmes have a transistor radio on their shoulder. They were listening to the radio while they were shooting, sort of working on music. . . . When they heard that the UN troops were in the hotel, the Katangan servants of a mortar unit turned their guns on the hotel. Thus about 50 bombs were launched. I arrived at that moment and asked them what they were firing at, and they said, 'Hotel, Hotel Leo II.' But God, you are crazy. I just came from the hotel myself. There is no UN soldier around. You will kill everybody but the UN men. . . ."

Gendarmes had learned the art of "camouflage" but in their own way, of course. Most of them had their helmets covered with herbs one yard long. They would walk in town or drive in jeeps, while branches hung around them as feathers on an American Indian. One day I saw a Katangan patrol disguised from their feet to their heads. Their helmets were decorated with plumes of long herbs, while red and white flowers were sprinkled with the herbs. One could have seen them from a mile away. I remember one day I was talking with friends on the stairs of the local Court just opposite the City Hall building still under construction. There were no doors nor windows. Turning my head towards the building I saw herbs dangling from the 4th and the 5th floors. It was in the middle of September 1961, during the war, and Indians were several hundred yards away in the Post Office Building. For a moment,

seeing the herbs growing on the 5th floor of the building, I thought that due to heavy rains in Africa the vegetation could have grown there over night. Taking a second look I realized that Katangan gendarmes with their helmets covered by branches were looking down at us through the unfinished windows.

Comical scenes and bullets were probably the only thing we had enough of during the wars. I can see even now in front of the hotel during December battles several old Katangese armoured cars. They were going towards the UN positions on the north side of Elisabethville. Twenty minutes later all came back and stopped with a deafening noise in front of the hotel. The African drivers shouted to us: "Our armoured cars do not run anymore while the machineguns are stalled." Several Europeans climbed up and started to unlock the machineguns, while a Greek mechanic slipped under one of the vehicles to see what was wrong. He came out after only seconds and said to us, amazed: "How do you want them to run? The gear box is hanging out and scrapes the ground. I do not understand how they arrived here." Indeed, the Katangan armoured cars were very old, but Central Africans have little mechanical knowledge and almost never repair their vehicles, their guns, or their equipment. They are terrible wasters in this respect. Thus the amount of ammunition they wasted, according to their training officers, was fantastic. One should have observed the shooting of UN planes flying over at 4-5,000 feet in order to realize the quantity of bullets wasted by gendarmes. And they were loaded down with ammunition. The "para-commandos" had a uniform with dozens of pockets, mostly on the trousers. These pockets were filled up with cartridges and caused them troubles when they tried to walk. In December, gendarmes received "Energa" grenades which, placed at the end of a gun cannon, could be used as a bozooka. Opening the cartridge boxes, they noticed that there were no bullets, and so they threw them away, thinking it was a mistake or that a clever European cheated them by selling them used cartridges. As far as grenades were concerned, Katangan gendarmes refused to use them. They were too noisy! In spite of efforts made by European officers to show them the grenades' efficiency, African

gendarmes, afraid of the noise, rapidly got rid of them. This was fortunate for the UN troops.

This Katangese Army, once the December war ended, again started to boast of its achievements. Gendarmes narrated to all how they beat the "ONUSIENS." It was a partial victory, and it belonged to the mercenaries. However, these gendarmes were so arrogant about their "victory" that Tshombe had troubles making them observe the cease-fire.

One of the main weaknesses of the Gendarmerie was its aviation and its artillery, both almost non-existent. Gendarmes had mortars, but few knew how to use them or to fire accurately; they never used cannon. They had several 105 mm cannon but no artillerymen. Had they used cannon, they could have controlled Luano Airport, prevented UN planes from landing, and forced Indians to stay in their trenches. Katangans twice missed an opportunity to liquidate the UN troops and both times because of a lack of a real air force and of a small artillery group. It was obvious in September, as well as in December 1961, that what was essential was to chase the UN troops from the airport or to cripple them by preventing UN planes bringing reinforcements from landing. Katangans and mercenaries, had they understood this necessity, could hardly have accomplished it. Therefore, the strange part played by Northern Rhodesia and its leader, Sir Welensky, and by South Africa in the Katangese affair is noteworthy. Both had promised their support and indeed South Africa supplied Katangans with weapons and ammunition, while Rhodesia closed its eyes to transportation over the borders. Both countries let Katanga recruit mercenaries among its military men. But that was all. If both countries wanted to efficiently support Katanga, a supply of men and adequate weapons would have changed events. But once again, the Free World's policy of fear can be noticed. In spite of diplomatic complications, both countries, had they been backed by England, France, and the Free World, could have discouraged the UN action against Katanga.

* * *

If stories about Katangans have a comical flavor sometimes, the

mentality of the UN troops did not lack a tragic flavor. In the Square Uvira, for instance, UN Ethiopians murdered and plundered. In the Union Minière District of Lumumbashi its troops killed an European and his 85-year-old mother in cold blood. Near the UN Headquarters on Avenue Bodson, several Ethiopians raped two European women. Pillaging, killings, and abusive methods should be inscribed on some UN banner. We must admit that with such a diverse group of soldiers coming from all parts of the world and mainly supplied by underdeveloped countries, one could not expect exemplary conduct. Any army in war indulges in abuses and savagery. But the UN army is a peace army, and in such a job it can claim no excuses. As the present Secretary General, U Thant, said himself in late December 1962, the term "military victory" of UN troops in Katanga is not appropriate; it does not suit an organization which according to its charter has no military goals. However, the responsibility should be shared by those who permitted the sending to the Congo units with a very doubtful respect for the human being, for its property, and with a very low standard of civilization. Ethiopians were constantly accused of robberies, plunder, and savage acts. One day, after Katanga integration, a revolted Belgian magistrate went to see the Commander in Chief of the Ethiopians in Elisabethville and complained about the conduct of his soldiers. The Ethiopian officer candidly said: "What do you want after all? My soldiers are children. In addition, Ethiopian soldiers are not paid and during the war they have the right to pay themselves by pillaging." Besides a great part of the Ethiopian troops sent to the Congo were loaned by Emperor Haile Selassie to the UN after they revolted against him. They were therefore rebels, mutineers reputed for their lack of discipline. They had been sent to the Congo by the Emperor as a punitive measure!

These Ethiopian troops entered Elisabethville Golf Course in December 1961 which was considered as a strategic point. They broke cabinets, doors, windows, and stole chairs and everything of any value including our clubs. We were more than 60 players. There is no doubt that Ethiopians never played golf and did not come to Katanga in order to learn this sport. It was, therefore, a

sheer act of plunder. Several weeks later, the Indians took over the golf course and we could again use it. There were plenty of Swedish, Irish, and Indian officers on the course now. Many among them were playing with stolen clubs and their soldiers, who served as caddies, passed under our nose with our own missing equipment. The UN officers, were not at all embarrassed.

Another noteworthy incident, which happened almost daily in Katanga, was the stealing of civilian cars by UN troops. The General District Attorney in Katanga protested these repeated thefts of cars. He even gave a full list of cars stolen, being used by the UN troops, bearing UN tags. A week after, he received a letter from the UN but without a signature. The letter said that it was none of the DA's business to complain about such thefts and that the UN was not stealing cars anyway. It is true that during the hostilities, Katangans stole a number of UN cars and that the UN troops were taking their revenge. But is such an organization supposed to act in the same manner as Katangans? Can it steal, kill, and confiscate private properties? If the UN did not enjoy any prestige in Katanga, this should be attributed to the respective governments which sent troops to the Congo without careful selection and without inculcating them with goals and the obligations of their mission.

The UN did not come to Katanga to maintain order. It came to force the integration of Tshombe's territory into the Republic of the Congo. This organization, therefore, forgot the noble aspiration embodied in its charter and spoke, instead, with the acid breath of bullets.

CHAPTER XIII

KATANGA ENTERS ITS THIRD YEAR OF INDEPENDENCE

We always like to formulate hypotheses. . . . If Tshombe had been received in America when he applied in January 1962 for a visa, it is likely that the State Department and President Kennedy himself could have explained America's policy on Katanga and the Congo, and the Katangan leader would certainly have understood the whole political *raison d'être* of Washington. He would probably have cooperated. As a matter of fact, Tshombe was neither a harsh person as some pictured him, nor an irreconcilable, intransigent leader. Several times he has shown his understanding, his moderation and his attachment to the Free World. Tshombe could have been persuaded by an affable, impartial American Government to help the Free World in its decision to create an united Congo with an anti-Communist strong Central Government. Tshombe could have been persuaded then that he did not stand a chance by sticking to secession. But in denying a visa to Tshombe, America failed not only its democratic principles, but missed a good opportunity to help solve the Congo difficulties. Tshombe eventually became resentful and started a policy of delay, propaganda, and diplomacy. Reluctantly, Tshombe went to Leopoldville in March 1962 in order to renew the negotiations after the Kitona agreement and to prove his good will; but in Leopoldville black clouds were forming. Adoula, back from Washington, held all the cards. Tshombe was alone, isolated, and Adoula wanted to bring

him to his knees. This is the African way to deal with a vanquished people and Adoula thought he was victorious. In Kitona a Federal Constitution was promised, and Tshombe insisted upon this. But the Central Government reversed itself, wanting to solve other matters first, such as the integration of Katanga's Gendarmerie in the National Congolese Army. Adoula wanted Tshombe to recognize his power and to order his gendarmes to pledge allegiance to the Congolese Government, to Kasavubu, the President of the State. Moreover, Adoula wanted the Union Minière revenues. Thus, while Tshombe hoped to discuss a Federal Constitution as the basic element of any solution, Adoula struggled to obtain the two above mentioned concessions. Each clung to his position. Tshombe, tired of negotiations and pretending that he wanted to take some rest, expressed his wish to return to Elisabethville. It was the 16th of April, 1962. Tshombe arrived at Nzilo Airport near Leopoldville and climbed into the plane. But the ANC troops had already blocked the runway in order to prevent the plane from taking off. Fortunately, Robert Gardiner, the UN representative, intervened, and with UN troops cleaned out the runway so that Tshombe's plane could take off. It was after a month of sterile negotiations and Tshombe was received in his capital by an enthusiastic crowd of nearly 10,000 including several hundred Europeans.

During Tshombe's absence, the population and Europeans in particular had fear for his fate. They imagined Tshombe poisoned or cut in slices by Adoula's men. But Tshombe obstinately stayed in Leopoldville so that people could not say that he was a coward or that he was averting an "entente" with his brothers. One should not forget that a year before, almost at the same time, Tshombe had been arrested by his "brothers" in Leopoldville.

In this painful birth of the Congolese unity, Tshombe did not believe in the viability of the new born, but he took risks in order to prove his good intentions. Thanks to the UN, to Gardiner, for one, Tshombe returned to Eville safe and sound, a little bit tired, certainly disappointed by the discrepancy of views between him and the Central Government. In the speech he made on 17

April 1962 in the Post Office Square, Tshombe for the first time thanked the UN for its impartial conduct to him and Katanga. It was indeed, the UN and Gardiner who prevented Adoula from arresting Tshombe. We hoped that after this public thanks made to this organization, relations between it and Katanga would become excellent. In his speech, indeed, Tshombe promised to return to Leopoldville and to continue the negotiations, if his people wanted it, as he put it. As a gesture of good will, he offered to the Central Government 100 million Congolese francs, 2 million dollars at the official rate. Katanga had almost 2 billion Congolese francs in its bank from the day it introduced the new Katangan franc, that is to say after secession. With the "generous" gesture, Tshombe naively hoped to be popular among 14 million Congolese, among whom one million were unemployed in Leopoldville alone. It was far too little. Here he missed the opportunity to impress the world and put Adoula on the spot.

PROPAGANDA, DIPLOMACY, AND ILLUSIONS

It was Easter. Tshombe was back, and a kind of Euphoria was reigning in Elisabethville. For days, Katangan leaders emptied cases of whiskey and champagne, celebrating the return of their "prodigious" boss. Several days after Easter, Tshombe called on the press and warned America on the dangerous game she was playing by backing Adoula's dictatorial government. He drew a parallel between the support given by the United States to Syngman Rhee and to Adoula whom he accused of having jailed 4,000 Congolese and of having gagged the press. Tshombe obviously forgot that his own regime was far from being a democratic one and that Katanga's press hardly dared to criticize it. But Tshombe launched himself into criticism without foreseeing the repercussions which resulted. Adoula reacted and called Tshombe a hypocrite using a dangerous propaganda to escape from a constructive proposition and solution. At the end of his conference, Tshombe however stated his intention to continue the discussions with Leopoldville, but, as he said, reluctantly.

Meanwhile, in Northern Katanga, the ANC reinforced itself and was harassing the Gendarmerie, trying to infiltrate.

Soon after his return from Leopoldville, Tshombe paid a visit to the most important towns in Katanga in order to increase his popularity and to show Africans that he was alive and stronger than ever. At last a certain diplomatic action was attempted by Tshombe in Leopoldville. Through various agitators, Belgians as well as Africans, and by giving money to easily corrupted Congolese deputies and senators, Tshombe tried to reinforce the opposition against Adoula. In proving his democratic convictions, Tshombe freed several Balubakat deputies and threw them some gifts and nice words. Tshombe's gesture was intended to shake the authority of the Balubakat leader, Jason Sendwe, who was also Vice-Prime Minister in the Central Government. Sendwe had lost the elections in 1960, fled to Leopoldville, joined the Central Government, and was now backing Congolese unity. Everybody knew, however, that Sendwe simply wanted to overthrow Tshombe with Adoula's help. Before the elections, Sendwe had written in the paper "Congo d'abord" an article titled: "An Independent Katanga in an United Congo." A model of African paradox and logic . . .

Relations between the UN and Katangans were for a while distinctly better, due to Gardiner's intervention in the intended arrest of Tshombe. Gardiner, the UN's operation chief in the Congo, also promised to liquidate the Baluba Refugee's Camp providing that Tshombe would return to Leopoldville and renew negotiations with Adoula as the UN and America wanted. Courageous but with little confidence, Tshombe left his capital for Leopoldville on 18 May, 1962. He was more or less ready to make any concession which could not hurt the peace and economy of Katanga. Tshombe wanted in particular to gain time, hoping that Adoula would be less demanding and would accept a Congolese Federation. But the Central Government in collusion with the UN was hurrying ANC troops to North Katanga and fighting became unavoidable. There was a period after Tshombe's departure to Leopoldville, when the only topic was supplied by daily

skirmishes between gendarmes and the ANC. There was much exaggeration from both sides. What was happening in the North was a casual ambush and a constant patrolling by both sides. When the ANC was advancing, the gendarmes and mercenaries were withdrawing. Then several mercenaries were advancing twelve miles, shooting, and the ANC was running away. Big fuss, protestations in Elisabethville and in Leopoldville.

So the UN, the ANC, and the Katangans reinforced themselves. In Leopoldville Tshombe was confined to his hotel room under UN guard. At one moment he declared that he had accepted the integration of the Gendarmerie. A mixed UN military commission in Leopoldville-Katanga was to make an inspection in the North to put an end to hostilities. The same commission was to facilitate the integration of the Katanga army into the National Congolese Army. But nothing concrete occurred

In Elisabethville, meanwhile, ministers were protesting against Tshombe's "sequestration" asserting that they could not contact him and that any agreement signed by him under these circumstances would not be valid. As a matter of fact, Tshombe was a sort of prisoner in the hands of the Central Government, and it was expected that Tshombe would have to act as he did in Kitona, that is to say, by promising, accepting and signing everything so that he might come back. On both sides, ambitions were bared. At one moment, Jason Sendwe, the Vice-Prime Minister and Tshombe's foe, had a discussion with Tshombe and threatened to arrest him. Sendwe's attitude was, of course, an undiplomatic one, since it could neither calm the Katangans nor tame Tshombe. The negotiations were dragging out while Independence Day for Leopoldville (30 June) and for Katangans (11 July) was approaching.

The main object of discussion at the moment was whether in the talks and in eventual agreements the term of Katanga State or Katanga Province be used. Tshombe and his supporters were against Katanga regarded or called "Province" and they were insisting that in a new Constitution, Katanga bear the official denomination of "Federated State" or simply "Katanga State."

Katangans thought, that by accepting the term of "Province" they were making a bad bargain. In these talks, the United States and some officials were backing the idea of a Central Government with the participation of the Katangans. But this offer, made discretely by America to Tshombe, did not seem to please him. America did not want to hurt the Central Government's feelings and indirectly suggested to Tshombe a participation formula. But the Katangan President refused the job of Vice-Premier Minister with the Central Government as long as Jason Sendwe had a similar position. In Elisabethville, most ministers and advisors were against any participation by Tshombe in the Central Government. They feared losing Tshombe and seeing Katanga going to pieces. It was bad advice because if Tshombe had entered the Congolese Government he probably could have changed the course of history.

THE WAR OF PRESTIGES

Around the middle of June, the UN had already evacuated 30,000 Balubas from the Refugee Camp. Tshombe, in Leopoldville, did not seem to be reaching any conclusions while Katanga was preparing the annual ceremony for celebrating the entering of its third year of independence. The two previous years, Katangese Independence Day was marked by a military parade, by speeches and rejoicing. Everything was in motion and the whole administration had to commemorate this "National Holiday." Therefore, a problem had to be faced by Tshombe in light of the upcoming Congo Independence Day. If Tshombe did not leave Leopoldville before the 30th of June, he inevitably had to attend the ceremony there and to pay honor to the Congolese Flag. Had he done it, Tshombe feared that he would lose his prestige and would not be justified in opposing the integration of Katanga. Tshombe decided to quit Leopoldville before the 30th of June. Fortunately for him, Adoula himself had left for an inspection tour to Coquilhatville and Tshombe could tell him

bluntly: "If you, Adoula, leave Leopoldville and interrupt our talks, I shall take some vacation and return to Elisabethville."

In Elisabethville, the Congo's Independence Day was completely ignored. The Katangans were preparing for their own Independence Day, 11th of July. Tshombe, on the day of his return from Leopoldville, delivered a rather moderate speech. He criticized his confinement in Leopoldville, the United States interference in the Congo's politics, and finally ridiculed the attitude of two of his foes, Gbenye and Bomboko. Tshombe assured the Katangese crowd that he did not sign anything in Leopoldville, that he discussed the project of a Federal Constitution, and that he would soon renew the dialogue with the Central Government. He pointed out also that he returned because he needed a rest and to meditate upon solutions. Tshombe ended his speech with: "Long Live Free and Prosperous Katanga." It was the first time that he did not mention Katanga as an Independent State. Consequently we hoped that Tshombe understood the situation and would henceforth cooperate with Leopoldville and terminate this war of prestige, of ambition, and of sterile talks. As in any crucial moment, under the pretext of a medical check, Tshombe left for Rhodesia to see Sir Welensky. This time, according to reliable sources, the Rhodesian leader advised Tshombe to be supple and to avoid a rupture with Adoula. Back in Eville, Tshombe called upon the local and international press and announced that he had appointed the Katangese delegates who would work with Leopoldville and the UN in solving the four problems: the Gendarmerie integration, the unification of the monetary system, the sharing of UM revenues, and the project for a Federal Constitution. Tshombe, however, violently attacked the Central Government for what he considered to be "a premeditated offensive by the ANC in Northern Katanga and the creation of a new province which split Katanga and whose capital was in Albertville." To the question put by a journalist, Tshombe admitted that he had discussions with representatives of various Congolese Parties, such as ABAKO, PUNA, and MNC Kalondji, reputed to be opposed to Adoula. The same day, Tshombe sent a letter to the UN ex-

pressing his concern about the latest reinforcements arriving in Katanga and protested against the evacuation of 15,000 Baluba refugees to Albertville. Tshombe pretended that they were Katangans and should be kept in Elisabethville. Again Tshombe demonstrated his confused policy. He had asked Gardiner to evacuate the camp, and now he was demanding the opposite.

Next day, a new conference by Tshombe. He thanked the UN which assured him of its peaceful intentions in spite of reinforcements. He also stated that he had got UN authorization for celebrating 11 Juillet, Independence Day, with a military parade. On 11th July, indeed, 2,000 gendarmes para-commandoes, military and other policemen carrying individual guns and sub-machine-guns paraded in front of the crowd on Avenue Etoile, near the Post Office where the official tribune was raised. Tshombe, his ministers, and all Katangese personalities, whites and blacks, were sitting in the rostrum in the Post Square which has been named henceforth "The Square of the Heroes from 13 September, 1961." Before the parade, Tshombe made a speech and to the surprise of everyone attacked Belgian colonialism. He wanted to prove by this that he was not a Belgian marionet as he was accused of being by the Afro-Asian Bloc. Tshombe condemned the first Belgians who arrived in the Congo of having assassinated African leaders in Katanga at that time. Belgians who attended the parade felt uncomfortable. It seems that at the last moment Tshombe asked an Italian advisor to write him a speech in this tone, tossing aside the one drawn up the night before by Belgian advisors. One could easily notice that Tshombe was reading the speech text for the first time because he was staggering on each sentence. Tshombe replied in the same discourse to an accusation made by the UN Secretary General some time ago. Mr. Thant had said that the Union Minière was Katanga and that it had saved Katanga from chaos. Tshombe, standing several feet from the Union Minière Director, continued his blunders, saying: "Katangans saved the Union Minière when it was threatened by the Force Publique mutiny." The Union Minière Director discretely smiled during this unfortunate statement. It was indeed childish

to pretend that Katangans saved the mines in July 1960 since the troubles were provoked by themselves, or more exactly by the Force Publique. There was, therefore, no reason for boasting. But the speech had ended, and the military parade commenced. Two brass bands, one belonging to the Gendarmerie, the second to the Police, were entertaining. Compared to the previous parade of 1961, this one had a distinctive native aspect: not a single white officer or non-com. A year before, Belgian officers were marching at the head of each unit while another marched behind it. Then everything was impeccable, uniforms, alignment, military marches, and military stand. But times had changed. In 1961, the parade was impressive; planes flew over and armoured cars, trucks, and jeeps rumbled; this year the white influence was invisible. Planes were hidden at airports along with heavy equipment and mercenaries. Nevertheless, the marching was acceptable since the soldiers had received new uniforms to give the impression they were a disciplined and trained army. Of course, the soldiers also belonged to the elite units. Everybody knew that this was the facade. These elite gendarmes were mainly recruited among the Bayeke tribesmen, traditional warriors who have courageously fought against Balubas in the North and against UN troops. Among the gendarmes, many are "PARA-COMMANDOES," that is to say, "the best." They were wearing a red beret like Belgian paratroopers and the "smoke," a camouflaged uniform. Several of the Katangans, however, had some exercise on the ground. A parachute on their back, they were carried by jeeps driving at a high speed. At a signal, they detached their parachutes and, due to the speed, it opened, permitting a sort of flight and a tumble after a hundred yards or so.

During Independence Day, no UN soldier was to be seen in Elisabethville. All had been ordered to stay in their quarters. Incidents were feared since we knew that the UN was unhappy with the presence of so many gendarmes in town. The UN officials had apparently authorized a parade by 300 militarymen and policemen, but Tshombe wanted to add some brightness to the Independence parade, and on the eve of the parade trucks and

trains brought in gendarmes. The arrival of 2,000 gendarmes in Elisabethville occurred under the nose of the UN which did not try to prevent them by establishing control of the Eville outskirts.

KATANGESE WOMEN IN POLITICS

The military parade ended in late afternoon, and everybody went home happy to see Katanga entering its third year of independence, in spite of troubles, enemies, and fears. The military parade, however, had angered the UN which sent a letter in the evening to Tshombe protesting and stating that it had not authorized the parade. The next morning the UN raised barricades around Eville on the pretext that it wanted to prevent gendarmes in the future from entering Elisabethville with guns.

One of the UN barricades was on Avenue Tombeur, 400 yards from the city center and exactly at the border of the African town, Albert. It was indeed a way to invite trouble since several days later a bloody incident occurred when UN Indians and a thousand African women and children had a fight. The incident occurred on July 17 at 9 o'clock in the morning. Needless to mention the UN foolishness in keeping troops in the heart of an African town. The Katangans and particularly women were frightened by soldiers and guns. Africans like tranquility in the villages and in the towns where they live. Africans in Katanga profoundly disliked the Indians and especially the Ghurkas, with their Mongolian, and Chinese faces.

In short, Katangese women living in Albert town started to complain to Tshombe and to Munongo about the presence of the UN barricade near their homes. The UN Indian unit which was guarding the barricade had also occupied the two African schools in the vicinity of the barricade. It was during the summer vacation, but the African women were scared and nervous. Several days before, an exchange of insults between the UN men and Africans occurred at this barrier, and the atmosphere was rather tense. The Indians sometimes liked to joke about an approaching young girl or a boy but the Africans became very suspicious. They knew

of all sorts of indecent attempts made by some of these soldiers. One mother reported that her child received some food from an Indian and that it was poisoned. Another said that her daughter had just escaped raping by a UN soldier. Due to this mood, it was obvious that something could happen anytime. The Katangese Women's Association, which mainly was busy with politics, and which was writing daily letters of protest to the whole world, started to defend the Albert inhabitants' claims. On July 16 this Association addressed a letter to the UN saying that the Avenue Tombeur barrier was destroying the peace in Albert town. The Katangese Women asked the UN to send at 9:00 the next day a representative to discuss the barricade. Munongo appreciated the Katangese Women's Association's initiative and even encouraged African women to come to the barrier to talk to the UN official. The UN official did not come to the "rendezvous" as asked by the Association, but hundreds of African women and children were already massed in front of the barrier guarded by Indians. Suddenly, armed with stones and sticks, the crowd rushed on the thirty UN soldiers, set fire to the bush, and forced them to quit their trenches. The women threw stones, the children were crying, and the Indians lost their heads. Indeed, it seems that the most dangerous thing that can happen in Africa is to be attacked by women. They are worse than the worst savage and rip you to pieces. As Belgians said to me: "If you are in the hands of angered Africans, you have a slight chance to escape; but if you fall into the hands of the women, nothing will remain of you . . ." And the storm against the Indians started under the eyes of the Katangese policemen who seemed to enjoy it. When the police finally intervened, it was too late. Several Indian soldiers panicked and opened fire. A dozen bullets only, but it was enough for a 17-year-old woman and a 5-year-old child to be mortally wounded. In fact, it was astonishing that so few women were killed. The two African victims of the incident died several hours later at the City Hospital while the tension mounted among the people so much that we feared at one moment to see all Katangese women starting an attack against the UN troops.

The tension lasted two days. After the protestations and cables sent by Katangans to the whole world, calm returned. Moreover, Robert Gardiner himself arrived in Elisabethville, attended the funerals of the victims, and presented condolences. I can still see Gardiner entering the City's Cathedral where the two coffins were mourned, together with two Swedish officers, one bringing flowers to the victims. It was indeed rather strange to see UN men who wrongly or rightly have shot at women visibly embarrassed, presenting flowers in public. It was in any case a fair-play gesture from Gardiner and from the UN, as an inquiry was also promised. Gardiner invoked the self-defense right of his troops, but the incident supplied Katangans propaganda for a while in which the UN was accused of barbarity, savage conduct, cowardice, etc.

But what angered Tshombe and his advisors at that time was the statement made by an American official who, following the incident, said that Katangan policemen shot the women in order to denigrate the UN. This assertion by the American official was tactless and inexact. Besides, the UN itself admitted that its soldiers shot bullets, in the air of course. But when you are in a ditch and women are above you, shooting in the air means shooting on those above.

A delegation of the women who attended the bloody demonstration of July 17 paid a visit several days later to the Katangan Minister of National Defense asking for indemnities, the same indemnities given to soldiers during war. The Government did not dare to refuse the women, who, by the way, were very influential in Katanga.

A statement by Mr. U Thant finally provoked the deterioration in the relations between the UN and Katanga. In Helsinki, Finland, answering a journalists' questions, the UN Secretary General said that "nothing was easy in the Congo since the Congolese chiefs were just a bunch of clowns." For the leader of the UN to refer to Africans as "clowns" revealed how much this Asian really thinks of Congolese and seriously dented his pose as a leader of Olympian understanding and peace.

During the dry season, from April to September, we had a torrent of incidents which poisoned the relations between Katangans and ONUSIENS. In the North of Katanga, the ANC was skirmishing with gendarmes and mercenaries. The Katangans daily protested against ANC attacks and at each press conference either Tshombe or Kimba denounced UN complicity.

We were, therefore, the witnesses of tragic events since people were getting killed daily. But we were also harvesting humorous stories. With regard to the peculiar Katangese administration, I heard that a Belgian, Kibwe's economic expert, had been arrested for corruption. He apparently authorized a group of Italians to create a sort of lottery on international soccer games. The Belgian was sentenced to six months in prison, sent to Kasapa, the local jail, and dressed in the special uniform. Kibwe, deprived of his advisor, was crippled; and, therefore, he discretely arranged for the Belgian convict to return to his office and continue advising him. We could see the Belgian in his convict uniform, working in his office under the guard of two policemen. At lunch he invited his guards to a nearby restaurant, and then together they had their "siesta" as was the habit in Africa.

And since we speak about corruption and jails, I shall tell what happened to me with an African, appointed by Tshombe as Director of the Social Security Office. This director was 25 years old; and the day when I met him he introduced me in a restaurant to his friend, the Minister of Social Prevoyance, another African 24 years old, the "benjamin" and the "intellectual" of Katanga's Government. The future director of the Office of Social Security, at that time, was the Minister's private secretary. This African often came to see me; we dined together, and we became good friends. He was polite and very amiable. And he opened my eyes to another aspect of the Bantou mentality. One night, as I was leaving a restaurant, I noticed a beautiful, enormous American car. I recognized the driver immediately. He was my friend, and recently appointed Director of the Social Security Bureau. I congratulated him and inquired about the car. "It is mine," he said proudly. "I just bought it." Since I was not alone and could not

talk too much to him, I politely said again: "Congratulations, and we shall see each other soon and have a talk." The answer was this: "I am very sorry, but I could not see you before two or three months from now. I am very busy," and he left with his car filled with friends, women, and children. Several days later I heard that he was arrested for embezzling almost \$20,000 dollars. It was probably what he meant when he told me that he was . . . very busy.

THE U THANT PLAN

The demonstration of the Kantangese Women once forgotten, the differences between Katanga and Leopoldville hardened. If at one moment Adoula seemed in accord with a Federal Constitution in Kitona, at the beginning of August he seemed to change his mind. N'Krumah, the Ghanaian leader, had asked Adoula to preserve the Congo's unity and to refuse federalism. Adoula, under the influence of the Afro-Asian Bloc, dropped the federalist proposition he made and decided to parcel out the Congo into 16 provinces. At the present time, the Congo has proliferated into 23 provinces, compared to the six it had under Belgian rule. Tshombe had left Katanga for Geneva, again pretending it was for a medical check-up. There were rumors about a meeting between Tshombe and an American official who was trying to persuade Tshombe to be cautious and make all possible concessions to Adoula in order to avoid the worst. In Geneva Tshombe declared to a journalist that he would accept the split of Katanga into two provinces providing that a Referendum was organized.

But the UN also now realized that the only solution for the Congo resided in a Federal system, and the Secretary General, Mr. Thant, came on the 20th of August with his famous plan of reconciliation for the Congolese. America backed the U THANT PLAN and the federalist idea. Tshombe, had he been shrewd, would have expressed his enthusiasm and considered himself victorious. He could have truthfully claimed to have been the first to think of it and promote it at the 1960 January Round

Table. But Tshombe seemed little impressed by the change in UN and US policies. The UN proposed mixed commissions, UN-Leopoldville-Eville, to discuss the sharing of revenues, the integration of the currency, of the Gendarmerie, and at last the project of a Federal Constitution. On August 23, Gardiner came to Elisabethville and left in Tshombe's hands the U THANT PLAN for a national Congolese reconciliation. Adoula immediately accepted the Plan, while Tshombe, who for two years cried for a federation, hesitated ten days before accepting it. When finally he accepted the Thant Plan, he did so with some reserves. For people who have seen Tshombe's herculean efforts for a federation, his attitude was incomprehensible. Did he now doubt the sincerity of the UN or had he now seen that nothing short of complete autonomy would work? U-Thant and America were certainly disappointed by Tshombe's hesitancy and decided to precipitate a solution by presenting a second plan called "Implementation."

Tshombe's advisors, to whom I personally expressed my astonishment concerning his delayed acceptance of the plan, said he signed at the last moment just to give the impression that Katangans reflected upon it before making any decision. I believe Katanga did not want to please either the UN or the US for their federalist support since they considered themselves the sole true "visionaires" in this respect. At any rate, Tshombe's delayed acceptance angered the UN and America which began to lose their patience.

The mixed commissions started their work in Eville in October 1962. Several weeks of discussions ended with an accord on almost all points in litigation: military questions, monetary integration, sharing of revenues. A protocol was signed by the three delegations; there were mutual congratulations, experts were thanked, and everything seemed settled. And Ngalula, appointed by the Central Government as chief of Congolese delegations, left for Leopoldville to submit the agreement. But Adoula was saying now that his delegates signed under constraint. Under what pressure Adoula changed his mind and adopted such a

course of action is today known. It seemed that U Thant himself, in collusion with the others, wanted to anticipate, to immediately terminate the Katangese secession and to cut short any delaying tactic by Tshombe and his supporters.

CHAPTER XIV

STRUGGLE TO SAVE KATANGA

No matter what Belgians in Katanga may say, many people in the Free World wanted to save the plucky beleaguered country from confusion and unconditional surrender. Katanga had its supporters everywhere, in France, in Belgium, in Great Britain and in the United States. Rightly or wrongly, many hoped to help Katangans to play an important part in the Congo and in Africa. But few people in Katanga itself recognized this support. They had now begun to see themselves as persecuted and alone. After the two wars, Tshombe as usual entered into negotiations with the unique goal of gaining time. Tshombe and his Advisers still thought that sooner or later Katanga would win full independence and that everything was a matter of time. They were not aware of two things: first of all that Katanga was on the defensive and secondly that the time they finally gained had not been used for the economic and administrative consolidation of the country.

The insecurity in which Katanga lived, the hostility it faced constantly, prevented the building of a solid, efficient economy, administration and army. The Gendarmerie used up a great portion of Katanga's revenues since 1960 but it never represented a force capable of protecting the country against a real enemy, a real offensive. The Gendarmerie and its mercenaries could of course harass a weak enemy like the ANC and fight a guerilla war in the bush against the UN troops but it could never face a real battle or win on a large front. The Katangese Air Force was

of questionable efficiency and it was quickly crippled by the UN when several jets were supplied to it. Katanga, of course, could have defended itself with the mercenaries help against the National Congolese Army, had the UN troops not intervened. But it was enough for the Central Government to use several bombers to discourage Katanga of any resistance. Several times, for instance, I tried to persuade my friends in Katanga that they were taking great risks considering their Air-Force as sufficient. I brought up the possibility of sporadio bombardment of Eville by Leopoldville planes used by Communist pilots. Everything was indeed possible and it is still feasible in the event of a new conflict. But they were not impressed. Several bombs on Elisabethville or other towns more or less periodically would have paralyzed the economic life. Within 24 hours all Europeans, women and children would have abandoned their work in Katanga. I do not accuse my friends of cowardice but it was and is a Katangese reality, a Congolese reality, to deal with. This country cannot afford upheavels. The European population, essential to its life, did not come to the Congo to get killed but to work and enjoy a comfortable life. These are two different things: suffering a war for your fatherland and taking the same risk in a remote country where you are at best only temporary. Belgians had suffered atrocious bombardments during the last war, in their fatherland. The Congo and Katanga, unfortunately, were not their country. They did not come to the Congo to live under the constant threat of wars and bombardment. Of course the situation is different in South Africa or in Angola where a mass of Europeans came to these territories to stay forever and thus a patriotic spirit is undeniable.

Under these circumstances, Europeans in the Congo must be very careful. For their own interest and for African interests too, they have to plan together to avoid troubles, to insure order, peace, and security. The day when the UN will quit the Congo, the Central Government can easily maintain an atmosphere of danger through bombing harassment. The Katangans may reply but Europeans will finally desert this troubled land. More than any

other country in the world, the Congo needs order to progress and one cannot insist enough on the Congolese giving up tribal, provincial or secessionist fights.

DREAMS AND HOPES

For two years and a half, Tshombe and his advisers missed opportunity after opportunity. When they realized that their secessionist cause was strongly opposed, they remained on the defensive. They never attacked the Congolese or the African problem through propaganda. If Tshombe could have forgotten his separatist ideas for a while, and presented himself as a Congolese leader seeking the benefit of the whole Congo, the Free World and other African countries would have backed him.

As I said above, Katanga did nothing to consolidate its administration and economy. Except for the Union Minière, nothing was bringing revenue to the treasury. Africans were incompetent in the agricultural field, they were not even capable of feeding themselves, or regularly working a piece of land. Everything depended and still does on the Union Minière and its chimneys. If the UM ceases its exploitation for some reason, everything would stop in Katanga.

During more than two years, Tshombe and his supporters did not succeed in consolidating their so-called democratic regime. The autocratic regime of Tshombe, though perhaps unavoidable in Africa, had been reinforced. Tshombe and his advisers should have suppressed tribalism while, at the same time, allowed opposition in order to respect democratic principles. Munongo persecuted the Balubas and following their exodus which was encouraged also by the UN, Katanga's economy was substantially shaken. Tshombe and his Katangans should have foreseen the economic consequences of a massive departure by Balubas from Katanga since they were the only ones, practically, who were skilled workers and reliable civil servants. When the Kasai Baluba men deserted Katanga, production in all fields dropped one half. Some UN officials certainly encouraged the massive

exodus of the Kasai men in order to ruin the economy of Katanga and to put Tshombe out of the fight. They succeeded partially. Except for the UM which prevented its Kasai workers from leaving their jobs, the production of all other factories, plants, workshops, craftwork, etc., dropped substantially, after the Kasai departure and has not recuperated since.

Thus, Tshombe presented himself as pro-Katangan and never as pro-Congolese. Had he shouted more loudly than Adoula for Congolese unity he could have attracted more friends. Some African States might have ended their criticism of him and encouraged his action as beneficial to the whole Congo, and eventually to the whole of Africa. African solidarity was a reality to deal with but Tshombe ignored it. Belgian technicians repeatedly said that Katanga without Tshombe would collapse. They confided also that Tshombe as a Congolese leader would have been quickly shown up as incapable of running the whole country. To most Belgian Advisors and other Europeans, Tshombe was unreplaceable in Katanga and this fixed idea has dominated Katanga's policy and kept them from taking a larger view. But it was obvious that in order to save Katanga, the whole Congo had to be saved. Belgians in Katanga claimed that the best way to stop a cancer is by cutting off the infection. They did not understand that this cancer, this gangrene was only superficial and could have been healed by Katanga and by Tshombe himself, employing a constructive, altruistic and sensible action. But by looking only to Katanga's borders, Tshombe and his supporters hurried the catastrophe and prevented men of good will from helping them.

Nevertheless, one cannot completely blame Tshombe for wanting to preserve the autonomy of Katanga. His counselors must bear the responsibility since they should have been aware of the Congolese, the African and the international realities confronting Katanga. These advisers should have discouraged Tshombe in his secession to the utmost and told him courageously that Katanga's independence was not feasible under the present circumstances, and that he should wait for another occasion, for another year or

for many years. I said previously that Katanga had its supporters in the Free World and even in some African countries. America was accused of guiding the UN action and of financing it, but it was America which spared Katanga from troubles with the UN during the whole year of 1962. Tshombe and his ministers were never arrested by the UN and America never tried to forment "a coup d'Etat" against Tshombe. France and Great Britain also backed Katanga although neither accepted the secession. Katangans should have understood that the Free World had its reasons for not wanting the secession but that it hoped, however, to save Tshombe and his province. There were many messages and messengers sent by the Western World to persuade Tshombe and his men to give up a rigid policy, to forget temporarily about secession and to cooperate with Adoula in the interest of the Congo and of Freedom. But Katangans wanted the Union Minière revenues for themselves. Due to long distances, to Katanga's wealth and to human coveting, there will always be reason for dispute. The question is how Katanga will protect itself in the future? The solution that the Western world proposed is that of a Congo united under the direction of a Central Government backed by the Free World and strong enough to discourage any ambition to take over the Congo by Communists or African neighbors.

In this struggle to save Katanga, Free World support can be illustrated by the following: Katanga enemies in the UN such as O'Brien, Tombelaine, General Radja, etc., those responsible for the two wars were removed. The new UN representatives were selected from among Africans. Few whites were in the UN Congo operation. Gardiner, an African, was the chief of UN operations; U Thant, an Asian, was Secretary General, while in Katanga itself, Mathu, another African was now dealing with Tshombe. Unfortunately, Tshombe did not know how to take advantage of this change. At the beginning, relations between Tshombe and Gardiner were excellent, but later on Tshombe angered the UN official who of course lost his sympathy for Katanga too. Another official, Ralph Bunche, an American Negro and a Deputy UN Secretary General together with Gardiner, pressed by the Afro-

Asian Bloc finally decided to end the Katangese secession and Tshombe did not know how to dissuade them by cooperating with them.

But Katangans at that moment were whimpering, and protesting against the ANC attacks in the North and against UN reinforcement. By the end of 1962, this organization had brought to the Congo nearly 20,000 men recruited as follows: 5,300 Indians; 3,000 Ethiopians; 3,000 Malaysians; 2,500 Nigerians; 1,700 Tunisians; 600 Ghanaians; 600 Canadians while Swedes, Norwegians, Danes and Pakistan, formed the rest, serving mainly in administrative jobs. The major part of UN troops, mainly Indians, Ethiopians and Malaysians, were massed in Katanga; roughly 13,000. The UN now had Jet-planes, cannon, armoured cars, modern, complete equipment. On its side, Katanga had almost 25,000 gendarmes and policemen plus 300 mercenaries, and diverse armament purchased far and wide and at a very costly price. These gendarmes were very well equipped, better than most armies in Africa at least. One gendarme had four pairs of boots, two blankets, two or three uniforms, a number of socks, berets and shirts. Many had several guns or automatic guns of the type used by NATO, the Belgian made "FAL." While trying to reinforce their Army, Katangans were spreading propaganda in America, in Europe and among African states for their secessionist and federalist cause.

In New York, the UN Headquarters, Katanga had, in 1960, opened an office called "Katangan Information Bureau" which was managed by a Belgian born in the Congo, Michel Struelens. No Katangan worked in the office but important Katangan officials often visited it, including Evariste Kimba, Joseph Kiwele and others; Tshombe's brother visited it towards the end and attempted vainly to talk to someone in authority in the State Department.

Everyone who knew Struelens liked him and he worked feverishly day and evening to establish friendly relations here but always observed with great care the limitations set by Washington upon the agents of foreign powers. His industry and obvious

sincerity attracted much sympathy. He spoke at universities and before many clubs upon the subject of Katanga's independence, he never made over statements and always acted so modestly yet presented his case so forcibly that his efforts alone roused thousands of Americans to discuss and admire Katanga. He was in daily teletype communication with Tshombe, sent out a weekly news letter that was accurate; and for some months conducted a 15 minute radio program on Monday nights to keep America informed. A highly successful protest meeting was held in Madison Square Garden when Tshombe was denied the right to enter the United States. It was packed to the rafters with Katangan sympathizers. The speakers included three important United States Senators; George Sokolsky, the dean of New York newspapermen, and many others. Page ads had already appeared in the New York *Times* paid for by indignant Americans protesting the UN action in Katanga. So frightened did the Administration become that it lost its head and set Carl Rowan, its hatchet man, to making wild statements to the effect that the Katangan Information Bureau was bribing Americans to be sympathetic! He implied that those signing the New York *Times* protest were in the pay of the Union Minière! Since these included such distinguished Americans as Herbert Hoover, Richard Nixon, Senators Dodd, Tower, Thurmond and a number of Congressmen, university professors, Governors, etc., it was so ludicrous that it reflected on the State Department. The accounts of the Katangan office were fine-combed to try to get something on them. Their funds were revealed in perfect order; and it was unhappily uncovered that it had spent far less on propaganda than most of America's best friends such as England, France and others. Rowan in desperation vaguely accused "some Central American country" of being offered one million dollars by the Katanga office for recognition of Katanga! It was rumored then that the nation was Costa Rica. This little country promptly denied it leaving the State Department holding the empty bag. But for his services, Kennedy "kicked Rowan upstairs" and made him Ambassador to Finland.

No doubt the sympathy roused in America made Tshombe too optimistic. He and other Katangan officials felt certain that the Republicans would not permit the American Government to throw more good money into the Congo by guaranteeing the new bid for Congo funds with a 200 million dollar UN bond issue. Without this, the UN could not have continued there for it was broke. But the American Government, as usual, took the easy course and provided half of the needed funds and urged other nations to supply the rest.

Katanga was now isolated almost completely. Tshombe did not realize that the functioning of a democracy is slow and cumbersome and that the Administration in power has all of the odds in any contest. The Kennedy Administration hammered its way to success in this venture. But if the New York newspapers had not at the time of the December UN war been on strike, the UN would not have had such an easy time of it in suppressing Katanga, and Tshombe would not now be in so helpless a position. This newspaper blackout played directly into the hands of Kennedy. That and his apparently at the time, firm stand on Cuba, were his two greatest weapons.

Relations between Tshombe and the UN were already bad, even very bad after the unfortunate incident with the Katangese women. Barriers were all over the place while UN soldiers and Katangan gendarmes were nervous, watching each other with resentful eyes.

I remember the conversation I had one night in late October 1962, with one of the "Katangese personalities." He was one of the "evolved" Africans, 50 years old, with a rather good knowledge of World history, an excellent memory and who was regarded as intelligent as well as modest and moderate in his Katangan convictions. But when I dared to say that the Gendarmerie seemed to me not strong enough to defend the country against a Central Government helped by Russian volunteers, he started to laugh and made this . . . statement: "Listen. In 1940, a handful of Finns commanded by Mannerheim beat the Russians. Isn't that true? Well, believe me, if the Russians put their feet on

Katangan soil we shall cut them to pieces. Our Gendarmerie is formidable! . . ." Unfortunately, even if they did not share entirely the opinion of the above mentioned official, many seemed convinced that in the event of a third war, the UN would be thrown out of Katanga. Katangans had mined a number of roads, bridges, barricades and industrial installations. It was perhaps, their only trump card.

TSHOMBE'S GOOD WILL GESTURES

A year before, in 1961, Tshombe succeeded in gaining General Mobutu's support to be freed from his prison in Leopoldville. In addition to a large amount of money given to Mobutu, in exchange for his freedom, Tshombe promised to put his Gendarmerie under his command. It was indeed an excellent alliance since Mobutu as a friend of Katanga could have influenced the Central Government and facilitated an agreement between Leopoldville and Tshombe. 80 officers of Mobutu arrived in Elisabethville and people hoped that the friendship between Mobutu and Tshombe would save Katanga. But this alliance did not last long. Munongo expelled Mobutu's men because they were fomenting troubles by boasting of their higher pay guaranteed by the United States compared to Katangan officers' salaries. Mobutu was, of course, vexed and his friendship was lost.

In 1962, facing the constant hostility of the Central Government, Tshombe attempted to create a Federation of Swahili-speaking people. Several neighboring countries where Swahili was used as a "lingua franca," such as Tanganyika, Ruanda-Urundi and half of the Congo itself, were supposed to join this Federation. Tshombe dispensed money left and right, invited several African leaders but the Federation remained a dead letter. At one point, Tshombe attempted to establish an alliance with North Rhodesian leaders, looking to the day when that country would be independent. One of the most important Rhodesian leaders, Kenneth Kaunda and his UNIP Party, had a pronounced Communist flavor and were practically financed by N'Krumah. Another

Rhodesian leader, Henry Nkumbula, was Wellensky's friend and seemed for a while at least to be a friend of Katanga and of Tshombe. But Tshombe's diplomatic and financial efforts towards these two African chiefs failed since both finally proclaimed overtly that they were for the Congolese unity and for the Central Government.

America made a last effort at the end of 1962 to save Katanga and Tshombe from trouble. One of the State Department's assistant secretaries, Mr. George McGhee, arrived in Elisabethville and almost begged Tshombe to give up his secession and to reach an agreement with Adoula to enter the Central Government. The American official drew Tshombe's attention to the fact that the UN could not possibly afford to lose face in the Congo. Mr. McGhee's intervention was not well understood by Tshombe or his advisers who regarded the presence of the messenger as a sign of hesitancy in its policy toward Katanga. One of Tshombe's advisers who spoke to the American angered him with his preconceived ideas about America and with his presumptuous conduct, and McGhee returned to Washington. The American official had previously illustrated to Tshombe the risks he was taking by delaying a decision. He told him, for instance, about casual economic sanctions against Katanga in the event the U Thant Plan was not implemented quickly by Katangans. According to Tshombe's advisers, McGhee's explanations and warnings were not very clear and precise. At any rate, neither Great Britain, nor France, nor Belgium had been very explicit in this affair. Moreover, these countries seemed opposed to the American and UN intentions for economic pressures against Katanga, and this of course puzzled and encouraged Katanga to delay a solution again.

In that crucial period, Tshombe was appointed "Doctor Honoris Causa" by the University in Elisabethville. It was certainly not the best moment for such a comedy. There were troubles and impending dangers to be faced. But Tshombe's nomination recalled to me an old Rumanian Proverb which tells about the old woman who is combing her hair while her house is in flames. . . . I do not say that Tshombe did not deserve to be honoured with that title. In

Africa, at the present time, there are many such "Doctors" among African leaders and Tshombe should have been nominated in his turn. But the moment was ill-chosen.

McGhee's intervention had, however, some effect on Tshombe. The Katangan leader several days later offered to share Katanga's revenues with the Central Government and in particular to allow it to collect money from the transportation of copper through Congolese territory, to Matadi, its harbour. For more than two years, Katanga's copper had been exported through Angola and Mozambique and loaded on boats in Lobito (Angola) and in Beira (Mozambique). Of course it meant providing both countries and Northern Rhodesia which let the trains pass through, with substantial amounts of money and in hard currency. Before the independence from the 300,000 metric tons of copper, nearly 120,000 were sent by road through Matadi, via Port Franqui, crossing the Congo itself. The Central Government once again proved its ignorance when it asked that all Katanga's wealth be exported through the Congo, which was unworkable. In addition, this railroad was closed by the destruction of the bridge on Lubilash by Katangans when the ANC attacked the nearby town of Kaniama. Even repaired, the railroad was very insecure. There were troubles in Kasai between Lulua and Bakete tribes. Mechanics leaving Elisabethville had to be replaced with friendly tribesmen to avoid being killed and thus the smooth operation of this railroad was impossible. But the Union Minière and Tshombe tried to overcome these difficulties in order to prove their good will and permit Leopoldville men to make some money. The Lubilash bridge was finally repaired by the Union Minière and on October 10, Tshombe officially opened the railroad to Matadi for his copper. Several days later Tshombe offered Adoula a cheque of 2 million dollars as an advance on future rights over revenues. It was exactly 2 per cent of the whole Katangese income. On October 17, finally, Tshombe decided to reopen the Telecommunications between Elisabethville and Leopoldville, which had, by the way, been interrupted by the Central Government itself. The ceremony took place in the Post Office Building in front of

UN officials, Foreign consuls and the press. I remember that Tshombe took the receiver and asked the operator to give him a line and called Adoula. When the operator told him: "Mr. President, you have Mr. Adoula on the telephone," Tshombe pronounced these . . . historic words: "It's you Adoula? You are always the bad guy." . . . It was, of course, the African statesmen's manner of talking to each other.

ULIMATUM . . . ULTIMA

During November 1962, it became obvious that America was eager to terminate the Congolese affair. President Kennedy, in view of the elections which were approaching, made a spectacular decision with regard to Castro. He demanded the removal of all nuclear missiles, established by the Soviets on this island. Moscow obeyed Kennedy's warning and withdrew its rockets and part of its troops. Kennedy's courage in this decision increased his popularity in the elections and the Democrats gained seats in both House and Senate. This success seemed to strengthen his stand against Katanga. At that point the American Government clearly warned Tshombe that it had no intention of modifying its position on Katanga and that it hoped for an immediate implementation of the U Thant Plan. The UN also applied pressure on Tshombe saying that the time of negotiations was over and that Katanga had to initiate action. On the 5th of December, U Thant sent a letter to Tshombe, a sort of ultimatum, asking the Katangan leader to begin implementation of the Plan within 15 days. For a moment, Tshombe seemed to realize the danger. He declared his intention of reconciliation and promised to implement the U Thant Plan point by point. Tshombe found, however, a pretext for delaying any execution. He asked Adoula to first ratify in the Congolese Parliament, the amnesty promise made recently by Kasavubu. Tshombe said that amnesty had to have legal form. By this astute request Tshombe expected to see Adoula face strong opposition and eventually be overthrown. But Adoula anticipated Tshombe's move and prevented the meeting of the Congolese

Parliament by sending its members . . . vacationing! He simply sent them to make various well paid trips, and he definitively broke with Tshombe. Tshombe's request for a ratification of Kasavubu's offer of amnesty embarrassed the American Government also which feared for Adoula's fortunes. There is no doubt that Tshombe again goofed by insisting on the amnesty, though he was an anti-Communist, he was pleading obliquely for the liberation of two pro-Communist leaders, Gizenga and Gbenye, both jailed by Adoula for secessionist ideas. Katanga once again proved its blindness and lack of diplomacy. Tshombe would have helped his own enemies, the Lumumbists, Moscow's instruments, in order to embarrass Adoula and eventually get support for his federalist goals.

On the 1st of December 1962, President Kennedy sent a letter to Tshombe advising him to assure the liberty of movement of the UN troops in Katanga.

THE AMERICAN FLAG RIPPED

Tshombe closed his ears to the advise of Mr. Kennedy, he had other fish to fry. . . . In Northern Katanga, Kongolo town held by his gendarmes was encircled by the ANC and in trouble. For more than one year, 60,000 pro-Tshombist Bahembas were living in the Kongolo area under the constant threat of the rival Baluba tribe. Tshombe armed 3,000 Bahemba gendarmes and with a dozen mercenaries permitted them to defend this enclave located at 800 km, from Elisabethville. The Katangan planes could hardly supply this garrison. For months, Tshombe's planes taking off from Kolwezi, succeeded, however, in supplying and bombing. The UN let them do it for a while but finally warned Tshombe that it would not permit anymore flights. Kongolo garrison was from that moment doomed. Kongolo's defenders, unsatisfactorily supplied were already complaining. The ANC soldiers were more numerous now, the UN was behind them and in addition relations between gendarmes and mercenaries from the garrison itself worsened. There was no longer any understanding and coopera-

tion. Mercenaries and gendarmes were living in separate quarters. To Tshombe and to Katangans, holding Kongolo was a matter of prestige, of solidarity with a friendly tribe, the Bahemba. In December, the ANC multiplied its attacks, its ambushes with the result that a couple of mercenaries and a score of gendarmes were killed. And Kongolo finally fell into ANC hands after mercenaries had been evacuated by plane by several daring pilots who landed on the airport in Kongolo under ANC mortar fire. The Bahemba gendarmes then deserted Kongolo and hid themselves in the brush.

Kongolo's loss did not provoke, in Elisabethville, the sadness one would have expected. Several words in the local press and then it was forgotten. This oblivion coincided with the impending attack by the UN against Katanga's industrial towns, Elisabethville, Kipoushi, Jadotville and Kolwezi. Tshombe had not given a pertinent answer to the ultimatum sent by U Thant. On the 13th of December, the Belgian Government unofficially rushed the Liege University Recteur, Mr. Marcel Dubuisson, to Elisabethville. Marcel Dubuisson was a friend of Tshombe, begged him to implement as soon as possible the U Thant Plan. According to several advisers, Spaak's messenger was not too explicit in presenting the Belgian point of view in this imbroglio followed by ultimatums. Several days after Mr. Dubuisson's visit, several mercenaries, foremen from the Union Minière, white and African students from the local university, all demonstrated against the Belgian Consulate, breaking windows and burning Spaak's picture hung for that purpose on one of the building's balcony. The acting Belgian Consul, Colonel Wanderwalle, was furious. For months he had helped Tshombe and his technicians to form a reasonable policy and diplomacy. On the 20th of December, a similar riot occurred this time reinforced by a hundred young Africans. They attacked with stones and mangoes, the United States Consulate located one hundred yards distant from Tshombe's residence. The rioters set fire to a kiosk in the garden, broke all windows and ripped the American flag. From Tshombe's residence, a secretary telephoned the Consulate inquiring about the

demonstration and asking if the staff was in danger. But no police were sent to the consulate and Tshombe's personal guards impassively looked on. When the smoke of the burning kiosk became thick, Tshombe's collaborators in the Residence feared that the fire might extend to their offices and a couple of special police platoons were called to disperse the crowd while firemen arrived to extinguish the fire. It was too late. Katanga was indeed spilling the cup of patience for the world newspapers had immediately announced the insult done to the American Nation. Tshombe and his counselors not only forgot to present their excuses but seemed to have enjoyed the demonstration.

The tension reached its highest point. The UN and Katangan barricades were face to face already. There was a distinctive smell of gun powder in the air.

CHAPTER XV

THE THIRD UN MILITARY ACTION

In December 1962, the UN had theoretical control over Elisabethville. Its troops were guarding several exits of the capital on the roads leading to the five African towns. In the city itself, mercenaries in civilian clothes were strolling, shopping and drinking their usual glass of whiskey and coca cola at the cafe terraces. Scores of gendarmes, mostly unarmed, were also coming and going. The UN barricades, made of several empty gasoline barrels guarded by a score or two of UN men, reminded us, in spite of Christmas, of the constant danger of another grave incident. Indeed at two hundred yards from each UN barricade, Katangans had their own, similar one. Understanding, and friendship between the two had never existed but lately gendarmes and Onusiens were looking at each other with the finger on the gun trigger. Katangans, on Sunday nights in particular, when the beer was distributed, seemed more courageous and insulted the Indians, shouting: "Kuia, macaques" (Come on you monkeys). But Indians and Tunisians who knew Katangans for many months, did not pay attention to them. On the December 23, the UN Commanding Officer replaced the Tunisian unit at Lumumbashi barrier with Africans, as—courageous as Katangans, the Ethiopians of Emperor Haile Selassie. For several days Katangans derived fun by approaching the UN Tunisian barrier to insult or to look at them. On the 24th of December, a Katangan group of gendarmes tried to make fun again and approached the UN barrier taunting the Ethiopians.

And the shooting started. . . . Who shot first? Both in our opinion, since both were scared stiff. The UN however pretended that Katangans had planted a flag under the nose of the Ethiopians on the copper hill, the so called "terril". Katangans said that the UN opened fire on them and provoked the shooting. Anyhow, on the eve of this incident another shooting occurred near the town of Karavia, on the Northern skirts of Eville. Several drunken gendarmes shot in the air trying to scare some comrades regarded as cowards because they did not insult the UN barrier guard enough. The UN retorted to this internal shooting, so to speak, fearing an attack, but everything calmed down quickly. Nevertheless, two incidents in 24 hours, were sufficient to excite emotions. There had been no casualties but the incident at Lumumbashi was considered serious, since Tshombe, General Muke, UN officials and foreign consuls came to the scene in an attempt to stop the shooting which lasted for more than one hour.

Then the incident was closed, we spent Christmas, in tranquility though tension had increased. The Katangan Government feared the worst. Ministers went in hiding in the African towns, when rumors about their arrest by the UN circulated. Only Tshombe remained in Eville with his advisers. On the 26th of December, the UN handed to Katanga, a request to send a delegation immediately to Leopoldville to legalize the reconciliation. Tshombe hesitated.

On December 27 in the middle of the night another shooting started behind the golf course, on Karavia road. At 8:00 in the morning of December 28, UN troops, after a severe bombardment with mortar and heavy machine-gunning, entered the five African towns. Gendarmes escaped to the bush after they turned back the UN for a couple of hours. By noon, the UN occupied the Katangan Headquarters of the Gendarmerie in Karavia while panic among Africans was at its height. In several African towns, the UN Ethiopian troops fired without regard for civilians. Such as in Albert and Katuba towns where more than sixty helpless Africans were killed. Thousands deserted their homes and attempted to go to Rhodesia, whose border was the only refuge at that time. When

night fell, shooting and mortar bombing could be heard in Elisabethville. Katangan mercenaries vanished, seeking refuge in Kipoushi, 30 km from the capital where the resistance, it was said, would be . . . terrific. From all sides, one could hear: "If the UN troops attack Kipoushi they will be cut to pieces." Kipoushi is our "Maginot Line."

In Elisabethville, water and electricity supplies were cut. Several electric pylons had been blown up by UN mortars during the previous day's action. All Africans had deserted the town. No more civil servants, no more policemen, no more ministers. We were alone, we the whites, in a dead town while the UN soldiers were coming and going all over the place. The Indians and the Tunisians were less feared but once an Ethiopian was seen in the street, men and women hid in their houses, closing all doors and windows. On the 29th of December at 16:00 a Tunisian unit approached Tshombe's residence, step by step through neighboring streets, obviously aiming to encircle it.

For several days, Katangan Ministers had feared arrest by the UN in spite of its official denials of such intentions. In his residence Tshombe was discussing with his main adviser Professor Clemens and several secretaries when the telephone rang. Someone warned them that Tunisians were on their way to encircle the residence. And before the circle was closed by UN troops, Tshombe and his advisers jumped in a car and went into hiding in the apartment of one of the advisers in the center of Elisabethville. Several technicians insisted that Tshombe leave Eville at once. And indeed, Tshombe and his friends attempted to cross the UN barricade on Avenue Hemptine in the direction of the Katuba town where by a bush road he could have reached Rhodesia, at Kasumbales. But the UN prohibited any traffic and Tshombe's car had to return to Eville. That night Tshombe slept in the apartment of his adviser, waiting for the next day when the escape was to be engineered with care. And on December 30 in the morning, someone on good terms with the UN got an authorization to go with two Red Cross Ambulances into the town of Katuba to pick up injured and dead people. Tshombe put on the

uniform of a male nurse and was driven by his friends through the UN barrier without any trouble, finally reaching the Rhodesian border safely. I was assured by a witness that when the Red Cross Ambulances were checked by the UN men, on Avenue Hemptine, a Tunisian soldier said to his officer: "Look, there is Tshombe." The Tunisian officer replied: "You are seeing Tshombe all over the place. . . . Leave me alone, all Africans look like Tshombe." At any rate Tshombe was free. Having left his country he was now "an exiled leader."

Aware of Tshombe's escape to Rhodesia, Europeans in Elisabethville expressed opposite views. Many approved his escape, others considered Tshombe's gesture as dastardly and lacking political sense. Without Tshombe, they said, Katanga does not exist anymore. Partially it was true. Tshombe, no matter what the UN said, was the most popular leader in this Province and had at least 50% if not more, of the African population on his side, and certainly the whole European colony.

KIPOUSHI: TSHOMBE'S MAGINOT LINE

When the UN heard of Tshombe's flight, the military command decided to launch troops against Kipoushi, near Elisabethville. For more than a year, people were speaking of Kipoushi as being a tremendous fortification, impregnable! Tshombe had indeed massed his best gendarmes here and one hundred mercenaries, weapons and ammunition. Kipoushi also had an airport recently modernized which was located on both Katangese and Rhodesian territory, "a cheval." I have been assured that in Kipoushi an Air Force was assembled and that three Vampire Jets were being put together. In fact, several days before I had also heard that the three Vampires, capable of launching rockets, could not fly because of malfunctioning in the electronic equipment and that up to then attempts to repair them failed for lack of qualified technicians.

To visit Kipoushi during the year of 1962, one needed lots of permits. When you asked for such "laissez-passer," Tshombe's

counselors, and the African high ranking officers were astonished and, opening their eyes wide said to you: "What do you want to see in Kipoushi?" "It is a forbidden," strategic, military, secret, dangerous zone. It is very difficult to get permission." "Why?" I replied, "Is it the Russian zone?" Officially no journalist succeeded in visiting Kipoushi at that time as the town was considered the most important military area and the "espionite" was causing great havoc. Indeed, several UN men had been caught strolling around. One day at the end of 1962, a Belgian friend working as correspondent for a big pro-Katangan newspaper in Brussels came to Elisabethville. He insisted on visiting Kipoushi. As I knew Tshombe's collaborators, we went together to the residency and asked for a "laisser-passer." At that moment, Tshombe was in Europe and Kimba and Munongo were running the country during his absence. So we entered Kimba's office and one of his secretaries promised us the necessary permit. She wrote down our names, prepared the permits and looked for Kimba and General Muke for their signatures. One hour later she announced to us that Kimba and Muke were not to be found . . . but that we will get our "laisser-passers" the next day, for sure. As I knew that this was just a way to discourage our intention of visiting Kipoushi I decided to go the same day with the African District Commissioner, a very good friend of mine, who had the town under his supervision. We therefore left Elisabethville for Kipoushi with the District Commissioner, in his official car, with the Katangan Flag planted high on it and with his own Belgian counselor. We passed with no trouble all barricades guarded by gendarmes, finally reaching the famous fortified wall built by Katangans to stop any UN attack. . . . Two yards thick, more than 500 yards long, it cut the road in two. The wall, made of bricks was full of battlements. No gendarme, no mercenary, not even a cat was around. Everything looked quiet, deserted. But the District Commissioner proudly assured us that inside the fortification, there were cannon, mortar machine guns, etc., just waiting for the UN troops. . . . We left the "Katangese Maginot Line" and arrived in Kipoushi crossing other barriers also with no trouble. Seeing the official

car with its wide flag, gendarmes saluted us without question. In Kipoushi we spoke to several persons, we took a look at the airport and at several planes; and since there was nothing more to do we decided to visit the new district built by the Union Minière for its African workers.

"Look at these beautiful houses we have built," said someone. "All are empty. No African wants to live here because of fear. They prefer their own slums, where they feel more secure. Here they feel alone, isolated and are scared. What a pity!" added the UM official.

While we were visiting the houses, a policeman arrived in a jeep, approached the District Commissioner and said: "You are called back to Elisabethville immediately. Mr. Munongo just phoned for you." We went on visiting the new development for another 15 minutes, when a Katangan officer rushed up in another jeep and practically ordered the District Commissioner to return urgently to Eville with all his company and "without losing a minute." We all had a peculiar feeling and we obeyed. As we approached the fortifications area, two cars loaded with gendarmes, machine-guns in their hands bared the road stopping us. We, the two journalists, had to sit in the gendarme's car driven by an African Surete Officer, between two gendarmes who obviously were guarding us. The Surete Officer approached the barriers, stepped out and said something to the gendarmes who let us pass. Finally we arrived in Elisabethville followed by the District Commissioner's car and entered Munongo's private house. The Surete Officer together with the DC and his technician entered the house to talk to Munongo while we remained in the car waiting at least a half an hour. When the DC and his Belgian technician finally left Munongo, we heard from them that "we were free" but that all of us had incredible luck to be alive.

What happened seems very simple but very unthinkable too. One of Kimba's female secretary's (who later on was discovered to be a UN informer) phoned General Muke saying that two spies of the Central Government went to Kipoushi with the "traitor" District Commissioner, to steal military plans and cross

the border to Rhodesia afterwards, en route to Leopoldville. The Commander-in-chief of the Gendarmerie, "General Muke", without inquiring ordered his gendarmes to shoot the official car of the District Commissioner without warning. Fortunately Munongo heard Muke's intention and sent a car to pick us up and thus avoid a most unpleasant incident. The most embarrassed was, of course, the District Commissioner who had been treated as a "traitor" while he was a true and loyal Katangan.

This stronghold of Katangans, this "Ligne Maginot" of Tshombe where I risked being killed was taken on the 30th of December 1962, in a day by UN Irish troops without firing a shot. Several Katangan battalions deserted the fortifications when the first UN truck reached it, abandoning guns, mortars and ammunition. About fifty mercenaries, seeing the gendarmes flee, deserted the Maginot line themselves, saying, "If the Negroes do not want to fight why should we get killed for them." The Kipoushi town, the "Verdun" of the Katangans, fell into UN hands in a matter of hours, without any resistance by mercenaries or gendarmes to the surprise, the indignation, and the despair of all those who swore on Katanga's strength and its ability to stop the UN march.

Meanwhile, Tshombe, in Rhodesia was listening to Sir Welensky's advice. Welensky explained to him the risk of a prolonged exile and his duty to return to his people immediately. Tshombe returned on December 31 but not to Eville. He went to Jadotville, 130 km from the capital, where he immediately declared that if the UN progressed a yard more in its march he would order the blowing up of all Union Minière plants and mines, roads and bridges. For the hundredth time Tshombe repeated his threat to implement his famous policy of "the scorched earth."

Most Katanga Ministers, gendarmes, and mercenaries poured into Jadotville to continue the resistance. A few troops and mercenaries remained in Northern Katanga, Kamina, Kolwezi where the ANC was trying to penetrate. Kipoushi's fall brought consternation among all those who put their faith in the resistance of this stronghold. It was rather difficult to see how the gendarmes would fight for Jadotville and Kolwezi, in the event of any UN

march against these two important mining towns. In fact, Tshombe himself realized that he had to rely now on other "trump cards", on a policy of threat rather than on his soldiers. He was back among his people and he was capable of deciding the fate of the UM installations and the whole country. We knew very well that tons of dynamite had been placed in UM plants in Jadotville and Kolwezi, hundreds of mines loaded on bridges, concealed on roads and so forth. The UN would have to reflect before taking any action. At the Union Minière, except for fanatics, people trembled at the prospect of seeing destroyed in several minutes what was built in a half century and what enabled Katanga to claim independence.

THE WESTERN CONSULS RUSH TO HELP TSHOMBE

In this Katangese province which for more than two years and a half had tried to separate itself from the Congo there were about a dozen foreign consuls. America, England, France, Italy, Greece, the whole of Western Europe had its representatives in Elisabethville in spite of Katanga's confused political position. Only the Afro-Asian Bloc had refused to have representatives. The Consuls were as bustled about as the newmen were. Each time Tshombe or Kimba had a bad dream, they had to listen to protestations and laments. Some Consuls were liked by Katangan Ministers and European technicians, others were ignored or hated. Of course, the US Consul at the time Mr. Dean was the most hated. The Italian Consul too, in spite of a large colony of Italians, was not in the regime's graces because he seemed to fancy the UN. The Italian Consul, Mr. Natali, who had burned his cipher code in the December war had later on another unpleasant adventure which deserves to be narrated. The Italian Government was backing the UN action and was ready to supply it with planes, in spite of the 13 pilots butchered and the culprits unpunished a year before by the Congolese Army in Kindu. The Italian Government, strangely enough, had forgotten that its pilots had been transformed by the ANC savages into Italian salami and sold like dog meat to canni-

bals. They offered planes but no more pilots. Of course, Katanga protested and Mr. Natali, the Italian Consul, thought that he was obliged to answer by posting a sort of leaflet on walls in Eville in which he explained the Italian position concerning the UN and moreover defended it. Tshombe at that time was making an inspection tour inside Katanga. He was supposed to be back that night. Meanwhile, Munongo and Kibwe agreed to arrest the Italian Consul and to expel him on the spot. The Katangan Surete men entered the Consul's house and arrested him in front of his tearful wife not giving him a chance to take even a tooth brush. To arrest a diplomat in such a callous way surpassed even Soviet Bloc habits. Tshombe returned that night and offered vague excuses to other Western Consuls who protested the arrest and who were very concerned for their vanished colleague. He was not in Rhodesia and nobody knew where he was. Tshombe phoned Munongo and inquired about Mr. Natali. Next day, Munongo reported that Mr. Natali had spent the night with his guards in a house near the Rhodesian border which he finally crossed in the morning. The Italian Consul had indeed arrived in Rhodesia, phoned his ambassador in Leopoldville who several days later came to Eville in order to obtain authorization for his return. I give this full story about the Italian Consul arrest in order to illustrate the childishness of Katangan ministers and high officials and their advisers lack of influence in failing to prevent them from such blunders. In addition to this story, I heard several days after that a shop owner, an Italian grocer who hated Natali and who was a intimate friend of Munongo, had arranged the arrest. This Italian adored Katanga and sold in his grocery store called "The Sun of Katanga," ham, vegetables and macaroni. He indulged himself in politics and apparently was close to Katangan ministers.

On the 30th of December 1962, in the evening, Tshombe returned from Salisbury to Jadotville after a dramatic meeting with Sir Welensky. The Rhodesian leader together with a British envoy warned Tshombe that he had to go back to Katanga by all means. In Elisabethville, uneasiness prevailed. Kipoushi, the Katangan stronghold had fallen. Two thousand gendarmes and one hundred

mercenaries were heading toward Jadotville. The gendarmes clearly stampeded, were harassing both whites and blacks. Following the mortar fire on their towns, thousands of Africans from Eville's suburbs had left and congested all roads to Rhodesia and in particular the area of Sakania, Mokambo Kasumbalesa. These refugees were now in complete destitution, famished and scared of the gendarmes' conduct. A driving rain was falling at the time on Southern Katanga, increasing the suffering of the population. The Rhodesian Authorities became concerned about the presence of these thousands of refugees but also because colored UN troops were approaching their borders. Rhodesian troops strongly supported by whites, had apparently received orders from Welensky to open fire on UN Ethiopians and Indians who intentionally or by mistake crossed the border in the pursuit of Katangan gendarmes.

In Elisabethville, there was no longer a Katangese authority. All ministers, high officials and civil servants had left for Jadotville or Mokambo. Some Ministers fled to Rhodesia. All civil servants, all clerks had abandoned their jobs. The only Katangan official who stayed behind was the Police Chief, Sapwe Pius, and a young Director of the Imports-Exports Office, Jean Mutombo. Seeing the complete disintegration of the administration, Belgian technicians reacted by creating a Supply Office for food and gasoline. The existing stocks could supply the population for only 6 weeks and nobody could tell when importations again would be possible. The Belgian Supply Office distributed rationing cards and decided to print supply stamps as quickly as possible. There was no real panic, however. Practically nobody evacuated his family. The UN had meanwhile opened Luano Airport to civilian transportation and strangely enough, there were more passengers coming to Eville and to Katanga than people leaving the troubled country. This attitude by Belgians came less from courage than from lassitude, I would even say from a sort of fatalistic view. There had been too many troubles, too many wars, too many miseries in two years and a half. This time, they said: "God will decide."

But Europeans did not forget to criticise Tshombe more and more and all his African collaborators who fled like rabbits. The Belgian and the British representatives, tried to persuade Tshombe to come to Eville, and thus avoid the appointment of a special Com-misar to Katanga. Some political circles in London and Brussels wanted Tshombe to remain a valid interlocutor in this Congolese crisis as the legally elected Provincial President. Tshombe understood and returned to Jadotville. It was on the 30th of December late in the evening. Many Belgians in the Metropole realized that the Congolese affair was not yet ended and that a solution in the interest of all could still be found behind Tshombe. The Union Minière too feared that in the absence of the Katangan President, nobody would have enough authority to prevent the destruction of its plants by gendarmes and mercenaries.

KATANGA AND ITS POLICY OF "SCORCHED EARTH"

Belgian, British and French financial groups which had interests in the Union Minière's exploitation were particularly concerned at this time. They would have liked to get Katanga out of the chaos and preserve intact the Union Minière installations. But Tshombe, back in Jadotville, was insisting on his policy of scorched earth, if the UN advanced on Jadotville and Kolwezi. The Belgian Consul and his British colleague rushed to Jadotville and tried to persuade Tshombe to return to Elisabethville and negotiate with the UN. Both the British and Belgian Governments hoped that once Tshombe was back in his capital, a *Modus Vivendi* would be found and the Union Minière installations spared from ruin. The UM directorate in Brussels was fuming and measures to dissuade mercenaries from blowing up the plants were drawn up. For the UM, Jadotville represented almost half of the whole copper production. Pressures therefore were put on the United Nations in NY and in Leopoldville for a truce, thus permitting diplomatic approach to Tshombe. U Thant again asked Tshombe to immediately implement his reconciliation plan. Tshombe agreed to send his delegates and Union Minière representatives to Leopoldville to arrange

the sharing of revenues. Tshombe was also supposed to permit without delay a customs check on copper exportation.

As a matter of fact, the Central Government feared losing everything with an intransigent policy towards Tshombe, and Adoula himself wisely offered to negotiate with Tshombe to prevent the destruction of UM mines. As a good will gesture, the UN opened Luano Airport to civilian traffic and Belgian Airways Company "Sabena" could land and take off after one year and a half of interdiction. The reopening of the Airport by the UN was done at the Central Government's request. UN representatives in Eville appealed to Katanga Police Chief Sapwe Pius and both decided to establish a mixed patrol of policemen to maintain order. This step was intended to prove to Tshombe the UN's desire for cooperation.

On New Year's Eve, the UN offered Katangan mercenary pilots permission to land their planes in Manono Airport, and thus avoid punishment. A naive gesture indeed, since nobody believed that a pilot would let himself fall into UN hands when he could very well land in Rhodesia or in Angola on friendly territories.

Hopes were increasing. Adoula again announced that Kasavubu's offer of amnesty would be respected and that no civilian or military adviser of the Katangan Government would be pursued. In Jadotville, Tshombe however seemed determined to go to Kolwezi and to organize the resistance there and direct the scorched earth policy.

In Elisabethville, the population now feared the ANC arrival since the Central Government could very well pretend that in the absence of any authority, its duty was to take over. It was January 3, 1963 and Tshombe was still in Jadotville discussing with the Consuls his eventual return to Elisabethville. By the same token, the UN seeing Tshombe's hesitation, toughened its attitude. To delay his return Tshombe asked the UN to guarantee him his safety. Robert Gardiner on behalf of the UN and Adoula answered that it was up to him to return to his capital if he desired and that they did not intend to interfere in Katanga's internal affairs and that time for negotiations was running short. In other words, there was no more question of delay in negotiation. Several of Tshombe's

advisers thought that under the circumstances the best solution was to order total destruction rather than capitulate. It was neither the Union Minière's opinion nor Great Britain and Belgium's desire. It was indeed madness to let Tshombe blow up Katangan mines and plants which after all benefited to the whole population. In Jadotville, several Union Minière foremen were apparently ready to help mercenaries blow up the installations in revenge on the UN, on America, on Belgium, and on the entire world. Fortunately, a pro-Tshombist Rhodesian African leader, Henry Kumbula joined with another leader, Kaunda, in threatening Tshombe not to attempt such foolishness. Tshombe, very upset, returned to Rhodesia from Jadotville to clear the dissension. But the UN troops were already marching on Jadotville, building a bridge on Lufira river to replace the former one which was destroyed by Katangans when Kipoushi fell into UN hands.

And in Katanga's capital, fears of the UN troops and the impending arrival of the ANC were growing. Several Ethiopians had killed the wife of a UM agent in broad day light in front of her terrified husband and children. The French Ambassador in the Congo strongly protested to the UN in NY as the woman was of French extraction. Meanwhile in Jadotville, the tension mounted. Destruction to the cobalt plant was accomplished amid shouts of joy "Americans will have no more cobalt." Indeed, America was the main cobalt purchaser which she uses for nuclear weapons. In Elisabethville opinions were divided. Some, disgusted by the desertion and the cowardice of the African Leaders, preached co-operation with the UN in order to restore public services, such as: mail, electricity, water, supply, etc. Others refused any cooperation. In the Main Post Office Building there were no more European technicians. The Union Minière promised to take care of the mail. From Jadotville Tshombe went to Kolwezi with his Professor Clemens and several ministers. UN troops, taking advantage of Tshombe's departure, entered the mining town and were rather well received by a fed up population. Nothing important was blown up in Jadotville as Tshombe had threatened. Mercenaries received important amounts of money from the Union Minière

to perform only mock destruction. Because of this "treason" in Mokambo, gendarmes started to bother mercenaries, inciting the African population against them. Munongo, who was in Mokambo, took up the leadership of the resistance. According to several Europeans escaped from Mokambe. Munongo told his Bayeke soldiers that the moment had arrived to behead all whites. But Jadotville was already occupied by UN troops and 4,000 Europeans were safe, except for two Belgian women shot by Indians as they were attempting to escape with their husbands in a car to Elisabethville. Journalists who escorted the UN troops to Jadotville took several pictures of the tragedy. One of the husbands looking at the body of his wife, banged his head against the car door in despair. The UN commander said it was a "mistake".

Following their victory in Kipoushi and Jadotville, the UN military officials seemed ready to march on Kolwezi also. And again a terrific fear entered British and Belgian hearts as a rapid action by the UN could bring the destruction of Kolwezi's electronic plant Luilu. In NY, U Thant seemed embarrassed by the UN troops rapid march. But Gardiner apparently threatened resignation if the UN troops were prevented from going on with their march to Kolwezi and occupying the whole of Katanga. On January 4, 1963, the UN Headquarters in NY pretended that its troops entered Jadotville without orders because of bad communications between NY and Leopoldville officials. It was only a way to appease the British and Belgian Governments for their concern for their Jadotville plants. The justification given by the UN HQs in NY was of course insincere since in Elisabethville it was clear that the Indian Commander-in-chief, General Norothna, seeing the easy conquest of Kipoushi, had decided to exploit the victory and continue the attack on Jadotville. The UN in Elisabethville was accused of having disregarded HQs orders. Meanwhile, there was a hope that Bunche would come to Eville and discourage Tshombe from implementing his scorched earth policy.

CHAPTER XVI

CAPITULATION

In his retrenched camp of Kolwezi, Tshombe declared to newsmen that he had decided to set Katanga on fire as the last means to stop the UN troops and to bend the Central Government's intransigent attitude. "All bridges between Jadotville and Kolwezi are loaded with mines," Tshombe said, and it was true. Delcomune hydro-electric dam was also filled with dynamite. Had it blown up, another dam, the Mwandingusha would have been swept away also and 100,000 Africans would have been flooded out of their abodes. Another bridge on Lulualaba was also loaded with mines. If that bridge was blown up, the UN troops could not enter Kolwezi in less than a couple of weeks. Under the circumstances, the U. S. Government supplied the UN troops with amphibious vehicles and all the equipment for building a military bridge. The Indian brigade was at 30 km south of the bridge waiting for the arrival of the American equipment. On the night of January 5, the U.S. Government sent a cable to Tshombe advising him to cooperate with the UN, to end the secession and to get rid of all mercenaries.

Let us read the notes I was keeping at that period:

5 January 1963

— In the town of Mokambo, Munongo, started the organization of guerilla warfare against the UN. Gendarmes, however, gave signs of disobedience.

— 200 civil servants, whites and Africans arrived today from Leopoldville to take care of Katanga's administration.

— Famine reported among gendarmes and civilians concentrated between Sakania and Mokambo, near Rhodesia's border. 5 trains with food sent Eville from Ndola were confiscated and pillaged by gendarmes in Sakania.

— Belgian and British Consuls try to establish contact with Tshombe in Kolwezi and to persuade him to come back to Eville.

— Two small bridges between Jadotville and Kolwezi were blown up today by Katangans.

6 January 1963

— Dramatic situation among thousands of African refugees congesting Sakania Road. The Rodesian Red Cross intervened to help the refugees when the UN refused.

— In Elisabethville, discouragement among Europeans. If Tshombe does not come back quickly, everything is lost for him. Other Europeans believe that life will go on even without Tshombe, as the administration is actually in their hands.

— Two men, one African and one Belgian, sent by the Central Government to Eville entered the office of the local paper *Essor du Katanga* this morning, took Tshombe's picture from the wall and furiously stamped on it.

— No water, no electricity. Radio Katanga is silent.

— Increased fear of the ANC's impending arrival. 112 ANC soldiers are reported debarking from planes at Luano airport.

7 January 1963

— The Belgian Consul in Salisbury, together with the Katanga National Bank Director, are reported in Kolwezi attempting to persuade Tshombe to return to Elisabethville.

— The Secretary General Deputy, Ralph Bunche, has met in Leopoldville with Robert Gardiner and General Gebre, Commander in Chief of UN troops. They apparently decided to give up any negotiations with Tshombe.

— In Kolwezi, gendarmes expelled Europeans from the Union Minière and are now guarding it. They fear that Europeans may do the same thing as in Jadotville, that is, prevent destruction of

UM plants. From Kolwezi, it is reported that Tshombe's advisers preach resistance with all its risks.

— In Ndola, Northern Rhodesia, at the Hotel Savoy, several Katangan Ministers with women and children wait for developments. Some have no money. The wife of Muhona accuses Tshombe of all her misfortunes. . . . Another Minister, purse empty, sleeps in his car in the hotel parking lot. From Ndola, Tshombe's wife and children left today for Brussels.

— Skirmish at Luano Airport between Katangans and recently arrived Leopoldville Immigration officers. Other civil servants sent by Leopoldville will take care of customs. Katangan civil servants, fearing loss of their jobs, returned to work today. Some among them are ready to cooperate with the UN and with the Central Government.

8 January 1963

— Tshombe has been persuaded to return to Elisabethville. He left Kolwezi by plane to Kipoushi where the Belgian Consul picked him up in his car. Tshombe arrived in Elisabethville at 12:30. Newsmen speak about decisive intervention by the Belgian Consul from Salisbury and Van Roey, Director of the Katanga National Bank. But Tshombe angrily retorted: "I do not need orders from a small clerk" (speaking about his friend Van Roey) Tshombe also said that he expelled the Belgian Consul from Kolwezi. For several hours Tshombe held talks in Police Chief Sapwe Pius' house with various people. Then he walked to his residence located several hundred yards down the street. About 200 Africans and 100 Europeans are around to greet him. No Minister came with Tshombe. The UN states that it will guarantee Tshombe's protection if he gives up his "scorched earth" policy.

9 January 1963

— Tshombe has been advised to remain in Eville in the interest of Katanga as well as himself. He is also advised to calm Munongo down and the gendarmes in Mokambo. Other technicians suggest that he order Gendarmerie integration to prevent the ANC arrival in the capital. Finally, Tshombe has been asked to go to

Sakania, to bring back the refugees and allow the UN free movement on the road to Rhodesia via Sakania.

— The UN seemed embarrassed by Tshombe's return to Eville, Tshombe assured the UN of the discipline of his gendarmes and promised to implement the U Thant Plan.

— From N. Y. it has been announced that eight traditional Katanga chiefs, among whom are Munongo's brother and Tshombe's father-in-law, sent a letter to Adoula asking for the arrest of Tshombe and his Ministers. In Tshombe's entourage, the letter is strongly denied.

— Tshombe ordered all civil servants, whites and blacks, to return to their offices today under threat of being fired.

— Nasser has returned 4 tons of gold to the Central Government which had been deposited in Egyptian banks two years ago by Lumumba.

— The British Consul in Elisabethville warned Tshombe that his Government is opposed to the scorched earth policy.

— In Baudoinville, North Katanga, 100 Europeans encircled by the ANC sent desperate radio appeals to be evacuated. The UN promises to intervene.

10 January 1963

— Tshombe lead a UN Indian column to Sakania and Mokambo thus opening the road to Rhodesia. At noon, UN troops entered Sakania without any shooting. Two gendarmes were arrested. Munongo left for Kolwezi. Tshombe, riding in the first car, asked the population to cooperate with the UN. People hope that Tshombe will act in the same way in Kolwezi and will let the UN enter before any destruction is attempted by hard core Katangans.

— In Kamina, the Baluba Chief, Kasongo Niembo, a Tshombe ally, started discussions with the UN. Several days before, Kasongo Niembo, his warriors and mercenaries had sought asylum in the bush when the UN occupied the town. Kasongo Niembo asked Tshombe by radio, "What shall I do? The UN offered me cooperation." Tshombe answered: "Go on, cooperate, but carefully. . . ."

— In Leopoldville, Bomboko, the Congolese Foreign Minister

asked Brussels and London to recall their representatives in Eville because they were getting involved in internal politics. All they did was advise Tshombe to return to Eville. Both countries ignore such audacious request by Bomboko.

— Ethiopian troops pillaged the Police supply of uniforms and other equipment in Elisabethville. Sapwe Pius, the Police chief, recovered 2,000 boots and distributed them on the spot to policemen. One can see Katangan policemen today with two or three pairs of boots in their hands.

—It is expected that the UN will proceed to Kolwezi but Katangans still stick to their threat of destruction. If Luilu is blown up, Union Minière production will drop to the level existing in 1940.

— UN units passed, in late afternoon, in front of Tshombe's residence. Tshombe told his advisers that he fears arrest. The Belgian Consul protested to the UN for what he considers a provocation. It is obvious that Tshombe's last chance to preserve his position in Katanga is to prevent destruction in Kolwezi. Otherwise, he will be accused of irresponsibility and lack of authority over his gendarmes. In Elisabethville, most technicians are now advising Tshombe to go to Kolwezi and open the road to UN troops as he did in Sakania.

KOLWEZI: DAMOCLES' SWORD

The threat of total destruction over the Union Minière plants, dams, bridges, etc., in Kolwezi, stirred feelings in Europe and the United States and in UN circles as well. If destruction was carried out by Katangans the UN realized that it would have to bear the responsibility. The UN military, of course, wanted to complete its conquest over Katanga but in view of possible damages, many in this organization were hesitant in being too hasty. The dynamiting of Luilu plant and the Delcomune Dam seemed to be, therefore, a sort of Damocles Sword over the heads of those concerned with Katanga's future.

— On the 10th of January, 1963, two cars stopped in front of the Katangane National Bank. Several men quickly collected

several millions of dollars, in hard currency, Katangan and Congolese money, and rushed it to Rhodesia and to Kolwezi. The UN did not notice anything. Its officials in Eville were so badly informed that instead of occupying this bank, they had sent troops to guard the private bank of the Belgian Congo, this the next day after the official one had been emptied. Katangans recovered some money and were able to continue the resistance in Kolwezi. Gendarmes and civil servants had to be paid by the end of the month and it was obvious that the Central Government was not yet prepared to take care of this. In Kolwezi, the three important Katangan leaders: Munongo, Kimba, and Kibwe, were holding a meeting. The ministers discussed the continuance of the fight. The people feared a real fight less than a desperate action and the blowing up of all installations. Tshombe, in Eville, could not conceal his disappointment at the gendarmes cowardice in Kipoushi and Jadotville. In addition, two things deeply disturbed everybody in Elisabethville: the arrival of the ANC and the arrest of Tshombe by Mobutu's men. Rumors had already circulated in town about the landing of Congolese planes at Luano Airport bringing a company of ANC soldiers. These . . . military men or in any case, their comrades, had butchered the 13 UN Italian pilots in Kindu and massacred 21 Missionaries in Kongolo. People were justified in their fear, therefore. Reports about the ANC savagery and thirst for revenge were coming daily from Northern Katanga and other parts of the Congo. The Belgian Consul assured Belgian subjects of his full cooperation in the establishment of an aerial bridge in the event of a massive ANC arrival in Elisabethville.

TSHOMBE RUNS AWAY . . .

On the 12th of December, at noon, an European lady and an intimate friend of Tshombe saw ANC officers in uniform at the airport. She rushed to Tshombe's house terrified and said to the Katangan leader: "Mr. President, you must flee. I just saw ANC men at Luano; they came to arrest you." Tshombe did not hesitate and was ready to run away again. At the last moment, the British

Consul informed of Tshombe's intention, tried to persuade him to stay. But Tshombe would not listen to him and stepping into a car, went to Rhodesia and from there to Kolwezi, the last bastion of Katanganese resistance.

13 January 1963

— The UN troops occupied the Katanga National Bank building today. In the safe they found only 10 dollars in Belgian francs and 200 million Katangan francs, money supposed to cover salaries of the civil servants in Elisabethville for one month.

— Dissension is reported among Katangese ministers and officers in Kolwezi. Some want to go on with the fighting, others realize the uselessness. In Eville, Tshombe's escape again creates dismay but people still hope he will return after having convinced his men in Kolwezi to calm down and give up the scorched earth intentions.

— It is reported from Leopoldville that Adoula is opposed for the moment to sending ANC troops to Elisabethville. Adoula pretended that ANC soldiers are needed in other parts of the Congo. It is certain that the Americans and Belgians have advised Adoula not to send trouble-makers to Katanga yet.

14 January 1963

— General mood among Europeans and Africans is one of fear in spite of Adoula's opposition to the sending of ANC troops. There is apprehension about a prolonged stay of Tshombe in Kolwezi since the Central Government may argue that due to the absence of police and authority, the ANC should go to Katanga's capital. Indeed, it is the best moment for Leopoldville to seize this province. Belgian messengers are in Kolwezi attempting to dissuade Tshombe from threat of his scorched earth policy and to allow the UN to enter that town. They are also attempting to persuade Tshombe and his Ministers to come back to Elisabethville and establish their authority. Several members of the Balubakat Party arrived today in Eville. They also intend to argue for Tshombe's moderate cooperation.

— Attempt to rape an European, a 16 year old girl, by Africans

in the center of Elisabethville today. The anxiety continues to grow.

—Radio Katanga today resumed its broadcast under the supervision of the UN and of Leopoldville men. In a native language, a speaker incites Africans against Belgians and strongly attacks colonialism. Where is it, this colonialism now? Belgians addressed protests to the UN Headquarters in Elisabethville.

— Meeting of all enterprise managers in Katanga in the Chamber of Commerce Hall. Foreign consuls have been invited. They are warned and told to report to their Governments the precarious situation prevailing in Elizabethville and other industrial towns. If order is not maintained, said the businessmen's port-parole, a massive desertion by Europeans is planned.

17 January 1963

— Ambush of UN troops carried out yesterday by 30 mercenaries near Kolwezi. According to well informed sources, mercenaries wanted to boast their capability to newsmen. A score of wounded and killed among the UN Indian troops. The UN aviation rushed to the area but mercenaries and gendarmes had already fled to the bush.

— Tshombe returned at 16:00 today to Elisabethville from Kolwezi. Great victory for his moderate advisers and especially for both the Belgian and British Consuls. No Katangan minister accompanied him. One hour later Tshombe went to the UN Headquarters and it is reported that he may sign Katangas' capitulation today.

17 January—18:30 Hours

Tshombe's message was made public a minute ago. It was sent to the UN Secretary General and to the British, French, Belgian, and American Governments. The message, strangely enough, bears the date of 15 January when Tshombe was still in Kolwezi. Following is the content: "Katangan ministers assembled on Monday, the 14th of January with President Moise Tshombe presiding and have decided to send Mr. U Thant, Secretary General of the UN, the following message: "We are ready to proclaim in front of the world, the end of Katanga' secession. We are ready to allow

freedom of movement to UN troops all over Katanga. We are ready to return to Elisabethville in order to settle the modalities of the complete implementation of the U Thant Plan. We are ready to ask the President of the Congolese Republic and the Prime Minister to consider as being in effect from now on, the amnesty provided by the U Thant Plan so that freedom and security may be guaranteed to the President of Katanga and to all his civil servants and to all persons under his authority. We are determined to cooperate loyally with the United Nations in the implementation of their task and we ask that a day and an hour be arranged for a meeting. In order to spare the population suffering, we hope that our proposals will be accepted and executed with the shortest delay."

"Signed: Moise Tshombe"

Speaking to the press, Tshombe informed it about the above decision and added: "I do not recognize that anybody has authority to deprive the Katangan people of its right to self-determination. However, the Katanganese people hope to exert this right through a federal regime in full accord with other states in the Congo and under the application of the U Thant Plan, so far as it is necessary and considering that a solution to the Congolese problem by force cannot be a definite one. Together, the UN, the Congo, and Katanga should work with comprehension of our mutual difficulties, if indeed we want to suppress henceforth the problems we faced since the Congo's independence. Katanga knows war for the third time. The history which will be one day written will show the occasions missed until the last moment for a peaceful reconciliation in a Federated Congo by Africans who shall never be enemies. Without foreign intervention, Africans could understand each other, and could reach an agreement. In this moment, the Katangan people suffer, the war operations have disrupted communications, unemployment reigns, and women and children die in the bush. Who will bring them back to their homes if not their legitimate leader whom they have lost? This is why I deliberately took the risk of returning without delay to Elisabethville, trusting

in the honor of the UN. Thus the proof of my good will is shown in the implementation of the U Thant Plan requirements. This is why, I assembled my ministers and capital decisions have been reached. . . ."

It was with great relief but not without sadness that Tshombe's words were heard by Katangans, whites and blacks, after two years and a half of struggle. Tshombe, indeed, faced the whole world during that period. Now he capitulated. . . . He promised the UN at last to open the road to Kolwezi and to prevent any destruction, to supervise the dismantling of all mines and explosives from roads and bridges, etc., and to yield up all stocks of weapons and ammunition. Tshombe obtained in return, permission to keep a small Katangan gendarmes unit as his personal guard. . . .

18 January 1963

— Prices are climbing. The Katangan franc almost completely lost its value and reached the same value as the Congolese franc on the black market, that is to say five times less than its nominal value. Shopowners sell whatever they have for Belgian francs, dollars, or Rhodesian currency.

— In Accra, the capital of Ghana, N'Krumah asked the UN to arrest Tshombe and to try him for the assassination of Lumumba. N'Krumah also demands the sentencing of Kibwe, Munongo and Kimba, all accused of complicity in the death of the former Congolese leader. N'Krumah's request is very embarrassing for the UN and for the Central Government in particular since others, such as Kasavubu, Mobutu, Ileo, Nendaka, the former aid of Lumumba and now chief of Surete, had much to do with the liquidation of Lumumba.

— Algeria announced that Ben Bella, its Prime Minister, offered support to the Angolan rebels against the Portuguese authorities. Algeria just got its independence and, though Ben Bella is incapable of running his own country without French technical and financial help, the Algerian leader is ready to upset Angola's peace. Although Algeria's peace is shaky due to justified dissatisfaction by the Berbers and others.

21 January 1963

— Tshombe will lead a UN column into Kolwezi in the afternoon. Gendarmes and mercenaries have already escaped to the bush. Mercenaries are reported on their way to Angola. A train has left Kolwezi with mercenaries, weapons and ammunition for the Angolan border.

Katanga's capitulation today is an accomplished fact. The three main industrial towns, Kipoushi, Kolwezi and Jadotville, the objectives of Katanga's scorched earth policy are now out of danger and under UN control. Tshombe has no trumpcards left but his prestige which has been bolstered by the fact that he prevented Katanga destruction. In Elisabethville, in Brussels, all over the world, there is relief. The UN finally had a victory after two years and a half and after having spent 200 million dollars and the death of hundreds of Africans and whites.

Katanga, the independent, the secessionist, is a thing of the past. After years of struggle, Katanga kneeled in front of the UN and the Central Government.

The Katangan affair seems terminated but this does not mean that the Congolese crisis is ended, too. By Katanga's capitulation, the Central Government loses the main argument for its inability to govern. For more than two years, Leopoldville has never ceased to say that everything went wrong because of the secession of Katanga. Well, the rebel Tshombe gave up. There are no more mercenaries, no more resistance. The UN smashed Katanga. Some are still rejoicing in the fact but one can hardly see how a united Congo will be saved from economic and social decay. The Central Government's debts are already enormous and inflation is marching on. More than 20 billion Congolese francs are in circulation and the printing machine is running day and night. Leopoldville will absorb the two billion Katangan francs which were circulating in Katanga, but the monetary situation will not be solved by the same token. Some in Leopoldville are delirious with joy but they don't realize that the task they have to accomplish now surpasses their capabilities. Order in the Congo must be maintained, but for more than two years nobody succeeded in

maintaining it. Provinces and regions are shaken by tribal fights, roads are non-existent, the railroad is cut, misery, unemployment, and food shortages prevail.

Tshombe is, however, among his Katangans. He prevented destruction and now watches his enemies taking over what he ruled as well as he could. Tshombe has no more power. The man who since 1960 defended free enterprise and cooperated with whites and sought friendship with the West has kneeled. The man who defended Katanga since 1960 is now a toy in the UN hands . . .

THE INTEGRATION OF KATANGA AND ITS RESULTS

It is obvious that for the moment Adoula's Government is concerned with its stability and with taking control over Katanga's wealth. This means that the "Haute-bourgeoise," the ruling class, will want to live luxuriously, eager for new cars, whiskey, and champagne parties; eager to live a maharadjah's life at the expense of Katanga. We shall see how the Central Government will act in the immediate future, in a year or two from now. The Congolese imbroglio, with or without a secessionist Katanga, is far from being ended. It will go on with the same trouble and the same problems. This country which received premature independence, which has no educated people, no capable leaders, will need for a decade or more the technical aid of the Western world. If there is no more shooting in Katanga, this does not prevent it from sinking into an economic situation which will equal that of rest of the Congo. At the present time, after six months of integration, 20,000 Europeans in Katanga are anxious to know what will become of their work, for their businesses and their future. Indeed, salaries must be paid, transfers must be secured, importations must be normalized. It is true that in Katanga as long as the Union Minière works, there is hope. Around the Union Minière hundreds of enterprises may thrive and thus provide jobs for Africans themselves. But if Europeans become discouraged by the avidity of the Central Government which can

give to Katanga whatever it wants, they will desert this province and it will fall in ruins. The Union Minière, of course, will continue its exploitation but if ruin hits Katanga, the company will have to work behind barbed wires to protect its agents, and its installations from unemployed, starved Africans. The UN and the Central Government have assumed a great responsibility in this Congolese affair and the American Government which backed both should not be spared in sharing in it. It decided to integrate Katanga by force as a solution for peace and prosperity. Let us hope that the responsibilities of such initiative will be capable of redressing the economy, maintaining peace among Africans, and preventing Europeans from deserting the Congo. Indeed, if security is not assured to whites, this country cannot return to prosperity or peace. One should not live with illusions in this respect. Africans in Leopoldville or in Katanga have the same qualities and the same defects. Up to now, the rest of the Congo and the capital of Leopoldville lived in confusion and disorder not because Katanga seceded but because whites were leaving. Before independence, Central Africans worked only under European supervision and sometimes coercion. Who will compel them now, who will persuade them to work, to labour in their fields, to struggle for themselves and for the sake of the nation?

THE CENTRAL CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT AT WORK . . .

Only two weeks, after he signed the capitulation communique, Tshombe boarded a plane and went to Paris under the pretext that he had eye troubles. For a while, Tshombe used glasses and did seem that he had an eye infection. Whether it was the sight of the Congolese Government messenger Joseph Ileo, who came to Elisabethville as No. 1 Minister, or the fact that his eyes were tired by nights of work and worries, Tshombe decided to disappear for a while from the Katanganese scene. As a matter of fact, he did not have many things to do any longer as Ileo was now the real boss. Before leaving Eville, Tshombe, however, had

the politeness to exchange several words with Adoula's man in Katanga. Kimba took over the direction of the provincial affairs thus becoming President Ad Iterim, and the man who was to deal with all problems. The Central Government, in addition to Ile, had sent a couple hundred men who took charge of the Immigration Service, the Tele-Communications, the Surete and other sensitive fields of the administration. Once they arrived, those "homme de confiance d'Adoula" started making lists of Belgian technicians to be replaced or fired. The most dangerous they felt were those serving with the Court, the Surete, and the Information Department. One by one they were called to Leopoldville. At the same time, the Monetary Council started to function and constantly received claims for transfers, importation licences and debts contracted by the previous administration. The answer was always the same: "Wait. It will come."

Under the Central Government pressure, the UN had to allow the ANC to come to Katanga and troops were used in mixed police patrols: UN soldiers, Katangans, and ANC men. In groups of 7 and 10, they were patrolling the towns and the native villages.

Before his departure, Tshombe ordered General Muke, the Gendarmerie Commander in Chief, to go with 25 officers to Leopoldville and pledge allegiance to Kasavubu thus marking the official integration of the Gendarmerie to the ANC. This "General" always rigid in his Belgian uniform came back from Leopoldville with the same uniform but with Congolese markings. His officers were similarly dressed. But the great part of the Gendarmerie was hiding in the bush and most of the soldiers took guns and ammunition with them. They were frightened at the prospect of the ANC recruitment offices and the order to be reintegrated. Tshombe had paid them three to six months in advance and gave them the choice of quitting the Gendarmerie or enlisting with ANC. Here and there, groups of gendarmes came to enlist themselves with the Armee Nationale Congolaise. But the majority, proud of their *pars-commandoes* uniforms, proud of being Katangans, were still hiding in the bush or in civilian clothes in their own towns. They were bitter, without money, and when

they could they stole a house, a car, a woman, and so forth. Banditism was showing its teeth. . . .

In the European towns, in Eville, for instance, the situation was not encouraging. In spite of mixed patrols of police reinforced by Tunisians, robberies and vexations were reported everyday. The ANC soldiers, particularly, arrested people under pretexts, deciding to show they were the sole masters of the country. An European who was taking some pictures was arrested and cruelly beaten up and sent to Leopoldville under the charge of being a trouble formenter.

The relations between the ANC and the UN troops quickly deteriorated. Meanwhile, Adoula announced a visit to Elisabethville. It was at the beginning of March, 1963. Adoula saw white and African personalities, expressed his satisfaction for the integration of Katanga and thought it would be a good idea also to visit the African suburbs and towns around Elisabethville. His car, with a UN and an ANC escort, crossed the African towns at a slow speed. Some Africans greeted him, but in Kenya City, Tshombe's fief, Adoula was received with stones and insults. Very sportingly, he forgot the incident and left for Leopoldville promising unity, fraternity, and a very happy future for Katangans. But barely did his plane take off when trouble burst in Katanga.

The ANC in search of gendarmes who refused to enlist with it, found and killed two a few days after Adoula's departure. During the same night another ANC patrol tortured a Katangan policeman in the African City of Karavia. A Tunisian patrol was immediately summoned, when the ANC men refused to yield, killed two ANC soldiers who had assassinated the Katangans. The next day, at the City Mortuary, four bodies, two ANC and two gendarmes, were lying down on the ground, united for the second time by death. The UN fearing other incidents warned the ANC that it was assuming supreme command over all ANC and gendarmes and interdicted any patrol not escorted by UN men.

But it was a useless precaution, since the ANC acted as it pleased, in the African way. Several weeks later, an European was shot while passing in front of the Conseil Monetaire build-

ing. The Conseil Monetaire Building belonged to the National Bank of Katanga and had a rather glorious past. Tshombe had stored up in this building, after the secession, millions of bills with his picture on them. After the integration the building became Congolese property and was guarded by ANC soldiers together with several UN Ethiopians; on the roof hung two enormous Congolese flags. The 25th of March, I think, Simon Ascher, a shopowner for more than 30 years in Elisabethville, who was somewhat deaf, did not hear the ANC soldiers and continued to enter the building. It was 10:00 and the street was crowded. The ANC soldier shot Ascher in the back in front of the eyes of a hundred revolted pedestrians. One hour later work stopped in Elisabethville; as a protest a 48 hour strike was organized by Europeans. Restaurants, bars, shops, everything pulled down its blinds. Elisabethville was a dead city. For once whites united and were solid in front of such a dastardly crime. And the same idea came to my mind: if all the whites unite in a newly independent African country and leave it over night for several months, there might be less desire for independence among Africans. I am convinced that if such an action would be taken by Europeans, in troubled areas, Africans would finally understand what independence really means. Modern urban life would come to a standstill. For a week or two, Africans would live on stocks, pillage, kill each other and then darkness would prevail. No more electricity, no more fresh water, no more food and especially, no more . . . beer. Of course, the Soviet might step in and such an experience would easily be exploited by them. At any rate, it is an idea.

Tshombe in Paris was received with spectacular pomp by the French. He went to Deauville, then attended, it was publicly said, a football match in the south of France. But, in fact, he was making contacts with French personalities with an idea of returning to politics with a more realistic, efficient policy, as Frenchmen told him. In Elisabethville, Tshombe's enemy Jason Sendwe was carried in the streets on a stable-litter by his Balubakat supporters. Sendwe and his Party commenced its propaganda aimed at the unity of Katanga. In fact, the Central Government in collusion

with Sendwe had split Katanga in half a year ago in order to embarrass Tshombe. Now Sendwe, eager for power, was opposed to the split and wanted an indivisible Katanga.

As the economic situation in Katanga worsened, the Congolese Monetary Council opened its UN filled purse and gave to Katangans 350 million francs for transfers and imports. It was the first money received by Katangans since January, 1963. However, Europeans began smiling and hoped that it would continue. Katangan francs were withdrawn little by little from circulation and replaced with Congolese bills. The Congolese notes had the Belgian king's picture, "Roe Baudoin," the same that were in existence before independence. For years they cried for independence and once they got it, Congolese in Leopoldville did not have the efficiency to replace the effigy of King Baudoin. . . .

In Katanga, life has changed, of course, because of lack of money and lack of interest, because of insecurity and constant trouble. But life continued, however, precariously. There were no more luxury shops and restaurants, almost nothing to sell in the open stores. Before the wars, one could eat oysters and lobsters in Eville restaurants, now one was happy to eat two eggs. A bottle of Scotch cost a fortune, wine was almost nonexistent and people fought for a pound of sugar. The Central Government succeeded in reintegrating Katanga but upset its economy, its administration, its charm and its peace. In the rest of the Congo the situation was the same. It was integrated but suffered a leveling to lower standards of life. . . .

Tshombe did not have a tranquil stay in France. Katangan ministers bombarded him with cables describing the situation and demanding his return. By the middle of March, Tshombe gave up France for Elisabethville. His trip to France, under the medical care pretext, had some political sense, however. French circles courting Tshombe said that his policy had failed due to Belgian duplicity. Tshombe liked to justify his failure and enjoyed finding scapegoats, of course, of Belgian descent. Once back in Elisabethville, he suddenly became pro-French and started ignoring Belgians, accusing them of disloyalty and having served only the

policy of Spaak. No Belgian collaborator could see him. Orders were given to the guards to prevent former technicians from entering his residence. Inside, surrounded by his new French advisers, Tshombe was making plans. . . .

Barely returned from Paris, Tshombe called upon the Belgian Consul in Elisabethville, Mr. Paanis, and later released a communique to the press. He hinted that the Consul himself had accused Belgian technicians of being traitors to Katanga's cause. Nevertheless, the whole Belgian colony was ready to believe Tshombe and the poor Consul was swamped with letters and protests. In vain he tried to explain Tshombe's words. Several days later, Tshombe fired his principal adviser with the Surete, and another close collaborator, both Belgians, after both had risked their life for him.

In order to display such a spectacular ungratefulness to his Belgian technicians, Tshombe had to be sure of his position. He had French support while the population was always on his side. He had been received at his return from Paris by several thousand Africans who were enthusiastic and probably encouraged Tshombe in his new attitude. Tshombe made a tour of the African towns and even went into the country in order to judge his popularity and from time to time accused Belgians of various charges.

The alliance between former enemies, Balubakat and Conakat Parties, now seemed accomplished because of their mutual desire that Katanga should not be divided as the Central Government wanted. Both parties formed the Frontkat, that is, a "front" for the reunification of Katanga. But a dozen political tribal parties emerged too. Some with a clear Communist color. Adoula had decided to end Tshombe's influence and to keep Katanga disunited. He knew that a united Katanga would sooner or later again claim secession. He manoeuvred in Parliament and finally got ratified a plan to divide Katanga into three provinces: The North, with its capital in Albertville; the Lualaba Province, and East Katanga. The three provinces each received one of the Union Minière mines. Tshombe was finally left the leader of a minuscule province where, as a matter of fact, his Lunda tribesmen were not even in

the majority! The balkanization of Katanga was in any case, Adoula's riposte to Balubakat and Conakat members and former foes who were now all for a united, strong, rich Katanga with possible new secessionist aspirations.

It is true that by the end of March, Adoula was facing strong opposition but he succeeded in checking it.

At any rate, Tshombe now encountered not only Adoula's resentment but even troubles with his Western supporters. In June, 1963, he wanted to go to France again, and was kept at the airport for 24 hours by French authorities under the pretext that he was coming with an irregular passport. Was it an intended insult or shrewd gestures by French to put Adoula's suspicions to sleep? Seeing the support given to Adoula by most countries, Tshombe knew he must get into the Central Government so that later on he could present himself as a Congolese leader thus playing a more attractive role. It is certain that, for Tshombe, there cannot be another solution than joining Adoula and his Government. The Free World would, of course, greet such a reconciliation and cooperation. Adoula shows little desire now to prevent Soviet penetration. 120 Russians work in Leopoldville in the Soviet Embassy as compared to 80 in the American Embassy. But Tshombe, also, started to fish in troubled waters. Angolan leaders, under Communist guidance, came to Katanga and Tshombe gave them "carte-blanc" for propaganda and organization. It is very possible that under the benevolent eyes of Tshombe who still is the most popular leader in Katanga, all sorts of Communist agitators may come to this province and work against Belgians and against the Free World.

At any rate, by the middle of 1963, there were rumors of the establishment of a Soviet Consulate in Elisabethville. Some Pravda correspondents and other people coming from the Communist Bloc were getting into Katanga for the first time. In Leopoldville, Adoula went even further. In addition to official diplomatic relations offered to the Soviet Union and permission granted to 120 "diplomats," Adoula's Government recognized Mr. Holden Roberto's Exiled Government which claims inde-

pendence for Angola. Roberto leads a terrorist movement against the Portuguese territory with support coming from Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Ghana and all the Afro-Asian Bloc, plus the *American Committee for Africa*, an organization with extremely clear Marxist convictions.

Tshombe, following advice from his French circle, is trying to become popular among African nations and to erase the bad reputation he made for himself as the "Belgian's, the whites', the capitalists', and the colonialists' friend." It is a very dangerous attempt and Tshombe may break his neck if he lets himself be carried on by pro-Communist waves. Tshombe should be more careful. He may lose the sympathy of former friends. Tshombe deals with an amorphous mass, with Africans who do not realize what they are doing. After his trip to Paris, in late March 1963 when he toured Katanga, his African brothers received him with "Long live Tshombe, long live Khrushchev, long live Katanga." In the Africans' eyes, Tshombe was like Khrushchev, that is the *strong* politician. The local press itself explained the meaning of this unfortunate analogy between Tshombe and a detestable Communist dictator: I quote the *Echo du Katanga* from 21 March 1963, a daily paper in Elisabethville: "The police could not restrain the crowd from pressing against Tshombe, whom Katangans call "Khrushchev" the man of vigor, who represents equity, integrity, and irreproachable inflexibility." This is the Katangan anti-Communism! This is African confusion. The same newspaper pretends, by the way, to be an "anti-Communist tribune."

Well, Katanga and Katangans, Congolese, blacks, and whites who see in Khrushchev the man of irreproachable justice, equity, etc., etc., may start to build their country with this type of "strong men" and we shall see who will bite whose fingers one day. Anyway, it is now obvious that the Kennedy Administration drove a valuable Western ally into the arms of the Communists and finds at the same time that Adoula for whom they did it has always been secretly in the Red Camp.

CHAPTER XVII

SO-CALLED ANTI-COMMUNISM IN LEOPOLDVILLE AND IN KATANGA

True unity in the Congo, in my opinion, is extremely difficult. Unity which has been imposed by the UN will last only so long as UN troops remain. This organization has already withdrawn many of its troops from a high of about 20,000 there are now about 5000 left. It is certain that America will prevail upon U Thant not to withdraw the rest at least until fall 1964. For a re-exploding Congo would cost the Democrats many votes.

In July 1963, the UN had in the Congo some 1500 technicians as teachers and experts in various economic, financial, agricultural, social and political fields. The UN technicians who will stay behind and be reinforced, are not to be compared to Belgian technicians. Most of the UN technical force do not speak perfect French, and those who speak the best French come mostly from Haiti or ex-French colonial areas and do not understand the Congo, and have not the skill of the highly trained Belgians.

America will most certainly continue to pay for a large part of the UN operation which now allows the Administration to boast of having "solved" the Congo affair. U Thant stated at the beginning of the 18th Assembly of the United Nations that it was essential for world peace for UN forces to be kept in the Congo for six more months. (In six months the story will be the same.) So the United States, Britain, Canada, and other Western powers have agreed to contribute around \$1.3 million. If Congress approves, which it will, the United States will make a

special donation of about \$772,000, in addition to its regular 32.02 per cent assessment. The Red Tito, when planning his recent visit to America, decided to contribute some, too, just enough to seem to want to be cooperative. He will probably more than make up his share by a new loan from America. France and Russia are still determined to be isolationists in this.

It is well known that many of the technicians employed in the Congo have leftist convictions and in their capacity of teacher will indulge in pro-Communist politics. Among Tunisian officers, for instance, in early 1963 before their departure, many were directly supplying Angolan rebels with weapons out of the UN store; while others were openly inciting Congolese against the Belgians who had been invited to return calling them "dirty colonists." The Soviet Union cannot have a better vehicle for its subversive propaganda than the UN. Moscow has studied Africa thoroughly and probably the data it has collected is important and realistic—in contrast to so much democratic opinion which is wishful thinking. The Russians will study the blunders made by the whole Free World on this continent, and it will give them plenty of facts about our weakness and their chances to supplant us. There is no doubt that the Soviet Government has been as surprised by Africa's turmoil in the last decade as we have been and they are not yet prepared to deal properly with this area. But for years the Communist Bloc opened its subversive schools to thousands of Africans to indoctrinate them or to train them as agitators, leaders, guerilla men, etc. All sorts of agents are feverishly trained, some successfully, others not. The selection of future leaders, of real trouble-makers, is very simple. Moscow wants only ambitious, only tough unscrupulous, power-eager Africans and does not lose any time with idealists. The Communist Bloc, as it happened in Bulgaria early in 1963, gets rid of all those who are nostalgic, idealistic, and corrupted by Western freedom and whom it cannot use or control. At least 1,000 Congolese are at the present time being prepared in Communist schools and soon under one form or another, they will return to their country to foment agitation, strikes and to incite their brothers against

former friends. Many are already on the scene. As Western European policy and America's tactics are following the pattern of the defensive, it is hard to see how we will face Communist terrorist methods. The Free World abandoned after the last World War, many countries which it had helped to reach manhood and a civilized and working status after World War I, and this was done by pressure from Communist demagoguery, but cleverly disguised as nationalism. The Western world does not take the offensive anymore. It now finds it too comfortable to make concessions which it calls "peace measures," and "relaxing tension." Unless a sudden change in our political conceptions is made, the Free World and America, its head, will continue to retreat morally and geographically. "Peace in our time," as Prime Minister Chamberlain of England once put it when he made concession after concession to Hitler, means defeat when the Reds are ready to strike. Time will give the Communists the chance to consolidate and to get their own home fronts economically capable of sustaining a war effort without revolt.

Whether it is fear of nuclear war or just the love of luxury which the Free World now enjoys we seem unable to prevent Communist penetration and subversive actions commenced under the label of nationalism, in all the countries which are still in our zone of influence. Let us say that the Communist Bloc can afford such initiative since we do nothing to stir nationalism and self-determination in the countries already controlled through terrorist methods by the Soviet Union, its troops and its satellite regimes.

THE CAPITALISTS IN THE CONGO ARE ANTI-AMERICAN

But to come back to Katanga and to anti-Communist convictions among whites and blacks, the least we can say is that it was just a pretext to protect limited interests. Katangans were and may be anti-Communists as far as they can enjoy their province's wealth. What happens to the rest of the Congo has no significance

for them. The true anti-Communist is a sincere democrat, and an altruistic person. He wants freedom for the whole world not just for himself. In Katanga, Europeans and African leaders had and still have a very confused knowledge of Communism. And this is great danger for the whole Congo, I should say for all Africans on this continent since all do not know exactly how to stand and why to stand on the Free World side. Their convictions on anti-Communism are still very loose. Risking my friendships in Katanga I often denied their anti-Communist and pro-Western pretensions. I personally suffered too much as a citizen of a country crushed by Soviet Russia under the impassive eyes of Western Europe and America not to see the egotism and the hypocrisy of people who pretended to be anti-Communists. Africans, said the Belgians, are versatile. They change from one idea to another, from right to left with the agility of a monkey. I am ready to agree. But if Africans have an excuse to be ignorant about Communism and Democracy, if they shift from right to left and vice-versa, Europeans and especially intellectuals in the Congo have positively no justification to do the same. Many times they told me that they would have preferred to see Katanga in Russian hands than dominated by Americans. And they were not joking. In the summer of 1961, when Tshombe was detained in Coquilhatville, several Europeans persuaded Munongo to use disheartening blackmail just for the purpose of obtaining recognition of an independent Katangan state. Munongo tried to scare Americans and offered economic and cultural relations to the Soviet Bloc and his action was agreed to by most Europeans in Katanga. It was thus the old method of all false, phony liberals, of all phony anti-Communists, of the selfish, blind segment of the bourgeoisie and aristocracy in Europe. Through hatred of America, they are ready to deal with the Devil, with their own and worst enemy, Communism. Bank managers, business owners, small and big capitalists in Katanga dared to tell me that they admired the Soviet economic system and that the Marxist controlled economy was the only one capable of bringing progress and prosperity to Africa. I wish they could go behind the Iron

Curtain and live there for a while so that they can learn once and forever what the Communist system means, and realize the naivete of their convictions.

Many white Katangans, and I speak, of course, about Europeans involved in politics in this country, did not want to create a democratic regime. Tshombe's regime was pleasant and agreeable to those who supported the secession without question but Katanga was intransigent with those who looked at the whole Congo and wanted to save it from Communism. Tshombe and his white advisers never used their radio station to attack demagogues like N'Krumah, Nasser, or Sekou Toure. Katangans were "anti-Communist" as long as the Soviet Bloc opposed their independence. This is the only reason why they did not permit Communist infiltration in Katanga.

The situation in this respect is similar in Leopoldville and in other areas controlled by the Central Government of Adoula. For one who has seen the damages provoked in the world by the lack of solidarity among anti-Communists, what happened in the Congo cannot change his opinion. We should not trust the Congolese in their alleged pro-Western convictions. And examples in this field are innumerable. One may regard the Congolese attitude vis-a-vis Angola.

WHEN CONGOLESE SHED TEARS FOR ANGOLANS

The Central Congolese Government backed by the UN, Belgium, and the U.S.A., while incapable of making ends meet, maintaining order, and handling its own affairs, mixed in other countries' business and particularly in Angola's internal affairs. After independence, the Congo became the fief of Angolan rebels. In March, 1961, an invasion was engineered from Leopoldville against Angola by Bakongo leaders under the leadership of Mukongo, Holden Roberto. Kasavubu himself, and most Africans in the Leopoldville area, come from this tribe which also extends through the ex-French Congo. What started as a Bakongo solidarity became an African solidarity directed against the people

in Angola who have lived under the Portuguese for almost four centuries. If Lumumba as a Communist and a demagogue had the excuse of ignorance or grievance to provoke trouble wherever the Free World had a foothold, Adoula and other leaders who were anti-Lumumbists have not now the same excuse. We have seen the terrific consequences resulting from premature independence in the Congo. We have sadly witnessed the striking failure of many of the newly independent countries to maintain order and to keep up a semblance of a democratic regime. We had naively expected somehow to see more freedom, not less, when the colonialists left, and a more realistic and moderate approach to politics. Congolese leaders have emerged as supporters of the Angolan independence while they themselves are still bogging down in the chaos of their own independence.

What is the purpose of independence when it cannot be used to better living conditions for your people; when you cannot bring progress but regress, when you still must rely on former colonialists for everything worthwhile? This is the question which should occupy all African leaders who speak about Africa for the black Africans (what of all the white Africans born there?) It is, by the way, ignored that most Arab states in Africa and elsewhere, are ruled not by blacks or Bantous, but whites or mixed bloods, mulattoes. When will N'Krumah start his intrigues against white North Africans? After they help him to destroy white South Africans?

The accomplices of Communist or crypto-Communist Angolan leaders such as Holden Roberto, Mario Andrade and Netto, in Leopoldville and in other parts of Africa, would probably like to push Africans in Angola into the same chaos, the same marasmus existing in the Congo for three years now. The desire for power, regardless of consequences, alone explains such criminal irresponsible intentions. But if they have egotistic reasons for their drive how explain their backing by many in the West who should know better?

Nobody can deny that the Portuguese are a great people who brought civilization to South America, Angola, Mozambique, and

many parts of the world at a time when the difficulties of travel were enormous. They proved their vigor and adaptation in world-wide exploration in all kinds of climates. Brazil is one of the great accomplishments of this little nation which happens to have only nine million people now—and probably had no more than one of the smaller American cities at the high tide of its ventures. Wherever they went, the Portuguese adopted a policy of integration and not one of discrimination—setting an example which America cannot yet equal. In Angola, they are involved in a multi-racial process, mixing with Africans and creating a new race. This in the light of the present day drive of American Negroes to accomplish integration in the United States, should be appreciated. But rather, there is an attempt by American Negroes to force their country to back extreme sanctions against Portugal to make her leave Africa. If only they guessed it, these Aframericans, who are mostly mulattoes and none of them pure Bantous anymore, would know that the same forces in Africa who hate the Portuguese, dislike them, too, and for the same reason: they are not black Africans!

The excuse for this opposition to Portuguese rule is by some said to be the economic backwardness of the Portuguese themselves. They would demand miracles from this small, poor nation which is trying to bring four million Africans up to the European level. This has not been done for the masses of Africans anywhere, and is not possible in a short time. It takes people almost an equal time to overcome and change century-long habits. It needs centuries of suffering, and all sorts of obstacles, for a people to understand what freedom entails. Europe took two milleniums to arrive at its present stage. The Portuguese have started to modernize Angola only lately at the beginning of this century as the Belgians and British did in Rhodesia and the Congo, but with less economic resources or understanding of modern techniques. They have accomplished a tremendous amount considering their limited means. But what they have done is of great importance—perhaps more even than industrial progress. In Angola, practically all Africans speak Portuguese, and very good Portuguese. The races

there have learned to cooperate amicably, and to respect each other more than anywhere else in the world. The Portuguese marry, mutually entertain, go to school with, share professional status with the other races of Angola. It is the gift of Portugal to world civilization that she has proven that all people are basically equal. Everywhere in Angola you see blacks and whites and mulattoes mingling. It should be realized, too, that industrial progress cannot fully take place without a highly developed language—the Bantou languages are incapable of explaining scientific or subtle modern processes to people.

At least Americans should understand the situation in Angola before criticizing it, yet there is a virtual blackout in the United States on articles about Portuguese Africa—unless they are derogatory. If America backs the rebels in this struggle, there will be another Haiti in Central Africa. The situation will be very nearly the same. The Haitians butchered the whites, and the blacks and mulattoes set up a government. But there has never been peace there between them because the blacks harbor an enormous inferiority complex, are voodooists and practice polygamy whereas the Mulatto elite is Christian. The blacks cannot run the country without the others, but there is never peace between them. Had the whites remained, this imbalance would not be.

It is easy for Communists to weep over the fate of underdeveloped people while closing their eyes to the regression they have brought to former highly developed independent countries. It is easy because they have joined forces with the Africans at the UN in order to create more mischief. The Africans should understand that the solution for people still living under European domination lies in sincere cooperation. How can this fragile tormented Congo, which is rotten with tribalism, with "fainéantisme" benefit from an independent Angola which will wallow in the same chaos? This is a question which should be borne in mind not only by all African countries which have banded together to supply weapons and money to terrorist movements in various parts of the continent, but by America.

The Algerian Government of Ben Bella, which at the present

time itself faces the problems of a premature independence, dares to help the Angolan rebels! On January 31, 1963, several months after the French gave Algeria its independence, the Communist Angolan leader, Agostino Netto, who is in the good graces of Ben Bella, stated: "The Algerian Government is among all African Governments, the one which gives us the most efficient and largest support. The Algerian Government offered us the opportunity to train our "macquisards" on its territory and supplies our fighters with weapons and ammunition." For what purpose would this little dictator like to organize a maquis in Angola? It was not Agostino Netto who built the towns and roads in this African region. Netto has Portuguese blood in his veins and is very proud. Mr. Netto should not forget that if through misfortune he and Roberto or Andrade take the power in an emancipated Angola, the only thing that they can do is beg the Portuguese for help to get them out of trouble, just as Mr. Adoula did when he went to Brussels and begged for financial and technical help. Is this the way that a country justifies its right to independence?

This irresponsible attitude can be encountered in many under-developed countries. In Addis Ababa, May, 1963, an African summit conference examined Angola's situation and promised support to the rebels. Following this plot against the Portuguese, the Central Congolese Government officially recognized the provisional government in exile of Holden Roberto who already enjoyed the privilege of training several thousand Angolan terrorists in the Thysville military Camp near Leopoldville and Angola's borders. Other African countries followed and will follow in the future, Adoula's example. Meanwhile, Ben Bella offered 10,000 Algerian trained terrorists to fight against the Portuguese. Now that Algeria and Morocco are fighting he will be unable to spare any. Egypt, Ethiopia, Algeria, Ghana, had severed diplomatic relations with Portugal while pressure was applied by African countries for a united Angolan Liberation Movement formed by the present three factions of Roberto, Netto and Andrade. While Andrade and Netto have a rather distinctive Communist taint, Holden Roberto seems to sneer at them giving the impression

that the Free World has nothing to fear from him. As I said, most African leaders, Roberto included, have no special feeling for Communism or anti-Communism. They turn towards those who approve their power-hungry aspirations, their hurried desire to be leaders over the masses. Those who know Africans can hardly see how the three Angolan leaders will get together since each one has his own ambitions, each one has his tribe, supporters who must be satisfied with ministerial positions, a luxurious life and highly paid jobs. . . . They have already been quarreling over racial lines! Blacks against Mulattoes!

At any rate, sooner or later, encouraged by the African solidarity plot, Angolans in exile will attempt to seriously shake the Portuguese hold on Angola. A rebellion has already started in Portuguese Guinea, neighboring Senegal, to expell "colonialists." Portuguese have troops in the Kabinda enclave near Leopoldville, in Angola and Mozambique and are spending almost 200 million dollars for defense annually. It is a heavy burden for a small and rather poor country. Over 300,000 Portuguese now live and work in Angola. Whatever people may say, most of these Portuguese came to this territory to develop it and to work and live. In their crowded homeland there is poverty and unemployment and they have to find employment somewhere. Most Portuguese in Angola are poor and make little more than the most unskilled African worker. They will certainly fight to keep their jobs and a territory they themselves have developed. I have seen with my own eyes in Angola what is inconceivable in other parts of Africa. I have seen Portuguese workers cleaning the streets, repairing the road, labouring on the land. Nowhere in Africa have I yet seen poor Europeans drudging for such extremely modest wages. In the Congo no Belgian would accept such bad pay or live in such modest conditions. When I left Katanga and the Congo in the middle of 1963, and made a tour of Angola I was amazed by the Portuguese standard of living there. Many Portuguese live in slums together with the Africans. They work side by side with Africans. They really have an integration policy and I did not notice in them either the desire of exploitation or the arrogance of the superior.

Portuguese cannot be accused of acting as Belgians or even as the French acted in drawing a difference socially, intellectually between them and Africans. It is said by Roberto and other dissatisfied Angolans that the Portuguese are poor and illiterate and therefore Africans cannot benefit enough from them! So these humble Portuguese who are willing to be brothers with the Africans must be spurned because they are poor, hard working proletarians and do not live in luxury! The fact that they practice integration sincerely which Negroes in America claim they want so much, makes no difference!

In early July, Portugal, exasperated by the Adoula Government's support of Roberto and his terrorists, severed diplomatic relations. The consequences might be grave for the Congo. Two-third's of Katanga's copper is exported through Angola's and Mozambiques' harbours, Lobito and Beira, because the Congolese railroad to Matadi cannot absorb all the mineral production. The Congo risks economic blockade if the Portuguese decide to close their borders to Congolese copper exports. The Congo plays with fire just because it wants to prove a childish solidarity. Again this African hurry may jeopardize the Congo's economy and Angola's slow but sure progress. No one can deny the tremendous international pressures suffered today by Portugal which is accused of all crimes, of all misdeeds. As one who stayed in the troubled Congo, I am afraid that hurried Africans, Communists and ignorant busy bodies, will turn Angola upside down too, unless the Portuguese fight with all they have. What the natives in Angola need is peace so that they may improve their standard of living and their social and intellectual status. Under such criticism, under military pressure, the Portuguese cannot continue to work for the benefit of the natives. One should not forget that Angola has enough wealth for poor Portuguese and poor natives but that this wealth needs a climate of peace to be useful. There are over a dozen tribes in Angola and their only tie is not skin color, not independence aspirations, not Mr. Roberto; but the Portuguese language which they all speak. This is the real germ for creating an Angolese nation one day.

Let the Portuguese form a strong Angolese nation first through their traditional multiracial policy and then something can be done about it if it seems to lack modernity. There are several fronts interested in the destruction of Portuguese Angola—in fact, like Katanga, it has few friends. There are those who hate the Portuguese because they are true Christians who still take their religion seriously. There are those who want the resources of Angola which are vast, and lastly there is the Bantou drive for power—which like the Nazi drive for power is based solely on race. In this the Bantou and the white South African harbor the same designs. Both are racist. From these several fronts, money pours into coffers of the rebels. And to think that this crew is respectfully heard and helped by many in the free world is an amazing commentary of our times. One can almost see a suicide complex in many democracies. This is surely the age of successful banditry masquerading as “people’s rebellions.”

I personally saw Holden Roberto in Leopoldville and I was not impressed by his political capabilities, or by the gallantry of his 3,000 trained “maquisards.” I have seen the evidences of Roberto’s gallantry in Angola itself on raped women and girls, on pillaged and burned plantations, and mutilated babies. Thousands of Portuguese, but more even of black Africans who preferred the rule of the Portuguese and refused to cooperate with Roberto’s bandits in pillage and rape in March, 1961, were tortured, then slaughtered. Yet this is the leader the American Government permitted to enter and make speeches to rouse sentiment against Portugal! There are those who even accuse the Portuguese of not using a light hand against the terrorists. Should they permit their hard-earned farms to be destroyed and their citizens mutilated without reprisals? They are forced now to spend huge sums on armament which they can ill afford and continue improving economic conditions also.

Africans should clean their own stables before pointing at those belonging to others. But the ease with which they have all won their independence from Europe has given them an arrogance which bodes ill for future progress. For Africans independence

does not mean either freedom or progress, but tribalism, nepotism, autocratic regimes and economic stagnation and eventually economic regression. A solidarity among Africans who cannot yet run their own countries will lead to chaos, to nothing. There are other means, peaceful means, to improve the standards of living of under-developed people. Terror breeds terror and it never ends. There is discrimination all over the world of one kind or another. In Russia and Red China the children of former aristocrats or educated classes are discriminated against. The highly educated nowhere really associate with the most ignorant or give them positions of authority. Therefore one might say there is discrimination of a kind everywhere and has to be for the sake of order. But separatism based on such a superficial difference as skin color should not be tolerated. The Portuguese have succeeded in creating little by little a mixed race of whites and blacks, a mulatto or Multi-race. America has always claimed to be a melting pot of races—and actually has been—but she forcibly and unethically drew the line when it came to the Negro and made miscegenation a crime in 26 states and an undesirable adventure in the rest. The Portuguese alone of the white race has never drawn the color line. Now this great experiment of hers in the heart of Africa where everywhere else the white acted like a lord, is not even mentioned when her "sins" are enumerated by the UN hypocrites. In fact it seems to embarrass them as much as it does the Boers farther south. Racism whatever its color wants no intermixtures for this blurs the line of its propaganda.

If white racism is bad now in America, why is not black racism bad in Africa? If the South Africans are excommunicated by the new UN elite because of Apartheid, why are not the Portuguese praised for its lack? The African *putsch* for power is the answer. But why exchange one intolerance for another which brings with it no gifts of science or mental disciplines as justification?

The Central Congolese Government now helps not only pro-Communist Angolans to raid the borders of a neighboring state who has committed no crimes against the Congo, but allows all sorts of agitators to travel throughout the territory stirring up

trouble and keeping the masses' minds off of work. Katanga, saved by Tshombe from Communist agents for three years, is now freely explored by a rabble of extremists. Messengers of Roberto, Netto, and Andrade now are inciting the Katangans against the Portuguese and against all whites all over the Congo. Arms are easy to obtain by these agitators. When the Tunisian Battalion pulled out of Katanga, they left behind plenty of UN ammunition and guns for anti-Portuguese, anti-white rebels. These have the blessings, too, of Adoula, our erstwhile friend and collaborator.

Those who back the Congolese Government in this irresponsible "African solidarity" movement should be aware of all its potentials. At the end of 1964 when the Americans may stop paying for most of the cost of occupation, the UN will withdraw more of its troops. But they will leave behind thousands of civilians from all nations with all sorts of wild convictions. It is not likely that among these will be any anti-Communists. The Soviet Bloc will use the UN as it has always done for the infiltrating of its men, its spies, who under the guise of teachers and technicians will transform the Congo into a Red bastion. These UN technicians are already better paid than the Belgians though their French is much poorer and their knowledge of the territory is far inferior—but they will get preference.

America which backed the UN occupation of the Congo, and picked up most of the bills, will continue to be used by it as long as America is willing to finance the situation for others to direct. But as soon as America tries to take a stand on any question, she will be scornfully ejected for "tying strings to the situation."

Moscow has understood from the first that UN action there would multiply the confusion, and she will now benefit from it. If Moscow now demands that the UN leave the Congo it is because they know that behind will stay their subversive agents in civilian clothes. It is not for love of the Congolese that Moscow wants unity there and UN departure. It is precisely because the UN has terminated its direct usefulness for international Communism. It now feels it can work faster without it.

CHAPTER XVIII

PROGNOSTICS AND CERTITUDES

It was the wish of the UN to make of the Congo an united country, a nation. Congolese unity however has not been accomplished and it is not for tomorrow either. The country is too big, the problems are too complex, the interests are too narrow minded, too selfish. Former French and British colonies generally could not preserve their unity after independence was granted to them. French Africa has been reduced to fragments, the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland has cracked. In the Congo, the UN intervened, made wars, spent hundreds of millions of dollars and today the organization boasts of the unification of this huge territory, but it is an extremely fragile unity, which will shatter at the first opportunity.

If United Nations troops remain in the Congo, the shaky unity of this former colony may survive awhile with ups and downs. The UN troops are in fact repeating by their presence, the Force Publique which the Belgians created to prevent fratricidal fights, maintain order and thus give the impression of an united country. Alone or in cooperation with the Congolese Army strongly controlled by it, the UN can keep the Central Government in power and prevent provinces and tribes from constant uproars, and quarrels. But for this end, a harsh manner will be necessary, and huge sums.

Economically, as long as the UN controls the Conseil Monétaire and assumes an equitable distribution of the national income

between the 23 provinces, an uneasy peace will continue, but the Congolese will always run short of money. There are too many provincial governments, each one with a dozen ministers, each one with insatiable taste to spend money for themselves. Tribalism and nepotism have to be satisfied and the only way is money. During two years and a half, America alone spent more than 150 million dollars in the Congo to provide for the Central Government's wants. And yet the Central Government budget was not balanced and inflation was going on. There is a hope that some balance in the Congolese budget may be accomplished through Katanga's income, that is by the addition of nearly 40 million dollars annually into the common budget. This amount of money taken to the detriment of Katanga's economy is largely insufficient for the Congo. Tshombe and his advisers were not wrong when they warned that Katanga's money will be a drop in the barrel of the united Congo. The Belgian colonial administration had confined itself to the Congo's revenues to run its administration but in addition a 43 billion francs internal loan was contracted by it in order to implement a ten year-social and economic development plan in this territory between 1950-1960. It is hoped today that the Congolese Monetary Council will replace the former colonial administrator. It is hoped that a score of international experts under UN control will do the same work as Belgians did before the Independence. There is an illusion in this substitute. Belgians were doing whatever they regarded necessary. Africans had nothing to say or almost nothing. Today it is different. The Congolese are independent and a great number of leaders believe that they know everything and have given themselves positions as administrators, and financial and economic experts of all kinds. Many Congolese leaders, therefore, will not always let the Monetary Council act on its own, since the institution is a creation of Independence. If Congolese try to manoeuvre the Monetary Council in an arbitrary manner, financial and economic higgledy-piggledy will result. To believe that Africans will soon be capable of administering the revenues of the Congo fairly or efficiently is to delude onself. Africans in the Congo have no idea what

money means exactly and they have no regard for someone else's money. Africans do not yet know how to administer their own money and frequently confuse the State's money with their own. Embezzlement and misappropriation by high or low rank civil servants and by private clerks is now common. The African in the Congo steals from the State with an astonishing innocence and nonchalance. I remember early in 1963 it was discovered that the Katangese Tele-Communications Department chief had taken from the State coffers \$17,000 dollars naively leaving a receipt, what is called by the French *bon-pour!* Called in by the District Attorney this Minister, knowing why he had been invited, took the money from his pocket and in a dramatic gesture put it on the judge's desk. . . . For him the affair was closed. Another African, the principal bookkeeper at the Main Post Office, was arrested about the same time because \$18,000 dollars (900,000 Francs) were missing. He admitted to the DA that he had indeed taken the money and had bought a house and a car. But he assured the DA with a typical African unconcern that he would reimburse the money in two or three years. Another African who was working for the Court as a secretary, interrogated about missing money, admitted stealing and explained his action in this way: —"You see Mr. District Attorney, when we Africans manipulate money we do like the European housewife when she makes preserves. She gets dirty and she licks her fingers. So do us Africans. Part of the money we deal with sticks to our finger, like the preserve. . . ." What this African who had some education, by the way, meant was that the temptation of an African to steal is so great that he is incapable of being honest.

These few examples show the difficulties, the insurmountable difficulties, of an administration entrusted to Africans in an united, federal or confederal Congo. As long as this habit of stealing is not extirpated, nothing else can be done. And what authority will attempt this re-educational effort? The UN? America? Belgians? No nation has any authority over Africans now that they are independent.

The Soviet Union asked for the immediate departure of the

UN troops soon after integration of the Congo, under the pretext that the mission was accomplished. If the UN troops are withdrawn, what authority will maintain the uneasy order? The UN will leave behind technicians and many civilians but this is all. If the UN withdrawal coincides with the creation of a strong, well controlled Central Government with a loyal, disciplined Army and Police, the situation in the Congo would improve greatly and tribal fightings may be prevented. But it is very hard to see a well trained, disciplined, impartial National Army and Police in the near future. It is impossible to root out in a few years the tribal instinct of the African, and fights will continue, here and there, in the bush or in town.

After the integration of Katanga, the US Government sent to the Congo a commission headed by Mr. Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State, to study the best methods to be used for the maintenance of social and economic order in this troubled area. According to Mr. Cleveland's report, the United States is favorable to a rapid withdrawal of UN Forces from the Congo providing that internal security will not be jeopardized by it. It will be necessary therefore to have an efficient National Congolese Army.

The second main point of the report is concerned with the Congo's economy. It states that during the next twelve months aid of 175 million dollars is essential to the Congo and America expects from Great Britain, West Germany and France participation in this financial assistance since Belgium is already aiding its former colony. This report deals with the two crucial problems of the Congo.

As far as solutions are concerned, the report is rather vague. America is in the wrong if she believes that substantial economic aid can fix everything in the Congo. It is the African's habits which must be reformed.

After the integration of Katanga, fratricidal fights slackened off a while because of the UN troops' presence. But tribalism was simply lying low waiting to see the trend of events. Elsewhere in the Congo, where there were few UN troops, such as in Kasai and Kivu, bloody fights flourished. In March 1963, in the diamond

region of Kasai, fierce fighting took place between the regime backed by the Central Government and the tribe of Albert Kalondji. Kalondji had once proclaimed himself "King" of this district and seceded! Now the Adoula Government has Kalondji in jail, or he may be dead, but his people continue to rebel. Some natives wanted to divide this province, others denied the authority of the Central Government completely.

The cruelty on both sides can be illustrated by the amount of casualties and refugees. The UN itself spoke at the time of more than 400 killed but missionaries living in that area have estimated nearly 3,000 losses. Recently, in South Kasai, UN Liberian units had to fight against tribesmen who were armed only with bows and arrows. 100,000 Africans, men, women and children, hid in the bush to escape hostilities. Most were fed by Catholic and Protestant missions. Cannibalism was said to be widespread.

The UN results in Katanga, up to the middle of 1963, are the following:

- Increased nationalism among the Katangans.
- Wider breach between Leopoldville and Katanga.
- Greater confusion, anxiety.
- Physical and spiritual destruction resulting in economic ruin.
- A desire for vindication by the Katangans.
- Increased hatred of whites, especially of Americans.
- Hatred of Americans by whites as well as blacks.

In the rest of the Congo the UN does not enjoy great popularity either.

Following its awkward, and insincere action in Katanga, the UN became a "*mal nécessaire*." If its troops withdraw now, it is a disaster. Since withdrawal seems certain in a year or so, we shall analyze this alternative. Katanga with or without Tshombe will again attempt to separate from the Congo. If Tshombe is replaced by any other Katangan leader who is in the Central Government's "grace," he will do exactly what Tshombe did: secede. Once he feels himself and his Katangans strong enough and once he considers the Central Government and its Army weak, he will expel from the territory any foreign influence and authority. Of course,

this intention may be discouraged by a strong and loyal Congolese Army ready to die in Katanga for the sake of the Central Government. It is rather difficult to believe that the ANC will have such ideals and such courage.

Another possibility is to see Katanga intervening through Conakat and prominent Balubakat leaders, in the Central Government. If Tshombe and other Katangans become influential in Leopoldville, they may forget the secession of their province, and struggle for the Congolese unity. But even if Katangans succeed in entering the Central Government through the front door, it is doubtful that other leaders from Leopoldville or other parts of the Congo will cooperate with them. At any rate, the Central Government will always need a strong and efficient Army capable of preventing attempts at secession.

THE UNITED STATES AND ITS CHANCES IN THE CONGO

America seems for the time being determined to keep the Congo out of the Communist's range. The Belgian Government does not oppose America's action and cooperation between the two is promising. It is undeniable that without the Belgian's cooperation, Americans cannot hope to act efficiently in this former colony. Anyhow, after the UN departure, America will probably increase its intervention and we are certainly capable of reorganizing the economy of the Congo to some extent. There remains however a doubt about our chances of preventing tribalism and social troubles in order to counterfight any Communist attempt of penetration. The Congo needs money but even more it depends on a military and police force. The Congo is a huge territory and it is not enough to maintain peace in towns. Order must reign inside the country, in remote areas, in villages and in what is called the bush. But is America ready to send its soldiers, and especially to adopt a harsh method if it is necessary, as the Belgians did when they faced trouble? America is a democracy. Belgium is too and that is precisely why it has lost the Congo.

Because of humanitarian principles and repugnancy in using force, both countries and the whole of Western Europe are incapable of maintaining their domination or influence in former or present colonies. And let us face the truth. Force is necessary in these unprepared new countries as the respect for force seems to be the base of any constructive action. The American soldier will go to the Congo if he is sent and will protect towns, mining installations, urban centers, but it is hard to believe that he may enter the remote villages in order to maintain peace or to force the African to work his land and to come to work. The Congo today faces economic crisis because Africans do not work, tax collection is stopped, indigenous resources and agricultural produce are non-existent. The new Congolese budget is about 400 million dollars, five-eighths to be paid for by the country, the rest supplied by foreign aid, by Belgium, America, etc. It is doubtful that the Congo can collect roughly 250 million dollars from the country itself. Katangese copper and the Kasai Diamond mines are of course a substantial source of tax revenue although the smuggling is tremendous and it has not been stopped. An official of the Diamond Company of Kasai, the Mibeka, told me it is estimated that more than 35 million dollars in diamonds has been smuggled out of the Congo, stolen by Africans who cannot be controlled. In Kivu province, coffee plantations have not yet started full production because peace has not been entirely restored and because Africans are reluctant to work. The cost of living rises every day and Africans already idle do not have any interest in working for nothing, as they say, and they are right. Before independence their modest wages had permitted them to eat and have a decent life. Now the African who makes, for instance, 3,500 francs monthly has to pay 1,000 francs for a sack of manioc flour. Fish, meat, rice, everything soared to tremendous prices in relation to the Congolese salaries. While cost of living rose ten times, wages have been increased two and three times. And the discrepancy between the high cost of living and salaries is daily enlarged. One cannot insist enough on the work problem in the Congo and the question is who will force the Africans

to work? Unemployment has increased, urban centers are overpopulated and from such situations only strikes and troubles may result. America offered to supply part of the Congolese budget but this is not enough as the Congolese will need more and more, unless reforms are instituted to make the Congo rely on indigenous resources. By the end of July 1963, Adoula, facing inextricable budgetary problems, again begged Belgium to help the Congo. But how can Belgians invest money again when former Congolese debts have not been reimbursed by the Central Government? 43 billion francs are still in dispute and Belgians who loaned this money have not been repaid. In addition, Belgians are tired of making sacrifices for their former colony after they were treated like "criminals," criticized and accused by all and especially by the Congolese themselves. The Central Government severed diplomatic relations with Belgium after independence and such an insult cannot be easily forgotten. In Katanga, even Tshombe has now turned his back on the Belgians, looking to French assistance and advisors instead. It was another blow to the Belgians and their desire to help the Congolese. Belgians are not eager to make new investments and a country cannot progress without investments. Here America can intervene, but how generous, how kind may America be to invest money in a country where there are no guarantees of reimbursement or even gratefulness. Where the unions are already clammering for "nationalism of all industry." Racial discrimination in America has been exaggerated by enemies, the Communists, and Africans believe anything that is said to them in this respect. I wonder why we Americans do not send more Negroes to Africa who are the best people to destroy the Communist propaganda by proving their education and the high standard of living which they enjoy in America, this so-much criticized country. Africans will have the opportunity to see that the minority in America enjoys a life which is a hundred times better than theirs and that of many Europeans.

One can easily see that America's chances in the Congo, due to its Christian, democratic principles, its reluctance to use force and to its bad image as a land of segregationists, racists, etc., are

not very good. On the contrary, the Soviet Bloc with its contempt for democratic methods, with its terrorist system has much more chance than we have to dominate Africans. Unfortunately these underdeveloped countries respect force and the Soviet Union is ready to display its force any time. Communists do not use half-measures; they have no scruples, no pity. Moscow will act in the Congo, first through propaganda against whites, against what they call "neo-colonialism." All miseries the Congo suffers and will suffer will be blamed on the Europeans and Americans. All Communist radio stations, from Ghana to Egypt, from Moscow to Peking, are busy trying to ruin Free World prestige in Africa and to incite Africans against whites. Russians are also whites but for the present they forget their color for their power-drunk irresponsible goals of domination. That the Russians are whites is as yet un-noted by most Africans who seem to be color blind here. The Red Chinese recently let this cat out of the bag in its bid to seize control of the Communist world. Communists will use African quislings and African Communists while they remain concealed, pulling the strings. Sooner or later Communists will start to use clandestine radio stations in African territory itself. Such a radio run by several African Communists led by Russians may do terrific damage to the already shaky cooperation between Congolese and Belgians and other whites. Little by little these Communist clandestine stations will be backed by clandestine subversive organizations which will spread terror and trouble, incite tribalism, and stir Africans against whites and against each other when profitable. As I said, Soviet Russia will use African agitators and will keep the real *meneurs* in the dark. They will try to give the impression that the agitation movement is genuinely African and local. That is their most perfected technique.

Belgians pretend that the Communist doctrine will never have an impact on the African individual who likes his freedom and his independence. Of course the average African cannot assimilate the complicated Communist doctrine and the Soviet leaders will refrain from exposing it. They will simplify it and preach only

easily understandable ideas to attract the naive. It will be the old sermon for equality, against exploitation, against the rich, against everything that may be disliked by any individual who is born dissatisfied. Most human beings are born dissatisfied and are ready to blame their own failures of laziness and mismanagement on others. Communists in Africa do not need to get involved in dialectics, they will use blunt methods, in the organization of terror, of the police, spying and sneaking and thus control the masses. By terrorism and corruption, Communists can easily create a new ruling class and a loyal police force, and from then on anything will be possible in Africa. The African has already accepted the will of the community, of the tribe. The respect for force and the "clanique" mentality will facilitate Communism. The Communists will create their Party organization on a tribal basis first with members tied as they are now to tribal leaders. Later on, they will establish a cooperation at the summit, between tribal leaders. Within the tribe the Communists will have a terrorist police force and a well paid corps and can hope to do in the Congo, *la pluie et le beau temps*, in other words to do whatever they want to.

The ground is prepared for Communist agitation and penetration. Congo devaluation continues. Unemployment, misery, and impoverishment of the mass, increases.

In order to hinder Communist agitation and penetration, America and Western Europe must concentrate on the suppression of devaluation and its inherent consequence, the pauperism of the mass. There are two solutions, both difficult to apply. First, Africans should be compelled to work and to work at least eight hours per day. During the colonial era, the Congolese farmer worked the equivalent of four hours in the morning. In the towns it was impossible to keep them working eight hours since half of the time they loafed, slept, or talked. A nation which does not work will always live in misery. The second solution is to put a stop to devaluation as soon as possible. To this end, huge credits are necessary in order to fill up the market with products and

give people confidence in the money they make. But I am afraid that Africans in the Congo have already been spoiled by American largesse and will want to go on enjoying the life of parasites, expecting everything from rich, charitable people while giving nothing in return.

IF THE WESTERN WORLD HAD BACKED KATANGA'S INDEPENDENCE

Assuming that the West had recognized the secession of Katanga, they could not refuse the same to other Congolese provinces aiming for autonomy and self-determination. By diplomatic and political manoeuvres, the West certainly could have persuaded a number of African countries to also recognize the Independent State of Katanga. This courageous action of course required the West's determination to oppose by all means the interference by the Soviet Bloc in Congolese internal affairs. Such a task was rendered difficult by the quick arrival of the UN in the Congo and by the fact that its majority sided with Moscow, which of course was against Katanga's independence as a pro-Western State. The UN through Soviet Bloc pressure would have brought the cold war to the Congo had the West pushed too far in its support to Katanga.

Supposing that the West could have prevented Soviet influence in the UN and in the Congo, it might have been possible for us to persuade the Central Congolese Government to forget about the Katangese secession and to oppose other attempts of secession by other provinces on the grounds of unfeasible, unrealistic claims such as: poverty, geographical or ethnical requirements.

Tshombe offered in Tananarive in March 1961 a Confederation of six Congolese provinces. Katanga was maintaining economic ties with the rest of the Congo through a sort of common market. The confederalist idea of Tshombe was of course vague since it gave to the Central Government prerogatives in foreign and external affairs. Tshombe wanted a complete internal autonomy

for Katanga while he would give up all rights in the field of international relations. This system seemed to me impracticable since it is difficult for one to be master of his own house while obeying orders from the outside. There are always obstacles in being independent and at the same time dependent on outside obligations, unless between the Central Government and Tshombe no political difference prevailed. It seems to me that what Tshombe wanted was an economic independence, to keep Katanga's resources in Katanga for Kantangans and later on to attempt political autonomy, a total independence.

Had Katanga succeeded in being recognized as an Independent State by the West and finally by the World community, economically the country would have been only half viable. Katanga, because of its mines, can provide for its population's needs. But geographically Katanga is encircled in the heart of Africa and therefore has no exit to the sea. To live Katanga must sell its minerals, its copper, and export them. Katanga exports its mineral wealth by using neighboring countries' railroads, such as the Angolan Benguela Railroad, Northern Rhodesian railroad, and Mozambique railroad. Of course there is the Congolese railroad but incapable for the time being of absorbing all of Katanga's minerals and bringing them to the harbour of Matadi. To sell its copper, to carry it out to harbours, Katanga must live on good terms with Northern Rhodesia, Angola, and the rest of the Congo. If for one reason or another Katanga's neighbors want to strangle Tshombe's country they can do it. It is therefore certain that Katanga, while an independent State, would have been dependent on its neighbors. It is precisely why the Belgians and Tshombe himself envisioned creating a Federation with Rhodesia and Tanganyika. If Katanga's neighboring states sided with the Soviet Bloc, Katanga would be finished or would have to offer an immediate alliance with the Central Congolese Government in order to use Matadi harbour.

Indeed, the greatest obstacle to future peace in Africa is its arbitrary boundaries. The present borders were drawn for the convenience of a vanished power bloc which had the force to

maintain them. The Africans jealousy guard their colonial patterns blaming the remaining whites in Africa for what is the fault of the past in general. America completely ignored the need for border readjustments in Africa before new states were definitely formed. Some effort at this could have been made painlessly if America had not pressured the Europeans to leave so quickly.

CHAPTER XIX

CONCLUSIONS

One cannot refrain from the temptation, after analyzing the realities in a country such as the Congo, of summing up his conclusions. Let us take a look on what we regarded as certitudes of the Congo's future.

— With the presence or in the absence of the UN, Communist agitation will become stronger in the Congo, anticipating a real penetration. Ringleaders educated behind the Iron Curtain and in other Communist countries will come back to the Congo, overtly or clandestinely, in order to increase dissatisfaction and arouse Africans against Western Europeans and Americans.

— Economic insecurity will persist for many years to come in spite of external help in credits. The Congo has a long road to travel before it reaches economic and political stability. Business of all kind will wallow in stagnation as insecurity for whites and Africans will not be easy to dispel.

— The African's poverty will increase because devaluation can hardly be stopped quickly.

— More Europeans tired of insecurity and sacrifices will desert the Congo.

— Politically, the Congo, as most other newly independent African countries, will pass for years through the dictatorial phases of governing. Tribalism will taint politics and various dictators will favor various factions to the detriment of others.

— Socially the Congo will pass through the "bourgeoisie" stage,

so to speak. This bourgeoisie, the ruling class, already exists and will dominate the mass in the political, economic and social spheres and for its own benefit. This will be beneficial to the whole country if it becomes a real bourgeoisie in an expanding economy; but if it remains only an "elite" as in Haiti and most Latin American countries, it will be detrimental.

As far as solutions to be found to create a stable, peaceful, democratic and modern Congo, in my opinion there are none without the Belgians' help. Nothing constructive, thorough, and valid can be attempted without whites and chiefly without the Belgians who know the country, who love it and to whom Africans are accustomed. If in the Congo Belgians are indispensable, so are the Portuguese in Angola, the British in the Rhodesias, the French in their former colonies. It is useless to imagine that Belgians in the Congo can be replaced by other whites, now. It is an illusion. Africa has been compartmentalized and each area has its own characteristic, its own people. The colonization era for Europeans is only apparently terminated. While no European country is capable of supplying massive immigrants to underdeveloped countries and regions, these cannot do without Europeans. Russians are incapable of colonizing in the sense of civilizing, but they can attempt ruthless occupation and exploitation. At any rate, one cannot insist more on the essential cooperation between whites and blacks.

The solutions I list below may appear utopian and they will certainly shock various people. But in the African countries, independence is only a label since it does not always mean freedom, equality and work. Countries without political maturity, without educated people and leaders, without a precise ideal cannot expect anything but spectacular, unusual solutions. Independence, to the African, was the way to live like the white but without having the same obligations, responsibilities and qualities of workmanship.

Economics and finances should be entrusted to European civil servants doubled by Africans as apprentices. Severe punishment should be enforced for stealing, robberies, disobedience and tri-

balism or political agitation. Without severe law, without enforced justice the African will continue to be dishonest and irresponsible.

African chiefs, traditional or administrative should constantly repeat to their brothers the necessity of a complete and sincere cooperation with European civil servants, officers, etc. These leaders should explain to the mass that it is not practical to emphasize politics when the economy comes first and is the basis of the other. Of course the mass should be assured of freedom, liberties, right to work, satisfactory wages and a peaceful life within the law through full obedience to the law.

It is obvious that such a mixed administration should use African and white civil servants carefully selected among the most honest, most capable, most responsible.

At last, the Africans in the Congo should pass through the "paysannat" phase (the farmer class) and slowly be prepared for the industrial stage in order to become technicians, doctors, engineers, and skilled workers. Agriculture, now after independence, is non-existent in the Congo. The African does not like manual work. He liked to fish and to hunt but not hard routine work. After Independence, the Congolese understands even less the necessity or the pleasure of working with his hands. The African has a definite tendency for easy work, which in his mind, is that of clerk, or civil servant. The Congo's economy will be sane again only when agriculture flourishes and products come from the African peasants' hands. That day, importation of essential food will be superfluous and the State will save substantial amounts of money and even make money through exports as in the past.

The fact is that the new nations shouting the loudest about neo-colonialism have at the moment more whites working in them than never. But to conceal this they are called "technicians." Perhaps making anti-white speeches at the UN saves their pride and it may be that it convinces the world that they are really running their own affairs. The white advisers in Africa now have responsibility but no authority and this makes everything less

efficient than before. Also they must constantly stand by and say nothing when they are insulted.

We hear much also about African unity. This is an attempt to hide the greatest weakness of this continent which is tribalism. Even those who would end tribalism in their lands do not envision unity as embracing all mankind. Solidarity among Africans is merely a means to get rid of whites and is not a philosophy of human cooperation and oneness. As Hitler discovered hatred of outsiders can be a racially unifying force. The only flaw in it is that it must eventually fail due to the interdependence of humanity.

It is out of Christian understanding and love that I enunciate my often severe opinions towards Africans and other people involved in the Congo imbroglio. I have called it a circus because it has been a spectacle of blunders by all concerned. At a distance it even has hilarious aspects. I beg for understanding from the reader of my sincerity and severity of criticism.

CHAPTER XX

POSTSCRIPT

In stressing the need for Africans to visualize a larger sense of justice which would include not only tribal enemies, but people of other colors and cultures, I have perhaps neglected to emphasize that the weakness of the American is now in the other direction. In attempting to force unity and equality everywhere outside of the United States, the American has lost sight of the legitimate differences among people. This kept America from understanding the diversity of the Congolese tribes. It would have been better there to unite several tribes in each province in the beginning. In Katanga, this was being done under Tshombe, and the white European was a kind of cement to bind them together in a single project. In the brutal attempt to enforce complete unity, America has reignited the fires of tribalism so that there are now 23 warring sections to satisfy rather than six. Gradualism which has become a bad word among liberals, is often the quickest road to change.

It is sad to note that the Congo operation has apparently taught no one anything. At the opening of the 18th Assembly of the United Nations, delegate after delegate has arisen to congratulate U Thant on his strong stand in Katanga. Instead of criticizing the mistakes made by the UN there and its very dubious success, they have accepted as right the military suppression of a desire for independence. Nothing in the future which gets in the way of this new juggernaut is liable to be tolerated. In the same

breath in which they cry down "colonialism," the new nations express joy at the defeat of Katanga. But the same delegates drop words of admiration at Sukarno's seizure of West New Guinea although the natives there have nothing in common with Indonesians and begged for the right to vote on the matter. India's grab of Goa also fills them with satisfaction. There is no mention of the Red conquest of Tibet, and an obvious embarrassment over Communist China's aggression in India and quarrel with Soviet Russia. These subjects are nimbly avoided in a saddening display of hypocrisy.

Some day, humanity will look back upon Katanga and its circus of ring masters, acrobats and clowns as the training ground for a new world master whose primary duty will be the subjugation of the West. There is but one hope. It is very possible that highly developed industrial states function best under democracy. The softening of Russia may be due to the fact that industrialism has advanced far enough there to demand more responsibility and social justice from its leaders. Perhaps in the very functioning of industrialism a need for democracy is created and will somehow emerge.

On the otherhand, Communism in operation reveals a constantly ballooning inefficiency. Theoretically, Communism can be made to appear better than Capitalism. Wherever it has erred it has been laid to its youth. The sins of Capitalism, made in its youth, however are not forgiven. For this reason, Communism has outshone free enterprise in propaganda. In operation the results are lamentable. The lack of incentive and initiative under Communism make an enormous amount of paper work necessary because it takes two workers for every act committed: one to work and one to watch the worker. This slows down the whole process of production. There is no way out.

Some recent events pin-pointing Communism in Africa bring the first light of hope there: for after all the Africans are a practical people. They believe what they see unlike the more erudite, bookish Far East and West.

During the last of November 1963, Adoula's security men

caught two members of the Russian Embassy returning from Brazzaville, across the Congo river from Leopoldville, with their briefcases full of counterfeit Congolese francs. Documents on the Russians proved that they were to be used to undermine the already shaky financial situation of Adoula's government. The Congo Premier who had invited all of the Communist Bloc back to his country—after they had been kicked out under nearly similar circumstances two years before by General Mobutu—immediately expelled the Russians again. This leaves Adoula now depending entirely upon the Belgians and Americans for money and support.

The end of another of the acts in the Katanga circus seems near. The documents found on the Russians show that they were working with Christophe Gbenye whose headquarters are now in Brazzaville. Gbenye, another Lumumba heir, is now chief of former Army Colonel Alphonse Pakassa, who commanded the Congo troops both at the time of the massacre of the thirteen Italian airmen in Kindu and at that of the massacre of the twenty-one Catholic priests in Kongolo. On December 9, 1963, this same Pakassa, travelling now under another name, was recognized and searched at the Paris Orly airport. His papers showed that he was on the way to deliver a secret message from Gbenye to Ben Bella in Algeria. Now the plot clears as we put the pieces together: Ben Bella, a Red Moslem, is financing and arming the Angolan terrorists, and his agents lead the UN attacks on Portugal (a Catholic Christian nation). Gbenye and Moscow are flooding the Congo with counterfeit francs. Gbenye, Gizenga and Pakassa sought to terrorize Northern Katanga with their horrible deeds and succeeded—for no one has been punished for these crimes against humanity and the territory was handed over to their henchmen when Tshombe's army was driven out by the UN, with American help. So we have the U.S. State Department unwittingly aiding the Moslem-atheist-Communist take-over of Central Africa—which will include both the ex-French and ex-Belgian Congo, as well as Portuguese Africa. This is the heartland of the continent from where they will be able to control all of Africa.

On December 2, 1963, Sékou Touré, President of Guinea, who from the start placed his country in the Red Orbit, and had received in the past five years countless missions from Red China and Russia to teach his people how to succeed by collectivist methods, regretfully stated that Guinea must return to free enterprise to escape economic ruin. The result of State-controlled industry has been, he said: "Anarchic, chaotic and humiliating."

On December 10, Captain Henrique Galvao who pirated a Portuguese luxury liner in 1961, was permitted to enter the United States to appear before the United Nations, to tell the Trusteeship Committee how to destroy Portuguese control in its overseas territory. Unexpectedly, Galvao lashed out at the terrorist leaders who foment massacres on the borders of Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea, saying that they did not represent the people who had no hand in selecting them. He also stated that people under Portuguese rule did not want revolution! It was a bitter blow to the Afro-Asian Bloc who had persuaded the United States to overlook Galvao's past so that he could build a fire under Portugal to make it hand over its possessions to self-appointed revolutionists.

Only a satirist could do justice to the duplicity of the enemy at any given moment. Solemnly they proffer the West peace with one hand while they adroitly machine-gun our friends and fellow Christians with the other. One thing they never do is lose sight of their objective which is to isolate and disarm the United States.

Given a chance, free enterprise could always win over a slave system but an inherent caution in the mercantile psychology makes our leaders seek to please and placate their critics rather than to conquer them. So the battle lines are drawn between an inferior system having daring, astute leaders and a timidly-led superior way of life. The world is thus in for a long period of travail.

THE END